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STATEMEUT OF ISSOBS PRESENTED OH APPEAL 
I 
1. Was the trial court correct in upholding a contract 
entered between Elsie Brinkerhoff and her two sons, Cloyd and 
Mark, in 1966? < 
2. Was there any indication that Elsie Brinkerhoff complied 
with the terms of the contract or the law in giving notice of 
default of the 1966 contract or her intent to discover the same? < 
3. Did Elsie Brinkerhoff allow her two sons or their 
successors in interest any period of time to cure any alleged 
default under the 1966 contract? \ 
4. Is there any indication that the parties to the 1966 
contract intended to abandon the same and treat all contractual 
rights and obligations as a nullity having no effect whatsoever? i 
5. Has the trial court operated within the bounds of equity 
in reaching a conclusion that the 1966 contract should remain in 
full force and effect in accordance with the current desires of ( 
the parties thereto? 
6. Did Elsie Brinkerhoff waive strict compliance with the 
terms of the 1966 contract relating to Plaintiffs1 payment i 
obligations? 
7. Was the trial court1 s determination that Elsie 
Brinkerhoff was incompetent as to legal affairs from about 1970 a I 
matter lying outside the court's competence so as to constitute 
reversible error? 
8. Was the trial court operating within the bounds of law i 
and equity when assuming the responsibility of protecting the 
interests of Elsie Brinkerhoff during the trial? 
9. Absent any finding of incompetence, is the fact that 
Elsie Brinkerhoff failed to understand the nature of deeds 
executed transferring title after 1970, sufficient to invalidate 
such deeds? 
10. Is the "perfect tender" rule appropriate to this case? 
11. The trial court specifically found that all contracts 
entered by Elsie Brinkerhoff following 1970 were the result of 
undue influence. Absent all other findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, is this finding sufficient on its own to 
support the trial court's holding? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On June 21, 1982, Respondent Mont R. Anderson, Personal 
Representative of the Estate of Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff filed suit on 
the Sixth Judicial District Court in and for Kane County, Civil 
No. 1826, seeking to clarify title to property located in Kane 
County, Utah. (R.l) 
On July 16, 1982, Appellants along with Charles A. 
Brinkerhoff, Betty B. Esplin, and Darlos T. Brinkerhoff answered 
Respondent Anderson's Complaint. (R.16) By the same instrument, 
these parties counterclaimed against Respondent Anderson and 
crossclaimed against fellow defendant Mark J. Brinkerhoff. On 
September 7, 1982, an Amended Counterclaim and Crossclaim was 
filed. (R.65) 
On September 13, 1982, a Notice of Dismissal as to Defendants 
Charles Brinkerhoff and Betty B. Esplin was filed (R.74) followed 
by the filing of a Withdrawal of Attorney for the same parties on 
December 6, 1982. (R.78) 
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On February 22, 1983, a Second Amended Counterclaim and 
Crossclaim was filed on behalf of all remaining defendants against 
co-defendant Mark J. Brinkerhoff. (R.88) 
On September 23, 1983, a Motion to Withdraw as Attorney for 
Elsie Brinkerhoff was filed by Appellants' attorney Hans. Q. 
Chamberlain, at the request of Elsie Brinkerhoff. (R.334, Exhibit 
P-ll) 
Mark J. Brinkerhoff answered Appellants1 Second Amended 
Counterclaim and Crossclaims on September 27, 1983. (R. 341). By 
order of the Court, dated December 2, 1983, Respondent Anderson 
was allowed to file a Second Amended Complaint with substitution 
of parties whereby defendant Mark J. Brinkerhoff and heretofore 
unnamed party Lena Brinkerhoff were made Plaintiffs in the action. 
(R.350 and R. 351) < 
On September 13, 1984, Plaintiffs placed on file a Notice to 
Appoint Counsel directed to Elsie Brinkerhoff (R.388) and on 
October 1, 1984, all remaining co-defendants, through Hans Q. < 
Chamberlain, who previously represented Elsie Brinkerhoff, filed a 
Crossclaim against Elsie Brinkerhoff. On this same date 
co-defendants filed a Notice to Appoint Successor Attorney, also i 
directed to Elsie Brinkerhoff. (R.400) 
By stipulation recorded September 11, 1984, Elsie Brinkerhoff 
stated that she recognized the original contract as still in force < 
and that her actions in attempting to convey property covered 
thereby at a subsequent date were repudiated. (R.403) 
On February 19, 1985, Elsie Brinkerhoff, acting through < 
attorney Willard R. Bishop, answered the Crossclaim which had been 
filed against her. (R. 421) 
On February 21, 1985, a Pretrial Order was recorded and 
signed by Willard R. Bishop on behalf of Plaintiffs and Defendant 
Elsie Brinkerhoff and by Hans Q. Chamberlain on behalf of 
Defendants Adair, Goulding and Warren Brinkerhoff. (R.428) 
The case was tried before the Honorable Judge Don V. Tibbsf 
sitting without jury on February 22, 1985f and a Transcript of the 
proceedings was obtained. On February 20, 1986, the trial court 
entered its First Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
(R.629) as well as its First Amended Judgment and Decree Quieting 
Title (R.652) on behalf of Plaintiffs upholding the 1966 contract 
and requiring Plaintiffs to make up past due payments with 
interest. The First Amended Judgment also voided all documents 
signed by Elsie Brinkerhoff from 1970 forward, declaring all such 
documents the result of undue influence, among other things. 
mtmmoxMWti 
P l a i n t i f f , Mont R. Anderson, i s the personal representat ive 
of the e s t a t e of Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff, a l so known as "Tine" 
Brinkerhoff. He i s the son-in-law of P l a i n t i f f Lena Brinkerhoff. 
Lena Brinkerhoff was married to Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff at the time 
of h i s death in October of 1979• Mark J. Brinkerhoff i s the son 
of E l s i e Brinkerhoff and the brother- in- law of Lena Brinkerhoff. 
E l s i e Brinkerhoff i s the Mother of Mark Brinkerhoff, Cloyd 
Brinkerhoff, Golda B. Adair, Warren ("link") Brinkerhoff, Arlene 
B. Goulding, Charles Brinkerhoff and Betty B. Esplin. 
The real property which i s the subject of t h i s act ion 
c o n s i s t s of 1,956.17 acres of grazing ground and 18.01 acres of 
farm land. The property i s located north and eas t of Glendale, 
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Kane County, Utah. All of the subject property passed through the 
e s t a t e of Merle Brinkerhoff to E l s i e Brinkerhoff upon Merle's 
death. The Brinkerhoff property a lso c o n s i s t s of some water 
r igh t s in the Arizona S t r i p area and addit ional grazing and water 
r i g h t s . 
For . sometime fo l lowing the i r f a t h e r ' s death Cloyd and Mark 
had been taking care of the property and the l i v e s t o c k loca ted 
thereon. (Tr. 67) During t h i s period i t became apparent that 
E l s i e ' s other chi ldren were not in t ere s t ed in the farming and 
ranching opportuni t i es present by the land and an agreement to 
s e l l the land was e s tab l i shed whereby Cloyd and Mark agreed to 
purchase the land from the i r mother. In 1966, t h i s agreement was 
formalized by a contract prepared by Ken Chamberlain, Attorney at 
Law, who resided in Richf ie ld , Utah. (Exhibit P - l , P-2) < 
The contract provided that Cloyd and Mark, as buyers, were to 
pay $53,388.00 as considerat ion for the purchase of the real 
property which i s the subject of t h i s a c t i o n . The terms of < 
payment were out l ined as fo l l ows : (1) Mark and Cloyd were to pay 
E l s i e $2,000 each year for the rest of her l i f e r e t r o a c t i v e to 
November 1 , 1964; (2) rece ipt of payments for 1964 and 1965 was \ 
acknowledged; (3) a l l i n t e r e s t on the principal balance was waived 
in cons iderat ion for the agreement to pay the year ly instal lment 
with E l s i e ' s death regardless of the t o t a l amount paid; and (4) i f < 
the t o t a l rec i ted principal was not paid prior to E l s i e ' s death, 
two-sevenths of the remaining portion was to be paid in annual 
ins ta l lments divided equally between Warren and Charley i 
Brinkerhoff. The contract a l so provided for the establishment of 
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< 
an escrow along with ins truct ions pert inent thereto . (Exhibits 
P- l , P-2) 
The defaul t provis ions of the contract are part icu lar ly 
important. These provis ions give Els ie the option to demand a 
redel ivery to her of a l l escrowed documents in the event of 
defaul t in the payment of principal and i n t e r e s t or any other term 
fol lowing a 30-day remedy period. All de fau l t s other than 
payments of principal and i n t e r e s t required s p e c i f i c not i ce to 
commence the 30-day period. Once the demand was made for 
redel ivery of escrowed documentsf Mark and Cloyd would be required 
to peaceably surrender the premises, allowing E l s i e to re-enter 
without further process . (Exhibits P - l , P-2) 
Prom the time the contract was executed i t was treated 
primarily as a formality by a l l p a r t i e s . Prior to the s igning of 
the agreement Mark and Cloyd had been in possess ion of the land 
and were taking care of the i r mother fs needs. (Tr. 67) This same 
pattern of behavior continued fol lowing execution of the wri t ten 
document. The prec ise terms of the contract were never f u l l y 
fol lowed. All documents were not placed in escrow and payments 
were made to E l s i e in a manner other than that s p e c i f i c a l l y 
out l ined . (Tr. 68-69) Such payments were made by paying E l s i e ' s 
b i l l s , g iv ing her money d i r e c t l y or by deposi t ing money d i r e c t l y 
into her checking account rather than into escrow. (Exhibit D-22) 
All these procedures were acceptable to E l s i e . (TR 303:4-25; 
304:1-14; 327:8-13; 328:1-25; 337:1-18; 349:12-19; 367:12-25; 
411-412) 
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The trial court reached a conclusion that some of the 
payments made to Elsie in the above described manner constituted 
payments on the contract while others were in the nature of gifts 
and support which sons would normally provide to their widowed 
mother. (Tr. 536, P of P 9 and 10) Though actual payments were 
determined to be less than required under the terms of the 
contract, the court specifically found that at no time did Elsie 
ever declare herself dissatisfied with the performance, nor did 
she declare the contract in default or attempt to terminate the 
contract. (R. 537, F of P 11) The court specifically found that 
the 1966 contract was still in force, despite some delinquencies ( 
in payment. 
Beginning in about 1971, Elsie Brinkerhoff executed a number 
of documents bearing on this case. In 1971, Elsie signed an { 
affidavit declaring her intention to defend the rights of 
ownership to the subject property in Mark and Cloyd. (Exhibit 
P-3) In 1977, a receipt for $23,000 was signed by Elsie < 
recognizing payments received from Mark and Cloyd in the contract. 
(Exhibit P-4) Elsie continued to recognize the receipt of that 
amount up to and including the time of trial, and was satisfied < 
with how things were handled. (TR 303:4-25; 304:1-14; 327:8-13; 
328; 327:10-18; 349:12-19; 367:12-25; 411-412; 338:21-25; 339) 
In 197 9, a joint tenancy deed was prepared by Brad Adair i 
(Elsie's grandson and a son to Defendant Golda Adair) and signed 
by Elsie Brinkerhoff. (TR. 439) The deed purportedly transferred 
title from Elsie to Elsie, Cloyd and Mark as joint tenants with < 
full rights of survivorship. (Exhibit D-5) The deed did not 
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conform to the contract, was not properly notarized, and was never 
delivered or accepted. (TR 76-79, 440) The origin of this deed 
has not been clearly established. Brad Adair's "evidence" 
concerning origin was not allowed. (TR 436:17-23; 438:22-25; 
439:1-9) Neither Elsie nor Mark have any recollection whatsoever 
of the deed's inception or the events attending its execution. 
(TR. 73, 295-307) 
In 1979 Cloyd Brinkerhoff died and his property passed into 
his estate which is being administrated by Mont R. Anderson. Mr. 
Anderson filed the original Complaint seeking to clarify the 
ownership of the real estate in question. (Exhibit P-12; R.l) 
Prior to filing this suit, after the 1979 deed surfaced 
purportedly changing title in the subject property to a joint 
tenancy, Defendants (excluding Elsie) caused a warranty deed to be 
prepared which would transfer Elsie's purported interest in the 
property to Arlene Goulding, Charles Brinkerhoff, Betty Esplin, 
Warren Brinkerhoff, and Golda Adair in equal portions. (Exhibit 
D-6; TR. 307) Elsie's signature was obtained on the document even 
though the document was never read to her, she did not understand 
it, never appeared before a notary, was never paid any 
consideration, and she was never advised to seek independent 
counsel. (TR. 307-310) 
The original suit was filed against Elsie and each of her 
children specifically mentioned in the immediately preceding 
paragraph, as.well as Mark Brinkerhoff. 
Hans Q. Chamberlain, was initially contacted personally by 
Golda, Warren, Arlene, Charles and Betty and was asked to serve as 
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counsel. On August 13th, 1983, Elsie indicated t h a t she did not 
want to remain a party to the act ion and requested t h a t her 
a t torney, Hans Q. Chamberlain, withdraw, which he did. (Exhibit 
P - l l ) . Elsie Brinkerhoff thereaf ter remained unrepresented un t i l 
Willard R. Bishop, a t her wri t ten request , entered an appearance 
on her behalf on February 14, 1985. (Exhibits P-40, P-41; R.421) 
Therefore, a t the beginning of the t r i a l , Willard R. Bishop 
represented Mont R. Anderson, Lena, Elsie and Mark. During the 
course of the t r i a l , because Els ie could not remember asking Mr. 
Bishop to represent her , the court decided t h a t in the i n t e r e s t of 
j ud i c i a l economy i t would look af ter E l s i e ' s i n t e r e s t s and appoint -
counsel only if her i n t e r e s t s were being abused. (TR. 347) 
Hans Q. Chamberlain, who formerly represented E ls ie , continued the 
legal act ion against her . \ 
When the t r i a l court determined t h a t $50,655.11 was owed to 
Els ie , P l a i n t i f f s promptly paid t h a t amount, in f u l l . (R.611, 
R.663, and R.670, Notice of Payments, Notice of Final Payment, i 
Receipt of Funds and I n i t i a l Inventory) 
mmm 
gPtBE-JE < 
M * i i r.in m* am mm 
I I I JUDGMENT OP THE TRIAL COURT IS PROPERLY 
WITHIM TIE BOOBS OP THE LAW AMD HAS ACHIEVED 
EQUITABLE RESULTS IH DISTRIBUTING THE SUBJECT 
PROPERTY. 
i 
All of the f ac t s and circumstances surrounding the 
above-ent i t led ac t ion indicate tha t the t r i a l c o u r t ' s F i r s t 
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and F i r s t Amended 
< 
Judgment have achieved r e s u l t s which are c lea r ly within the powers 
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of the Court, are in the best interests of all parties, and should 
not be overturned on appeal. 
In matters requiring the trial court to exercise its powers 
of equity, such as specific performance of contractual obligations 
in the present case, the Utah Supreme Court has ruled that great 
deference should be accorded the trial court. In Tanner^ vs.. 
BaP-dsgaard, 612 P.2d 345 (Utah 1980), a case substantially similar 
Kiflirt•iiaiid. i *m* * u> mi* ' ' «* 
to the present, the high court stated: 
As is so often true in such controversies, 
there is sharp conflict in the evidence as to 
material and controlling facts. Notwithstand-
ing the correctness of Defendants1 urgence 
that this Court may review the evidence 
because it is a case in equity, it is our 
well-established rule that due to the 
prerogatives and advantaged position of the 
trial judge, we indulge considerable deference 
to his findings. Where evidence is in 
dispute, we assume that he believed that which 
is favorable to his findings, and we do not 
disturb them unless it clearly preponderates 
to the contrary. 
Id. at 346. 
Appellants1 statement of factss does not comply with this 
rule and is really an argument by them, not the facts as found by 
the trial court or as they support the lower court's findings and 
rulings. 
Furthermore, Utah law grants a preference to the cou r t ' s 
powers of equity whenever the same come into conf l ic t with 
inconsis tent provisions in the common law: 
Whenever there i s any variance between the 
ru les of equity and the ru les of common law in 
reference to the same matter the rules of 
equity shal l p reva i l . 
Utah Code Annotated, 68-3-2 (1953, as amended). 
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In the present case Plaintiffs have successfully sought to 
reassure their position under a contract entered in 1966 between a 
mother and her two sons. The original purpose of the contract was 
to provide for the material well-being of Elsie Brinkerhoff 
throughout the remaining days of her life. All parties to this 
action were aware of the initial arrangements and for many years 
expressed no dissatisfaction with the manner in which business was 
transacted between Elsie and her two sons. At no time under the 
1966 contract has Elsie ever wanted for the necessities or desires 
of her life. In fact, to this very day Elsie continues to express 
her desire that the contract remain in force, a position entirely 
consistent with the trial court's Judgment and the desires of all 
parties to the original contract. (TR 295-307; 359:9-15; Exhibits 
P-ll and P-40) < 
Any conclusion other than that reached by the trial court 
would frustrate the intent of the parties and work an injustice 
upon Elsie Brinkerhoff, as well as Plaintiffs, in this action. < 
Plaintiffs stood ready to fully perform the obligations placed 
upon them by the trial court in making up any deficits in their 
performance, and paid the full amount found due by the Court. < 
(R.611, R.670; Notice of Payment; Receipt of Funds and Initial 
Inventory, and R.663, Notice of Pinal Payment TR 126:7-10; 
144:6-17) In fact, Plaintiffs have paid the entire remaining < 
unpaid balance, as found by the Court, into trust for Elsie as 
ordered by the Court in order to assure that she is well provided 
for during the remaining days of her life. < 
-11-
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Defendants, on the other handr seek to abrogate all of the 
rights and interest Elsie has to receive payment under the 1966 
contract and substitute their own 1981 agreements. The result of 
such actions would have the effect of leaving Elsie without the 
funds to which she is entitled and has received under the 
contract, which funds are hers. As a replacement Defendants 
propose to pay a lesser amount over a period extending the rest of 
Elsie's natural life. Defendants would then become the owners of 
land which they have never used or worked in recent years and for 
which they had no interest or concern at the time of the original 
1966 agreement. All such arrangements would be made to the 
distinct and unconscionable disadvantage of the Plaintiffs and 
Elsie Brinkerhoff. 
The remainder of this brief will indicate that on the facts 
and on the merits of the law the trial court achieved a just and 
equitable result which is clearly within the recognized limits of 
its jurisdiction. 
THE 1966 CONTRACT ENTERED BETWBEH ELSIE AID 
•BR H O SQIS, CLOTD AMD HARK, HAS REMAINED A 
VALID CONTRACT PROM ITS EXECUTION TO Til 
PRESENT. 
The trial court specifically found that the contract entered 
between Elsie Brinkerhoff and her two sons, Mark and Cloyd, was 
the result of arms' length bargaining conducted with the advice 
of counsel by fully competent parties. (R. 629, P. of P. No. 4). 
Furthermore, Appellants make no claim and present no evidence to 
the contrary. In fact, all parties to the contract continue to 
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recognize its validity and existence. Appellants, non-parties to 
the contract, are the only ones who fail to recognize the binding 
nature of the contract's provisions. 
The facts and evidence presented at trial have given no 
indication that Elsie, as seller of the subject property, acted 
in any manner, either under the contract or by law, which would 
operate to terminate the contract. The contractual terms 
pertaining to default and termination are as follows: 
In the event of a default in the payment of 
any installment of principal or interest and 
in the event of a default in any other term or 
condition herein and in the event notice of a 
default other than for payment of principal 
and interest shall be given to buyers by the 
seller and a subsequent failure to remedy the 
same shall continue for a period of thirty 
(30) days, then the seller may at her option 
demand a redelivery to her of all of the 
escrowed documents... 
(Exhibits P-l, P-2) 
These provisions, while somewhat ambiguous as to the 
circumstances under which notice will be required, clearly 
demonstrate that action is required on the part of the seller 
before the contract will be considered in default. Whether notice 
is required or not, seller must exercise her option to "demand a 
redelivery to her of all of the escrowed documents," as an 
indication that she considered the buyers to be in default. At no 
time has Elsie Brinkerhoff ever made such a demand, or anything 
akin thereto, upon Mark or Cloyd. (TR 295-307; R.633, F. of F. 
11) 
The contract also provides for alternative remedies such as 
reducing the agreement to judgment or foreclosing as a mortgage. 
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All of these a l t e r n a t i v e s require de f in i t e act ion on the par t of 
the s e l l e r prior to any action buy s e l l e r . (Exhibits P- l , F-2) 
Forfe i tures under installment land sa les contrac ts have long 
been disfavored under the law. The Utah Supreme Court has held 
t h a t aff i rmative act ion i s required to exercise the fo r fe i tu re 
option. Fuhrlman ,y,..JB.i8Sanger, 375 P.2d 27 (Utah 1962); see a l so , 
£&M££' supra a t 346; and BftM«L.y* ,flAfcLBfc*n«?ff * 545 P.2d 1152, 
1154 (Utah 1976). Elsie never did take any act ion to terminate 
the contract , and in fac t , has always recognized i t s v a l i d i t y . 
(Exhibits P - l l , P-40; TR 359:9-15; 295-307; 367:12-25) 
A. AL„*M>, t .fas,. .M.iaflLfci ,B,t;^ ateri>p,£g- ..aiafe-har 
k¥,<L M9I\fL JfiUflfL 1ML..&^ M 
^ „ ^ a u ^ t , , , ^ tft£iA abiia^Aaas mA^jLJk^s 
The facts and circumstances surrounding execution and 
performance under the 1966 contract clearly demonstrate the 
importance and necessity of requiring notice prior to declaring 
default. The written contract in this instance was the mere 
formalization of a relationship that had existed since the death 
of Merle Brinkerhoff, Elsie1s husband, two years earlier. Since 
that time Mark and Cloyd had been in possession of the real 
property and were in the process of farming the land and grazing 
sheep thereon. In addition, the two sons were caring for their 
mother's needs by seeing that her bills were paid, as well as 
making annual payments of $2,000.00. (TR 64-68; Exhibits P-l, 
P-2) 
When the contract was executed, the parties1 mode of 
operation was altered very little. It is true that documents were 
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signed with all the specificities enumerated above, but the 
history surrounding the execution clearly indicates that the 
parties had no intention of demanding exact compliance. For many 
years thereafter, even to the present day, Mark and Cloyd 
continued to care for their mother's needs. Elsie was never 
dissatisfied with their performance and never requested anything 
from her boys that was not forthcoming. (TR 295-307) 
These facts demonstrate that none of the parties to the 1966 
contract believed that Mark and Cloyd were in default. Without 
notice it would have been impossible to know at what point Elsie 
considered her sons to be in default of their obligations, or, if
 ( 
they were, what remedy she might choose. In a case with facts 
very similar to the present the Utah Supreme Court has exacted a 
requirement that notice be given. In Harris y.A Svkes, 624 P.2d { 
681 (Utah 1981) , the Plaintiff had made a down payment on the 
purchase price of certain real property, but the monthly and 
periodic payments were made sporadically, and in amounts different
 { 
than called for by the contract. Nevertheless, the Court required 
the defendant to supply notice of default prior to reselling the 
same property to a third party. , 
In the present case, a long history of accepting payments 
other than those specifically required by the contract was in 
evidence. This Court should reach a conclusion which is in . 
accordance with reason and the JiQKjrls case noted above by finding 
that the 1966. contract is still in effect and that termination 
requires that the buyers be given notice and an opportunity to ^ 
cure their default prior to suffering an unjust forfeiture. As 
-15-
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shown by the record, when given an amount due by the trial court, 
it was forthwith paid in full. 
It is evident that the contract itself anticipates the 
necessity of notice under circumstances where the buyers would not 
have knowledge of their default, or of any remedy chosen by the 
seller. The contract specifies that default for circumstances 
other than payment of principal and interest requires notice. 
These provisions allow the buyers to respond prior to incurring 
forfeiture. Mark and Cloyd Brinkerhoff or their successors in 
interest should be granted no less opportunity. 
B. Utafe, Jaw„fF,^flVif<&• AhflVA.mUM flUftY, * 
^ ^ M ^ I ^ ^ . U . Q l Q f J i K , M ..toLf,,, t£„. c^L e 
M8A,*;.,to.eflsft,, griftr. . ^ . g t f py,gApa.^hijl|iitfftf skP^ 
&AW,.JK,CTifliPJ^ lM±»M)t£§ 
contracts* 
As noted above, Utah law i s c lear ly h o s t i l e to allowing 
fo r fe i tu re under instal lment land sa l e s con t rac t s . The Court has 
reached t h i s conclusion despite spec i f ic contractual provisions 
ca l l ing for f o r f e i t u r e and t r e a t i n g a l l e a r l i e r payments as 
l iqu ida ted damages. M l J^JtiW^UL^hikm figtft- * 5*7 P.2d 1108 
(Utah 1977) . 
In order to avoid the harsh results of forfeiture, sellers 
are required to allow a reasonable time in which buyers can cure 
their defaults: 
It can be seen that the provisions of the 
contract, designed to terminate contractual 
relations, are not •elf-executing. They 
require some affirmative act on the part of 
the seller. Therefore, the contractual 
relations between seller and buyer are in 
existence until such time as the seller 
chooses to notify the defaulting buyer of its 
election to proceed under one, or all, of its 
options. In so doing, seller must give the 
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flftfiaulAlM,..,laiyftr ..a ..reasonable ..time, ^within 
™gft *V-Siifft--. tfre_<lefanl t , ^ .Without.^ th i s 
aatoppg-,^ft .tefigatuna fraraf ygMU-ja9.L.-to9y 
MM^.tS. . ifo, -ife. muld.,. ...not^Ixavs .sextain 
ta2Vlftqgft .hU..fcpnanqg„.KajEL..at.. aa ^nd A _He.^a ld 
*ttimg...t;hc^eller^may ...have waived, .fejEaalt, or 
would e l e c t to enforce the contract rather 
than f o r f e i t i t ; or he could assume he would 
be permitted t o perform. (Emphasis suppl ied . ) 
Hansen, supra at 1154. The Court has held t h i s rule "espec ia l ly 
appl icable" in cases where the defaul t has been overlooked for 
substant ia l periods of time. LamPOt v.< Byjen, 508 P.2d 532, 534 
(Utah 1973) . 
In the present case it has never been shown that seller was 
dissatisfied with buyers performance under the contract. For this 
reason no notice and no period for cure has ever been accorded 
buyers under the contract. To enforce the forfeiture provisions 
would work a double injustice. Buyers would lose the land and < 
seller would lose the funds which she has received. All of this 
would be accomplished under Appellants' supposed concern for 
Elsie's well-being. < 
c. amisjaLntetiiPtt.,m , jal Ur., m^i. jfcton JAEfi 
pmteA^nXitix^Mi rijta . t ^ ^ g m a ^ . f t r ^ 
ffl9jj,BJiliitt9f „ • ¥,*,yL. n^^M,pattapit a ,JjMLtaU»fflt 
fiftYimt .^Kl&,Ji^kO^, ^\lW^XLl>M..mtiLf£-
i 
The contract doctrine of waiver has been defined in the 
following manner: 
tTlhe voluntary and intentional relinquishment 
of a known right [which] may be either express ( 
or implied. Waiver can be implied from 
conduct such as making payments for or 
accepting performance which does not meet 
contract requirements; waiver can also be 
expressed verbally or in writing. Express 
waiverr when supported by reliance thereon, i 
excuses non-performance of the waived 
condition. 
Udevco, Inc. v. Wagner, 678 P.2d 679, 682 (Nev. 1984). 
The evidence clearly demonstrates that Elsie Brinkerhoff 
waived strict compliance with the payment terms under the 1966 
contract. Elsie never demanded, nor expected, more from her boys 
than that which was immediately forthcoming. Her desires were 
simply that some of her bills be paid and money be given when she 
found herself in need. Indeed on some occasions when funds were 
tendered, Elsie rejected them along with a declaration that there 
was no need. Such declarations may rise to the level of express 
waiver, but at the very least Elsie's conduct impliedly waived the 
necessity of complying with strict payment requirements. 
(TR 295-307) 
The only way Elsie's waiver could be overcome and strict 
compliance demanded is through notice of her intention to do the 
same. Such a requirement is readily understood in cases 
considering forfeiture under installment land sales contract 
provisions. 
Most litigation in this area concerns itself 
with failure to make timely payments under a 
land contract...In order to establish a prima 
facie case of waiver, the vendee must show 
that the vendor has condoned or assented to 
previous defaults and has not given notice of 
his intention to insist on strict compliance 
in the future. 
toa^flynE• jfrtfwfo,..-inst s^Jtefrr,,,.JAB** 577 p-2d 645' 6 5° (wy°-
197 8). Furthermore, because forfeitures are not favored under the 
law it has been held that "slight evidence" of the intention to 
relinquish a right is sufficient to warrant the finding of waiver. 
Id. at 650. 
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In the present case the evidence i s overwhelmingly in favor 
of f inding a waiver. Therefore, the 1966 contract should be 
upheld and the judgment of the t r i a l court susta ined. 
D: JhiLt, l*>MuMte&%\<>ii AML^hfi.jaMUfs.t,? 
2L1MU jfif^%Kam^RliUMUon¥ ,fchram<3lti;-
Appellants contend that Elsie Brinkerhoff and her two sons, 
Mark and Cloydf had abandoned their 1966 contract at the time 
Elsie signed later documents transferring a partial interest in 
the subject property to them. The contention is, nevertheless, 
unfounded in the facts and under the law. 
The term "abandonment" in the sense involved 
here means the intentional relinquishment of 
one's rights in the contract; and in order to 
nullify such rights, there must be a clear and 
unequivocal showing of such abandonment. Where 
there is dispute as to whether this has 
occurred, it is usually a question of fact, to { 
be determined from the circumstances of the 
particular case, which include not only 
nonperformance, but also expressions of intent 
and other actions of the parties. 
T,iff^D^QgM ^ A.^l aftfliA.,, Jfafei- L,., XJLJHUUBM, 544 P. 2d 481, 484 (Utah ( 
1975). Furthermore, on questions of abandonment reversal should 
not be granted unless the evidence "clearly preponderates" against 
the findings. Id. at 484. < 
While it is true that the Supreme Court in Timpano go s 
Highland* found the contract had been abandoned, it is also true 
that the facts in the present case are clearly distinguishable. In * 
TlBPanggoj Highlands buyers had been making sporadic payments on 
their land purchase when seller leased the same property for a ten 
year period to a third party. The Court upheld the decision for * 
abandonment of the contract. Timpanogps .Highland* is 
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distinguishable in that buyers had never entered into possession 
or used the property in any way, other than with Plaintiffs' 
permission, nor did they pay the taxes thereon. Furthermore, the 
parties had been in continual negotiations concerning buyerfs 
failure to make adequate payments under the contract, none of 
which is true under the present case. Here, as soon as 
Appellants' claims were discovered, suit was filed. 
The Utah Court has also defined abandonment as the voluntary 
relinquishment of a "right to a benefit" due from another. PitCher 
y,, Lautitz.en, 423 P.2d 491, 493 (Utah 1967). In the present case 
there is no indication that any of the parties intended or 
pretended to give up their rights under the 1966 contract. Mark 
and Cloyd remained continually in possession of the land, used the 
same for their grazing and farming operation, and paid the 
applicable taxes on a yearly basis. Elsie has stated consistently 
that she expected "her boys" to take care of her by paying her 
bills and seeing that she had the money she needed. Indeed, even 
one of the Appellants, Golda B. Adair, expected Mark to continue 
making payments on his portion of the land. (Tr. 265) Such an 
obligation could have only arisen under the 1966 contract. 
Appellants assert that Mark or Cloyd had persuaded Elsie to 
issue the 1979 Warranty Deed, transferring Elsie's interest in the 
land to a joint tenancy, as proof of abandonment. The evidence 
that such a persuasion occurred was minimal, at best, in that it 
is "supported" solely by the testimony of one individual, which 
testimony was not admitted because it was in contravention of a 
timely objection based on hearsay rules. (TR. 434; 435, 437, 438 
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and 439) Furthermore, the trial court apparently chose not to 
believe such information or found it unnecessary in deciding the 
case. Whatever the case may be, Appellants have failed to 
demonstrate that the facts clearly preponderate against the trial 
court's findings and, therefore, reversal on the issue of 
abandonment is entirely inappropriate. 
E. / L V k M S , , , ^ 
Iftfi••• Iftft6 • .fiftP,ttM,qt^ teRLCftinttfttn.^ft, ,.9ttftyMfifr 
spoUpiitt-Pft, MA .,ten9ft.„MflMntte9^» • RfigbA^aTf 
fiftnfcK^a-,gp.rLCl.H8A.QJL-y.Ul.lxaaArAte the purpoie 
gf-i,Atift.„• gQJ&Sftfift,. , a ? A , ^ m , ,qlL.JBftLtltf»,Bg 
teRSfcife.^hmEP-
All parties to the 1966 contract or their successors in 
interest desire that the instrument be maintained and the benefits 
be realized. Mark Brinkerhoff and Mont R. Anderson, Personal 
Representative for the Estate of Cloyd Brinkerhoff, have sought 
speci f ic performance of the contract. Elsie Brinkerhoff has 
continually repeated her desire to uphold the contract's 
provisions. She has stated, "I had no idea of ever breaking that 
i 
contract,11 and in response to the direct question by the court as 
to whether she wanted the contract in existence she added, "Yes, I 
d i d . . . I wjint that money to l i v e on. That's a l l I would have to 
l i v e on." (TR. 300 and 367). At every opportunity, Elsie 
reaffirmed the contract. (Exhibits P - l l , P-40; TR 318:11-17; 
362-363; 295-307) Even Appellants would expect Mark to continue 
making payments under obligations which could have only arisen 
from the 1966 contract. (TR. 265). 
A decision which would abrogate the contract under 
consideration by reversing the tr ia l court's Judgment wil l 
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frustrate the document's original purpose: the assurance that 
Elsie Brinkerhoff will have the support she needs for the 
remainder of her earthly life. It is hard to understand how 
Appellants can claim to have only their mother's best interests at 
heart when the result of their actions would deprive her of the 
same level of support to which is rightfully due. Even ignoring 
the amount the court has awarded in back payments and interest, 
the Appellants' offer of support would amount to $200 a year less 
than that to which Elsie is entitled under the contract. For this 
reason, the Plaintiffs respectfully implore the Court to recognize 
the just and equitable decision of the trial court and refuse to 
reverse on appeal. 
IVi f i f lA • wTVTUT 
TIE DETERMINATION THAT ELSIE BRINKERHOFF WAS 
INCOMPETENT IN HANDLING HER LEGAL AFFAIRS FROM 
ABODT 1970 OR WAS A HATTER CLEARLY WITHIN TIB 
COMPETENCE OP TIE TRIAL COURT, OR AT TIE VERT 
LEAST, WAS WOT REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
Appellants1 major contention on appeal is that the trial 
court committed reversible error when it found that Elsie 
Brinkerhoff was incompetent in her legal affairs from about 1970, 
and failed to require that she be represented by independent legal 
counsel. Such a position is unsupported by the facts and 
procedural history of this case. 
As to the argument that Elsie's competency was never properly 
raised as an issue, Appellants are clearly in error* Indeed, long 
before trial Appellants themselves, acting through counsel, had 
questioned Elsie's competence in handling her legal affairs. In 
Defendants1 First Interrogatories to Plaintiff (R. 46) , 
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Interrogatory 23(i) Appellants ask: "At the time Elsie 
Brinkerhoff signed the 11977 receipt], please describe in detail 
her mental and physical condition and state whether or not she was 
under the influence of any person present at the signing. " (R. 
51) Also, in the Pretrial Order, signed by Appellants1 Attorney, 
Issue of Pact, No. 4(F) reads: "At all times relevant herein, was 
Elsie Brinkerhoff competent to act for and on her behalf, and sign 
all documents relevant to this action?" (R. 436) And finally, 
Appellants directly questioned Elsie's competence at trial when 
counsel queried: "Mrs. Brinkerhoff, do you remember in 1982, or 
let me back up: In 1979, do you think you were competent?" 
(TR. 325) 
It has been held that "decrees in equity and judgments at law 
must have a basis in the pleadings and the evidence." 61A 
AmJur2d, Pleading, Section 382. However, it must not be forgotten 
that "whether a judgment is supported by the pleadings depends, 
not on the allegations in the complaint alone, but on a reasonable < 
construction of all the pleadings when considered together." Id. 
The primary importance of the rules of pleading are that the 
parties have every opportunity to be heard on all relevant issues. i 
What constitutes a pleading is generally an issue defined by 
statute or rules such as the Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 
Section 1. ( 
In this case the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is the 
controlling authority. Under Part III, Pleadings, Motions, and 
Orders, of the Rules, Rule 16 states that a Pretrial Order "limits i 
the issues for trial to those not disposed of by admissions or 
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agreements of counsel; and such order when entered controls the 
subsequent course of act ion, unless modified a t the t r i a l to 
prevent manifest i n j u s t i c e . " As noted above, the question of 
E l s i e ' s competence was properly before the court under the 
P re t r i a l Order which was signed by counsel for Appellants. 
Appellants ' brief points out numerous statements made a t 
t r i a l as to E l s i e ' s general s t a t e of mind in an e f fo r t to persuade 
the Court tha t there was no evidence of incompetence. I t should 
be pointed out tha t most of these statements were e l i c i t e d by 
counsel for the P l a i n t i f f s . P l a in t i f f s have never believed t h e i r 
case rested upon a determination of E l s i e ' s competence, but t ha t 
i s not to say tha t there was l e s s than ample evidence upon which 
the t r i a l court could base a finding of incompetence. A review of 
the t r a n s c r i p t c lear ly shows tha t the t r i a l court has ample 
support for i t s finding? Appellant Golda B. Adair herself 
recognized the problem when she s ta ted tha t Elsie "would sign 
anything" (TR 243:2-13), and became concerned about competency 
when she believed Els ie began signing any documents handed to her 
regardless of the i r legal effect . (TR 267, 268, and 268A:1-13). 
I t i s i n s t ruc t i ve tha t a f ter Elsie signed documents in Appellants ' 
favor, Golda to ld Els ie not to sign any more! (TR 243:6-13) 
I t i s pa r t i cu l a r ly important t ha t the c o u r t ' s finding on 
competence re la ted to E l s i e ' s a b i l i t y to understand the legal 
s ignif icance of documents placed before her by well-meaning 
chi ldren. The court speci f ica l ly s ta ted tha t "from and af ter 
1970, Elsie Brinkerhoff signed documents tha t were presented to 
her without understanding the legal or other s ignif icance of such 
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documents. She lacked sufficient power to comprehend the subject 
of such documents.. .and was not able to act with discretion 
thereto." (R.634, 635; F. of F. 15) All of the statements 
offered by Appellants as proof of Elsie's competence relate to her 
ability to take care of herself in the regular affairs of life and 
not to her understanding of the legal transactions to which she 
was subjected. 
Indeedf there is ample evidence to support the trial court's 
finding of incompetence in the consistent statements of Elsie that 
she never read documents that were placed before her for 
signature. (TR. 304, 305, 308, 311, 312) Each such statement 
indicates that Elsie signed documents on the basis of trust 
reposed in her children and family, upon influence exercised by 
them, and not on the understanding that she was altering her legal < 
or financial affairs. She never evinced any intent to alter her 
affairs. 
The court's finding of incompetence should in no way < 
constitute reversible error. As demonstrated above the issue had 
been placed before the court and there was ample evidence to show 
that Elsie failed to understand the nature and consequences of her < 
legal transactions. In addition, the record clearly supports the 
court's finding that the 1966 contract was in full force and 
effect as demonstrated above. Appellants had full knowledge of i 
this contract and were under no circumstances bona fide purchasers 
for value. (JR. 631, F. of F. 5) And, finally, in light of the 
court's specific finding of undue influence, as discussed in i 
detail below, there is no justification for reversal. 
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i 
EQIffHY 
THE TRIAL COURT DID HOT COMMIT REVERSIBLE 
ERROR BY ASSUMING THE RESPONSIBILITY OF 
PROTECTING THE INTERESTS OP ELSIE BRINKERHOFF. 
Appellants argue that the trial court was required by Rule 
17(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to provide Elsie Brinkerhoff 
with a guardian ad litem, rather than assuming this 
responsibility, and that such an assumption constitutes reversible 
error. This argument, however, misconceives the essential purpose 
of Rule 17(b). 
Rule 17(b) states: 
When an infant or an insane or incompetent 
person is a party, he must appear either by 
his general guardian ad litem appointed in the 
particular case by the court in which the 
action is pending. 
In considering the effect which should be given to such a 
rule, the Utah Supreme Court has sought to respect its essential 
purpose which is to assure that all meritorious defenses are heard 
and that the party is not deprived of any benefit she might 
otherwise have obtained. Whitney... y^_ Walker, 479 P.2d 469, 471 
(Utah 1971); see also T y p l ^ E Yj-flirffr 57 P.2d 332, 335 (Idaho 
1936). 
In the present case there is no indication on the record or 
in Appellants Brief that Elsie has been denied any defenses or 
benefits to which she is entitled. The only outcomes which could 
have been adopted by the court were those presented by either 
Plaintiffs or. Appellants and each of these positions were fully 
represented. 
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The only explanation for Appellants1 heavy reliance on such a 
technical view of the rule is that they are attempting to protect 
their own selfish interests. As pointed out above, under 
Appellants' view on this case, Elsie would be required to forego 
her substantial interest in the 1966 contract for the lesser 
payments promised by Appellants. Such a result would work a 
significant disadvantage upon Elsie and would operate in direct 
contravention of her stated desires today, particularly where she 
has received $50,665.11. (R.611, R.663, Notice of Payment, and 
Notice of Final Payment) For this reason Appellants should fail in 
their attempt at reversal in order to obtain a technical 
compliance with the rule. 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has maintained that Appellants 
have the burden of showing that the error was substantial and
 i 
prejudicial and that they were thereby deprived of the opportunity 
for a full and fair presentation of the issues. Redftv&lppment 
hmtiM. ,9& J M t , i^ S,,, •<?* to y.». ,ftM SHU** 526 P. 2d 47, 51 (Utah 1974),
 { 
and S,ippion„lyi.trttffgnL§ra3l ,M^§,.fiMJB*' 4 7 0 p-2d 399' 4 0 2 ( u t a h 1 9 7 0 ) 
Appellants have failed to make the required showing. 
tQVBLX 
ABSENT ART FINDING OF INCOMPETENCE, TIE FACT 
THAT ELSIE DID NOT UNDERSTAND TIB NATURE OF 
TIB DEEDS TRANSFERRING TITLE IS SUFFICIENT ID 
INVALIDATE THE 1979 AND LATER 1981 DEEDS. < 
In order to transfer a valid interest in real property the 
grantor must have a present intent to effect such a transfer. In 
order for the grantor to possess the requisite intent she must 4 
understand the nature of the transaction being placed before her. 
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I 
The facts surrounding the execution of the deeds in 197 9 and 
laterf to Appellants and others indicate that Elsie lacked 
understanding and, any intent to transfer propertyr or to alter 
existing legal relationships. 
At trial the following series of questions and responses 
clearly indicated that Elsie did not understand the nature of the 
documents she was asked to sign: 
ME*.-.Bishop: At the time the [1980 Warranty 
Deed, Exhibit D-6] was brought to youf did you 
read it? 
^,B^8.MR<;A^aKliaf^8 N o' J didn't read it, he 
just said — Well I said, "Oh, you came early 
in the morning, " and he says "Here Grandma are 
some papers I'd like you to sign," and I says, 
"What's that for," and he says, "Oh, to see if 
we can get a little money for you, " 
Mr... J&jghop: Did anybody read it to you before 
you signed it? 
R^i^B.u.qker^off: No. 
B^M^pfaops whY d i d y°u s i 9 n i t ? 
.Blale Bxinkerhoff: Because he brought it and 
said he wanted me to sign it, and I didn't 
know what the deal was. They never asked me 
anything about it. 
(TR. 308) . 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that "where a deed is 
executed with no intent to transfer a present interest, it will be 
invalidated by a court in equity," and that "a conveyance is valid 
only upon delivery of a deed with present intent to transfer." 
ftflKlM^Y^itato** 6 8 4 P-2<3 632, 635 (Utah 1984). It is clear that 
Elsie did not possess the necessary intent to effectuate the 
transfer. 
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Furthermore, there was no attempt on the part of the 
Appellants or any other party to secure independent counsel for 
their mother. In other words the grantees had the document 
prepared and then secured signature from the grantor without 
suggesting that she obtain independent counsel. They did not even 
bother to read the document to Elsie prior to securing her 
signature. 
In a similar case, the Supreme Court has held that 
fiduciaries and persons having a confidential relationship with 
the grantor have a "duty to act fairly, make a disclosure of 
material information, and to take no unfair advantage of superior 
position." SgeqgistL ,v, Seequist, 524 P.2d 598, 599 (Utah 1974). 
In Seequist the court expressed its displeasure that a grantee 
child had made no attempt to secure independent advice or 
representation, even though he was aware that his mother had no 
independent knowledge of the facts surrounding the transfer. Id. 
at 599. 
On this basis alone the Court should find ample evidence to 
uphold the trial court's position which refuses to recognize the 
1979 and later deeds, including those purportedly transferring 
real property interests to the Appellants. 
i 
Elsie J. Brinkerhoff never had any intent to do anything but 
adhere to her 1966 contract. (TR 295-307) 
i 
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fflifflLXI 
THE "PERFECT TENDER ROLE" HAS NO APPLICATION 
TO THIS CASE. 
Appellants contend that Plaintiffs are not entitled to 
specific performance of the 1966 contract because they failed to 
tender their own performance prior to initiating suit. The 
context of this case makes it clear that the demands of the 
"perfect tender" rule do not apply. The above-outlined argument 
has demonstrated that Elsie had waived her right to strict 
compliance with the contract's payment terms. (See Point II 
above.) None of the parties to the contract ever considered the 
instrument to be in default. It would be inappropriate to demand 
that the Plaintiffs tender perfect performance when it was 
entirely unclear that there had been a failure of performance at 
all, and if there had been, what the nature and extent of the 
failure were. Under the circumstances of this case, it was 
impossible to make a "perfect tender". Nevertheless, Plaintiffs 
told the trial court they would immediately pay any amounts found 
due, and did so. (TR 126:7-10? 144:6-17) 
Where a buyer believes in good faith that he has complied 
with the terms of the agreement, specific performance may be 
awarded, particularly where an unjust forfeiture would occur. 
Literal and exact performance is not always 
necessary. Under certain circumstances, 
specific performance of a contract will be 
decreed in spite of the fact that the 
complainant has not wholly performed his part 
of the agreement, or where there has been 
substantial compliance with the terms of the 
contract, as where a party in good faith 
seasonably offers and continues ready to 
comply with the stipulations of the contract 
although he may err in estimating the extent 
-30-
of the obligation. Generally, where the 
plaintiff has made a conscientious effort 
fully and fairly to comply with his contract 
to purchase land, specific performance will be 
granted. . . . 
In administering equity in a specific 
performance case, a technical forfeiture of 
rights under a contract, in the absence of bad 
faith, is not favored where a preservation of 
the contract through specific performance will 
yield to each party that to which he is justly 
entitled. A court in equity has the power to 
relieve a defaulting purchaser from a 
forfeiture and to compel specific performance 
by the seller when, in the court's judgment, 
to do otherwise would result in an 
unreasonable forfeiture. 
71 AmJur2d, Specific Performance, § 62. 
Indeed, the Court has granted specific performance in many 
cases where there has been no indication that a "perfect tender" 
was extended by the buyers in land sale contracts. See, Tanner, 
«* «* ' i i i m i i i i i H i n • ' 
supra; and Fuhriman, supra. In such cases, the Court has often 
focused on the behavior of the seller to justify an award of 
specific performance. For example, in fa.gk..y, HuU..Jw.elftaa.en.t 
Co., Inc., 667 P.2d 39, 40 (Utah 1983), the Court, in awarding 
specific performance, took particular notice of the fact that 
seller had waived its right to forfeiture by consistently 
i 
accepting buyers' late and sporadic payments. The Idaho Supreme 
Court has also taken this position where seller failed to comply 
with provisions of a contract pertaining to default. A grant of 
specific performance was awarded even though a payment was 
tendered many years later. Singleton, v.. Pichpn, 635 P.2d 254, 255 
(Idaho 1981). 
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All of the cases cited by Appellants to support their 
contentions that perfect tender was required of the Plaintiffs can 
be distinguished on the facts. In none of these cases is there 
any indication that sellers had expressly or impliedly waived the 
requirements of strict performance under their contracts. 
Furthermore, none of the buyers had yet taken possession of the 
land being transferred. In the present case, however, the 
transactions had progressed to a much further extent. Buyers had 
been in possession for many years and a significant history of 
dealing was in evidence. This history made it clear that the 
seller did not expect strict compliance with the terms of the 
written agreement. Sellers must elect and give notice of the 
remedies they seek. It would be unjust to require forfeiture for 
failure to comply with the technical rules regarding perfect 
tender, particularly where, as here, payment in full has been made 
by Plaintiffs and accepted by Elsie J. Brinkeihoff. (R.611, 
Notice of Payment? R.663, Notice of Final Payment; and R.670, 
Receipt of Funds and Initial Inventory) Finally, Elsie 
Brinkerhoff has accepted the benefits flowing to her and has 
determined not appeal. If Appellants claim anything, their proper 
relief is a claim for damages against Elsie. 
WOIWT VII 
ABSENT ALL OTHER FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS, TIB 
DETERMINATION THAT ALL AGREEMENTS ENTERED BT 
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF FOLLOWING 1 9 7 0 WERE THE 
RESULT OP UNDUE INFLUENCE I S SUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S MOLDING. 
The t r i a l court , independent of a l l other f indings, 
determined tha t a l l contracts and agreements entered by Elsie 
Brinkerhoff following 1970 were the r e s u l t of undue influence: 
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19. The Court finds that all of the children 
and certain grandchildren of ELSIE J. 
BRINKERHOFF, from their respective viewpoints, 
and because of what they perceived as being 
others taking advantage of their mother or 
grandmother by such other parties, used their 
own influence to convince ELSIE BRINKERHOFF to 
execute documents and take legal positions in 
order to accomplish what they, the children 
and/or grandchildren or other relatives, 
thought was for ELSIE BRINKERHOFF1s best 
interest. 
20. The Court finds that the children and 
grandchildren who prevailed upon ELSIE 
BRINKERHOFF to execute documents and take 
legal stands after 1970 did not intend to take 
advantage of her for their own purposes. 
Nevertheless, they did take advantage of ELSIE 
BRINKERHOFF for the purpose of benefiting her 
in their own minds, from their own points of 
view. As a result, those persons who 
persuaded and induced ELSIE BRINKERHOFF to 
sign contractual, legal and financial 
documents, including deeds, and to take 
certain legal positions from and after 1970 
used improper constraint or urgency of 
persuasion, whereby the will of ELSIE 
BRINKERHOFF was overpowered, and she was 
induced to do or forebear an act which she 
otherwise would not do, or otherwise would do 
if left to act freely. 
21. The unfair persuasion of ELSIE 
BRINKERHOFF on various occasions from and 
after 1970 generally took place in private. 
The persons persuading her to sign legal and 
financial documents were able to obtain her 
signature because of her age, psychological 
dependency, and existing confidential and/or 
family relationships. 
22. The transactions leading to the signing 
of financial and legal documents by ELSIE 
BRINKERHOFF were initiated by her family 
members, not by herself, under circumstances 
in which ELSIE BRINKERHOFF lacked reasonable 
access to independent, non-confidential 
advice. 
(R. 640-641, F. of F. 19-22; see also, First Amended Judgment and 
Decree Quieting Title, Paragraph 1, R. 653-655) 
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The Utah Supreme Court has defined "undue influence" in the 
following manner: 
The mere relationship of parent and child does 
not constitute evidence of such confidential 
relationship as to create a presumption of 
fraud or undue influence. While kinship may 
be a factor in determining the existence of a 
legally significant confidential relationship, 
there must be a showing, in addition to the 
kinship, of a reposal of confidence by one 
party and the resulting superiority and 
influence on the other party. The 
relationship must be such as would lead an 
ordinarily prudent person in the management of 
his business affairs to repose that degree of 
confidence in the other party which largely 
results in the substitution of the will of the 
latter for that of the former in the material 
matters involved in the transaction. The 
doctrine of confidential relationship rests 
upon the principle of inequality between the 
parties, and implies a position of superiority 
occupied by one of the parties over the other. 
Bradbury^.. Rasnrnssen, 401 P.2d 710, 713 (Utah 1965). 
The facts outlined above, as well as the findings of the 
court, indicate that undue influence has clearly been established 
in this proceeding. Elsie's children and grandchildren have 
occupied a position of superiority in their understanding and 
knowledge of the legal and financial transactions which were 
placed before her following 1970. The record demonstrates that 
Elsie's dependency on her family led to trust, unjustifiably 
reposed, which resulted in the signing of documents Elsie knew 
nothing about. 
The Court has indicated that once a confidential relationship 
is shown and a transaction occurs which benefits the party in whom 
confidence is placed, the burden is shifted to the benefitting 
party to show that no fraud or undue influence has occurred. 
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Cunningham A . .Cunningham, 690 P.2d 549, 553 (Utah 1984). The 
Appellants have failed to meet their burden and the fact that they 
were acting in "somewhat good faith is not enough to free them 
from the consequences of their actions." Id. at 553. 
mm$m 
All of the facts and circumstances surrounding this case 
point to the unfortunate occurrence of a family in distress. Many 
well-intentioned parties have tried to protect their mother and 
grandmother from perceived injustice. The trial court was called 
upon to sort out a variety of transactions taking place over a 
substantial period of time. Exercising its power to do equity, 
the court has fashioned a remedy to preserve the stated intention 
of all parties: to assure that Elsie Brinkerhoff has sufficient 
funds to meet her financial needs during the remaining period of 
her life. The court has achieved this result while remaining well 
within the bounds of the law. Plaintiffs simply request that the 
Supreme Court affirm the First Amended Findings and Fact and 
Conclusions of Law by sustaining the First Amended Judgment 
formulated by the trial court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this JC/tW day7 of December* 1986. 
;HOT'T6TO 
BISHOP & RONNOW, P. C. 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Respondents 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the jQfC\ ^ day of December, 1986, 
four (4) copies of the foregoing Respondents' Brief were delivered 
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< 
to the office of Mr. Hans Q. Chamberlain, Attorney for Appellants, 
at 250 South Main Street, Cedar City, pta.JK"j8A120, 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the JITL. day of December, 1986, one 
(1) copy of the foregoing Respondents' Brief was mailed to Mr. 
F. Kirk Heaton, Attorney at Law, Guardian for Elsie J. 
Brinkerhoff, at 70 North Main Street, Kknab, Utah 847^41, by first 
class mail, postage fully prepaid. 
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J^f***, 
WILLARD R. BISHOP, P.C. 
WILLARD R. BISHOP 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
P.O. Box 279 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Telephone: 586-9483 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF KANE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
MONT R. ANDERSON, Personal 
Representative of the Estate of 
CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, MARK J. 
BRINKERHOFF, GOLDA B. ADAIR, 
WARREN BRINKERHOFF, ARLENE 
B. GOULDING, CHARLES A. 
BRINKERHOFF, BETTY B. ESPLIN, 
DARLOS T. BRINKERHOFF, and 
JOHN DOES I through V, 
Defendants. 
COMPLAINT 
Civil No. im 
Comes now Plaintiff, by and through counsel, who complains 
of Defendants, and for cause of action alleges: 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
ACTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT 
1. The real property which is the subject of this 
action is located in Millard and Kane Counties, State of 
Utah, and this action arises out of the ownership, use, and 
possession of said real property. 
2. On or about 26 October 1966, a certain "Agreement" 
was entered into by ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, as SELLER, and CLOYD 
H. BRINKERHOFF and MARK J. BRINKERHOFF, BUYERS, covering the 
sale of certain real properties, located in Millard and Kane 
Counties, State of Utah. A copy of said "Agreement" is 
attached hereto, marked as Exhibit "A", and incorporated by 
this reference. The real property which is the subject 
matter of this action is more particularly described as 
follows: 
tv&xW*' 
PROPERTY LOCATED IN KANE COUNTY UTAH 
I. West 1/2 Section 25, Township 39 South, Range 4 1/2 
West, containing 320 acres. 
II. NW 1/4 SE 1/4, S 1/2 NE 1/4 Section 26, Township 39 
South, Range 4 1/2 West, containing 400 acres. 
III. Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, SE 1/4 NW 1/4, NE 1/4 SW 1/4, 
E 1/2 E 1/2, SE 1/4 NE 1/4, NW 1/4 SE 1/4; Section 
27, Township 39 South, Range 4 1/2 West, Salt 
Lake Meridian, containing 478.80 acres. 
IV. East 1/2 NE 1/4, S 1/4 SE 1/4, NW 1/4 SE 1/4, Section 
35, Township 39 South, Range 4 1/2 West, containing 
200 acres. 
V. SW 1/4 NE 1/4, W 1/2 SE 1/4, SE 1/4 SW 1/4, Section 
29, Township 40 South, Range 4 1/2 West, containing 
160 acres. 
VI. NW 1/4, E 1/2 SW 1/4, Section 30, Township 40 South, 
Range 4 1/2 West, containing 238.99 acres. 
VII. Lot 2, Section 5, Township 40 South, Range 4 1/2 
West, containing 39.08 acres. 
VIII. SW 1/4 NW 1/4, of Section 8, Township 40 South, 
Range 4 West, Salt Lake Meridian, containing 40 
acres. 
IX. Lot 1, Northeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of 
Section 31, Township 40 South, Range 4 1/2 West, 
containing 79.30 acres. 
X. Beginning at the Northwest Corner of the Northwest 
Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of Section 26, 
Township 40 South, Range 7 West, and running thence 
South 4.30 chains; thence South 70° East 15 chains 
to the middle of the channel of the creek; thence 
Northwesterly along the middle of the channel of said 
creek to the North Line of said Northwest Quarter of 
the Northeast Quarter; thence West 11.23 chains to 
the place of beginning, containing 11.77 acres. 
ALSO 
Beginning 4.30 chains South of the Northwest Corner 
of the Northwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of 
Section 26, Township 40 South, Range 7 West, Salt 
Lake Meridian, and running thence South 70° East 15 
chains to the middle of the channel of the creek; 
thence Southerly along the middle of the channel of 
said creek to the South line; thence North 73°45' 
West 14.60 chains; thence North 4.30 chains to the 
place of beginning, containing 5.60 acres. 
XI. Beginning at the S 1/4 corner of Section 23, Township 
40 South, Range 6 West, thence East 10.23 chains, 
N 80°W 6.36 chains, West 3.63 chains, S 1 chain to 
beginning, containing .74 acres. 
PERSONAL PROPERTY: 
XII. A one-fourth (1/4) interest in Hobble Canyon Reservoir 
(9-36-12) in Mohave County, Arizona. 
XIII. A one-half (1/2) interest in Sullivan Reservoir in 
Mohave County, Arizona. 
TOGETHER WITH all grazing privileges and permits annexed 
a 
to or based upon any of the foregoing real, personal, 
reservoir, or water rights as commensurate. 
XIV. Glendale Irrigation Company certificate No. 204, for 
9.1 shares of East Ditch Water, to ELSIE J., CLOYD 
H., and MARK J. BRINKERHOFF, dated 29 April 1967. 
XV. Glendale Irrigation Company, certificate No. 354, for 
10.4 shares of West Ditch Water, to ELSIE J., CLOYD H., 
and MARK J. BRINKERHOFF, dated 29 April 1967. 
MILLARD COUNTY UTAH 
XVI. Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4, Block 25, Plat "A", Delta 
Townsite. 
XVII. Lot 2, Block 26, Plat "A", Delta Townsite. 
3. Defendant ELSIE BRINKERHOFF received and accepted 
payments as specified in Exhibit "AM, thereby acknowledging 
the existence of said "Agreement". 
4. The "Agreement" was never recorded and all payments 
were made directly to Defendant ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, rather 
than into the established escrow. 
5. On or about 13 April 1971, Defendant ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, 
signed a certain "Affidavit", setting forth the sale of 
certain property to CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF and MARK J. BRINKERHOFF, 
and further stating that she would defend and protect the 
rights of Mark J. Brinkerhoff and Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff. A 
copy of said Affidavit is attached hereto, marked as Exhibit 
"BM, and incorporated by this reference. 
6. On or about 6 April 1977, Defendant ELSIE BRINKERHOFF 
signed a certain statement, having the statement duly notarized, 
stating that she had received the sum of $23,000.00 in 
payments on said property from Cloyd and Mark Brinkerhoff. 
A copy of the statement is attached hereto, marked as# Exhibit 
"C", and is incorporated by this reference. 
7. After the death of CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF, Defendant 
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF executed and recorded various deeds covering 
the above-described real property, to other individuals, in 
an attempt to cloud title to the above-described real property 
in passing to the Decedent's rightful heirs. 
8. By virtue of the execution and recordation of these 
subsequent deeds, Defendants' claims are adverse or hostile 
3 A 
to and in conflict with the interest of Plaintiff, and a 
dispute has arisen with respect to the parties' rights. 
9. The true names of Defendants DOE are unknown to 
Plaintiff. Upon discovery of such true names, Plaintiff 
reserves the right to substitute the same in place of the 
fictitious names used herein. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE 
10. The allegations of paragraphs 1 through 8, above, 
are incorporated by this reference as though fully set forth 
herein. 
11. On or about 26 October 1966, ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, as 
SELLER, and CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF and MARK BRINKERHOFF, as 
BUYERS, entered into a contract, wherein certain real property, 
grazing privileges, and water and reservoir rights in the 
States of Utah and Arizona were sold, in consideration of 
BUYERS paying to SELLER, the sum of FIFTY THREE THOUSAND 
THREE HUNDRED EIGHTY-EIGHT ($53,388.00) DOLLARS, payable at 
the rate of TWO THOUSAND ($2,000.00) DOLLARS per year, 
beginning November 1, 1968, BUYERS having paid the sum of 
FOUR THOUSAND DOLLARS ($4,000.00) for the years of 1966 and 
1967 at the time of execution of the contract. As a further 
condition to the contract, BUYERS agreed to pay to SELLER, 
for the entire remainder of SELLER'S life, irrespective of 
the amount to be paid under this contract, the sum of TWO 
THOUSAND DOLLARS per year, and if the contract was not paid 
in full at the time of the death of ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, the 
remainder would be paid to her heirs, equally, share and 
share alike. 
12. Plaintiff has duly performed all of its obligations 
under said contract, except payments for the last two (2) 
years, and as to such obligation, Plaintiff has offered and 
tendered full performance thereof, but Defendant ELSIE 
BRINKERHOFF has wrongfully refused and still refuses to 
accept the same. 
13. Defendant failed and refused, and still fails and 
^ 
refuses to perform her obligations under said contract. 
14. Plaintiff has no adequate legal remedy in that the 
real property is unique, having special value to Plaintiff, 
and is the type of which Plaintiff cannot obtain a duplicate. 
15. The contract, which is the subject matter of this 
action, is fair and equitable, and is supported by consideration 
as is shown by the above facts and by the fact that Defendant 
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, signed a certain notarized statement, 
Exhibit "C", stating that she had received, as of 6 April 
1977, the sum of $23,000.00 in payments on said property 
from Cloyd and Mark Brinkerhoff. 
16. By reson of Defendant ELSIE BRINKERHOFF's failure 
to perform the remainder of said contract according to its 
terms, Plaintiff has sustained damages in the amount of the 
fair market value of said property. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
ANTICIPATORY BREACH 
17. The allegations of paragraphs 1 through 8, above, 
are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 
18. In late fall of 1979, Plaintiff was informed that 
Defendant ELSIE BRINKERHOFF had executed and recorded various 
deeds covering the property which she previously sold to 
Plaintiff, in an attempt to pass title to other individuals 
not entitled thereto. 
19. Plaintiff has performed all conditions to be performed 
in the contract, and stands ready, willing, and able to 
continue said performance. 
20. The actions of the above-named Defendants in 
accepting and recording the various deeds covering the 
above-described real properties, when they were fully aware 
of the existence of the contract with Plaintiff, were done 
in anticipatory breach of Plaintiff's rights in and to the 
said property. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
QUIET TITLE 
21. The allegations of paragraphs 1 through 8, above, 
^s A 
are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 
22. Plaintiff's interest in and to the above-described 
real property is prior in time and right to those alleged 
claims of Defendants. 
23. The Estate of CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF, at all times 
pertinent to this action, had, and still has, an interest in 
and to certain real properties as above-described. 
24. By virtue of Defendant ELSIE BRINKERHOFF executing 
and recording subsequent deeds to the above-named Defendants, 
the claims are adverse or hostile to and in conflict with 
the interest of Plaintiff, and Plaintiff is entitled to an 
order of this Court, declaring and adjudging Plaintiff to be 
the owner, in fee simple, of his undivided one-half interest 
in and to the real property, and ordering Defendants, and 
each of them, and all persons claiming by, through, or under 
them, to have no estate, right, title, lien, or interest in 
and to Plaintiff's interest. 
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
DAMAGES 
25. The allegations of paragraphs 1 through 8, above, 
are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 
26. Alternatively, in the event the Court does not 
grant relief under the First through the Fourth Causes of 
Action, above, Plaintiff is entitled to damages for the 
current market value of the above-described real properties 
as may be determined by the Court. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for Judgm«nt against Defendants 
as follows: 
ON THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION: 
1. That the above-entitled Court determine and enter a 
declaratory Judgment determining the rights of the parties 
to this action to terminate the controversy or remove any 
uncertainty as to ownership of the above-entitled property. 
i 
2. For Plaintiff's costs of Court incurred in this 
action. 
3. For such other and further relief as the Court 
deems appropriate in this action. 
ON THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION: 
4. That Defendant ELSIE BRINKERHOFF be required to 
specifically perform said contract by accepting the payments 
as set forth in said contract. 
5. If specific performance cannot be granted, for 
damages in the amount of the fair market value of the property. 
6. For costs of Court incurred in this action. 
7. For such other and further relief as the Court 
deems appropriate in the premises. 
8. That the Court declare the deeds executed and 
recorded after the death of Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff to be null, 
void, and of no effect. 
ON THE THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION: 
9. That the above-entitled Court declare Defendant 
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF to be in anticipatory breach of her contract 
and award Plaintiff damages for the current market value of 
the above-described property. 
ON THE FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION: 
10. That Defendants, and all persons claiming by, 
through, or under them be required to set forth the nature 
of their claims to the above-described real property. 
11. That all adverse claims of said Defendants to the 
real property be determined by this Court. 
12. That this Court declare and adjudge that Plaintiff 
is the owner, in fee simple, of his undivided one-half (1/2) 
interest in and to said real property; and that Defendants, 
and each of them, and all persons claiming by, through, or 
under them, have no estate, right, title, lien, or interest 
in and to Plaintiff's interest. 
fe*^£f rr^ai "M: ~7*&:.i. 
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13. That this Court permanently enjoin and restrain 
Defendants, and each of them, and all persons claiming by, 
through, or under them, from asserting any claim whatsoever 
to Plaintifffs interest. 
14. For Plaintiff's costs incurred in this action. 
15. For such other and further relief as the Court 
deems appropriate. 
ON THE FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
16. That this Court determine the current market value 
of the above-described property and award Plaintiff damages 
accordingly. 
17. For Plaintiff's costs incurred in this action. 
18. For such other and further relief as the Court 
deem appropriate in the premises. 
DATED: q- June 1982 
JILLARD 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Plaintiff's Address 
Sahara Rancho Medical Center, Suite 201 
2320 South Rancho Drive 
Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 
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A G R E E M C N T 
TIII5 AGREEMENT, mode and entered into by and between ELSIE BRINKFRHeFr 
of Glendaie, .County of Kane, State of Utah, PARTY Cf: TME FIRST PART, herein-
••.;.• • y,;'..•:';* ; • •- ; '.\ .'-V* • •'•;.'.•.• ' :"*>t';:.V*-'•/;'>*/"' V^ ••••; ;oai*>s^Va';.»;/ooV ' V 'a* ^ v^-'o "^  • 
after referred to" as; the '"SELLER" and CLOYD^H."BRINKERHOFF and'MARK BRINKERHOFF 1 
: \ v A I 
i ,A " P U Y i J ^ j 
I o I: :> 
TiJAT WHEREAS, t h e SELLER i s "'he owner o f t h e re* . I p r o p e r J" v . o r ^ - i o . 
p r i v i l o cos arc! v -o tc r r i g h t s i n t h e S t a l e s o f U h e ; : ind Ar i / o / i . .•; 
AND WHEREAS, t h e BUYERS d e s i r e t o p u r c h a s e i l ie r>a;nc; 
AND WHEREAS, t h e p a r t i e s hove oc j r ced upon I•:-.)', . »:»a e >rK i J i \ns f r : r i h 
sa l e t h e r e o f ; 
NOW THEREFORE, in considerat ion of the premises and of the rr j tua/ 
r-^vpn^rt"*. ->-r? O T ^ A - ^ n t ' * . h o r e i n a ^ t ^ " " H * our- "f*r*r- •-•:•••;• I ••;• Per o l r, ..•r i » T :p r n r • 
. . . J I . ' ! « o ' v . o r . i ?;:< • ; K ; ! ; ( : : I * OS I u I I OV. S : • . •• ' • • . ' ' 
1. That for and in consideration of fhn Iota I sum of FIFTY THREE 
THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED EIGHTY-EIGHT ($53,308.00) DOLLARS, as the full consider* 
tion therefor, the SELLER covenants and agrees to sell and the BUYERS covenant 
and agree to buy the. follov/ing described real property, grazing privileges end 
water and reservoir rights in the States of. Utah and Arizona: 
R; AL PROPERTY IN MILLARD COUNTY, UTAH: 
I • ', 7. ", .ovJ ••'., r. •..*''••: 7r>, Pi--; !'\ , ;>olta T-v.r:o ro. 
;. . . 0 I - '; • , H I . ; . i>- i \' : . ••.. : '. 
REAL PROPERTY IN KANE COUNTY, UTAH; 
Township 39 South, Range 4£ West, Salt Lake Meridian: 
"./est Half of Section 7 % containing; 37") acres. 
fL'rt.u>ost Quarter; Soolhoast Quarlxr e;vj Iho Sou : i Mo. i f 
.:« the No'-thoasl Ou.srtor containing -'.l:.; acres, al! in 
-••..-..'i ^ n ..' , Tov.iisfii p oa South, R^n^ji: A •; West, S H": Laho 
* i 
1 
."••'.-r i L'I o n , c c n t a i r, i n-. acres, .v.. 
Lais 1, 7, 3, ane A; Southeast y'uarter of the North 
V.-'V- •' U f i ^ H - n r i M.....4 ' - •- « •• -
East Half of the Northeast Quarter; Soulah Ha l.f of Mic 
Southeast Quarter; Northwest Quarter of the Southeast 
Quarter of Section 35, containing 200 acres. .,..,*...***••. 
Township 40 South,- Range l| V/es't; Salt Lake Meridian: 
Sear ion •'.': Nnrthwcst Quarter: ilnst 11:1,' :<• I mi .Y.>u'• hv.« •• i 
Qii.ricr, :or. i\ai ni no 233.-V ncro::. 
Section 5: Lot 2, containing 52.03 ncrcr. 
Township -0 South, Range 4 V.'ost, Salt Lake Meridian: 
Soulhwost Quarter of Ihe Nor I hw^s {• Quarler W S'.viian •.', 
containing -vj acres. 
Township 60 South, Range 7 West, Salt Lake Meridian: 
Beginning at the Southwest Corner of the Southwest Quarter of 
the Southeast Quartan of -Section 23, Township 40 South, Range 
-7 ' *-».^f <"-.!-»- i -,f.. ,6 M - . r * r*' '• ••-" • - - ,:.... »•; .- , ..- r - .• -i ^  ~?. 
• i : • : ; •< • . • . ' ! . • : ' * • ' • . *~ • . ' • . . i t ; '. ••,. :\• c : \ . . . 
.";«... i ::';; :'•
 :<: ~.. " •
v
 2 01: t.'. 1 »: i» ' ' i • * he.;; i m i i . . .%.:\\ \ \\ \ ;• . /•" 
.-.•arc-... 
Beginning at the Northwest Corner of the Northwest Quarter of 
the Northeast Quarter of Section 26, Township 40 South, Range 
7 West, anc! running thence South 4.30 chains; thence South 70° 
East 15 chains to the middle of the channel of the creek; thence 
Northwesterly along the middle of the channel of said creek to 
the North/Li no of said Northwest Quarter of the Northeast 
Quarter; thence Viest 11.23 chains to the place of beginning. 
Beginning 4.30 chains South of the Northwest Corner of the 
Northwost Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of Section 22, 
Towr.' hi -> -2"; Sauth. 2ana-"- 7 V.'rr-t, Salt La;;.- Meridian ?.riti rjr-
•'.'. r . .•• • . - ; '• .' .* "' ' ; " •;. *-.\ ,v* I • \ \ \ r \\ aV !o • • '!' a 
• •-•'-••' .• ••'. ^ a :hainj; ihuncc North *.. ..^  ahainc to the 
place of begirning, containing 5.60 acres. 
The above three tracts being part of land situated in Sections 
23 and 26 of said township and ranqo, <;anict i'nes re for r o d to 
vn-..f f i ~i-.ll- y Lor "A". 
-, Sal i- I. 2 - fi-.ricii-..:,: 
PERGONAL PROPERTY: 
* The f o\ lowing .dosci-Uiod* water: end rfisorvprr rf ^fs:^ : . v 
• - • • . ' • • ' • • ; ^ : - ^ . - ^ - ' . > - r > i r i ; ^ • • ' ' • » . • . ' * • ' • • • • • • : • . • • • • . - ' - • • • • • • • • • . • ' . . • ' , • . . • . . 
-^xr^^' 
Arid o i l gror.in*;; p r i v i le^cr". - - r i»i :jor.'.ii t s K:H'-;.<'u !o o." .*.*" -ci 
i;i>;)n ony of the i c r c c p i n j r<":..}|, pcrr.on J ! , re. .-: - rvni r , --r water 
r i< ]ht~ or. com nonr-uri ' i tc. 
: ! o !.-•/ l!v 
v.-. i , or* )f.ii 
in? n ^ r t i o s l e r c o t:v.vr I .r .irv.; i n '".on:*i i :.Y,r.: r; -..n o; 
SLLLER t o ti-.n BUYERS of -the f orovjoi r..: .-v.:; .md per - . - . . ! <y\ •- -,r:i 
r e s e r v o i r r i j h t s find v ; r , j : : i n -j p r i v i \'.;•/-:
 t ! he t;l.JY!.i:', v.i I I ,>•'•; I*. ','.•.>• ' . I . I I I . ! ' !'..«• 
sum of TYiO THOUSAND ( $ " , 0 3 3 . 0 0 ) DOLLARS, csch y e a r , b e e i n e i i u j w i t h t h e 1st day 
of November, 1964, of which payments due on November 1 , 1964 and November 1 , 
:it: 
oocn yo-.'.ir ! : , cr^ J f t c r I"1' ;i ; i i i i r.i • '!'.)•/'"'.' . • : . '. i ; . ' : i ; :r . r... v: (e cr. ; i ' 
7!v." ^U'^C-NS • j - roe tii-j-f they v . i ! ' :>:•'/ t h e M r i . :' ! > 7 , 3 ) ' \ 0 " y^r czr r ;• 
/ 
t h e SELLER f o r tho e n t i r e r c r m i r d c r of SELLER'S l i f e i r r o r . p ^ c t i wx o: f l ic . r iuur . t 
wh ich may be pa id under t h i s c o n t r a c t whether i t o .xoods t h e t^.'•-': i c o n s i d e r s ! i ~ n 
here inabove r . r r ou t o r whether i h j ' ~:':~-' "*.! nno'.mt r h ^ I ! n o t be no i d by j - p l / i n o 
amount o f $2 ,000 .00 per year f o r t h e l i f e o f t h o SCLLER i r r o r j p e c t i vc of t h o 
amount which m y be pD id , t ho SELLPP waives i n t e r e s t upon t h e u "•;>•:» i d ho loner * , . 
I t i : ,-r.Jvi «:nd, : iOv.evrr, !; »i :.'••• •.: I d Iho v^vo I cons i dc r ^ i'i on h c r e i n -
; . ; v r •.!•.;.-;.:.•• .-,.:.v he po id h r ; - ;::;VE::S t o t i v SE'U.R dwr in - ; hrLI.ER'S i i f r t i r y 
i h : o i'.)->:: ' ; '• <" ' : t h •:> t ho E h l . U ^ • ••' ' , ';,::»ir; r o i . i . ' s l . ; ^ ::r. .;'.•• : i •.. .-.jrce-nenj 
••.'•'. rr* ;.r<" di 7! :,:; i l l p'lyvicr.ts Y.hlo'. ' \\r r.COii M.OO? ' , ' ' rotT;d' : r , : : . ' I I ho poir ; 
" • : - . - , : ! ' ' i ! i , ..*. pr-o'-'i cbd i . r o i n i r. o e n . l ' j r - . ^ , r .horPo :r>d r.r,'.-.r^ ; ! ; h e , ;"• 
;^l4tr^-f^^^L . 
;r2£iTi&A*i*ui*«— i~»- ,^.««-»*'-
^•s^aai*aM»*3ejw»:=--—""' 
^ r rcr i Br i : . ! \ :r ! iOi i -"I;K! Ohor U ( . . , = ' • ) ( 1 / ! « . : . 
t o each) of the balances duo U t . fcaing s t i pu.lated- t h a t JhQ .BUYERS together* wi th 
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und h i s wi f c as j o i n t t e n a n t s w i t h f u l l r i g h t s of s u r v i v o r s h i p , JJ.-.O S M J I I 
• r ov i oec .Miiri 
n:r. ; . :<T<.M
 :> 
r -»n1 ; i r.ed, 
:-.-:-c':c-' i'^r:..!C;ic;r: 
l f t i . c nUYI^ri Siv. ! ! .; . i : " -.! i • ' ; y M ; i ' , o: ; « i : . ; 
f j r .n .-sll t he - v V . r ."•,v«-v!.,.v.-; 'inr! ->,rr^;;; 
' i -v; i i .".St.-":! '-.lent ri-ic hereunder thr. L::';;"./.: D o o o s i l c r y 
s h a l l do l i v e r t o i h o BUYERS ?.!! t h ^ oscrov.od documents. 
I n t h e event of o de f . - ' ^ l t i n i he :i.v/mcnt o:' i-*y I n r t o I i -K 
,hp.£. 
?\i$£4f: 
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"son povnrnt of the f i 
interest shill bo given to tnc f;.!JYn:;~ hy the 3cl.!.;:r> ;inr' 
I to rc-ied/ th~ ' j-.^o sh:? I ' .":ervr; :,\\r< [•-.>• -. ^ orioo' of thirl- (:•:;) then the 
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As an alternative remedy 'i'ho SliLLFR may elect to reduce any payment 
,:\:i-N{-vr^v-'^.--;'.-';^' .;,.:..;: , , / .- . . ., ^ ' * Z ? i ? 
o r a l K^yments^acceiGra^ -balance-of princi'pa I 'and 
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:\.r'»r .-,;\c '".'<"* \:- \°'' ,;oss i na t i t l e in f " : . ; ^ !. •> i h ' - , ' : !J"o;/ ' 
i n ;hc manner p r o v i d e d hy law. 
Dur inc ] t h e p e r i o d t h e SUYiVRS a r e co.-r.p I y i n-;; \.i 
i! 
."/jree-;'/-in . th '^y '" :v*. I I he civ: i t l e d i . ; h o s o l o , r- •*!•:•. v p . a i i f : 
occupancy, and <o. joy^ont of the above dasc r ihod :>ro.)i :oo; . v j h j ' - . t . . . ! / i j i l .o 
r i c h t s of the StLlZR t„» i n s p c d t!;0 •. ..r; ,»t ro.jsor •<;!• •'•;.•.•.. 
' 1 . The BUYERS have inspected sa id premises c^ncl f i n d the sa-no in a 
-y.;;'.manner satisfactory4to them er^'J, there a r o n o covenants or warranties other 
Vi :•'. r.J i ! he j r the f.:, : ; ; ;v' ' : :-:; t > •'.:• I , 1 ho tr-ros , iu : '. :,;.o i , i ors »•. 
t h i s .\ijrce,ne:it \ .h ich s!v? I i h ind and i ;i:.ire t o th.-r; ! ;C;VM i t o.' ; he h e i r s , suc-
cesso rs , ^ncl ass icas or the p a r t i e s he re to and the par ty i n ccc a..: ! t ac rccs t : 
pay a l ! cosla, and aJreasonablo a t l omioy fs roe in ihc o / c n t o.r,'croc acn I* of t h i s 
contract is required. 
WITNESS the hands of the part ies hereto t h i s Jl^_ day of Q^jjSu^, 
s? I'X.G. 
^ '* ' ' ^ / * , A / 7 
SELLER 
C ioyd ! I. \',r i i i l -orh., r ' 
SUYC.^ S 
A F F I D A V I T 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF KANE ) < 
BEFORE ME, the undersigned Notary Public, personally appeared 
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, who stated under oath, as follows: 
That she has sold Real Property described hereinafter to Mark J. 
Brinkerhoff and Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff, and that she will defend the rights of own-
ership and also any rights of way of ingress or egress to the said Real Property. 
That she will enter into a lawsuit or any other procedure needed to protect these 
rights of ingress or egress, to said property. 
The real property is described as follows: 
BEGINNING at the South Quarter Corner of Section 23, Township 40 South, Range 7 
West, Salt Lake Meridian, Utah, and running thence East 10.23 chains; thence North 
80° West 6.36 cabins; thence West 3.68 chains; thence South 1 chain to the point 
of beginning. 
ALSO BEGINNING at the North Quarter Corner of Section 26, Township 40 South, Range 
7 West, Salt Lake teridian, Utah, and running thence South 8.6 chains; thence South 
73°45! East 14.6 chains; thence Northwesterly along the middle of the channel of 
the creek to the North boundary line of said Section 26; thence West 11.23 chains 
to the point of beginning. Containing 11.77 acres 
Total acres: 12.51 
That the Affiant will at any time help to defend and protect the 
rights of Mark J. Brinkerhoff and Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff as far as the Real Property 
is concerned. 
~£> "W X / J ^ j*n/W/SrJt* 
Elsie Brinkerhoff "P 
> 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this / / day of April, A.D. 1971, 
•//<Q zz****- (o/ise?*'^*'1-*'4^ ^ 
Notary Public
 /^*7 / • # , /, Jj,£ 
Residing at { Z J t d . ^ t l ^ ^ C ' ^ 
My commission expires » 
fi/.ty/r? 
EXHIBIT "B" 
^ J 
To whon i t pay concern: 
I t E l s i e BrlnkcrHoff, have rece ived from Clqyd 
/>n<1 Kark Hrlnkerhoff , ps payment on p r o p e r t y , 
Ilgned: "<fe J^^eJ^qAA^^Kt 
STATE OF UTAH ) SS, 
County of Kane 
0 n
 ^
h i s
 ("7*1 day o f flp-<.P 117^ 2 , personally 
appeared before me Elsie Brinkerhoff , the signer 
of the above and foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledged 
to me that she executed the same. 
Notary Public 
Residing at SfX^^?lri$:^ LlT\\£, 
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HANS Q. CHAMBERLAIN 
CHAMBERLAIN & CORRY 
Attorneys for Elsie Brinkerhoff, 
Golda B. Adair, Warren Brinkerhoff, 
Arlene B. Goulding, Charles A. 
Brinkerhoff, Betty.B. Esplin, 
and Darlos T. Brinkerhoff 
110 North Main Street, Suite G 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Telephone: (801) 586-4404 
I9^P 
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR KANE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MONT R. ANDERSON, Personal 
Representative of the Estate 
of CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, MARK J. 
BRINKERHOFF, GOLDA B. ADAIR, 
WARREN BRINKERHOFF, ARLENE 
B. GOULDING, CHARLES A. 
BRINKERHOFF, BETTY B. ESPLIN, 
DARLOS T. BRINKERHOFF, and 
JOHN DOES I through V, 
Defendants. 
ANSWER, CROSSCLAIM AND 
COUNTERCLAIM 
Civil No. 1826 
Comes now Defendants, Elsie Brinkerhoff, Golda B. Adair, 
Warren Brinkerhoff, Arlene B. Goulding, Charles A. Brinkerhoff, 
Betty B. Esplin, and Darlos T. Brinkerhoff by and through 
counsel, and hereby answer Plaintiff's Complaint as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a cause of action upon 
which relief can be granted. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
Darlos T. Brinkerhoff is not a proper party to this action, 
and said Defendant reserves the right to move to have Plain-
tiff's Complaint dismissed against her at the appropriate time. 
II 
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* COWWY 
ATttMNCTS AT 1AW 
no M. MAM • aurrc • 
p. e. warn ? M 
OOAII COT. 
ifTAM S47SO 
THIRD DEFENSE 
1. Answering paragraph one of Plaintiff's Complaint, 
Defendants admit that the real property which is the subject of 
this action is located in Kane County, Utah, but upon informa-
tion and belief, allege that the Millard County property was net 
and is not owned by Elsie Brinkerhoff, and for many years last 
past, has not been used or possessed by any of the parties named 
above. 
2. Answering paragraph two of Plaintiff's Complaint, 
Defendants admit that said Agreement was in fact entered into, 
but allege that the legal description outlined in Plaintiff's 
Complaint is in error as follows: 
a. Parcel No. II should be described as follows: 
NW h, SE h, S h NE H Section 26, 
Township 39 South, Range 4 h 
West, containing 400 acres. 
b. Parcel No. Ill should be described as follows: 
* Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, SE !| NW !j, N E ^ S W * , E 
h E h, SW*s NE h, NW h SE h; Section 27, 
Township 39 South, Range 4 H West, Salt 
Lake Meridian, containing 478.80 acres. 
c. Parcel No. IV should be described as follows: 
East % NE !j, S H SE h, NW h SE h, Section 
35, Township 39 South, Range 4 h West, 
containing 200 acres. 
d. Parcel No. XI should be described as follows: 
Beginning at the S h corner of Section 
23, Township 40 South, Range 7 West, 
thence East 10.23 chains, N 80° W 6.36 
chains, West 3.63 chains, S 1 chain to 
beginning, containing .74 acres. 
e. Parcel No. XIV was not described in said Agreement 
designated as Exhibit "A". Defendant Charles A. 
Brinkerhoff specifically alleges that he is the 
owner of the property described in Parcel XIV, and 
that Plaintiff has no right, title or interest in 
and to the same. 
f. Parcel No. XV, is not particularly described in 
said Agreement designated as Exhibit "A", but is 
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CKDAN C l T T . 
appropriately part of this action inasmuch as it 
was part of the water right originally owned by 
Merle Brinkerhoff, deceased, husband of Elsie 
Brinkerhoff, Defendant herein. 
g. Parcel Nos. XVI and XVII, while legally described 
in said Agreement, are not, and have not been for 
many years last past, owned by any of the parties 
to this litigation. Upon information and belief, 
Defendant believe that said property was lost by 
reason of non-payment of taxes prior to the tine 
the Agreement designated as Exhibit "A" was 
executed. 
3. Defendant Elsie Brinkerhoff admits that she received 
and accepted some of the payments required by Exhibit "A", but 
denies that she received all payments required thereunder, 
specifically alleging that payments were not made by buyers 
therein, Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff and Mark J. Brinkerhoff. 
4. Defendants admit that said Agreement was not recorded 
but specifically deny that all payments were made directly to 
Defendant Elsie Brinkerhoff. Defendants specifically allege 
that buyers therein, Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff and Mark J. 
Brinkerhoff were under an obligation to pay directly to the 
escrow as per the terms set forth in the Escrow Agreement. 
5. Defendant Elsie Brinkerhoff admits that her signature 
is upon the Affidavit referred to in Paragraph No. 5 of Plain-
tiff's Complaint. However, said Defendant alleges that said 
Affidavit was to be effective only so long as Mark J. 
Brinkerhoff and Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff complied with the terms of 
said Agreement. 
6. Defendant Elsie Brinkerhoff admits that she signed a 
certain statement which was notarized. However, she does not 
believe that at the time she signed said statement, the sum of 
$23,000.00 was filled in as now written. Furthermore, the same 
was not signed before a Notary Public even though the document 
bears a Notary's signature and seal. Said Defendant specifical-
ly alleges that she has not received the sum of $23,000.00 as 
payment from Cloyd and Mark Brinkerhoff. 
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7. Defendant Elsie Brinkerhoff admits that on June 4th, 
1979, a Warranty Deed was prepared from herself, as grantor, to 
Elsie Brinkerhoff, a widow, Mark J. Brinkerhoff, a married man, 
and Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff, a married man, all as joint tenants 
with full rights of survivorship, and not as tenants in common. 
However, said Defendant denies that said Deed was prepared, 
executed and recorded after the death of Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff 
inasmuch as it was prepared prior to the death of Cloyd H. 
Brinkerhoff. Said Deed was in a prepared state and brought to 
Elsie Brinkerhoff by Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff who requested that she 
sign the same which she did, and the Deed was thereafter appar-
ently recorded by Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff. Said Defendant specif-
ically denies that the Deed was an attempt to cloud title to the 
above-described real property. 
Upon the death of Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff, Defendant herein, 
Elsie Brinkerhoff and co-defendant Mark J. Brinkerhoff, owned or 
became entitled to said real property as surviving joint ten-
ants, each as to an undivided one-half interest. Thereafter, 
and on August 15th, 1980, Elsie Brinkerhoff executed a Warranty 
Deed to her undivided one-half interest in the subject property 
to Golda B. Adair, a married women, as to an undivided one-fifth 
interest, Warren Brinkerhoff, a married man, as to an undivided 
one-fifth interest; Arlene B. Goulding, a married women, as to 
an undivided one-fifth interest; Charles A. Brinkerhoff, a 
married man, as to an undivided one-fifth interest, and Betty B. 
Esplin, a married women, as to an undivided one-fifth interest. 
Simultaneously, each of said named grantees executed individual-
ly a Trust Deed Note in favor of Elsie Brinkerhoff with a 
principal sum of $10,000.00, and collectively a Trust Deed with 
a principal sum of $50,000.00 to secure payment of said 
obligation. Therefore the real property which is the subject of 
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this action is now subject to the Deed of Trust in favor of 
Defendant Elsie Brinkerhoff. 
8. Defendants admit that the execution and recordation of 
these Deeds and recorded instruments are adverse to the interest 
of Plaintiff. 
9. Defendants are without sufficient information to answer 
paragraph nine of Plaintiff's Complaint, and for lack of such 
information, specifically deny the same. 
10. Defendants incorporate by reference their answers to 
paragraphs one through nine as more specifically set forth 
herein. 
11. Defendants admit that said contract was entered into, 
but specifically allege that the first annual payment was to 
commence on November 1st, 1966, not November 1st, 1968. Like-
wise, said Agreement provides that the sum of $4,000.00 was to 
constitute payment for the years 1964 and 1965, and not 1966 and 
1967 as set forth in Plaintiff's Complaint. The balance of 
paragraph no. 11 is admitted. 
12. Defendants deny that Plaintiff has duly performed all 
of the obligations required by Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff and Mark J. 
Brinkerhoff. Defendant Elsie Brinkerhoff admits that two annual 
payments have been refused, inasmuch as said Agreement terminat-
ed many years last past by reason of said non-payment and 
non-performance by Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff and Mark J. Brinkerhoff. 
13. Defendant Elsie Brinkerhoff admits that she has refused 
to perform her obligations under said contract, but for the 
reason that said contract is terminated and without legal 
effect. 
14. Paragraph fourteen is denied. 
15. Defendants admit that when said contract was written it 
was intended to be fair and equitable to all parties. However, 
Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff and Mark J. Brinkerhoff failed to abide by 
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the terms of said contract, and pursuant to the escrow in-
structions set forth on paragraph four of said Agreement, Elsie 
Brinkerhoff, as seller, was not under any obligation to provide 
Notice of Default by reason of non-payment, and therefore, by 
operation of law, said contract terminated and became of no 
further force or effect when Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff and Mark J. 
Brinkerhoff as buyers, failed to perform and make payments 
according to the terms therein set forth. 
16. Paragraph sixteen is denied. 
17. Defendants incorporate by reference paragraphs one 
through eight as more specifically set forth herein. 
18. Defendants are without sufficient information to answer 
paragraph eighteen, and for lack of such information, specif-
I ically deny the same. 
19. Paragraph nineteen is denied. 
20. Paragraph twenty is denied. 
21. Defendants incorporate their answers to paragraphs one 
through eight as more specifically set forth herein. 
22. Paragraph twenty-two is denied. 
23. Paragraph twenty-three is denied, Defendants specif-
ically alleging that the contract terminated by operation of 
law, and that thereafter, the estate of Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff 
lost any interest in the subject project by reason of his 
ownership as a joint tenant and his subsequent death. 
24. Paragraph twenty-four is denied. 
25. Defendants incorporate their answers to paragraphs one 
through eight as more specifically set forth herein. 
26. Paragraph twenty-six is denied. 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The contract upon which Plaintiff relies is void by reason 
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of the failure on the part of Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff and Mark J. 
Brinkerhoff to perform according to the terms thereof. Defen-
dants specifically allege that said persons, as buyers therein, 
failed to pay according to the terms of said contract, and upon 
non-payment on a timely basis, the contract terminated by 
operation of law and without further notice to said persons. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Elsie Brinkerhoff, as the seller, and Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff 
and Mark J. Brinkerhoff as buyers, all recognizing the failure 
on the part of the buyers to perform according to the terms of 
the contract, including timely payments, voluntarily terminated 
said contract and became joint tenants of the subject property 
presumably as a means to settle any disputes created by said 
contract. Upon the death of Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff, the joint 
tenancy previously in existence was severed, and Elsie 
Brinkerhoff became entitled to an undivided one-half interest in 
the subject property and Mark J. Brinkerhoff became entitled to 
the remaining one-half interest. By reason of the same, Cloyd 
II. Brinkerhoff and his heirs and successors in interest, ceased 
to own any interest in the subject property. 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
This Plaintiff is precluded from recovery under the doc-
trines of waiver, estoppel, laches and the doctrine of unclean 
hands. 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff has failed to mitigate damages. 
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COUNTERCLAIM OF DEFENDANT ELSIE BRINKERHOFF AGAINST PLAINTIFF, 
AND CROSSCLAIM OF SAID DEFENDANT AGAINST MARK J. BRINKERHOFF. 
Comes now Defendant Elsie Brinkerhoff, and counterclaims 
against Plaintiff and crossclaims against co-defendant Mark J. 
Brinkerhoff as follows: 
1. Elsie Brinkerhoff, Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff and Mark J. 
Brinkerhoff entered into the Agreement as more particularly 
described as Exhibit "A" attached to Plaintiff's Complaint. 
2. In the event the Court determines that said Agreement 
is enforceable, Defendant Elsie Brinkerhoff is entitled to an 
accounting from the estate of Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff and from Mark 
J. Brinkerhoff, and payment of all unpaid amounts, together with 
interest on each unpaid payment at the highest legal rate. 
3. Plaintiff above-named claims an interest in the subject 
property adverse to the claim of Elsie Brinkerhoff. Said claim 
is without merit, and the Court should quiet title to an undi-
vided one-half interest in the subject property in the succes-
sors of Elsie Brinkerhoff, namely, Golda B. Adair, Warren 
Brinkerhoff, Arlene B. Goulding, Charles A. Brinkerhoff and 
Betty B. Esplin. 
4. Upon information and belief, Defendant Elsie 
Brinkerhoff alleges that the grazing permits may have been 
unlawfully transferred from her name into the names of Cloyd H. 
Brinkerhoff and/or Mark J. Brinkerhoff. In the event the Court 
determines that the contract was terminated and is of no legal 
force or effect, Defendant Elsie Brinkerhoff is entitled to an 
accounting and judgment against said persons or estates for all 
rents and/or other monies deprived from the use of said permits. 
5. Upon information and belief, Elsie Brinkerhoff alleges 
that Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff and/or Mark J. Brinkerhoff obtained 
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rents from coal or other mineral leases upon the subject proper-
ty, and she is entitled to an accounting of the same, and 
judgment for any amounts that may be due her according to law. 
6. At the time of the death of Merle Brinkerhoff, husband 
of Elsie Brinkerhoff, in 1960, he was the owner of sheep and 
other personal property. Upon information and belief, Defendant 
Elsie Brinkerhoff alleges that Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff and Mark J. 
Brinkerhoff unlawfully converted said sheep and other personal 
property to their own use without compensation to Elsie 
Brinkerhoff, and by reason of the same, she is entitled to a 
j| judgment over and against said individuals for the reasonable 
value of said property. 
7. By reason of the Agreement designated Exhibit "A", 
Defendant Elsie Brinkerhoff is entitled to a reasonable attor-
ney's fee rendered in the prosecution of this action, together 
with Court costs incurred. 
COUNTERCLAIM OF REMAINING DEFENDANTS AGAINST PLAINTIFF, AND 
CROSSCLAIM OF REMAINING DEFENDANTS AGAINST CO-DEFENDANT, MARK J. 
BRINKERHOFF. 
Comes now Defendants Golda B. Adair, Warren Brinkerhoff, 
Arlene B. Goulding, Charles A. Brinkerhoff and Betty B. Esplin, 
and counterclaims against Plaintiff and crossclaims against 
Defendant, Mark J. Brinkerhoff as follows: 
1. Plaintiff claims an interest in the subject property 
which is adverse to the ownership of said Defendants. Said 
claim is without merit, and the Court should quiet title in said 
named Defendants in the subject property as to their collective 
undivided one-half interest. 
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2. From and after the Deed from Elsie Brinkerhoff to said 
Defendants on August 15th, 1980, said Defendants became entitled 
to an undivided one-half interest ownership in said property, 
and became entitled to one-half of all rents, profits or other 
monies deprived from the use of said property. Upon information 
and belief, said Defendants allege that Defendant Mark J. 
Brinkerhoff has collected all rents and other profits. By 
reason of the same, said Defendants are entitled to an account-
ing from said Defendant and a judgment thereafter for one-half 
of any and all proceeds generated by or through the use of said 
property. 
3. Upon information and belief, said Defendants allege 
that Plaintiff and/or Mark J. Brinkerhoff have unlawfully 
obtained the grazing permits and water rights and that the same 
are now in their names. Defendants are entitled to one-half of 
all proceeds generated by or through the use of said permits, 
together with an accounting for the same, and are entitled to an 
undivided one-half ownership interest in said permits. 
4. The interest of Plaintiff is inferior to the collective 
undivided one-half interest owned by Defendants. By reason of 
the same, the Court should quiet title in favor of said Defen-
dants and against Plaintiff, and its heirs, successors, and 
assigns. 
WHEREFORE, Defendant, Elsie Brinkerhoff, prays judgment as 
follows: 
1. For judgment against Plaintiff, no cause of action. 
2. That in the event it is determined by the Court that 
the contract is still valid and binding, that the Court award to 
said Defendant all unpaid sums owed pursuant to said contract, 
together with interest at the highest legal rate. 
3. For an Order determining that Plaintiff has no right, 
title or interest in the subject property. 
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4. For an accounting as against Plaintiff and 
co-defendant, Mark J. Brinkerhoff, and a judgment for all sums 
due said Defendant. 
5. For an Order determining that, as a matter of law, said 
Agreement upon which Plaintiff relies is void and without legal 
effect. 
6. That the rights of each party be determined by the 
Court. 
7. This Court permanently enjoin and restrain Plaintiff, 
and all persons claiming by, through, or under them, from 
asserting a claim whatsoever to Defendant's interests as deter-
mined by the Court. 
8. For a reasonable attorney's fee rendered in the prose-
cution of this action, together with Court costs incurred. 
9. For such other and further relief as to the Court deems 
just and equitable. 
DEFENDANTS, GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF, ARLENE B. 
COULDING, CHARLES A. BRINKERHOFF AND BETTY B. ESPLIN PRAY FOR 
JUDGMENT AS FOLLOWS: 
1. For judgment against Plaintiff, no cause of action. 
2. That the Court determine the rights of all parties to 
this action. 
3. That this Court award to said Defendants their respec-
tive one-fifth interest of an undivided one-half interest in and 
to said real property. 
4. That this Court determine that Plaintiff has no estate, 
right, title, lien or interest in the subject property. 
5. For an accounting from Plaintiff and co-defendant Mark 
J. Brinkerhoff, and for any judgment to which said Defendants 
may be entitled arising out of their ownership in the subject 
property. 
11 
* r\ r 
;'•• i?&/&•<-;V^ftAi;jv ?• ^ :-*\J3??," V^y', 
•y. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
CHAMBERLAIN 
ft CORKY 
nrrmmmv AT LAW 
»fO M. MAM - SUITE • 
m, 0 . MM TM 
oaoAa c»rr. 
6. That this Court permanently enjoin and restrain Plain-
tiff, and all persons claiming by, through or under him, from 
asserting any claim whatsoever to the interests of Defendants. 
7. For costs of Court incurred herein. 
8. For such other and further relief as to the Court deems 
just and equitable. 
DATED this /"''' day of July, 1982. 
/ X.^ 
ANS Q. CHAMBERLAIN 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
This is to certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the within and foregoing ANSWER, CROSSCLAIM AND COUNTERCLAIM to 
Mr. Willard R. Bishop, Attorney for Plaintiff, P.O. Box 279, 
Cedar City, Utah 84720, and to Mr. Mark J. Brinkerhoff, 
Glendale, Utah, 84729, first class postage prepaid on this 
< « M day of July, 1982. 
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HANS Q. CHAMBERLAIN 
CHAMBERLAIN & CORRY 
Attorneys for Defendants 
110 North Main St., Suite G 
P. 0. Box 726 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
(801) 586-4404 
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
KANE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MONT R. ANDERSON, Personal 
Representative of the Estate 
of CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, MARK J. 
BRINKERHOFF, GOLDA B. ADAIR, 
WARREN BRINKERHOFF, ARLENE 
B. GOULDING, CHARLES A. 
BRINKERHOFF, BETTY B. ESPLIN, 
DARLOS T. BRINKERHOFF, and 
JOHN DOES I through V, 
Defendants. 
AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM OF ELSIE 
BRINKERHOFF AND CROSSCLAIM 
AGAINST MARK J. BRINKERHOFF 
AND 
AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM OF GOLDA 
B. ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF, 
ARLENE B. GOULDING, CHARLES A. 
BRINKERHOFF AND BETTY B. 
ESPLIN, AND AMENDED CROSSCLAIM 
OF SAID DEFENDANTS AGAINST CO-
DEFENDANT, MARK J. BRINKERHOFF 
Civil No. 1826 
Comes now Defendant Elsie Brinkerhoff, and counterclaims 
against Plaintiff and crossclaims against Co-Defendant Mark J. 
Brinkerhoff as follows: 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
1. Elsie Brinkerhoff, Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff and Mark J. 
Brinkerhoff entered into the Agreement as more particularly 
described as Exhibit "A" attached to Plaintiff's Complaint. 
2. In the event the Court determines that said Agreement 
is enforceable, Defendant Elsie Brinkerhoff is entitled to an 
accounting from the estate of Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff and from Mark 
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J. Brinkerhoff, and payment of all unpaid amounts, together with 
interest on each unpaid payment at the highest legal rate. 
3. Plaintiff and Cross-Defendant Mark J. Brinkerhoff, 
claim an interest in the subject property adverse to the claim 
of Elsie Brinkerhoff. Said claim is without merit, and the 
Court should quiet title to all of said real property, personal 
property and water rights in the successors of Elsie 
Brinkerhoff, namely, Golda B. Adair, Warren Brinkerhoff, Arlene 
B. Goulding, Charles A. Brinkerhoff and Betty B. Esplin. 
4. Upon information and belief, Defendant Elsie 
Brinkerhoff alleges that the grazing permits described in the 
Purchase Agreement may have been unlawfully transferred from her 
name into the names of Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff and/or Mark J. 
Brinkerhoff. Said transfer was without authority from Elsie 
Brinkerhoff, and the estate of Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff and Mark J. 
Brinkerhoff have no right, title or interest in said grazing 
permits. In the event the Court determines that the contract 
(Exhibit "A") was terminated and is of no legal force or effect, 
Defendant Elsie Brinkerhoff, her successors and assigns, are 
entitled to the return of said permits, or for the reasonable 
value thereof as damages, and to an accounting and judgment 
against said persons or estates for all rents and/or other 
monies derived from the use or transfer of said permits. 
5. Upon information and belief, Elsie Brinkerhoff alleges 
that Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff and/or Mark J. Brinkerhoff obtained 
rents from coal or other mineral leases upon the subject 
property, and she is entitled to an accounting of the same, and 
judgment for any amounts that may be due her according to law* 
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6. At the time of the death of Merle Brinkerhoff, husband 
of Elsie Brinkerhoff in I960, he was the owner of sheep and 
other personal property. Upon information and belief, Defendant 
Elsie Brinkerhoff alleges that Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff and Mark J, 
Brinkerhoff unlawfully converted said sheep and other personal 
property to their own use without compensation to Elsie 
Brinkerhoff, and by reason of the same, she is entitled to a 
judgment over and against said individuals for the reasonable 
value of said property. 
7. By reason of the Agreement designated Exhibit "A", 
Defendant Elsie Brinkerhoff is entitled to a reasonable 
attorney's fee rendered in the prosecution of this action, 
together with Court costs incurred. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
8. Defendant Elsie Brinkerhoff incorporates by reference 
Paragraphs 1 through 7 of her First Cause of Action, and for an 
additional cause of action alleges and contends as follows: 
9. On August 15th, 1980, Elsie Brinkerhoff conveyed by 
Warranty Deed, all her right, title and interest in the subject 
property to Golda B. Adair, Warren Brinkerhoff, Arlene B. 
Goulding, Charles A. Brinkerhoff and Betty B. Esplin. 
10. In the event it is determined that said Warranty Deed 
did not cover water rights and personal property as more 
particularly described in the Agreement dated October 26th, 
1966, between herself as Seller and Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff and 
Mark J. Brinkerhoff, as Buyers, then and in that event, 
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Defendant Elsie Brinkerhoff is entitled to all interest in the 
same by reason of the termination of said Purchase Agreement. 
11. By reason of the foregoing, the Court should quiet 
title in Elsie Brinkerhoff, her successors and assigns to all 
real 
property, personal property and water rights described in said 
Purchase Agreement and to determine as a matter of law, that 
Plaintiff and Mark J. Brinkerhoff have no right, title or 
interest in the same, and that they should be permanently 
enjoined from claiming any interest in said property. 
AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM OF DEFENDANTS 
GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF, ARLENE B. GOULDING, 
CHARLES A. BRINKERHOFF AND BETTY B. ESPLIN AGAINST 
PLAINTIFF AND AMENDED CROSSCLAIM OF SAID DEFENDANTS 
AGAINST CO-DEFENDANT MARK J. BRINKERHOFF 
Comes now Defendants Golda B. Adair, Warren Brinkerhoff, 
Arlene B. Goulding, Charles A. Brinkerhoff and Betty B. Esplin, 
and counterclaims against Plaintiff and crossclaims against 
Defendant Mark J. Brinkerhoff, as follows: 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
1. By reason of the failure on the part of Plaintiff and 
Cross-Defendant Mark J. Brinkerhoff, to pay and perform 
according to the terms of the Agreement dated October 26th, 
1966, all real and personal property described in said Agreement 
became the sole, separate and absolute property of Defendant 
Elsie Brinkerhoff. 
2. On August 15th, 1980, Elsie Brinkerhoff, a widow, 
conveyed to Golda B. Adair, Warren Brinkerhoff, Arlene B. 
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Goulding, Charles A. Brinkerhoff and Betty B. Esplin, said 
property, each as to an undivided one-fifth interest. 
3. By reason of the same, said Grantees own said real 
property, personal property and water rights described therein, 
to the exclusion of Plaintiff and Cross-Defendant Mark J. 
Brinkerhoff. 
4. By reason of the foregoing, the Court should quiet 
title to all real property, personal property and water rights 
in Golda B. Adair, as to an undivided one-fifth interest; Warren 
Brinkerhoff, as to an undivided one-fifth interest; Arlene B. 
Goulding, as to an undivided one-fifth interest; Charles A. 
Brinkerhoff, as to an undivided one-fifth interest and Betty B. 
Esplin, as to an undivided one-fifth interest. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
5. Said Defendants incorporate by reference Paragraphs 1, 
3, 3 and 4, of their First Cause of Action, and for an 
additional cause of action allege and contend as follows: 
6. From and after the conveyance of the Warranty Deed from 
Elsie Brinkerhoff to said Defendants on August 15th, 1980, said 
Defendants became entitled to the entire ownership of said 
property, and became entitled to all rents, profits or other 
monies derived from the use of said property. Upon information 
and belief, said Defendants allege that Defendant Mark J. 
Brinkerhoff has collected all rents and other profits. By 
reason of the same, said Defendants are entitled to an 
accounting from said Defendant and a judgment thereafter for all 
proceeds generated by or through the use of said property. 
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7. Upon information and belief, said Defendants allege 
that Plaintiff and/or mark J. Brinkerhoff have unlawfully 
obtained the grazing permits and water rights and that the same 
are now in their names. Defendants are entitled to all proceeds 
generated by or through the use of said property, together with 
an accounting for the same, and are entitled to the ownership 
interest in said property. 
8. The interests of Plaintiff and Mark J. Brinkerhoff are 
inferior to the collective interests owned by Defendants. By 
reason of the same, the Court should quiet title in favor of 
said Defendants and against Plaintiff and Mark J. Brinkerhoff 
and their heirs, successors, and assigns. 
WHEREFORE, Defendant Elsie Brinkerhoff prays for judgment 
as follows: 
1. For judgment against Plaintiff, no cause of action. 
2. That in the event it is determined by the Court that 
the contract is still valid and binding, that the Court award to 
said Defendant all unpaid sums owed pursuant to said contract, 
together with interest at the highest legal rate. 
3. For an order determining that Plaintiff and 
Co-Defendant Mark J. Brinkerhoff, have no right, title or 
interest in the subject property. 
4. For an accounting as against Plaintiff and Co-Defendant 
Mark J. Brinkerhoff, and a judgment for all sums due said 
Defendant. 
5. For an order determining that, as a matter of law, said 
Agreement upon which Plaintiff and Mark J. Brinkerhoff rely, is 
void and without legal effect. 
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6. That the rights of each party be determined by the 
Court. 
7. That this Court permanently enjoin and restrain 
Plaintiff, and Defendant Mark J. Brinkerhoff, and all persons 
claiming by, through or under them, from asserting a claim 
whatsoever to Defendant Elsie Brinkerhoff's interest as 
determined by this Court. 
8. For a reasonable attorney's fee rendered in the 
prosecution of this action, together with court costs incurred. 
9. For such other and further relief as to the Court deems 
just and equitable. 
DEFENDANTS, GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF, ARLENE B. 
GOULDING, CHARLES A. BRINKERHOFF AND BETTY B. ESPLIN PRAY FOR 
JUDGMENT AS FOLLOWS: 
1. For judgment against Plaintiff, no cause of action. 
2. That the Court determine the rights of all parties to 
this action. 
3. That this Court award to said Defendants all of the 
real property, personal property and water rights which are the 
subject of this action pursuant to the deed from Elsie 
Brinkerhoff to them as grantees, said deed dated August 15th, 
1980. 
4. As an alternative remedy, that this Court award to said 
Defendants their respective one-fifth interest of an undivided 
one-half interest in and to said real property. 
5. .That this Court determine that Plaintiff and Mark J. 
Brinkerhoff have no estate, right, title, lien or interest in 
the subject property. 
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6. For an accounting from Plaintiff and Co-Defendant Mark 
J. Brinkerhoff, and for any judgment to which said efendants 
may be entitled arising out of their ownership in t; e subject 
property. 
6. That this Court permanently enjoin and restrain 
Plaintiff, and Defendant Mark J. Brinkerhoff, and all persons 
claiming byf through or under them, from asserting any claim 
whatsoever to the interests of said Defendants. 
7. For a reasonable attorney's fee rendered in the 
prosecution vf this action, together with costs of court 
incurred herein. 
8. For such other and further relief as to the Court deems 
just and equitable. 
DATED this ^J^l^r day of September, 1982. 
HANS Q. CHAMBERLAIN 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the within and foregoing AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM OF ELSIE 
BRINKERHOFF AND CROSSCLAIM AGAINST MARK J. BRINKERHOFF AND 
AMENDED CROSSCLAIM OF GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF, ARLENE 
B. GOULDING, CHARLES A. BRINKERHOFF AND BETTY B. ESPLIN, AND 
AMENDED CROSSCLAIM OF SAID DEFENDANTS AGAINST CO-DEFENDANT, MARK 
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\ 
J. BRINKERHOFF to Mr. Willard R. Bishop, Attorney for Plaintiff, 
P. 0. Box 279, Cedar City, Utah 84720, and to Mr. Mark J. 
Brinkerhoff, Glendale, Utah 83729, first class postage prepaid 
on this ...S*^ day of September, 1982. 
- i ^ -/,(/M-——— 
Secretary / 
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WILLARD R. BISHOP, P.C. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
36 North 300 West 
P.O. Box 279 
Cedar City, UT 84720 
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Telephone: 586-9483 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF KANE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
°<Ti 
MONT R. ANDERSON, Personal 
Representative of the Estate 
of CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF, 
Plaintiff, 
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, MARK J. 
BRINKERHOFF, GOLDA B. ADAIR, 
WARREN BRINKERHOFF, ARLENE 
B. GOULDING, CHARLES A. 
BRINKERHOFF, BETTY B. ESPLIN, 
DARLOS T. BRINKERHOFF, and 
JOHN DOES I through V, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE OF DISMISSAL 
AS TO DEFENDANTS CHARLES 
BRINKERHOFF AND BETTY B. 
ESPLIN 
Civil No. 1826 
Comes now Plaintiff, by and through counsel, and pursuant 
to the provisions of URCP 41(a)(1), prior to the service by 
Defendants CHARLES BRINKERHOFF and BETTY B. ESPLIN of an Answer 
or of a Motion for Summary Judgment, and gives notice of 
dismissal of the Complaint in this action as to said Defendants 
CHARLES BRINKERHOFF and BETTY B. ESPLIN. 
e September 1982 DATED: 
MILLARD ft. BISHOP 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
SERVED the within and foregoing NOTICE OF DISMISSAL AS TO 
DEFENDANTS CHARLES BRINKERHOFF AND BETTY B. ESPLIN upon the 
following: 
Mr. Hans Q. Chamberlain 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 726 
Cedar City, UT 84720 
Mr. Mark J. Brinkerhoff 
Glendale, UT 84729 
Mr. Charles A. Brinkerhoff 
P.O. Box 64 
Orderville, UT 84758 
Mrs. Betty B. Esplin 
P.O. Box 85 
Orderville, UT 84758 
i 
c-,v. 
first class postage fully prepaid this jyki^- day of September 
1982. 
^
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HANS Q. CHAMBERLAIN 
CHAMBERLAIN & CORRY 
Attorneys for Defendants 
110 North Main St., Suite G 
P. 0. Box 726 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Telephone: (801) 586-4404 
S&gM*** 
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
KANE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MONT R. ANDERSON, Personal 
Representative of the Estate 
of CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, MARK J. 
BRINKERHOFF, GOLDA B. ADAIR, 
WARREN BRINKERHOFF, ARLENE 
B. GOULDING, CHARLES A. 
BRINKERHOFF, BETTY B. ESPLIN, 
DARLOS T. BRINKERHOFF, and 
JOHN DOES I through V, 
Defendants. 
WITHDRAWAL OF ATTORNEY FOR 
CHARLES A. BRINKERHOFF AND 
BETTY B. ESPLIN 
Civil No. 1826 
Comes now Hans Q. Chamberlain, and hereby gives notice that 
he withdraws as counsel of record for Defendants, Charles A. 
Brinkerhoff and Betty B. Esplin. 
DATED this 2nd day of December, 1982. 
CERTIFICTE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the within and foregoing WITHDRAWAL to Mr. Willard R. Bishop, 
Attorney for Plaintiffs, P. 0. Box 279, Cedar City, Utah 84720, 
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first class postage prepaid on this , ^  "^ day of December, 
1982. 
/ ^ W ^ w -
Secretary y 
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HANS Q. CHAMBERLAIN 
CHAMBERLAIN & CORRY 
Attorneys for Defendants 
110 North Main St., Suite G 
P. O. Box 726 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
(801) 586-4404 
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
KANE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MONT R. ANDERSON, Personal 
Representative of the Estate 
of CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, MARK J. 
BRINKERHOFF, GOLDA B. ADAIR, 
WARREN BRINKERHOFF, ARLENE 
B. GOULDING, CHARLES A. 
BRINKERHOFF, BETTY B. ESPLIN, 
DARLOS T. BRINKERHOFF, and 
JOHN DOES I through V, 
Defendants. 
SECOND AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM 
OF ELSIE BRINKERHOFF AND 
CROSSCLAIM AGAINST MARK J. 
BRINKERHOFF 
AND 
SECOND AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM 
OF GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN 
BRINKERHOFF, ARLENE B. 
GOULDING, CHARLES A. 
BRINKERHOFF AND BETTY B. 
ESPLIN, AND AMENDED CROSSCLAIM 
OF SAID DEFENDANTS AGAINST CO-
DEFENDANT, MARK J. BRINKERHOFF 
Civil No. 1826 
Comes now Defendant Elsie Brinkerhoff, and counterclaims 
against Plaintiff and crossclaims against Co-Defendant Mark J. 
Brinkerhoff as follows: 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
1. Elsie Brinkerhoff, Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff and Mark J. 
Brinkerhoff entered into the Agreement as more particularly 
described as Exhibit "A" attached to Plaintiff's Complaint. 
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2. In the event the Court determines that said Agreement 
is enforceable, Defendant Elsie Brinkerhoff is entitled to an 
accounting from the estate of Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff and from Mark 
J. Brinkerhoff, and payment of all unpaid amounts, together with 
interest on each unpaid payment at the highest legal rate. 
3. Plaintiff and Cross-Defendant Mark J. Brinkerhoff, 
claim an interest in the subject property adverse to the claim 
of Elsie Brinkerhoff. Said claim is without merit, and the 
Court should quiet title to all of said real property, personal 
property and water rights in the successors of Elsie 
Brinkerhoff, namely, Golda B. Adair, Warren Brinkerhoff, Arlene 
B. Goulding, Charles A. Brinkerhoff and Betty B. Esplin. 
4. Upon information and belief, Defendant Elsie 
Brinkerhoff alleges that the grazing permits described in the 
Purchase Agreement, or Taylor-Grazing Rights, BLM Grazing Rights 
and Forest Service Grazing Rights which were not described in 
said Agreement, but were appertenant to and used collectively 
with the real property which is the subject of this action, may 
have been unlawfully transferred from her name into the names of 
Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff and/or Mark J. Brinkerhoff. Said transfer 
was without authority from Elsie Brinkerhoff, and the estate of 
Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff and Mark J. Brinkerhoff have no right, 
title or interest in said grazing permits. In the event the 
Court determines that the contract (Exhibit "A") was terminated 
and is of no legal force or effect, Defendant Elsie Brinkerhoff, 
her successors and assigns, are entitled to the return of said 
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permits, or for the reasonable value thereof as damages, and to 
an accounting and judgment against said persons or estates for 
all rents and/or other monies derived from the use or transfer 
of said permits. 
5. Upon information and belief, Elsie Brinkerhoff alleges 
that Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff and/or Mark J. Brinkerhoff obtained 
rents from coal or other mineral leases upon the subject 
property, and she is entitled to an accounting of the same, and 
judgment for any amounts that may be due her according to law. 
6. At the time of the death of Merle Brinkerhoff, husband 
of Elsie Brinkerhoff in 1960, he was the owner of sheep and 
other personal property. Upon information and belief, Defendant 
Elsie Brinkerhoff alleges that Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff and Mark J. 
Brinkerhoff unlawfully converted said sheep and other personal 
property to their own use without compensation to Elsie 
Brinkerhoff, and by reason of the same, she is entitled to a 
judgment over and against said individuals for the reasonable 
value of said property. 
7. By reason of the Agreement designated Exhibit "A", 
Defendant Elsie Brinkerhoff is entitled to a reasonable 
attorney's fee rendered in the prosecution of this action, 
together with Court costs incurred. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
8. Defendant Elsie Brinkerhoff incorporates by reference 
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Paragraphs 1 through 7 of her First Cause of Action, and for an 
additional cause of action alleges and contends as follows: 
9. On August 15th, 1980, Elsie Brinkerhoff conveyed by 
Warranty Deed, all her right, title and interest in the subject 
property to Golda B. Adair, Warren Brinkerhoff, Arlene B. 
Goulding, Charles A. Brinkerhoff and Betty B. Esplin. 
10. In the event it is determined that said Warranty Deed 
did not cover water rights, grazing rights, and personal 
property as more particularly described in the Agreement dated 
October 26th, 1966, between herself as Seller and Cloyd H. 
Brinkerhoff and Mark J. Brinkerhoff, as Buyers, then and in that 
event, Defendant Elsie Brinkerhoff is entitled to all interest 
in the same by reason of the termination of said Purchase 
Agreement. 
11. By reason of the foregoing, the Court should quiet 
title in Elsie Brinkerhoff, her successors and assigns to all 
real property, personal property, grazing rights, and water 
rights described in said Purchase Agreement, or which belonged 
to her as a matter of law or were used in conjunction with the 
real property which is the subject of this action, and to 
determine as a matter of law, that Plaintiff and Mark J. 
Brinkerhoff have no right, title or interest in the same, and 
that they should be permanently enjoined from claiming any 
interest in said property. 
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THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
12. Defendant Elsie Brinkerhoff incorporates by reference 
paragraphs 1 through 7 of her First Cause of Action and 
paragraphs 9 through 11 of her Second Cause of Action, and for 
an additional cause of action alleges and contends as follows: 
13. On or about June 4 th, 1919, Defendant Elsie 
Brinkerhoff, by Warranty Deed, conveyed real property more 
particularly described therein, to herself, Mark J. Brinkerhoff 
and Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff, as joint tenants with full rights of 
survivorship and not as tenants in common. Said Deed has been 
recorded in the Office of the Kane County Recorder, and the 
claims of Plaintiff and Defendant Mark J. Brinkerhoff, are in 
part based upon said Warranty Deed. 
14. At the time said Deed was presented to Defendant Elsie 
Brinkerhoff for signature, it was represented to her by Mark J. 
Brinkerhoff and Cloyd H, Brinkerhoff, that they were entitled to 
the real property more particularly described therein, when in 
fact they were not for the reason that they have not paid to 
Elsie Brinkerhoff all sums required of them, 
15. Said Deed was signed by Elsie Brinkerhoff based upon 
the fraud and misrepresentation of Mark J. Brinkerhoff and Cloyd 
H. Brinkerhoff, and by reason of the same, the Court should 
declare null and void and without legal force or effect, said 
Warranty -Deed, and order the same stricken from the records of 
Kane County, Utah, and order all property described therein to 
be quieted in Elsie J. Brinkerhoff. 
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16. As an alternative request for relief, Defendant Elsie 
J. Brinkerhoff alleges upon information and belief, that 
herself, as the grantor, and Mark J. Brinkerhoff and Cloyd H. 
Brinkerhoff, as grantees, were mutually mistaken as to the facts 
which would require Elsie J. Brinkerhoff to execute said Deed or 
facts which would entitle Mark J. Brinkerhoff and Cloyd H. 
Brinkerhoff to receive said real property. By reason of said 
mutual mistake of fact, said Deed is void and without legal 
effect, and the Court should order the same stricken and removed 
from the records of Kane County, Utah. 
17. Said Deed is also invalid for lack of consideration and 
said grantees named therein should not be entitled to benefit 
from said Deed under the Doctrine of Unclean Hands. 
18. The Court should rule, as a matter of law, that all 
real property described in said Warranty Deed is therefore 
vested in Defendant Elsie J. Brinkerhoff, or her successors, or 
her successors and assigns. 
SECOND AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM OF DEFENDANTS 
GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF AND ARLENE B. GOULDING, 
AGAINST PLAINTIFF AND AMENDED CROSSCLAIM OF SAID 
DEFENDANTS AGAINST CO-DEFENDANT MARK J. BRINKERHOFF 
Comes now Defendants Golda B. Adair, Warren Brinkerhoff, 
and Arlene B. Goulding, and counterclaims against Plaintiff and 
crossclaims against Defendant Mark J. Brinkerhoff, as follows: 
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FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
1. By reason of the failure on the part of Plaintiff and 
Cross-Defendant Mark J. Brinkerhoff, to make payments and 
perform according to the terms of the Agreement dated October 
26th, 1966, all real property, water rights, personal property, 
Taylor-Grazing Rights, BLM Grazing Rights and Forest Service 
Grazing Rights became the sole, separate and absolute property 
of Defendant Elsie Brinkerhoff. 
2. On August 15th, 1980, Elsie Brinkerhoff, a widow, 
conveyed to Golda B. Adair, Warren Brinkerhoff, Arlene B. 
Goulding, Charles A. Brinkerhoff and Betty B. Esplin, said 
property, each as to an undivided one-fifth interest. 
3. By reason of the same, said Grantees own said real 
property, personal property, grazing rights, and water rights 
described therein, to the exclusion of Plaintiff and 
Cross-Defendant Mark J. Brinkerhoff* 
4. By reason of the foregoing, the Court should quiet 
title to all real property, personal property, Taylor-Grazing 
Rights, BLM Grazing Rights and Forest Service Rights, and water 
rights, in Golda B. Adair, as to an undivided one-fifth 
interest; Warren Brinkerhoff, as to an undivided one-fifth 
interest; Arlene B. Goulding, as to an undivided one-fifth 
interest; Charles A. Brinkerhoff, as to an undivided one-fifth 
interest.and Betty B. Esplin, as to an undivided one-fifth 
interest. 
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SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
5. Said Defendants incorporate by reference Paragraphs 1, 
2, 3 and 4, of their First Cause of Action, and for an 
additional cause of action allege and contend as follows: 
6. From and after the conveyance of the Warranty Deed fron 
Elsie Brinkerhoff to said Defendants on August 15th, 1980, said 
Defendants became entitled to the entire ownership of said 
property, and became entitled to all rents, profits or other 
monies derived from the use of said property. Upon information 
and belief, said Defendants allege that Defendant Mark J. 
Brinkerhoff has collected all rents and other profits. By 
reason of the same, said Defendants are entitled to an 
accounting from said Defendant and a judgment thereafter for all 
proceeds generated by or through the use of said property. 
7. Upon information and belief, said Defendants allege 
that Plaintiff and/or Mark J. Brinkerhoff have unlawfully 
obtained the grazing permits and water rights and that the same 
are now in their names. Defendants are entitled to all proceeds 
generated by or through the use of said property, together with 
an accounting for the same, and are entitled to the ownership 
interest in said property. 
8. The interests of Plaintiff and Mark J. Brinkerhoff are 
inferior to the collective interests owned by Defendants. By 
reason o£ the same, the Court should quiet title in favor of 
said Defendants and against Plaintiff and Mark J. Brinkerhoff 
and their heirs, successors, and assigns. 
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WHEREFORE, Defendant Elsie Brinkerhoff prays for judgment 
as follows: 
1. For judgment against Plaintiff, no cause of action. 
2. That in the event it is determined by the Court that 
the contract is still valid and binding, that the Court award to 
said Defendant all unpaid sums owed pursuant to said contract, 
together with interest at the highest legal rate. 
3. For an order determining that Plaintiff and 
Co-Defendant Mark J. Brinkerhoff, have no right, title or 
interest in the real property, water rights and grazing rights 
(whether described in the Purchase Agreement or not), as more 
particularly set forth above. 
4. For an accounting as against Plaintiff and Co-Defendant 
Mark J. Brinkerhoff, and a judgment for all sums due said 
Defendant. 
5. For an order determining that, as a matter of law, said 
Agreement upon which Plaintiff and Mark J. Brinkerhoff rely, is 
void and without legal effect. 
6. That the rights of each party be determined by the 
Court. 
7. That this Court permanently enjoin and restrain 
Plaintiff, and Defendant Mark J. Brinkerhoff, and all persons 
claiming by, through or under them, from asserting a claim 
whatsoever to Defendant Elsie Brinkerhoff's interest as 
determined by this Court. 
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8. For an order declaring that a certain Warranty Deed 
dated June 4th, 1979 is void and of no legal effect, and 
ordering the same stricken from the records of kane County, Utah 
and declaring that Defendant Elsie J. Brinkerhoff, her 
successors and assigns, are entitled to all property as more 
particularly described therein. 
9. For a reasonable attorney's fee rendered in the 
prosecution of this action, together with court costs incurred. 
10. For such other and further relief as to the Court deems 
just and equitable. 
DEFENDANTS, GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF, AND ARLENE 
B. GOULDING, PRAY FOR JUDGMENT AS FOLLOWS: 
1. For judgment against Plaintiff, no cause of action. 
2. That the Court determine the rights of all parties to 
this action. 
3. That this Court award to said Defendants all of the 
real property, water rights, personal property, Taylor-Grazing 
Rights, BLM Grazing Rights and Forest Service Rights which are 
the subject of this action pursuant to the deed from Elsie 
Brinkerhoff to them as grantees, said deed dated August 15th, 
1980. 
4. As an alternative remedy, that this Court award to said 
Defendants their respective one-third interest of an undivided 
one-half interest in and to said real property. 
10 
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5. That this Court determine that Plaintiff and Mark J. 
Brinkerhoff have no estate, right, title, lien or interest in 
the subject property* 
6. For an accounting from Plaintiff and Co-Defendant Mark 
J. Brinkerhoff, and for any judgment to which said Defendants 
may be entitled arising out of their ownership in the subject 
property. 
7. That this Court permanently enjoin and restrain 
Plaintiff, and Defendant Mark J. Brinkerhoff, and all persons 
claiming by, through or under them, from asserting any claim 
whatsoever to the interests of said Defendants. 
8. For a reasonable attorney's fee rendered in the 
prosecution of this action, together with costs of court 
incurred herein. 
9. For such other and further relief as to the Court deems 
just and equitable. 
DATED this /<. day of February, 1-983. 
V( HANS Q. CHAMBERLAIN 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This' is to certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the within and foregoing SECOND AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM OF ELSIE 
BRINKERHOFF AND CROSSCLAIM AGAINST MARK J. BRINKERHOFF AND 
m «47ao 
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SECOND AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM OF GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN 
BRINKERHOFF, ARLENE B. GOULDING, CHARLES A. BRINKERHOFF AND 
BETTY B. ESPLIN, AND AMENDED CROSSCLAIM OF SAID DEFENDANTS 
AGAINST CO-DEFENDANT, MARK J. BRINKERHOFF to Mr. Willard R. 
Bishop, Attorney for Plaintiff, P. 0. Box 279, Cedar City, Utah 
84720, and to Mr. Mark J. Brinkerhoff, Glendale, Utah 83729, 
first class postage prepaid on this /.? — day of February, 
1983. 
Secretary ?" ] •' 
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August 13, 1983 
Mr. Hans Q Chamberlain 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 726 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
RE: Brinkerhoff vs Brinkerhoff Civil No. 1826 
Dear Mr. Chamberlain: 
Based on the following facts and provisions, I am writing 
to inform you of my intent to withdraw completely from the suit 
in question. 
A- This action has caused such a division in my family because 
of the underhanded manner in which the deeds were changed, that 
the feeling may be impossible th reconcile. 
B- Because the outcome of this action will be of no financial 
advantage to me, I will not assume any financial obligation that 
may arise from continued involvement. 
C- It is my intent and desire to restore all Property, Permits 
and Water Rights to thier rightful owners, Mr. Mark J. and 
Mrs. Lena A. Brinkerhoff. That the annual payment of Two 
Thousand be due and payable outlined in the original agreement. 
D- That my son Warren may, with prior approval, have enough 
space to plant a garden and provide for the needs of his family. 
E- That all family members try to resolve thier differences 
and reunite as a family group. 
F- I also express my displeasure at the allegation of financial 
wrong doing against my son Mark, they are false and with put base 
The record will show that this action is done of my own free will 
and choice, and represents my complete and total separation from 
any and all future involvement in this suit. 
fsie J'' Brinkerhoff 
( 
cc: Mr. Willard R. Bishop 
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HANS Q. CHAMBERLAIN 
CHAMBERLAIN & CORRY 
Attorney for Defendants 
110 North Main, Suite G 
P.O. Box 726 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
(801) 586-4404 
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
KANE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MONT R. ANDERSON, Personal 
Representative of the Estate 
of CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, MARK J. 
BRINKERHOFF, GOLDA B. ADAIR, 
WARREN BRINKERHOFF, ARLENE 
B. GOULDING, CHARLES A. 
BRINKERHOFF, BETTY B. ESPLIN, 
DARLOS T. BRINKERHOFF, and 
JOHN DOES I through V, 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANTS' FIRST 
INTERROGATORIES TO 
PLAINTIFF 
Civil No. 1826 
Comes now Defendants, and pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, propound the following Interrogatories 
to Plaintiff, to be answered according to Utah law: 
(For purposes of these Interrogatories, Plaintiff means 
Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff and/or his Personal Representative.) 
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: Please state when Plaintiff was 
appointed as the Personal Representative of Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 2: Please state all assets in the 
estate of Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff which Plaintiff is administering. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 3; Please state whether or not Cloyd H. 
Brinkerhoff and Mark J. Brinkerhoff conducted business as a 
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partnership. If so, please state the inclusive dates of the 
partnership. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 4: If said parties operated as a 
partnership, please state whether or not the partnership ever 
filed a partnership income tax return. If so, please attach to 
these Interrogatoriesf copies of all partnership returns filed by 
said parties from and after 1966. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 5; Concerning a certain agreement for 
the purchase of real estate dated October 26
 f 1966, and for all 
payments required to be paid therein, please provide the 
following: 
(a) The date of each payment, including the down 
payment. 
(b) By whom. 
(c) The amount paid. 
(d) To whom said payment was made. 
(e) The form of the payment (i.e., cash, check, 
etc.). 
(f) Whether or not any other consideration was paid 
or delivered in lieu of the payment required. If so, 
provide details of the consideration paid on each 
occasion. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Do you have knowledge of any 
records, documents, books of account, or other memoranda in which 
a record has been kept of these transactions? 
INTERROGATORY NO. 7: If so, state: 
(a) The nature of the records, documents, books of 
account or other memoranda. 
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(b) The date the records, documents, books of 
account or other memoranda were written or the date the 
last entry was made in them. 
(c) The present location of the records, documents, 
books of account or other other memoranda. 
(d) Who has possession and control of the records, 
documents, books of account or other memoranda. 
(e) Please produce a copy of said documents. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 8: According to the records, documents, 
books of account or other memoranda, or the personal knowledge of 
Plaintiff, what is the total amount of money or other 
consideration paid by Plaintiff or Mark J. Brinkerhoff pursuant 
to the agreement of October 26, 1966? 
INTERROGATORY NO. 9: According to such records, 
documents, books of account or other memoranda, what is the 
amount of any balance still due Elsie Brinkerhoff? 
INTERROGATORY NO. 10; Has Elsie Brinkerhoff ever 
demanded that you render an account for transactions which you 
made pursuant to the agreement of October 26, 1966? 
INTERROGATORY NO. 11; If so, how was that demand made 
(i.e. letter, telegram, telephone, personal meeting)? 
INTERROGATORY NO. 12; Pursuant to any letter, telegram, 
or other conversation, have you rendered an account to Elsie 
Brinkerhoff? 
INTERROGATORY NO. 13; If so, state; 
(a) Date rendered to Elsie Brinkerhoff. 
(b) Present location of account. 
(c) Amount account shows due Elsie Brinkerhoff. 
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INTERROGATORY NO. 14 In the event Plaintiff claims that 
consideration other than money was paid or given to Elsie 
Brinkerhoff, please state whether or not there was any conversa-
tion whereby Elsie Brinkerhoff agreed to accept the same in 
lieu of the payment due: 
(a) If so, please state the date of the 
conversation, who was present, and who spoke and what was 
said. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 15; In the event Plaintiff claims that 
money was deposited into the account of Elsie Brinkerhoff in 
lieu of paying her directly, please state the following: 
(a) The account to which said money was deposited. 
(b) The date of the deposit. 
(c) The form of the payment made in making the 
deposit. 
(d) Whether or not Elsie Brinkerhoff was notified 
of the payment. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 16: In connection with Plaintiff's 
Complaint, please state the status of the real property which is 
located in Millard County, Utah, that is, please state whether or 
not Plaintiff has been in possession of said property during the 
past ten years. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 17: Please state in whose name the 
Hobble Canyon Reservoir interest is now vested. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 18: If the Hobble Canyon Reservoir 
interest .; has been transferred, to Plaintiff or Mark J. 
Brinkerhoff or other third-party persons, please state when said 
4 
Ar, 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
McW,N 
HMEYS AT LAW 
MAIN - SUITS • 
©. BOX 7 1 1 
IDA* CITY, 
TAM « 4 7 * 0 
I) • • • - 4 4 0 4 
transfer was made, by whom, to what person, and the amount of 
consideration received by reason of the transfer. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 19; Please state in whose name the 
Sullivan Reservoir interest is now vested. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 20: If the Sullivan Reservoir interest 
has been transferred, to Plaintiff or Mark J. Brinkerhoff or 
other third-party persons, please state when said transfer was 
made, by whom, to what person, and the amount of consideration 
received by reason of the transfer. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 21: Please state upon what basis 
Plaintiff claims an interest in the Glendale Irrigation Company 
Reservoir Certificates. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 22: Concerning the Affidavit signed by 
Elsie Brinkerhoff on April 13, 1971, please state the 
following: 
(a) Who prepared said Affidavit. 
(b) Why was said Affidavit prepared or for what 
purpose. 
(c) Who requested that Elsie 'Brinkerhoff sign the 
Affidavit. 
(d) Does Plaintiff maintain that such an affidavit 
was required by reason of the original agreement entered 
into between Plaintiff, Mark J. Brinkerhoff and Elsie 
Brinkerhoff in October of 1966. 
(e) Why was only a portion of the real property 
described in said Affidavit as compared to all of the real 
property purchased from Elsie Brinkerhoff. 
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(f) Has the real property described in said 
Affidavit been sold or conveyed to any third-party 
purchaser. If sof please state the date of the 
conveyance, the reason for the conveyance and the amount 
of the consideration received for such conveyance. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 23; Concerning the statement signed by 
Elsie Brinkerhoff designated Exhibit ,fC" to Plaintiff's 
Complaint, please state the following: 
(a) Who prepared the statement. 
(b) Why was the same prepared. 
(c) Was the statement prepared for any income tax 
purpose. If so, for what purpose. 
(d) Was the sum of $23,000 filled in at the tine 
Elsie Brinkerhoff signed the same. 
(e) Was the document signed by Elsie Brinkerhoff in 
front of the notary public indicated therein, to-wit: 
Ruth S. Anderson. 
(f) Who else was present when Elsie Brinkerhoff 
signed said statement. 
(g) If there was any conversation at the time Elsie 
Brinkerhoff signed the same, please state in substance and 
effect who spoke and what was said. 
(h) How was the sum of $23,000 arrived at prior to 
the time the same was inserted in said statement. 
(i) At the time Elsie Brinkerhoff signed the same, 
please describe in detail her mental and physical 
condition and state whether or not she was under the 
influence of any person present at the signing. 
6 
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(j) In the event Plaintiff or Mark J. Brinkerhoff 
had not paid to Elsie Brinkerhoff the sum of $23,000 at 
the time she signed said document, please state why she 
agreed to indicate that she had, in fact, received 
$23,000. 
(k) Since the escrow agreement requires payments to 
be made to the escrow at the bank located in Hurricane, 
Utah, please state why Plaintiff did not request the bank 
to sign a statement that the sum of $23,000 had been paid 
to Elsie Brinkerhoff. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 24: Concerning Paragraph 12 of 
Plaintiff's Complaint which indicates that Elsie Brinkerhoff 
refused to accept the last two payments tendered to her, please 
state the following: 
(a) When the first payment was tendered to her. 
(b) When the second payment was tendered to her, 
(c) The form of the payment tendered on each 
occasion. 
(d) Who was present on each occasion when the tender 
was made. 
(e) Why Elsie Brinkerhoff refused to accept the same 
on those occasions, 
(f) Why Plaintiff or Mark J. Brinkerhoff did not 
deposit said monies to her account instead of delivering 
them to her personally since she refused to accept the 
same. 
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(g) If any conversation took place when the tender 
was made, please state each and every person present and 
state in substance and effect who spoke and what was said. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 25: In reference to Paragraph 16 of 
Plaintiff's Complaint concerning damages, please state what 
Plaintiff maintains is the fair market value of said property on 
each of the following dates: 
(a) The date that the contract was signed. 
(b) The date of the alleged breach by Elsie 
Brinkerhoff. 
(c) The date these Interrogatories are answered. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 26: Please state the date that 
Plaintiff first became aware that Elsie Brinkerhoff had executed 
and conveyed the real property which is the subject of this 
action to the other named Defendants herein. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 27: When Plaintiff became aware of the 
existence of said documents, please state what Plaintiff did in 
relation thereto. Also state what other conversation, if any, 
Plaintiff had with Mark J. Brinkerhoff on that occasion. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 28: Please state whether Plaintiff has 
ever recorded any Notice of Interest in the real property which 
is the subject of this action. If so, please state the date of 
the same, why the same was recorded and who prepared the document 
recorded. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 29: Attached hereto is a Warranty Deed 
(designated Exhibit "A") from Elsie Brinkerhoff, Grantor, to Mark 
J. Brinkerhoff and Leah Brinkerhoff, husband and wife. In 
connection with said Deed, please state the following: 
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(a) When was said Warranty Deed prepared. 
(b) Who prepared said Warranty Deed. 
(c) Why does said Deed convey the property described 
therein only to Mark J. Brinkerhoff and Leah Brinkerhoff 
when the contract which is the subject of this action 
requires the property to be conveyed to both Cloyd H. 
Brinkerhoff and Mark J. Brinkerhoff and their respective 
wives. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 30: Attached hereto is a Quit-Claim 
Deed (designated Exhibit "B") from Elsie Brinkerhoff to Mark J. 
Brinkerhoff and Leah Brinkerhoff, husband and wife. In 
connection with said Quit- Claim Deed, please state the 
following: 
(a) When was said Quit-Claim Deed prepared. 
(b) Who prepared said Quit-Claim Deed. 
(c) Why does said Deed convey the property described 
therein only to Mark J. Brinkerhoff and Leah Brinkerhoff 
when the contract which is the subject of this action 
requires the property to be conveyed to both Cloyd H. 
Brinkerhoff and Mark J. Brinkerhoff and their respective 
wives. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 31: Please state whether or not the 
Deeds described in the previous Interrogatories, or any other 
deeds, have ever been deposited to the Hurricane Branch of the 
Bank of St. George. If so, please state: 
(a) Who prepared said deeds. 
(b) When were said deeds prepared. 
(c) When were said deeds deposited to the escrow. 
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INTERROGATORY NO. 32: In connection with the escrow 
instructions which are found in the agreement which is the 
subject of this action, please state the following: 
(a) Was Plaintiff or Mark J. Brinkerhoff ever 
notified of any default by Elsie Brinkerhoff or the escrow 
agent. If so, please state the date of the notice of the 
default, who sent the same, and what was the response of 
Plaintiff or Mark J. Brinkerhoff. 
(b) Does Plaintiff admit that Elsie Brinkerhoff was 
not under any obligation to provide to Plaintiff notice of 
default in the event the payment of principal and/or 
interest was not paid? 
(c) If your answer to the preceding Interrogatory is 
in the negative, please state why notice of the default 
for failure to pay principal and/or was required by Elsie 
Brinkerhoff. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 33: Please state whether Plaintiff or 
Mark J. Brinkerhoff have paid the taxes on the real property 
which is the subject of this action for each year since 1966. If 
all taxes have been paid, please provide the date that taxes were 
paid for each year from 1966 through and including 1981. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 34: Please state whether Plaintiff or 
Mark J. Brinkerhoff has always been in total and exclusive 
possession of the real property which is the subject of this 
action. If the same has not occurred, please provide the dates 
when said- persons did not occupy said property and for what 
reason they failed to do so. 
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INTERROGATORY NO, 35: Attached hereto is a Warranty Deed, 
designated as Exhibit MC W, dated June 4, 1979. In connection 
with said Deed, please state the following: 
(a) Who prepared said Deed. 
(b) Why was said Deed prepared. 
(c) Where did you obtain the legal description that 
is found on the back of the Deed? 
(d) What was the actual consideration that passed at 
the time the Deed was executed and delivered? 
(e) Why does said Deed fail to convey the personal 
property that is described on page 3 of the Agreement 
dated October 26, 1966? 
(f) Who requested Elsie Brinkerhoff to sign the 
same. 
(g) Who was present when Elsie Brinkerhoff signed 
said Deed, and who spoke and what was said. 
(h) Why was the Warranty Deed prepared as a joint 
tenancy deed as compared to a deed to create a tenancy in 
common• 
(i) What was the purpose of the Deed since other 
deeds, to-wit, Exhibit "Aw and Exhibit "B", had been 
previously prepared. 
(j) Prior to the creation of the Deed, was there any 
conversation between Plaintiff, Mark J. Brinkerhoff and 
Elsie Brinkerhoff concerning the need to prepare, execute 
and record the Deed. 
(k) At whose request was said Deed recorded, and who 
paid for the recording. 
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(1) Why was said Deed recorded as compared to being 
deposited to the escrow which was created if it is 
Plaintiff's position that the agreement which is the 
subject of this action was still in effect at the time the 
joint-tenancy Deed was prepared. 
(m) At the time said Deed was prepared, was 
Plaintiff or Mark J. Brinkerhoff aware of the difference 
between a joint-tenancy deed and a deed which creates a 
tenancy in common. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 36; In connection with all grazing 
permits which are in part the subject of this action, please 
state the following: 
(a) When Plaintiff and Mark J. Brinkerhoff obtained 
said permits in their own name, and by what authority. 
(b) Whether or not said permits have been 
transferred onto third parties, and if so, the date when 
said transfer was made, and the name of the transferees. 
(c) If said grazing permits have been leased to 
third parties, please state the amounts received, from 
whom received, the date the payment was received and the 
reason for leasing the permits as compared to utilizing 
the same themselves. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 37; Please state whether or not 
Plaintiff or Mark J. Brinkerhoff have ever obtained any rents 
from coal or other mineral leases upon the subject property. If 
so, please state the following: 
(a) The date of the lease agreements. 
(b) The amount of each payments. 
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(c) Who made the payment. 
(d) Under what authority the lease was executed in 
as much as record title to the subject property has always 
been in the name of Elsie Brinkerhoff. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 38; Please state whether or not 
Plaintiff or Mark J. Brinkerhoff ever came into possession of 
certain sheep and other personal property that were owned by 
Merle Brinkerhoff prior to his death. If so, please state the 
following: 
(a) Describe the sheep and personal property. 
(b) How many sheep were obtained. 
(c) When possession of the sheep was obtained. 
(d) Whether or not any consideration was paid for 
the same. 
(e) What happened to the sheep or other personal 
property. 
(f) If any money was received when the sheep or 
personal property was sold, state the amount of the 
proceeds. 
INTERROGATORY NO, 39; Please state why Darlos T. 
Brinkerhoff was joined as a party Defendant to this action. 
DATED this J A J day of September, 1982. 
CHAMBERLAIN & CORRY 
/') 
/ 
\ HANS Q. CHAMBERLAIN 
^I<U^J^ 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the within and foregoing DEFENDANTS' FIRST INTERROGATORIES TO 
PLAINTIFF to Mr. Willard R. Bishop, Attorney for Plaintiff, P.O. 
Box 729, Cedar City, Utah 84720, and to Mr. Mark J. Brinkerhoff, 
Glendale, Utah 84729, first-class postage prepaid, on ther^/wr/ 
day of September, 1982. 
'/M/P&Pt Qlf^L^r 
retary I v " f 
14 
<&? A ^cn 
t-v**r>, - ,;i^ vfti» ' •—* •**• *> * ^ * * » • • \ * * » « » - I - H 4 « * V — — * * - -
WARRANTY DEED 
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, GRANTOR, of Glendele, County of Kane, State of Uteh, 
hereby CONVEYS and WARRANTS to MARK BRIMKERHOFF and tEAH BRINKERHOFF, husband and 
wife as joVe^ t•^a^t^^t*>«^t*/•|g^U^»vry^vo^$hIp and not as tenants in coewon, 
c ^ v r T r c r , ->r c u - i . ^. c o u n * . <-' »*ur.*, s-«~ic n. •!.: , : ..:. i." . • *. 
DOLLARS, anc4 rthcr goyd, valuable, end adequate cc-nci ocr.ji . ru, JH uriii. .•idi.c: one-
half interest in and "to "the following described real property »r. Millard and Kane 
Counties, State of Utah: 
Lots 1, 2, T>, and 4, Block 25, Plat "A", Delta Townsite 
Lot 2, Block 2t, Plat "A", Delta Townsito 
REAL PROPERTY IN KANE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH: 
Township 39 South, Range 4j West, Salt Lake Meridian: 
Section 25: West Half, containing 320 acres. 
>c&*^*3%&i!m a r t e r . and Soutf) M i f f © f ^ ; , 
' , . I I . - ; . T ; ;::.rt :»....-r I ynurle- of thr rj ; jlh^c-,1' >J-- r , , : r i : , r « l H " ; ' ' f the 
Cost M a l t ; Southwest vu^r te r of the Nor theast Quarter c*nd t h t northwest 
Quarter of Southeast Q u a r t e r , c o n t a i n i n g 4 7 0 . 8 0 a c r e s . 
Sec t ion 35: East Ha l f of t h e Nor theast Quar te r ; S^uth Hal f of the South-
east Quar ter ; Northwest Quar ter of the Southeast Q u a r t e r , con ta in ing 200 
a c r e s . 
Township 40 South , Range 4 j West, S a l t Lake M e r i d i a n ; 
Sec t ion 29: Southwest Quar ter of the Nor theast Quar te r ; West felMrf. 
t h e Southeast Quarter one* t h a Southeast Quarter of t h r Southwest Quar te r , 
con ta in ing 160 a c r e s . 
Srr . t i^n 3 »: tlcr4hv.cr,t Quar ter ; Eer t H.» 1 ' :»f the "•ci;tnv.f:r.,t Quar te r , eon-
..• I fil •» ' •':<. .' .-•••*rri, » 
EXHIBIT A . Sect ion 5: Lot 2 , c o n t a i n i n g 3 9 . 0 6 a c r e s . 
Township 40 South, Range 7 West, S a l t Ic.'.:* Meri d i a n : 
Bc-jinning a t the Southwest Corner of the Southwest ^ u u r t r r of the South-
cnr.t Qujr^cr of Sect ion 23 , To*nshi D 40 S*>utn, r.-0nge 7 West, S j l t Lefrf* 
Mer id ian and running thence East "i,;.?* eng ine: tt.c-»ce M . - t h f'.O* Wost 
»'. N", ch^inr.; thence West 3 . r £ chain- . ; thence South 1 ch.-in t ^ beginning, 
contoi piny .7-'. a c r e s . 
Bc<jinning a t t h j Northwest Corner of 1hc Northwo-t Qudrlcc of the N o r t h -
east Quarter of Sect ion 2f» and running tJcncc South 4 . 3 0 cha ins; thence 
South 7 3 * East \rj chains t o ttie middle of the channel of the c reek ; 
thence Northwcvler ly olong t h e middle «>' the <h.»nn^l ui *i.j i <J creek to 
i:-.e N j r i - L ine of sa id Northwest Quar ter of t»o h ' , r lh tu^t Vuur te r ; 
t i . c n . e V.'csi 11.21 chains t o the plooc of Ijrvj* r.n i ™j. 
Beginning 4 .30 chains South of tho Northwest Ct>mnr :>f tht.: Nor thwv. t 
Quarter of the Northoast Quar ter of Sec t ion 26 and running thence South 
7 0 * East 15 chains t o the Middle of the channel of ihe c r e e k ; thence 
Souther ly a long the middle of the channel of s a i d creek t o the South 
L i n e ; thence North 73*45* WeSt '14 .60 c h a i n * : i^nrr M-rt» /:. r ^ -'• ' - * • 
I T ! '•© i •-. •••j. c ' j ' l t . i i n i n j ' > . - 0 • ." "•; . 
The JI'JVC th ree t r a c t s being por t of l^nd s i t u a t e d in Sect ions 71 jnd 7". 
cf sa id tov.nship and range, sometimes r e f e r r e d t o u n o f f i c i a l l y as Lot "A". 
Township /Q South, Range A West, S a l t Lake M c r i d i o n : 
Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quar te r of Sect ion L, c o n t . «'0 a c r e s . 
Township -10 South, R.imje Aj West, S J H L«iko M c r n l i . m ; 
Lot 1 ; Northeast Quarter of the Northwest Quorter of S e c t i o n 31 , c o n t a i n ! n;. 
79 .30 a c r e s . 
Together w i th a l l improvements end appurtenances t h e r e t o annexed or i n 
any way a p p e r t a i n i n g . 
WITNESS t h e hand of sold GRANTOR t h l § ^ £ **y*t . 1966. 
• ^ • . f e ^ ^ 
_J^>g>«:.,^ J.,4^'^-J^- :y^L^^/^ 
I l M o F t n k c r h o f I S/j 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: SS. 
COUNTY OF KANE ) 
On t h i s •" (T d^y of ^ L r f , 19C&, pe rsona l l y appeared before, me 
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, t h e s igner of the w i t h i n end foregoing ins t rument , who duly eckno* -
tedged *o ne tha t she executed the seme. 
-#• s / / y 
My Commission Exp i res : '.•« - / ' , X (• _#>/ • * / > 
A-69 
yr» 3 ^ > * f r yv?*$**»+** / w ^ » i y < 
QUITCLAIM DCr.D 
ELSIE BUNKERHOFF, GRANTOR, of G l a n d a l a , County of Kane, S t a t e of U t a h , , 
h«r%W QUUClAllfc * © * * § * W 1 l * 0 W f ^ t f U f t ^ l ^ R M O F F , huiband and w / r t ; a t 
DCLlA:;r-, :nt. -.Ihr.r ;::>oii, v a l u a b l e , and 3decuo1c; con:.»li^rot i .'\z, '"n " ' "n vi ci.r' :•-• 
h i l t i n t e r e s t in and tvj the f o l l o w i n g descr ibed +^'-rr rind r e s e r v o i r r i c M s in 
Moheve C-xinty, S to le of Ar izona: 
A one f o u r t h i n t e r e s t in Hobble Canyon Reservoir ( v - J O - l ? ) i r. 
Mohave County, S to te of A r i z o n a . 
A one hn If i n t e r e s t in Su I hi van Reservo i r in MoVavo County, Arizona 
-XX 
WITNESS the hjnd of SJid GRANTOR thi'. . • d «v <>! / < V • 
U*ifc&m.<^* ^^^^^^ fr^r^ 
, l ^ . 
r . l 
:
' ' • ; * -
* / ' 
I 
ss. 
STATE Cf UTAi 
COUNTY OF KANE ) 
On t h i s / t day of L ^ t^f ~ , 196G, persona l ly appeared b«f 
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, t h t s igner of t h e w i t h i n and forego ing inst rument , who duly 
ft J 
this ££ day of C^J tJt ~ > 9^6Ct 
acknowledged 1o me t h a t she executed t h e same. 
' I 
My Conmission E x p i r e e : , c s • >;- r. * y + r> iw^v.. • ••;> - -*».v • ft?. ^ • * i r ^ t r v 
EXHIBIT B 
JLm* 
i t f^r -
Recorded at Reowaet of 
•t . ft*. F M Paid $ . 
By D tp . -
Mai! tax notice to . GranleejL. 
County fceconoar 
•©ok-
Addms. ...filjcndale., llUh._BAZ2SL. 
WARRANTY DEED 
Elsie Brinkerhoff, a widow, 
«f Glendale 
CONVEY and WARRANT to 
of G l e n d a l e , Utah 84729 
, County of Kane 
frantor 
, State of Utah, htreby 
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, a widow, MARK J. BRINKERHOFF, a x 
married man, and CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF, a married man, 
all as Joint Tenants with full rights of survivorship, 
and not as Tenants in Common, t/| 
grantees «2 
for the sum of £ 
-DOLLARS, 
County, 
$10.00 & o ther v a l u a b l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n -
the following described tracts of iand in KANE 
State of Utah: 
SEE SCHEDULE "A" ATTACHED HERETO AND BY THIS REFERENCE MADE A PART HEREOF. 
WITNESS, the hand of said grantor , this 4 t h day of June , A. 0. 19 79 . 
Sionod in the Presence of .^..J^ 
Elsie Brinkerhoff 
HATE OF UTAH 
County of Kane ) SS. 
On tht 4 t h day of June A. D., 19 79 personalty 
appearad before mt E l s i e B r i n k e r h o f f , a widow, 
EXHIBIT C 
the tionor of tht within mstrument who #u)y acknowledged 
to ma that s He executed tht same 
James B. A d a i r Notary Public 
My Commission expires — J.UM..19.._J9Za My residence i s - Ordery.l].l.efc...Utab. 
MUTMfM vTft* ttflf t N T M T . t 0 •«• T • K m * VHft MWV 
PARCEL 3: Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4; the Southeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter 
X5J^W5TT the Northeast Ouarter of the Southwest Quarter (NE^SW^); the East Half 
of the East Half (ESES); the Southwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter (SWWE'O 
and the Northwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter (NW^ SE**) of Section 27, 
Townshio 39 South, Range 4S West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, containing 478.80 
acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 4: The East Half of the Northeast Quarter (EhNE>0; the South Half of 
the Southeast Quarter (SSSE*a) and Northwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter 
(NWHSEVi) of Section 35, Townshio 39 South, Ranae 44 West, Salt Lake Base and 
~ Iteridian, centaining 200.0 acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 5.: The Southwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter (SW*NE*); the West 
Naif of the Southeast Quarter (W*»SE>*) and the Southeast Quarter of the Southwest 
— tlmrUr (SE%S*n*) of Section 29, Townshio 40 South, Ranqe 4H West, Salt Lake Base 
and Iteridian, containing 160.0 acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 6: The Northwest Quarter (fW*)#and the East Half of the Southwest 
barter of Section 30, Townshio 40 South, Ranne 4S West, Salt Lake Base and 
Hrridian, containinn 238.99 acres, more or less. 
... PARCEL 7: Lot 2, Section 5, Townshio 40 South, Range 4S We6t, Salt Lake Base 
and HericJUn, containino 39.08 acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 8: The Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter (SWyiW**) of Section 
8, Townshiof40 South, Ranae 4 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, containing 
40.0 acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 9: Lot 1 and the Northeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter (NE'^ NW**) 
of Section 31, Townshio 40 South, Ranae 4l? West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, 
containina 79.30 acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 10: BEGINNING at the North Quarter Corner of Section 26, Township 40 
South, Range 7 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence South 
0o35l West 567.60 feet; thence South 78°00' East 963.6 feet; thence North-
westerly along the creek bed, 803.0 feet, more or less, to the North line of 
Section 26; thence South 89057* West 741.18 feet to the point of beginning. 
Containing 11.77 acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 11; BEGINNING at the Southwest Corner of the Southwest Quarter of 
the Southeast Quarter of Section 23, Township 40 South, Range 7 West, Salt 
Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence East 10.23 chains; thence Horth 
80° West 6.36 chains; thence West 3.68 chains; thence South 1.0 chain to the 
point of beginning. Containing 0.74 acres, more or less. 
++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ 
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WILLARD R. BISHOP, P.C. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
P.O. Box 279 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Telephone: 586-9483 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF KANE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
MONT R. ANDERSON, Personal 
Representative of the Estate 
of CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, MARK J. 
BRINKERHOFF, GOLDA B. 
ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF, 
ARLENE B. GOULDING, CHARLES 
BRINKERHOFF, BETTY B. 
ESPLIN, DARLOS T. BRINKER-
HOFF, and JOHN DOES I 
through V, 
Defendants 
ANSWER OF MARK J. 
BRINKERHOFF TO SECOND 
AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM 
AND CROSS-CLAIMS OF 
DEFENDANTS 
Civil No. 1826 
Comes now Defendant MARK J. BRINKERHOFF, and answers 
Defendant ELSIE BRINKERHOFF'S SECOND AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM 
AND CROSS-CLAIM as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
Defendant ELSIE BRINKERHOFF'S SECOND AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM 
AND CROSS-CLAIM fails to state a claim against Defendant 
MARK J. BRINKERHOFF, upon which relief may be granted. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
1. This Defendant admits the allegations of paragraphs 
^2/// 
( 
\ \ 
1 and 13. 
2. This Defendant denies the allegations of paragraphs 
2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18. 
3. Answering paragraph 3 of Defendant ELSIE BRINKERHOFF'S 
SECOND AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM AND CROSS-CLAIM, this Defendant 
m^irsr-rtrair he claims an interest in the subject property 
adverse to the claim of ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, and denies each 
and every other allegation contained in paragraph 3. 
4. Answering paragraph 9 of said counterclaim and 
cross-claim, this answering Defendant admits that ELSIE 
BRINKERHOFF purported to convey certain rights and property 
in a Warranty Deed dated 15 August 1980, but denies that the 
Warranty Deed actually conveyed any right, title, and interest 
whatever in the subject property to others named in paragraph 
9. 
5. This answering Defendant denies each and every 
allegation of said Counterclaim and Cross-Claim not specifically 
admitted herein. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
6. As a separate and affirmative defense, this answering 
Defendant states that he has, or may have, further and 
additional affirmative defenses which are not yet known to 
this Defendant, but which may become known through further 
discovery, including, but not limited to, accord and satisfaction, 
arbitration, award, discharge in bankruptcy, estoppel, 
failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, license, payment, 
3V0- A "7 A 
release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of limitations, 
waiver, and other matters constituting an affirmative defense. 
7. This answering Defendant asserts each and every 
affirmative defense as may be ascertained through future 
discovery. 
VJHEREFORE, having fully answered Defendant ELSIE BRINKERHOFF'S 
SECOND AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM AND CROSS-CLAIM, this Defendant 
prays that the same be dismissed without more, and that he 
be awarded his costs incurred herein. 
Comes now Defendant, MARK J. BRINKERHOFF, and answers 
the Second Amended Counterclaim and Cross-Claim of Defendants 
GOLDA-B. ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF, and ARLENE B. GOULDING, 
as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
1. Defendants1 Second Amended Counterclaim and Cross-
Claim fails to state a claim against this Defendant upon 
which relief may be granted. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
2. Defendant MARK J. BRINKERHOFF denies each and every 
other allegation of Defendants' Second Amended Counterclaim 
and Cross-Claim. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
3. As a separate and affirmative defense, this answering 
Defendant states that he has, or may have, further and 
additional defenses which are not yet known to this Defendant, 
~D/H 
i 
i 
but which may become known through further discovery, including, 
but not limited to, accord and satisfaction, arbitration, 
award, discharge in bankruptcy, estoppel, failure of consideration, 
fraud, illegality, license, payment, release, res judicata, 
statute of frauds, statute of limitations, waiver, and other 
matters constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense. 
4. This Defendant asserts each and every affirmative 
defense as may be ascertained through future discovery/ 
WHEREFORE, having fully answered Defendants1 Second 
Amended Counterclaim and Cross-Claim, Defendant MARK J. 
BRINKERHOFF prays that the same be dismissed without more 
and that he be awarded his costs incurred herein. 
DATED: 1^0 Septemb* 
WILLARD R. BISHOP 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
SERVED the within and foregoing document upon the 
Defendants above-named, by mailing a full, true and correct 
copy to Mr. Hans Q. Chamberlain, Attorney for Defendants, at 
110 N. Main Street, Cedar City, Utah 84720, first class 
postage fully prepaid this /j&fi^ day of September^983, 
pad A-7fi 
BISHOP & RONNOW, P.C. 
Willard R. Bishop 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
36 North 300 West 
P. 0. Box 279 
Cedar City, UT 84720 
Telephone: (801) 586-9483 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF KANE COUNTY, 
STATE UF UTAH 
MONT R. ANDERSON, Personal 
Representative of the Estate 
of CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, MARK J. 
BRINKERHOFF, GOLDA B. ADAIR, 
WARREN BRINKERHOFF, ARLENE B. 
GOULDING, CHARLES BRINKERHOFF, 
BETTY B. ESPLIN, DARLOS T. 
BRINKERHOFF, and JOHN DOES I 
through V, 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 1826 
Based upon the motion of Willard R. Bishop, Attorney for 
Plaintiffs, and the stipulation of Hans Q. Chamberlain, Attorney for 
Defendants, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that Plaintiff be granted leave to 
file a second amended complaint and substitute parties in the above-
captioned case. 
DATED this ^ <iay of 4Acf« A-**} , 1983. 
1URT: 
DON V. 
District 
^?/0. 
i 
BISHOP AND RONNOW, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P.O. Box 279 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 <$£&>'?>, 
Telephone: 586-9483 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF KANE COUNTY; ^ 
STATE OF UTAH 
LENA BRINKERHOFF and MARK 
J. BRINKERHOFF, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs 
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, GOLDA 
B. ADAIR, WARREN 
BRINKERHOFF, ARLENE B. 
GOULDING, CHARLES 
BRINKERHOFF, BETTY B. 
ESPLIN, DARLOS T. BRINKER-
HOFF, and JOHN DOES I 
through V, 
Defendants. 
SECOND AMENDED 
COMPLAINT 
Civil No. 1826 
Come now Plaintiffs, by and through counsel, who 
complain of Defendants, and for cause of action allege: 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
QUIET TITLE 
1. This action arises out of the ownership, use, and 
possession of real property located in Millard and Kane 
Counties, State of Utah. 
2. On or about 26 October 1966, a certain "Agreement" 
was entered into by ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, as SELLER, and CLOYD 
"7'T / A "70 
2 
H. BRINKERHOFF and MARK J. BRINKERHOFF, BUYERS, covering the 
sale of certain real and personal properties, located in 
Millard and Kane Counties, State of Utah. A copy of said 
"Agreement" is attached hereto, marked as Exhibit "A", and 
incorporated by this reference. The real property which is 
the subject matter of this action is more particularly 
described as follows: 
PROPERTY LOCATED IN KANE COUNTY, UTAH 
I. West 1/2 Section 25, Township 39 South, Range 4 1/2 
West, containing 320 acres. 
II. NW 1/4 SE 1/4, S 1/2 NE 1/4 Section 26, Township 
39 Soi ch, Range 4 1/2 West, containing 400 acres. 
III. Lots 1. 2. 3, 4, SE 1/4 NW 1/4, NE 1/4 SW 1/4, 
E 1/2 E 1/2, SW 1/4 NE 1/4, NW 1/4 SE 1/4; Section 
27, Township 39 South, Range 4 1/2 West, Salt Lake 
Meridian, containing 478.80 acres. 
IV. East 1/2 NE 1/4. S 1/2 SE 1/4, NW 1/4 SE 1/4, Section 
35, Township 39 South, Range 4 1/2 West, containing 
200 acres. 
V. SW 1/4 NE 1/4, W 1/2 SE 1/4, SE 1/4 SW 1/4, Section 
29, Township 40 South, Range 4 1/2 West, containing 
160 acres. 
VI. NW 1/4, E 1/2 SW 1/4, Section 30, Township 40 South, 
Range 4 1/2 West, containing 238.99 acres.' 
VII. Lot 2, Section 5, Township 40 South, Range 4 1/2 
West, containing 39.08 acres. 
VIII.SW 1/4 NW 1/4, of Section 8, Township 40 South, 
Range 4 West, Salt Lake Meridian, containing 40 
acres. 
IX. Lot 1, Northeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of 
Section 31, Township 40 South, Range 4 1/2 West, 
Containing 79.30 acres. 
X(a).Beginning at the Northwest Corner of the Northwest 
- v:r n 
3 
Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of Section 26, 
Township 40 South, Range 7 West, and running thence 
South 4.30 chains; thence South 70° East 15 chains 
to the middle of the channel of the creek; thence 
Northwesterly along the middle of the channel of 
said creek to the North Line of said Northwest Quarter 
of the Northeast Quarter; thence West 11.25 chains 
to the place of beginning, containing 11.77 acres. 
X(b).Beginning 4.30 chains South of the Northwest Corner 
of the Northwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of 
Section 26, Township 40 South, Range 7 West, Salt 
Lake Meridian, and running thence South 70° East 15 
chains to the middle of the channel of the creek; 
thence Southerly along the middle of the channel of 
said creek to the South line; thence North 73°45' 
West 14.60 chains; thence North 4.30 chains to the 
place of beginning, containing 5.60 acres. 
XI. Beginning at the Southwest corner of the SW 1/4 SE 1/4 
of Section 23, Township 40 South, Range 7 West, Salt 
Lake Base & Meridian/ and running thence East 10.23 
chains; thence North 80° West 6.36 chains; thence 
West 3.68 chains; thence South 1 chain to the point 
of beginning. Containing .74 acres. 
PERSONAL PROPERTY: 
XII. A one-fourth (1/4) interest in Hobble Canyon Reservoir 
(9-36-12) in Mohave County, Arizona. 
XIII. A one-half (1/2) interest in Sullivan Reservoir in 
Mohave County, Arizona. 
TOGETHER WITH all grazing privileges and permits 
annexed to or based upon any of the foregoing real, 
personal, reservoir, or water rights as commensurate. 
XIV. Glendale Irrigation Company certificate No. 204, for 
9.1 shares of East Ditch Water, to ELSIE J., CLOYD 
H., and MARK J. BRINKERHOFF, dated 29 April 1967. 
XV. Glendale Irrigation Company, certificate No. 354, 
for 10.4 shares of West Ditch Water, to ELSIE J. 
CLOYD H., and MARK J. BRINKERHOFF, dated 29 April 
1967. 
MILLARD COUNTY, UTAH: 
XVI. Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4, Block 25, Plat "A", Delta 
A _ Q O 
4 
Townsite. 
XVII. Lot 2, Block 26, Plat "A", Delta Townsite. 
3. Defendant ELSIE BRINKERHOFF received and accepted 
payments as specified in Exhibit "A", thereby acknowledging 
the existence of said "Agreement11. 
4. The "Agreement11 provides that "the SELLER shall 
execute a Warranty Deed to the real property hereinabove 
described and quitclaim conveyances to the water and reservoir 
rights hereinabove described, of an undivided one half 
interest to each. BUYER and his wife as joint tenants with 
full rights of survivorship, . . . .". 
5. The "Agreement" was never recorded and all payments 
were made directly to Defendant ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, rather 
than into the established escrow. 
6. On or about 13 April 1971, Defendant ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, 
signed a certain "Affidavit" setting forth the sale of
 ( 
certain property to CLOYD J. BRINKERHOFF and MARK J. BRINKERHOFF, 
and further stating that she would defend and protect the 
rights of Mark J. Brinkerhoff and Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff. A ^ 
copy of said Affidavit is attached hereto, marked as Exhibit 
"B", and incorporated by this reference. 
7. On or about 6 April 1977,. Defendant ELSIE BRINKERHOFF < 
signed a certain statement, having the statement duly notarized, 
stating that she had received the sum of $23,000.00 in 
payments on said property from Cloyd and Mark Brinkerhoff. 4 
A copy of the statement is attached hereto, marked as Exhibit 
i 
5 
"CI", and is incorporated by this reference. 
8. On or about 4 June 1979, ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, 
executed a Warranty Deed (attached as Exhibit MD,f) , purporting 
to convey to herself, Plaintiff MARK J. BRINKERHOFF and 
CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF as joint tenants, the same property 
conveyed under the "Agreement", (Exhibit "A"). ELSIE BRINKERHOFF 
executed the warranty deed without the knowledge of either 
MARK J. BRINKERHOFF or CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF. 
9. After the death of CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF, Defendant 
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF executed and recorded various deeds covering 
the above-described real property, to other individuals, in 
an attempt to cloud title to the above described real property 
in passing to Decedent CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF's surviving 
joint tenant. 
10. By virtue of the execution and recordation of 
these subsequent deeds, Defendants1 claims are adverse or 
hostile to and in conflict with the interest of Plaintiffs, 
and a dispute has arisen with respect to the parties1 
rights. 
11. The true names of Defendants DOE are unknown to 
Plaintiffs. Upon discovery of such true names, Plaintiffs 
reserve the right to substitute the same in place of the 
fictitious names used herein. 
12. Plaintiffs1 interest in and to the above-described 
real property is prior in time and right to those alleged 
3^4 A 
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claims of Defendants. 
13. Plaintiffs, at all times pertinent to this action, 
had, and still have, an interest in and to the real properties 
as above-described. 
14. By virtue of Defendant ELSIE BRINKERHOFF executing 
and recording subsequent deeds to the above-named Defendants, 
the claims are adverse or hostile to and in conflict with 
the interest of Plaintiffs and said Plaintiffs are entitled 
to an order of this Court, declaring and adjudging r.aid 
Plaintiffs to be the owners, in fee simple, of their undivided 
one-half interest each in and to the real and personal 
property, and ordering Defendants, and each of them, and all 
persons claiming by, through, or under them, to have no 
estate, right, title, lien, or interest in and to Plaintiffs1 
interest. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for Judgment against Defendants 
as follows: 
ON THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION: 
1. That the above-entitled Court determine and enter a 
declaratory judgment determining the rights of the parties 
to this action to terminate the controversy or remove any 
uncertainty as to ownership of the above-entitled property. 
2. That Defendants, and all persons claiming by, 
through, or under them be required to set forth the nature 
of their claims to the above-described real property. 
7 
3. That all adverse claims of said Defendants to the 
real property be determined by this Court. 
4. That this Court declare and adjudge that Plaintiffs 
are the owners, in fee simple, of their undivided one-half 
(1/2) interest each in and to said real and personal 
property; and that Defendants, and each of them, and all 
persons claiming by, through, or under them, have no estate, 
right, title, lien, or interest in and to Plaintiffs1 
property 
5. That this Court permanently enjoin and restrain 
Defendants, and each of them, and all persons claiming by, 
through, or under them, from asserting any claim whatsoever 
adverse to Plaintiffs1 interest. 
6. For Plaintiffs1 costs incurred in this action. 
7. For such other and further relief as the Court 
deems appropriate. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE 
1. The allegations of paragraphs 1 through 14, above, 
are incorporated by this reference as though fully set forth 
herein. 
1. On or about 26 October 1966, ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, as 
SELLER, and CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF and MARK BRINKERHOFF, as 
BUYERS, entered into a contract (Exhibit f,Atf) , wherein 
certain real property, grazing privileges, and water and 
reservoir rights in the States of Utah and Arizona were 
sold, in consideration of BUYERS paying to SELLER, the sum 
-2/T7 
8 
of FIFTY THREE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED EIGHTY-EIGHT ($53,388.00) 
DOLLARS, payable at the rate of TWO THOUSAND DOLLARS ($2,000.00) 
per year, beginning November 1, 1968, BUYERS having paid the 
sum of FOUR THOUSAND DOLLARS ($4,000.00) for the years of 
1966 and 1967 at the time of execution of the contract. As 
a further condition to the contract, BUYERS agreed to pay to 
SELLER, for the entire remainder of SELLER'S life, irrespective 
of the amount to be paid under this contract, the sum of TWO 
THOUSAND DOLLARS ($2,000.00) per year, and if the contract 
was not paid in full at the time of the death of ELSIE 
BRINKERHOFF, the remainder would be paid to her heirs, 
equally, share and share alike. 
3. Plaintiffs have duly performed all of their i 
obligations under said contract, except payment for the 
last several years has- been tendered and offered in full 
performance thereof, but Defendant ELSIE BRINKERHOFF has < 
wrongfully refused and still refuses to accept the same. 
4. Defendant ELSIE BRINKERHOFF has at no time declared 
the "Agreement" in default, but has failed and refused, and { 
still fails and refuses to perform her obligations under 
said contract. 
5. Plaintiffs have no adequate legal remedy in that i 
4 the real property is unique, having special value to Plaintiffs 
and is the* type of which Plaintiffs cannot obtain a duplicate. 
6. The contract, which is the subject matter of this < 
( 
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action, is fair and equitable, and is supported by consideration 
as is shown by the above facts and by the fact that Defendant 
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, signed a certain notarized- statement, 
(Exhibit ,fCM) , stating that she had received, as of 6 April 
1977, the sum of $23,000.00 in payments on said property 
from CLOYD and MARK BRINKERHOFF. 
7. By reason of Defendant ELSIE BRINKERHOFFfs failure 
to perform the remainder of said contract according to its 
terms, Plaintiffs have sustained damages in the amount of 
the fair market value of said property. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment on the Second 
Cause of Action as follows: 
1. That Defendant ELSIE BRINKERHOFF be required to 
specifically perform said contract by accepting the payments 
as set forth in said contract. 
2. If specific performance cannot be granted, for 
damages in the amount of the fair market value of the property. 
3. For costs of court incurred in this action. 
4. For such other and further relief as the Court 
deems appropriate in the premises. 
5. That the Court declare the deeds executed and 
recorded after the death of Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff to be null, 
void, and of no effect. 
O/ZC? 
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THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
ANTICIPATORY BREACH 
1. The allegations of paragraphs 1 through 14, above, 
are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 
2. In late fall of 1979, Plaintiffs were informed that 
Defendant ELSIE BRINKERHOFF had executed and recorded various 
deeds covering the property which she previously sold to 
Plaintiffs, in an attempt to pass title to other individuals 
not entitled thereto. 
3. Plaintiffs have performed all conditions to be 
performed in the contract, and stand ready, willing, and 
able to continue said performance. 
4. The actions of the above-named Defendants in 
accepting and recording the various deeds covering the 
above-described real properties, when they were fully aware 
of the existence of the contract with Plaintiffs, were done 
in anticipatory breach of said Plaintiffs' rights in and to 
the said property. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for relief on their Third 
Cause of Action as follows: 
1. That the Court declare Defendant ELSIE BRINKERHOFF 
to be in anticipatory breach of her contract and award 
Plaintiffs1 damages for the current market value of the 
above-described property. 
2. For Plaintiffs' costs incurred herein. 
3. . For such other relief as the court deems appropriate. 
r?/ a\ 
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FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
DAMAGES 
1. The allegations of paragraphs 1 through 14, above, 
are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 
2. Alternatively, in the event the Court does not 
grant relief under the First through Third Causes of Action, 
above, Plaintiffs are entitled to damages for the current 
market value of the above-described real properties as may 
be determined by the Court, together with interest thereon 
at the legal rate. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for relief on their Fourth 
Cause of Action as follows: 
1. That this Court determine the current market value 
of the above-described property and award Plaintiffs 
damages accordingly. 
2. For Plaintiffs1 costs incurred in this action, 
3. For such other and further relief as the Court 
deems appropriate in the premises. 
DATED: 2^? November 198^  
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
SERVED the within and foregoing document upon the 
Defendants above-named, by mailing a full, true and correct 
copy to Mr. Hans Q. Chamberlain, Attorney for Defendants, at 
110 N. Main Street, Cedar City, Utah 84720, and to Elsie 
Brinkerhoff, Glendale, Utah, all mailings first class postage 
fully prepaid this ^ 7 % . day of November 1983. X7 
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A G R E E M E N T 
';-*%: 
after 
THIS AGREEMENT, made and entered into by and between ELSIE f^H 1: 
of Glendale, County of Kane, State of Utah,. PARTY OF THE FIRST PART, herein-
r V e f e r r i ^ ^ andMARK a=?fN'f£--
-• j i iM'Jv '-> • K a . ' K * , G i a l a ;.• ' vi'i -J :*« . P.Yt-.7 1 ;.'.". a',- a,'.',' '.'\ ' V i l a I ' V . i , 
. i-. ' ior ;v. . : rr«. 'u .o aa; the " I W E R S " , 
i i l l ! i £ - i l i i l i l : 
THAT WHEREAS, the SELLER i s the owner of the r^l property, a-a-
privilege'.*, and water rights in the Stoics of Utah ond Arizona; 
AND WHEREAS, the BUYERS desire to purchase the r.a.-nc-; 
AND WHEREAS, the parties have.agreed upon trr-v, and a->nui i i -u.a .' .-
sale thereof; 
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and of the mutual 
r^vr-,-,- + '. """".f4 n - r ^ ^ - ^ ^ t " . S?rr1 n ^ i ^ - r ~'_t r a t t'-'-* --•:••!!"•• ' v ; •:•:*.•':•-r •'•<•• 
. . . ) < : ' . • ' • - ; . . . ' ( • • ; > : i : ; i : . : I K : ' ! ; ; : ; ; * ..'•'.; i o l . T j ' - . S * . • . V ' - " " ' — ' . • " 
1. That for and in consideration of the total su-n ai FIFTY 7h-.-~ 
THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED EIGHTY-EIGHT ($53,338.00) DOLLARS, as the full ccr.si : 
tion therefor, the SELLER covenants and agrees to sell and the BUYERS covens 
and agree to buy the following described real property, grazing privileges : 
water and reservoir rights in the States of. Utah and Arizona: 
REAL PROPERTY IN MILLARD COUNTY, UTAH: 
I ^!v. \ : , " , i.nd .'"., a i . c h ~:>, P l a t 'A i.a-lta Tav.nsi t - - . 
!.- •: •: , ,3! .-.:•:; ,:• , P ! r t -\\ : , U M t . ; .;•>...: v . .. . 
• • < • \ ; REAL PROPERTY: I t i : KANE COUNTYV'UTAH: • 
Township 39 South, Range 4 i West, S a l t ako M e r i d i a n : 
West Ha l f of S e c t i o n 25, i c o r i t n i n i : r . ' 0 a c r e s . 
Nor thwest Q u a r t e r ; Southeast QuarN: :nd I ho U.;v:th Ha l f 
a.r 1 ! : - : Nor theas t y - j n r t c r c o a t a i n i r u 'J?, a c r e s , a ! ! i n ' 
S e c t i o n 2C, Township Z>'j Sou th , Rvjn^ <* £• West , G a i t i_ah' 
i-'.-ri c'i aa, c o n t a i n i n g -V0 a c r c ^ , nar or l e s s . 
La ts 1 , 7, 3 , and a; Sou iheas t vuar a r o.' t he N o r r h -
v.a-;! Q u a r t e r ; Nur1 ia:aa |- Qua r te r a ' c Gout!.west 
Q a a r t o r ; East Ha l f of \)^ East H a l l ; a A , N.aac 1 y u a r - ^ r 
o f t h e N o r t h e a s t
 y u a r 1 ' r ; Nurthv.es I v ,- {- ' r ' 'or af the 
Sau lhcas l Qua r t e r of S e c t i o n 27, Tuvaishi j : ".• Gsa ih , 
Raa<-c '".} West, c o n t a i n i n g '".70.3J a c r e s . 
EXHIBIT "A" 
-2-
Eost Half of the Northeast Quarter; South Ha \ f of the 
Southeast Quarter; Northwest Quorter of the Southeast 
.'•Vvi'-.v;*;-!;-,::-" 
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«s& 
z 
\ 5 
tt r» 
U « 
IViV' 
i a • a 
« Z m «" 
3 * 
o 
..n:•••• !! : I ( ::: rhe Sout!».-!jS'i .'."'.ricr one! "»!:•: S o \ :;.:;:v , • r t c r 
;:." ti;cj Southwest Quarter, r: o:vt -'ii ni ng ' 6 0 ocrcs. 
Section 33: Northwest Quarter: East lb I: of llm Sou' hv.-o^ .t 
Quarter, containing 238.9'.) acres. 
Section 5: Lot 2, containing 39.03 acres. 
Tov-'nship 40 South, Range 4 West, Salt Lake Meridian: 
S-:i. ! iiwcst Quarter of the Nor i hv.vj I Quvirlcr .if Lie.: I ion •_'. 
c :>r.t-"ii ni ng '0 acres. 
Township 40 South, Range 7 West, Salt Lake Meridian: 
Beginning at the Southwest Corner of the Southwest Quarter of 
the Southeast Quarter of .Section 23, Township 40 South, Range 
i v + . r - , t f i _ - » » , * » " * W i <»: " •• .--: . .:.•-. »•• • ••- " - • •> -
 # - -
.".r.j;;:;: vi (<:•;» :1>: :/^i!,, 1 • :l\ i ;t ; » !;':•':» n n i ;= . '..', i..i .. . /•'' 
Beginning at the Northwest Corner of the Northwest Quarter of 
the Northeast Quarter of Section 20, Township 40 South, Range 
7 West, and running thence Souih 4.30 chains; thence South 70* 
East 15 chains to the middle of the channel of the creek; thence 
Northwesterly along the middle of the channel of-said'creek-to 
the North/Line of said Northwest Quarter of the Northeast 
Quarter; thence West 11.23 chains to the place of beginning. 
Beginning 4.30 chains South of the Northwest Corner of the 
Northv.est Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of Section 70., 
Tr>w;v;;>i;) 'C S>>nth, n.irv:^  7 Wert, Salt La!;.- Meridian and run-
•:!:' ;<•:;:-<• .; v.jth 7-;.1* !•!•:! i • .•.••.•lines \r t h e . u - V I n o< tl'.o 
,'. n . ••' •.,' I'r.c '-.reck: ! ''rr. r- . ;.•! h.y.' \ v : ! : v •!:••.• -\\ iC\<* o' 
'"•• •..•!.•;• ^ *.-..ic.' r ^ N ; ' • v' j? J ••ti'i:. 1. i:K*; I! • "v.-.'~. \'.o'~'•-^ 
. - " . * i."ust !•! .'00 clwiinu; I hence Nor in •'.-..*0 chair.':: to rhc 
place of beginning, containing 5.60 acres. 
Tho above three tracts being part of land situated in Sections 
23 end 26 of roid towns'-.ip and ronoo, V.OT.CT incr. r~i>-rrod to 
V-- f : i - i: I Iv -;r L o t ".• V . 
'f ;-...•.vhi;; •'•(; S o r v h , flange 4 ? V.'orjt, 5»1!" I. "!.••! .'• :ri cli •'..:;: 
L • i *: N ? r t h c > rt Qu.irtcr :.•; \'.r- \\- r\ i.v.^ ' f '.-:.r-l*>r ->'. .>i;ii ;•;.-: 
' * . -•;". i-': i r» i ;i.'i 7v.;?0 ficrr:': . 
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PERSCXIAL PROPERTY: 
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A .;.fi^ ho: ." i :v'i -r-.ro-r/; i n Sv i I i •. • :.". Re 5 ' r v o i r i t ; !-io'.*.ovc' ?, r.;p-: .7 , 
' \ r i : c n j . 
And n i l g r a z i n g p r i v i l e g e s cjruj p e r m i t s ounc^e-d t o o.* l;^r;cd 
• j ; ) jn any or t h e f o r e g o i n g rco 1, p e r s o n a l , r e s e r v o i r , o r w o t c r 
r i g h t s 03 commensurate. 
?. Tho o o r t i o s .ngrce t h n t f o r and i n con:; i d o r o t i u.n or i he c o l e ; ; : • 
SELLER t o the GUYERS of 1he f o r e g o i n g reo I ond perron... I p roper i y , w.r ior ore 
r c s c r v o i r r i g h t s ond g r a z i n g p r i v i l e g e s , Ihc BUYER!, w i l l ; M / I O I I .O MALI.:* ' ' • 
sum of TWO THOUSAND ( $ 2 , 0 0 3 . 0 0 ) DOLLARS, each y e a r , b e g i n n i n g w i t h tl^c 1s t dey 
o f November, 1964, of which 'payments due on November 1 , 1964 and November 1 , 
." .>.ii i nt:e i v :-:y .<n;iti-:l i s v t o I l:n»:n IT; -^ i i/,0'•»..•.'./.; *:» l it ' . * 1 '1 '! • •' J ' 1 i . ' • •  >•-•• i-
coch year t h e r e a f t e r b e g i n n i n g November 1 , v.C.6' end coivi i nui ng d u r i n g t n c e r r ) ' 
l i f e of t h e SELLER. 7 . 
The BUYERS agree t h a t t hey w i l l pay t h e sum of 5 2 , 0 0 0 . 0 3 per yea r t o 
t h e SELLER f o r t h o e n t i r e remainder of SELLER'S l i f e i r r e s p e c t i v e of t h e er.ou-.-
wh ich moy be p a i d under t h i s c o n t r a c t whether i t exceeds t h e t o t e I c o n s i d c r o f I: 
he rc innbovc cor c u t o r whether "Nut + o t n ! onount r .ho l ! n o t be p o i d by i ^ l v i - y . 
•••:,- i ' j-! > . :;. • •;» '.'.', '.•.?''• *_•*:.•:••• .'..-•* '-'jr1: '•. ::.o pr ior* d; : r i :v; Mr) l i f e ;•'*••• 
' ' . * .'•'.!!.•..' •• '•: •..•:.:• i { ; r . r ; . i i ;.;t < >' ... t: 1 uh: r ! •:!'. i ,;g 0 ; ".he L'JY;.h.h '. ^  p^y "the 
cnount of $2 ,000 .00 per y c o r f o r t h e l i f e o f t h o SELLER i r r e s p e c t i v e of t h e 
amount which may be p o i d , t h e SELLER v.aivcs i n t e r e s t upon t l .n u.vvnid hol-ir.-ry... 
I t i r p r j v i r ^ d , hov. o v e r , IS;.»v :.'...••.: Id t h e t o t o I cons i dc ru IT on r c r e i r , -
•i).)vc
 ::.r:y.'\r. . ,-,.>•;• he po i d lr, t ho rr.JYLRS t o t h o SELLER d u r i n g SELLER'S ! i --•!;-• 
then ppo.M '.l :• : r vi'h :.n t he SELLER .:.;:" "..Mountc r o i M n i n g ::noer r o i o Agreo . " ; -
:. 'trr% erec. ' i t i r .g o i l p" >'Montr» \ .h ic i i '\-y/r. !,cen M.;';O he r o u n d e r , r!:»";ll !.e ;;3>:, 
':;•'::••!! i , ..'. pro'M dc-f.: h e r e i n i n oc;u:-l r . ho res , chores >jnd r.r.ore :J I i !••/,, ."'• 
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Warren BrinkerhoW oncl Charley Arlur.d fVi nkcrhof i lv.o-:V.vc:i i i.:; (:• '/M hs) ( 1 , , . 
, to each) of the balances due,(it. b#ing st i pu I at«d ;.that J^
 t&ff,ERS together* wit.* 
;:%rmrr... r . r - ; - i - , - . - ' " - ' f ; ' ' ? ' • . - • • !*rj»' "*.r •*.".•' ';•*" ^ ' v ' : * ' : " ' . V-'-': ' • ! \ P'*.:.'' i •• . ; " . ! • ' r " . * * '•-
. . , . ; ' . , : . • . . • ' ! , . i . . . - . > : : • • i ! ' . . ? ' . • '. . • • • • ! . - . • » « • • '. '.. \ ; > . : ' • • • ' , ' . . " . 
.
v i .hcr ; . : i \ M ' i r i o i , 1 »:.*:; i i o i v i MvUir1 l : , r 'i * ir* l ' ! !< "M {'.,r< • ' i> v.: *<! !•.<•;; ) , !*>•!' '. < r . . . 
i n t e r e s t o t f o u r (.'.£) per c e n t per pnnu^ on t h e d e f e r r e d d e c l i n i n g be 1 o n c e . 
The JUYE?.S r.-.^y, n t any t i r a o , nrep-r/ n I i o r ony p~ r t o; t h e r c v i i ni -
p r i n c i p a l cue under t h i s c o n t r a c t . 
: . The SI'Ll.L'P. r.ho 1 I execu te .i l . ' . i r ron I . !>-
h e r e i iw.j!\iv«' d e w r i IJCU ..nd • in t lc Kii:'.» • nv-:y.ui 
r i g h t s h c r c i n a f o v c d e s c r i b e d , of on u n d i v i d e d one i-.,i I f i n t e r e s t t o ozzh B'^'L* 
• and h i s x i f e as j o i n t t e n a n t s w i t h f u l l r i g h t s o f s u r v i v o r s h i p , ar,d shall 
ESCROW 1 N S T K X T I O I IS. 
I f t h e 3UYER3 sh. i l I moke ;•> I i p.iyneniT. of ; . r i : r : i > . I 0:;,! i i u o r e r . I ^c-r>y 
p r o v i d e d o.nd per t o r n o i l t h e o t h e r covenan ts 'JnrJ .>;reemonts h o r n i n - c o n t a i r , c , 
t h e n upon payment or t h e f i n a l i n s t a l l m e n t due hereunder fhc Esc rov: Dopes i t o r 
s h a H d e l i v e r t o t h e BUYERS a l l t h e escrowed documents . 
I n t h e event o f a d e f a u l t In t h e payment o f any i n s t a l l m e n t o f zr\r>c-
:-r i P.'I erv> •-•••• -:r.«! ::. v •'• •"''.'•*.;; t v"' -.' '.if-!•••'•" i n e n v : v ; f r c r t c r - i i / r co;"<;!; t ; ~:i ' •?."• 
'/ ; K : ;• '•'• * •.:•.••;.•:• .,.'•'ir:- .-> • .: r r \ ' •:• ' !' .-r v" : i : i ,:* • ,/.•»-• ;v»-.*. I • ; r < "v:.; .? : I •..•_ 
i n t e r e s t s h a l l bo g i v e n t o t h e BUYERS by t h e SELLER ?ind n subsequent f o i l u r -
t o remedy t h e SOTIO s h e l l c o n t i n u e fur* a p e r i o d o f t h i r t y ( 30 ) cLr /s, t hen " r n 
*;r'I.Lrrv :.vv/, ,'.t i.or o p t i o n , den.; nd n r e d e l i v e r y t o i i c r of .*:!! • / ' h ~ escro'..cc 
» ' 
iS-n':i,»v:n 'I ' .c u'jYilr.S ' " i l l v : ^ ; : t e ."tns »e >^n :b lv zurrryr.t'^ 
..re*ni :*<•:.' • .r-c-; v.. : l \v /c d'.ser" i hed •.:,n! !;:-: r.t.lJ.t.i! r.-".«y }•'.•• 
I!:c r. 'i ' .^ • ; : ! ; . . ; - . ' ; ;r! i ie r n r o e e r r ".; • •• r e t - i l r ; •**•'*. f ;:r.o ' i t;;j j <.: ye .-J d: 
: ! ! erevc-f^'*^ \~,\ t by (3UYEK5 ur.-Jer t h i s . \ f j rcn --eni ' . 
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As an alternative remedy the SELLER nay elect to reduce any,payment 
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^^^Wv^Ym«<m:^ 'principal an: 
note one ^ i o r h , : ^ poscinr j t i t l e t i . r c t . j h "! ;> !hf< ivlJYil.'" ..,,.-' • •>r>^. I •;-. "• .w, '.'..' • 
In. t h e manner p rov ided by law. 
Dur ing the p e r i o d t h e BUYERS o re coup ly i r,?; \:i rh t h e tor;-.n of !• -.; n 
.V ;r°.rr, 'Oi! i ; i r y rho I I h/: e i v i i t l o d i n i ho r . o i e , r ^ r [t:r,i vr . Oud h r n r f i c i ': I i : : 
occupc.r.cy, and rr . joy.ncnt of t h e above d e s c r i b e d p r o . i i ! ; c : r ,<iby-: t -.n ! . 1 J . 
r i g h t s of the SELLER t o i n s p e c t t h e UJ.MO o t re^soi.ob!'..- t i . v . u . 
A. The BUYERS hnve i n s p e c t e d r.oid premises and f i n d t h e sa-no i n a 
i ^ ^ ^ e r sot i fcfactory4to thorn• ftr$,there!arevno covenants or w a r r a n t i e s o t h e r 
5 S 
(A « 
I Vi .'.'i oho t I be or t h e essence o n t o n i l L ie tcrrr.c -.nc co:.<-i ; i .. . : 
/ h i s Agreement v.hich : ; h o l i b i n d and i nure t o t h e b e n e f i t o f , t h e hc i r s , suc -
c e s s o r s , and oss ions o f t h e p a r t i e s h?reto and t h e p a r t y i n cc fau I t aere::5 . 
noy o i l coci i> -ziul oJreoconob le a t t o r n e y ' s , fee i n t h e even t c n f o r c c o c n J- of > 
c o n t r a c t i s r e q u i r e d . 
VilTNESS t h e hands of the p a r t i e s hereto t h i s I t l day of 0 ^ 1 ^ ^ 
19CG. . ! ^ • 
^' '-) /) 
*"' '*
 %
 ' »'^/ /" /7 
' .' .^ii..%fjl.<.'— / _ ^T-{ .-<- ' J r x / u ^ ' T * _. / ( V —^ 
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SELLER 
C r r ; •'' 1!. i.'.r i i.h<;r":.. r f 
lMhM$.*/Jt<*.A 
A _ Q / . 
hlLULLlll 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF KANE ) 
BEFORE ME, the undersigned Notary Public, personally appeared 
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, who stated under oath, as follows: 
That she has sold Real Property described hereinafter to Mark J. 
Brinkerhoff and Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff, and that she will defend the rights of own-
ership and also any rights of way of ingress or egress to the said Real Property. 
That she will enter into a lawsuit or any other procedure needed to protect these 
rights of ingress or egress, to said property. 
The real property is described as follows: 
BEGINNING at the South Quarter Corner of Section 23, Township 40 South, Range 7 
West, Salt Lake Meridian, Utah, and running thence East 10.23 chains; thence North 
80° West 6.36 cahins; thence West 3.68 chains; thence South 1 chain to the point 
of beginning. 
ALSO BEGINNING at the North Quarter Corner of Section 26, Township 40 South, Range 
7 West, Salt Lake teridian, Utah, and running thence South 8.6 chains; thence South 
73°45f East 14.6 chains; thence Northwesterly along the middle of the channel of 
the creek to the North boundary line of said Section 26; thence West 11.23 chains 
to the point of beginning. Containing 11.77 acres 
Total acres: 12.51 
That the Affiant will at any time help to defend and protect the 
rights of Mark J. Brinkerhoff and Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff as far as Che Real Property 
is concerned. 
~c> <£$ x^f Jo A j.*+^wjrSrJ*^ 
Elsie Brinkerhoff fip 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before roe this / 7 day of April, A.D. 1971, 
.'s^ytu^c- itf/Cu*******-'*- ^ „ 
l
' Notary Public jf) /
 m • /? ., A //t/L Residing at &JU&'W^ fc<*"^ 
My commission expires 
jLf.fy/f?^ 
EXHIBIT "B" 
To whom It nay concern: 
1, Elsie Brlnkcrhoff, have received from CXoyd 
and Kark Brlnkerhoff, ps payirent on property, 
S1 *ncd: % Jy±JUzJjAJ^)Ct>U<4>gL 
STATE OF UTAH ) SS . 
County of Kane 
On t h i s (n?h day of CXp^ ,P 1C>7J2 # personally 
appeared before rae Elsie Brinkerhoff , the signer 
of the above and foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledged 
to me that she executed the same. 
\Tt*ril S ' f l^ t / t . • . j T *t ( 
Notary Public 
Residing at /fA.U-„?ki$z* Ut[(i; 
EXHIBIT ,fC 
J* 
Recorded it Request of 
•t , M. Fat Paid $ . 
By Da».-
County Recorder 
Book. Plot. Rtt.: 
Mail tax notice to GrantCf.V. Add rots. .Jalenda,le^ilUJi_a4I21_„ 
WARRANTY DEED 
E l s i e B r i n k e r h o f f , a widow, a/amor 
o* Glendale . County of Kane . State of Utah, hartby 
CONVEY and WARRANT to ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, a widow, MARK J . BRINKERHOFF, a 
marr ied man, and CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF, a marr ied man, 
a l l as J o i n t Tenants w i t h f u l l r i g h t s o f s u r v i v o r s h i p , 
and not as Tenants in Common, 
of G lenda le , Utah 84729 for t h ^ m of | 
$10.00 & other va luab le cons idera t ion -DOLLARS, 
tha following dascribad trace of land in KANE County,' 
Stata of Utah: 
SEE SCHEDULE "A" ATTACHED HERETO AND BY THIS REFERENCE MADE A PART HEREOF. 
m V 
D • 
» J r 
a $ 2 
"I s 
I 
WITNESS, tha htnd of v*& frantor 
m tha Pratanca of 
this 4 th day of June 
yl 
, A. D. I I 79 . 
sL<«^b^/Lu*^t. 
Elsie Brinkerhoff 
A 
6 2 
^ 
HATE OF UTAM 
County of Kane 
) ) SS. 
) 
On the 4 th day of June A. D., 19 79 parsonally 
appeared before me E l s i e B r i n k e r h o f f , a widow. 
the signer of tha within instalment who duly acknowledged 
to me that S he executed the same. 
. . . . . J ^ . ? j f t ^ . . ^ ^ L t _ 
James B. Adair Netary Public 
My Commwon axoim -. J.U.n*...i9.*.l*7S My residence is ™l..QTlter!f.lUta....U.UIl„ 
MVVMIM V?MI mil ft»M«f. t.e. tw t . «« * . mm mm 
ti? rr~u<i u u nr»»» ™ir 
• • 
SCHEDULE MAM 
PARCEL 1: The West Half of Section 25, Township 39 South, Ranqe 4S West, 
Salt Like Base and Meridian, contalnlnq 320.0 acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 2: The Northwest Ouarter (NWS); the Southeast Ouarter (SEU) and the 
South Half of the Northeast Ouarter (SSNEU) of Section 26, Townshio 39 South, 
Ranoe 4H West, Salt Lake Base ir\6 Meridian, containing 400.0 acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 3: Lots 1. 2, 3, and 4; the Southeast Ouarter of the Northwest Quarter 
[SEU4WM; the Northeast Ouarter of the Southwest Ouarter (NE**SW\); the East Half 
of the East Half (ESES); the Southwest Ouarter of the Northeast Ouarter (SWVJES) 
and the Northwest Ouarter of the Southeast Ouarter (NW\SEli) of Section 27, 
Townshio 39 South, Range 4S West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, containing 478.80 
acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 4: The East Half of the Northeast Quarter (ESNE**); the South Half of 
the Southeast Ouarter (SSSEH) and Northwest Ouarter of the Southeast Ouarter 
(NYSE's) of Section 35. Townshio 39 South, Ranoe 44 West. Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian, containing 200.0 acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 5.: The Southwest Ouarter of the Northeast Ogarter (SW^NEH); the West 
Half of the Southeast Ouarter (WSSEV4) and the Southeast Ouarter of the Southwest 
Ouarter (SESSWM of Section 29, Townshio 40 South, Ranqe 4S West. Salt Lake Base 
and Meridian, containing 160.0 acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 6: The Northwest Ouarter (NWS) and the East Half of the Southwest 
Ouarter of Section 30, Townshio 40 South, Ranne 4^ West, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian, containinn 238.99 acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 7: Lot 2, Section 5, Townshio 40 South, Range 4S West, Salt Lake Base 
and Meridian, containlna 39.08 acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 8: The Southwest Ouarter of the Northwest Ouarter (SWVJW\) of Section 
8, Townshio 40 South, Ranne 4 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, containing 
40.0 acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 9: Lot 1 and the Northeast Ouarter of the Northwest Ouarter (NEV*W**) 
of Section 31, Townshio 40 South, Ranoe 4l, West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, 
contalnlnq 79.30 acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 10: BEGINNING at the North Quarter Corner of Section.26, Township 40 
South, Range 7 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence South 
O ^ S 1 West 567.SO feet; thence South 78°00' East 963.6 feet; thtnce North-
westerly along the creek bed, 808.0 feet, more or less, to the Horth H n e of 
Section 26; thence South 09°57' West 741.18 feet to the point of beginning. 
Containing 11.77 acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 11: BEGINNING at the Southwest Corner of the Southwest Quarter of 
the Southeast Quarter of Section 23, Township 40 South, Ranged West, Salt 
Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence East 10.23 chains; thence North 
80* West 6.36 chains; thence West 3.68 chains; thence South 1.0 chain to the 
point of beginning. Containing 0.74 acres, more or less. 
44 44 44 4 4 44 44 44 
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BISHOP AND RONNOW, P.C. 
WILLARD R. BISHOP 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
P.O. Box 279 
Cedar City, UT 84720 
(FILED FOR RECORD, 
1$ ~Mpl 19, 
cjnhjwi, <&MHdrmn 
Clerk of the District Court. 
Telephone: 586-9483 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF KANE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
MONT R. ANDERSON, Personal 
Representative of the Estate 
of CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF, 
LENA BRINKERHOFF, and MARK J. 
BRINKERHOFF, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, GOLDA B. 
ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF, 
ARLENE B. GOULDING, and JOHN 
DOES I through V, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE TO APPOINT COUNSEL 
Civil No. 1826 
Come now Plaintiffs, by and through counsel, and hereby 
give notice to Defendant ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, to appoint 
counsel or appear personally to represent herself in these 
proceedings. 
DATED: 12 September 1984. 
BISHOP 
Attorney for "Plaintiffs 
/?«? A-QQ 
V 
I 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I HEREBY certify that I delivered a full, true and 
correct copy of the above and foregoing NOTICE TO APPOINT 
COUNSEL to Mrs. Elsie Brinkerhoff, Glendale, Utah on this 
/£) day of September 1984. 
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HANS Q. CHAMBERLAIN 
CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE 
Attorneys for Defendants and Cross-Claimaints, 
Golda B. Adair, Warren Brinkerhoff and 
Arlene B. Goulding 
110 North Main St., Suite G 
P. 0. Box 726 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Telephone: (801) 586-4404 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
KANE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MONT R. ANDERSON, Personal 
Representative of the Estate 
Of CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, MARK J. 
BRINKERHOFF, GOLDA B. ADAIR, 
WARREN BRINKERHOFF, ARLENE B. 
GOULDING, CHARLES A. 
BRINKERHOFF, BETTY B. ESPLIN, 
DARLOS T. BRINKERHOFF, and 
JOHN DOES I through V, 
Defendants. 
CROSS-CLAIM OF GOLDA B. 
ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF 
AND ARLENE B. GOULDING 
AGAINST CO-DEFENDANT, 
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF 
Civil No. 1826 
Comes now Defendants, Golda B. Adair, Warren Brinkerhoff 
and Arlene B. Goulding, and hereby cross-claim against Co-
Defendant, Elsie Brinkerhoff, as follows: 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
1. The real property, water rights and grazing rights 
which are the subject of this action are located in Kane County, 
Utah. 
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2. Cross-Defendant, Elsie Brinkerhoff, is the mother of 
Cross-Claimants, Golda B. Adair, Warren Brinkerhoff and Arlene 
B. Goulding, and she is also the mother of Cross-Defendant, Mark 
J. Brinkerhoff and the mother-in-law of Lena Brinkerhoff, who is 
the surviving widow of Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff. 
3. On or about October 26, 1966, Elsie Brinkerhoff 
executed a certain agreement covering the sale of certain real 
and personal property which is the subject of this action to 
Mark J. Brinkerhoff and Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
1. After the agreement entered into between Elsie 
Brinkerhoff as seller and Mark J. Brinkerhoff and Cloyd H. 
Brinkerhoff, as buyers, was executed, the buyers therein failed 
to pay to the seller therein all sums due under said agreement. 
2. Upon information and belief, Cross-Claimants allege 
that Elsie Brinkerhoff demanded of Mark J. Brinkerhoff and Cloyd 
H. Brinkerhoff the payments to which she was entitled, but they 
refused to pay to her all sums due and owing. By reason of the 
same, Elsie Brinkerhoff declared the agreement entered into on 
October 26, 1966, to be null and void, or it became null and 
void by operation of law. 
3. On or about June 4, 1979, Elsie Brinkerhoff deeded the 
real and personal property which is the subject of this action 
to herself, Mark J. Brinkerhoff and Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff, as 
joint tenants. Said deed was thereafter recorded in the office 
of the Kane County Recorder. 
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4. Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff died unexpectedly on October 14th, 
1979, and the joint tenancy created by the June 4, 1979 deed was 
severed. By reason of the same, Elsie Brinkerhoff owned 
one-half of said real and personal property and Mark Brinkerhoff 
owned the other one-half of said property. 
5. Cross-Claimants knew that their mother, Elsie 
Brinkerhoff, was not getting paid by the two sons who had 
purchased the subject property, and likewise knew that she was 
in need of funds, being rather aged and with little or no 
income. Cross-Claimants also became aware of the fact that 
Elsie Brinkerhoff owned one-half of the subject property by 
reason of the severing of the joint tenancy, and to assist their 
mother, entered into an agreement with her whereby they (Golda 
B. Adair, Warren Brinkerhoff, Arlene B. Goulding, Betty B. 
Esplin and Charles A. Brinkerhoff) would purchase Elsie 
Brinkerhofffs one-half interest from her for the total sum of ' 
$50,000, payable at the rate of $150.00 per month, with each of 
said five children to pay to Elsie Brinkerhoff the sum of $30.00 
per month. ( 
6. Pursuant to that agreement, Elsie Brinkerhoff deeded to 
said five children her undivided one-half interest in the 
subject property, and the five children executed back to Elsie * 
Brinkerhoff a Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed on the subject 
property, and established an escrow at State Bank of Southern 
Utah in Orderville, Utah. Payments pursuant to said Purchase < 
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Agreement were thereafter made and have continued to be made 
since the date the escrow was established. 
7. Mark J. Brinkerhoff and Lena Brinkerhoff, as the 
surviving widow of Cloyd H. Brinkerhoffr attempted to reinstate 
the contract entered into in 1966 by making payments to Elsie 
Brinkerhoff. Elsie Brinkerhoff refused said paymentsf taking 
the position that the contract had been terminated and that Mark 
J. Brinkerhoff, as a surviving joint tenant, owned an undivided 
one-half interest in the subject property. Elsie Brinkerhoff 
continued to receive payments from Cross-Claimants and at all 
times has recognized the existence of the agreement entered into 
between herself and Cross-Claimants. 
8. In June of 1982, Lena Brinkerhoff caused to be filed 
the above-entitled action. 
9. At that time, Elsie Brinkerhoff resisted the attempt of 
Lena Brinkerhoff to enforce the 1966 contract, and engaged the 
services of Hans Q. Chamberlain, Attorney at Law. Likewise, the 
five children to whom she had deeded the property were initially 
represented by the same attorney, who prepared numerous 
pleadings on behalf of said Elsie Brinkerhoff to deny the 
allegations made by Plaintiff. 
10. Defendants, Charles A. Brinkerhoff and Betty B. Esplin, 
thereafter elected not to remain in the litigation, and executed 
warranty deeds covering the interest acquired from their mother 
to Mark J. Brinkerhoff and Lena Brinkerhoff. 
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11. Thereafter, Elsie Brinkerhoff requested Hans Q. 
Chamberlain to withdraw as her attorney of record. At that time 
she was apparently being unduly influenced by Dale Brinkerhoff, 
the son of Mark J. Brinkerhoff. 
12. In September of 1984, Elsie Brinkerhoff entered into a 
stipulation under duress and pursuant to undue influence 
exercised upon her by Dale Brinkerhoff, the son of Mark 
Brinkerhoff, and other parties to this action, whereby she now 
attempts to recant the agreement entered into between herself 
and her five children in 1980, and to reinstate the 1966 
contract between herself and Mark J. Brinkerhoff and Cloyd H. 
Brinkerhoff. 
13. That said stipulation is void and of no legal effect. 
14. The deed under which Cross-Claimants claim ownership is 
entitled to be enforced and given legal effect by this Court, 
and Cross-Defendants are entitled to an order quieting title to 
them, as their interest may appear, in and to the real property, 
water rights, and grazing rights pursuant to the warranty deed 
from Elsie Brinkerhoff to them dated June 4, 1979, and pursuant 
to all rights acquired pursuant to a Quit-Claim Deed dated 
September 9, 1980, with Elsie Brinkerhoff as grantor and 
Cross-Claimants as grantees. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
Cross-Claimants incorporate by reference Paragraphs 1 
through 14, and further allege and contend as follows: 
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15. In the event the Court finds that Elsie Brinkerhoff is 
entitled to recant, withdraw and cancel the agreement entered 
into between herself and her five children in 1980, then Cross-
Claimants , Golda B. Adair, Warren Brinkerhoff and Arlene B. 
Goulding, will be damaged and will have lost the benefit of the 
bargain made by them in 1980. In that event, Cross-Claimants 
are entitled to damages over and against Elsie Brinkerhoff in an 
amount to be proven at the time of trial based on the loss of 
the benefit of the bargain. 
16. Cross-Claimants are also entitled to damages over and 
against Elsie Brinkerhoff for breach of warranty of title and 
such other damages as may be proved at the time this matter is 
heard on the merits. 
WHEREFORE, Cross-Claimants pray judgment against 
Cross-Defendant Elsie Brinkerhoff as follows: 
1. For an order determining the stipulation signed by 
Elsie Brinkerhoff in September of 1984 to be null and void and 
of no legal effect. 
2. For an order of this Court quieting title to said 
individuals to the real property, water rights and personal 
property which are the subject of this action as their 
respective interests may appear over and against Mont R. 
Anderson, Personal Representative of the Estate of Cloyd H. 
Brinkerhoff, Lena Brinkerhoff, Mark J. Brinkerhoff, Elsie 
Brinkerhoff, Charles A. Brinkerhoff and Betty B. Esplin. 
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3. As an alternative relief, for judgment over and against 
Elsie Brinkerhoff for damages in an amount to be proven at the 
time of trial based on breach of contract, breach of warranty of 
title, loss of benefit of the bargain, unjust enrichment, 
together with all other damages as may be proven at the time of 
trial. 
4. For a reasonable attorney's fee, for costs of court 
incurred herein and for such other and further relief as to the 
Court may appear just and proper. 
DATED this 28th day of September, 1984. 
CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE 
7^£AdA 
" ans Q. Chamberlain 
ttorney for Cross-Claimants 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the within and foregoing CROSS-CLAIM OF GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN 
BRINKERHOFF AND ARLENE B. GOULDING AGAINST CO-DEFENDANT, ELSIE 
BRINKERHOFF, to Mr. Willard R. Bishop, BISHOP & RONNOW, attorney 
for Mont R. Anderson, Lena Brinkerhoff and Mark J. Brinkerhoff, 
first class postage prepaid on this _-^/7{7 — day of September, 
1984. ,.---x 
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,/*J m ^VV^ lll^ tfgyl S f£ 
secretary ' 
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HANS Q. CHAMBERLAIN 
CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE 
Attorneys for Defendants and Cross-Claimants, 
Golda B. Adair, Warren Brinkerhoff and 
Arlene B. Goulding 
110 North Main St., Suite G 
P. 0. Box 726 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Telephone: (801) 586-4404 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
KANE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Wricf C 
°urf. 
MONT R. ANDERSON, Personal 
Representative of the Estate 
of CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, MARK J. 
BRINKERHOFF, GOLDA B. ADAIR, 
WARREN BRINKERHOFF, ARLENE B. 
GOULDING, CHARLES A. 
BRINKERHOFF, BETTY B. ESPLIN, 
DARLOS T. BRINKERHOFF, and 
JOHN DOES I through V, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE TO APPOINT SUCCESSOR 
ATTORNEY, NOTICE OF PENDING 
LITIGATION AGAINST YOU AND 
NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION 
Civil No. 1826 
TO: ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, GLENDALE, UTAH 
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that you are still a party 
Defendant to the above-entitled action, and by reason of the 
same, your legal rights may be affected in the lawsuit that is 
pending against you. 
By reason of the fact that you have asked Hans Q. 
Chamberlain, Attorney at Law, to withdraw as your attorney, you 
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are hereby requested to appoint another attorney to represent 
you in this matter, and that you should do so within ten (10) 
days from receipt of this document. 
You are further hereby notified that Golda B. Adair, 
Warren Brinkerhoff and Arlene B. Goulding, have caused to be 
filed against you a Cross-Complaint seeking to enforce a deed 
you signed and executed with yourself as grantor and them as 
grantees, said deed dated August 15, 1980; or in the 
alternative, for damages over and against you for breach of 
contract, breach of warranty of title, unjust enrichment and 
such other damages as may be proven at the time of trial. A 
copy of this Cross-Claim is being served upon you at the same 
time this document is being served upon you. Your legal rights 
could be affected by this Cross-Complaint and you should 
consult with an attorney concerning the same. 
You are further hereby notified that your deposition will 
be taken by Hans Q. Chamberlain, Attorney at Law, (the attorney 
for Golda B. Adair, Warren Brinkerhoff and Arlene B. Goulding), 
in the immediate near future. You will be given notice of the 
time, place and date of said deposition in writing. You are, 
however, required to appear pursuant to that Notice of Taking 
Deposition by reason of the fact that you are a party to the 
lawsuit now pending. 
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I A M B E R L A I N 
& HIGBEE 
TORNEYS AT LAW 
1. MAIN - SUITS S 
>. O. BOX 7*6 
CEOAH CITY. 
PLEASE GOVERN YOURSELF ACCORDINGLY. 
DATED this 28th day of September, 1984 
CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE 
/ 
ans Q. Chamberlain 
ttorney for Cross-Claimants 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the within and foregoing NOTICE TO APPOINT SUCCESSOR ATTORNEY, 
NOTICE OF PENDING LITIGATION AGAINST YOU AND NOTICE OF TAKING 
DEPOSITION to Mr. Willard R. Bishop, BISHOP & RONNOW, attorney 
for Mont R. Anderson, Lena Brinkerhoff and Mark J. Brinkerhoff, 
first class postage prepaid on this ^ J — day of September, 
1984. /-
Secretary yi^V 
BISHOP & RONNOW, P.C. 
Willard R. Bishop 
Attorney cor Plaintiff 
P. 0. Box 279 
Cedar City, UT 84720 
Telephone: (801) 586-9433 
(f-'ILEp FOR RECORD) 
^ l ^ i i m - L ^ Q a ^ 
Clerk of i!:a District Court. 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF KANE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
MONT R. ANDERSON, Personal 
Representative of the Estate 
Of CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF, 
LENA BRINKERHOFF, and MARK J. 
BRINKERHOFF, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, GOLDA B. 
ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF, 
ARLENE B. GOULDING, and JOHN 
DOES I through V, 
Defendants. 
STIPULATION 
Civil No. 1826 
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, Defendant in the above-entitled action, 
agrees and stipulates as follows: 
1. That the certain agreement dated October 26, 1966 
(hereinafter "Agreement" attached as Exhibit "A"), executed by 
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, Seller, and CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF and MARK J. 
BRINKERHOFF, Buyers, together with any other agreement containing 
substantially the same terms, is a valid and binding contract 
which she executed without coercion, and with full knowledge and 
understanding of its provisions and duties. 
2. That she agrees to conform to the- terms of the Agreement, 
and perform all conditions and duties provided and imposed 
thereunder, including specific performance on her part. 
. s/M 
3. That she recognizes she improperly attempted to convey 
land to others contrary to the terms of the Agreement, and hereby 
repudiates a certain Warranty Deed dated June 4, 1979, (Exhibit 
nBn) purporting to convey to ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, MARK J. 
BRINKERHOFF, and CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF, as Joint Tenants, the same 
property conveyed under the Agreement, and further repudiates any 
other deeds or instruments of conveyance which have the effect of 
divesting or in any way diminishing the right, title, and 
interest of buyers and their wives, in the property specified in 
the Agreement. 
4. That she acknowledges the receipt of $2,000 from the 
Buyers, and/or their heirs, MARK J. BRINKERHOFF and LENA A, 
BRINKERHOFF, for the 1983 payment pursuant to the terms of the 
Agreement, 
5* That she forgives and waives all rights to any and all 
delinquent amounts currently due under the Agreement. 
6. That she recognizes the validity of a certain affidavit 
dated April 13, 1971, (attached as Exhibit f,C"), and reaffirms 
the statements contained therein and further agrees to cooperate 
and assist Plaintiffs in the litigation of their claims against 
- other named Defendants in the above-entitled action* 
7. That her Amended Counterclaim against the Plaintiffs and 
her Crossclaim against MARK J. BRINKERHOFF, as filed in this 
action, shall be dismissed with prejudice and upon the merits. 
8. That the Court shall enter a decree of specific 
performance against her. 
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In consideration for the Stipulation specified above, 
Plaintiffs hereby stipulate as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs will not seek any award of damages against 
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF under their Second Amended Complaint. 
2. Plaintiffs will reimburse Defendants, GOLDA B. ADAIR, 
WARREN BRINKERHOFF, and ARLENE B. GOULDING for the amounts paid 
to ELSIE BRINKERHOFF for the purported transfer of properties 
specified under the Warranty Deed dated June 4, 1979, Exhibit 
"B", in return for the said Defendants' Agreement to drop all 
their claims filed in the above-entitled lawsuit and dismiss the 
same with prejudice. If said Defendants do not dismiss said 
claims before 20 September 1984, Plaintiffs shall be under no 
obligation of reimbursement. 
3. That the above-entitled Court may enter its Order and 
judgment in conformance with this Stipulation and Plaintiff's 
prayer for relief as specified in their Second Amended Complaint. 
DATED this £f*~ day of September, 1984. 
~£IxL^ ioAj^Jki^X^p 
ELSIE B R J t f K E R H O F F " / V 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
County of J"' I , 
On the 7 "~day of ^CtyjiUfJUj , 1984, personal ly 
appeared before me ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, Defendant named in the 
- 3 -
- x/ffi? 
above-entitled action, the signer of the above and foregoing 
instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that she executed the 
same. 
NOTAR IC, residing at: / 
ar fe£ pet-git 
DATED t h i s 
res: 
day of September, 
WILLARD R. BISHOP 
Attorney for Plaintiff** 
STATE OF UTAH 
County of 
) 
:ss. 
) 
On the /0 day of tjryiLLULs , 1984, personally 
appeared before me WILLARD R. BISHOP, attorney for Plaintiff 
ANDERSON in the above-entitled action, the signer of the above 
and foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he 
executed the same. 
NOTARY PUBLIC, resi 
(UtAfiX*, 7/J ?<tteO 
My Commission expires: 
_<3£. W/M^J 
CERTIFICATE OF HAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a full, true and correct copy 
of the above and foregoing STIPULATION to Mr. Hans Q. 
Chamberlain, CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE, Attorneys at Law, 110 North 
Main Street, Suite G, Cedar City, Utah 84720, by first class 
mail, postage fully prepaid this day of , 
1984. 
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TlUS AOT&KCHT, modo ond ontcrod Into by end botwon tLSIC trjriXCTttCFrj 
of Glcodolo, Co;nty of I'ono, Stoto of Utah, PARTY OF U K FIR3T PART, horcln-
e f t « r roforrod to os tho "SCLLCR" and CLOYO H. GfU K.'S.SHOFF end MAH2C CRI .'JKCftiuiY 
of Glondolo, County of torn, State of Utah, PARTIES OF TUI SCCaO P ^ T , r * r * t n -
o f tc r roforrod to as tho "LUYCRS", 
iiiIH£i5.£Ili J 
THAT UF.REASf tho SULLCR U the ovner of tho re-sl property, ^.r2?A n~ 
pr lv l logos ond votor r ights lr> tho Statos of Utah end Arizona; 
A15D V.1CRCAS, tho RJYERS deslro to pjrcha&o tho s ^ a ; 
Al© ViTCttEAS, tho pr.rtio$ hovo ocjrood upon term* and conditions izr th 
safe tl>orcof; 
\\di\ THERCFOrst, In consideration of tho prcnlocs and of tv-e r i t u a l j 
covenants and flgrccrnonSo horslnoftor set a i t the pnrtlcr. hereinafter onrco wli.i 
oad t>ct»oen ooo oncthor oa fo l lo*o i 
1 . That for ond In consideration of tho to ta l ru-n of FIFTY 7ir.>.J! 
V\WMD -nrvCE HUNDRED nOJTY-EIGJIT U53,30D.OD) DOLLARS, cs tho f u l l z or.s; i dcrr..-| 
t l o n thorofor, tho SELLCR covenant end ©grooc to C G I I and tt»o BUYERS covoror.t 
end ooxoo to buy tho following doscrlbed real property, grazing pr lv l Ic^c*; ond 
votor ond rosorvolr r ights In tho Statoo of Utah or»d Arlzcos: 
REAL PROPERTY IN MILK® COUMTY, UTAHi 
Lola 1 , 2 , 3 , and 4 , Clock 25, Plot "A", Do I to TovmsU*. 
l o t 2 , Block 26, Plot W , tolta Tovnslto 
REAL PROPERTY IM KATIE COUNTY, UTAHt 
Township 39 South, Rango 4 | Kcr.t, Sslt U:!;o ttarldlen; 
Vest I k H oi Sect I on 23", containing 320 ecrcs. 
!brthvcr.t Quortorj Southeast C a r t e r ond tho South KJ I f 
of iho Nrrthoast Quarter corstrlnlnQ 0 0 c:rcs, o i l In 
Soctlon 20, Tounnnlp ;>j South, Puxujo 4f Loot, Salt toko 
Meridian, containing AQQ acrcv, «noi*o or loss. 
to t f \9 ?t 3, ond /,; Southonot Q\»artor o^  tho North-
i.-cist Q^ortor; Nortl-.ooit ^ n r t o r of tho Southwest 
Quortor; Lont lb If of 1hu Vast I h t ! ; S-w.;1tit<ost v j ^ r l c r 
of the florthojot ^u.vrlor; Horthwotst <tor"tor of th3 
SoMthcor.V g o r i e r of fcc1lo> T?, lo-Aiif.hIp 3'; Sou1i\, 
IU .^^ QO A | V.C/:tf containing -V/0.OD tcroa. 
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Eost Half of tho Northojst Quarters South Half of tho 
Southeast Qu.'irtor; Narthi/ost tyartor of tho Southeast 
ftjartor of Soctlon 35, containing 200 acres. 
Township 40 South, Rango 4f Wost, Sal t lako Meridian: 
Section 29: Southt/ost Quarter of tho Northaast Quarter; 
V.'ost Half of tho Soothoost Quartor and tho Southoast Quarter 
of tho Southwest Quarter, containing 160 acres. 
Soctlon 30: llorthvost Quarter; East Half of tho Southwost 
Quarter, containing ?ys.1?) acres. 
Soctlon 5: to t 2, containing 3?.00 acres. 
Tovnshlp 40 South, Rango 4 Vost, Salt tako Meridian: 
Southeast Quarter of tho Northwest Quarter of Soctlon 8, 
containing 40 ccros. 
Township 40 South, Rango 7 West. Salt Lake Meridian: 
(V>gInning at tho Southv/ost Corner of the Southv.ost Quartor of 
1ho Southeast Quarter of Soctlon 23, Township 40 South, Rin'jo 
7 U'ost, C:>lt liiko Moridlcn »>nd running thor.ee Cest 10.23 
chains; thcnco North 60* Vest 6.36 chains; thcnco Vest 3.5o 
chains; thonso South 1 chain to beginning, containing .74 
ocros. 
[V^glnnlng a t tho forthwest Corner of tho Northwest Quarter o t ^ v 
tho Northeast Quartor of Section 26, Township 40 South, Hingo 
7 V.'ost, end running thonco Soulh 4.30 chains; thonco Scuth 70* 
East 15 d o I no to tho ml (Id lo of tho chmnol of 1ho creek; thcnco 
Karthv/estor ly clong tho mlc'dlo of tho chsnnol of said creek to 
tho Morifi Lino of said Northivast Quartor of tho Northeast 
Quartor; Ihosvso V.'ost 11.23 chains to tho placo of beginning. 
DogInnleg 4.30 chains South of tho Morthuoat Cor nor of tho 
Northwest Quortcr of 1ho Nort heart Quartor of Section 2C, 
Township 40 South, Range 7 l o s t . Sa l t toko Meridian and run-
ning thonco South 70* East 15 chains to tho mlddlo of tho 
channol of tUo crook; thence Southerly along tho mlddlo ol 
1ho chsnnol of said crock to tho South t i n e ; thonco North 
73*45* t e s t 14.CO chains; thonco North 4.30 chains t o tho 
placo of beginning, containing 5.60 ocros. ^ / 
Thd obovo threo tracts bolng part oj land sltuutod In Sections 
23 end 26 of said tounshlp ond rango, couotltrws roforrod to 
uno f f i c i a l l y as to t "A". 
To*n9hlp 40 South, ftanyc* 41 Kost, Sal t Uko Moridlon: 
to t \\ Korthcnct Quartor of tho Ibrthvost Quartor of Soctlon 
3 1 , conlalrilng 7P.30 acros. 
( 
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PERSCeiAL PftOPCRTYl 
*\ Tha fol Icntlng doscrlbod voter end reservoir r ightst 
A one*fourth Intorost In llobbto Canyon Reservoir (9-36-1?) 
In Mohovo Crxjnty, Arizona. 
A or* to If Interest In Sull ivan Rosorvolr In Mohovo County, 
Arizona* 
And o i l grazing prIvl logos and ponnlts annexed to or btscd 
upon any of th3 vcrogol ng r c o l , personal, reservoir , or wirror 
r ights 0$ co.vKjnsurato. 
2 . Tho parties rgreo that for and In consideration of tho sale by tho 
SELLER to 1ho OUTERS of tho foregoing real and personal property, v.utor znd 
reservoir r ights and growing prlvl logos, tho BUYERS w i l l pay to tho SELLER tlio 
sun of TWO THOUSAND ($2,000.00) DOLLARS, o c h yoar, beginning vHi'i ifvc le t c'jy 
of Novcnbor, 1964, of %hlch payments tkia on Kovonbor 1 , \CJCA and iio,t>i!!»cr 1 , 
1-JC5 oro hereby acknowledged by tho SELLER f ro * tho EWERS and the IXI/1T.S vl I I 
continue to pay annual In^tallaonts of $2,000.00 on tho 1st day of »\':>\e.:ijcr In 
oach year thcroaftor boglnnlng Havtxnbor t , 1906 and continuing during the cnt l rd 
I I f o of tho SELLER. 
Tho BUYERS agroo thot thoy w i l l pay tho sini of $2,000.00 per yo:»r to 
tho SELLER for tho ontlro romalndor of SELLER'S II fo trrcspoctlvo of 1!.o *nrjur,t 
tihlch ooy ba paid undor this contract whothor I t axceods tho t o l a l consideration 
horelnabovo tot out or vhothor 1hat to ta l mount shall not be p-sld by applying 
annual paynents of $2,000.03 ©gainst tho purchaco price during tho I I fo tl-no of 
tho SELLER and In consideration of on undortaklng by tho OtTrERS to pay tho | 
osKXjnt of $2,000.00 por year for tho Iff© of tho SELLER Irrcspoctlvo of tho 
fraount which nay bo p^ld, 1ho SELLER walvos Intorost upon tho unpaid talancas. 
I t l i provldod, howovcr, that ohould tho to ta l coosldoratlon herein-
above provldod not bo paid by tho CUfERS to tho SELLER during SELLER'S l l fo t l rw 
then upon tho douth of 1ho SELLER any ooounto regaining vndor th is Agrcooant 
a f te r crodlt lng a l l payoo.nti* vhlch havo boon node horoundor, * h a | | bo paid 
annually 0* provided l>croln In oqual sharoo, aliaros and r.horo a l l k o , to 
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t'orron Brlnkorhoff ond Char Joy Arland Brlnkorhoff tvo-sovonths (2 /7ths) ( 1 / / t h s 
to oach) of tho balances djo ( I t being st ipulated tlvnt tho BUYERS tooothor with 
Warren EHnkorhaff, Chorloy Arlond Drlnkorhoff, totty 0 . Eapl ln, Golda B. Ad j i r , 
ond Arlono B. Gouldlng constitute a l l tho holrs at law of tho SELLER ond thst 
other provision tes boon mado for 1ho la t te r thrco named ho l rs ) , together wit.'-. 
Interest at four lAf) por cont per ennun on tho dofcrrod declining bsloncca. 
Tho BUYCRS soy, e t any t lno f prepay o i l or cny psrt of tho regaining 
principal duo under th is contract. 
3« Tho SELLER ch-^ f f oxocufo o Varranty Dood to the roal property 
hereinabove described and quitclaim convoynncoo to tho water ond reservoir 
r ights hcrolnsfovo described, of en undlvldod one half Interest to oich BUYER 
nnd his wife cs Joint tcjvanta with f u l l r ights of survivorship, and s f n l l 
deposit said Instruments In tho Hurrtcano Branch of tho Brink of S t . George 
vhlch thai I hold those documents In t rus t nnd In escrow- subject to tho f o l l o U r r j 
ESCROW INSTRtCTlCfft 
I f tho BUYERS shall wnko o i l poymonts of principal and Interest herein 
provldod ond perform o i l tho other covenants and agreements heroin eo.rfalnod, 
then upon piymant of tho f i n a l Installment duo hercundor tho Escrow Depositary 
shall do I Ivor to tho BUYERS o i l tho cscrovod dccuTonts. 
In tho ©vent of a do fau l t In tho payment of any Installment of principal 
or Intorest ond In tho cvont of a default In any othor te rn or condition heroin 
ond In tho ovont notico of o default other than for paymont of principal and 
Intorost thai I bo given to tho BUYERS by tho SELLER and o cubscquont fa ! luro 
to roaody tho farno shall contlnuo for o period of t h i r t y (30) days, than tho 
5ELLLR osy# ot her option, donwnd o rodollvory to her of o i l of the ©scrovod 
docuA>ont« vhoroupon tho OUTERS w i l l vacoto ond poaccably surrondor n i l of tho 
provisos hereinabove doscrlbod ond tho SELLER m3y ra-ontor Into possess I on of 
tho for*) without furthor process ond en*y re ta in as rent ond licjuldatod dorva^os 
o i l cu^s ttiorotoforo paid by BUYERS under th is Agroo^ont, 
-III A-nq 
* H 
As an a l te rna t ive rowdy th« SELLER may oloct to roduco any payraent 
or a l l payjncn-hs, occ e l ore t ing and entering tho o n t l m balance of principal and 
Intcrost Immediately, to Judgront or may have said ronody on w o or nor© suc-
cosslvo or Intermittent occasions or ewy oloct to troot th is Agroonont us a 
noto vnd nortgogo passing t i t to through to tho BUYERS end foreclosing tho sc/:o 
In tho ovinncr provided by low. 
Coring tho period tho CUYERS ore complying with tho terms of th is 
Agreement, thoy shall bo oot l t lod to tho cole, cxcluslvo, and beneficial uso, 
occupancy, and onjoy^ont of tho abovo doscrlbod provisos subject only to tho 
r ights of tho 5ELIXR to Inspoct tho $ » » a t rotsonoblo times. 
4. Tho OUYEFvS have Inspected sold promises ond find tho suae in a 
.nsnnor Dotlsfoctory t o tho^ cod thoro oro no covenants or warranties oth^r 
t ton expressly sot forth heroin. 
5# Tltao shall bo of tho ossonco as t o a l l tho terms ond conditions of 
th is Agrocr»ent which shall bind and Inuro to tho borieflt of tho hei rs , Sue-
cossors, end assigns of the parties hereto and tho party In dofoult agrees to 
pay a l l costo and a reasonable ottornoy's foo In the ovent enforcement of th is 
contract Is requlrod, 
WT7ESS the hands of tho parties hereto th is
 m/&mm day o* mJ^cc* > 
£*L^*J^ 'fr 
t ls lo^ lT ikorT ior f^ yS 
V „..rf 
dS :fciXis.J-. • - A / / 
DUTtRO 
,/<<,• Lr.y*'<?**<<• 
A-IZO 
c 
Recorded it Requtst of — 
it , M. FM Paid $ -
By Dtp. — 
County Racordar 
Book. Piot - Ret.: 
Mail Ux notice to . Sranle&s.. Address. ..{ajBndal^.Utaii_.a4I2£ 
WARRANTY DEED 
E l s i e B r i n k e r h o f f , a widow, 
of Glendale • , County of Kane 
grantor 
, Statt of Utah, htrtby 
CONVEY and WARRANT to ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, a widow, MARK J . BRINKERHOFF, a 
married man, and CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF, a marr ied man, 
a l l as Jo in t Tenants w i t h f u l l r i g h t s o f s u r v i v o r s h i p , 
and not as Tenants in Common, 
Qranttflc 
of G lenda le , Utah 84729 for the turn of 8 
$10.00 & other va luab le cons idera t ion -OOLLARS, 
trtt following described tracts of lend in KANE County, 
Statt of Utah: 
SEE SCHEDULE "A" ATTACHED HERETO AND BY THIS REFERENCE MADE A PART HEREOF. 
s * 
t i 
* -
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WITNESS, tht hand of said grantor 
Signad in tht Presence of 
* * + 
. this 4 th day of June . A. 0. 19 79 . 
i~>,::Ll^£jb!^JL^^ 
M 
Elsie Brinkerhoff & & 
STATE OF UTAH 
County of Kane ) SS. ) 
On the 4th day of June A. 0., 19 79 personally 
appeared before me E l s i e B r i n k e r h o f f , a widow, 
the signer of the within instrument who duly acknowledged 
to me that S he executed the same. 
jU^yy^..r/^..../j^ui ~ 
James B. Adair Notary Public 
My Commission tapires -...June . 19*. .1979 My residence is ...O.rdery.1.Ile»...U.Ufl.. 
IOOTHI•• VTAN nni e««f AMI . f t %m i • KM*, VM um 
M? Exhib i t : MBM 
^ 
SCHEDULE "A" 
PARCEL 1: The West Half of Section 25, Townshlo 39 South, Ranqe 4S West, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian, contalnlnq 320.0 acres, nore or less. 
PARCEL 2: The Northwest Ouarter (NW>0; the Southeast Ouarter (SE1*) and the 
South Half of the Northeast Ouarter (SVIE1*) of Section 26, Townshlo 39 South, 
Ranoe 4S West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, contalnlnq 400.0 acres, more or less 
PARCEL 3: Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4; the Southeast Ouarter of the Northwest Quarter 
TSE^NW^); the Northeast Ouarter of the Southwest Ouarter (NE^SW**); the East Half 
of the East Half (ESES); the Southwest Ouarter of the Northeast Ouarter (SW^NE**) 
and the Northwest Ouarter of the Southeast Ouarter (nWiSE1*) of Section 27, 
Townshlo 39 South, Ranqe 4S West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, containing 4.78.80 
acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 4: The East Half of the Northeast Quarter (ESNE**); the South Half of 
the Southeast Ouarter (SSSE^) and Northwest Ouarter of the Southeast Ouarter 
(NW<iSElJ of Section 35, Townshlo 39 South, Ranoe 4S West, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian, containing 200.0 acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 5: The Southwest Ouarter of the Northeast Ouarter (SWWEfc); the West 
Half of the Southeast Ouarter (WSSEl«) and the Southeast Quarter of the Southwest 
Ouarter (SESSW^) of Section 29, Townshio 40 South, Ranqe 4S West, Salt Lake Base 
and Meridian, containing 160.0 acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 6: The Northwest Ouarter (M\) and the East Half of the Southwest 
Ouarter of Section 30, Townshlo 40 South, Ranne 4^ West, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian, containinn 238.99 acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 7: Lot 2, Section 5, Townshio 40 South, Range 4^ West, Salt Lake Base 
and Mericfian, containlna 39.08 acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 8: The Southwest Ouarter of the Northwest Ouarter (SWVWj) of Section 
8, Townshlo 40 South, Ranne 4 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, containing 
40.0 acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 9: Lot 1 and the Northeast Ouarter of the Northwest Ouarter (NEW**) 
of Section 31, Townshin 40 South, Ranoe 41, West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, 
containinq 79.30 acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 10: BEGINNING at the North Quarter Corner of Section 26, Township 40 
SbUtTi, Range 7 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence South 
0°35' West 567.60 feet; thence South 78°00' East 963.6 feet; thence North-
westerly along the creek bed, 808.0 feet; more or less, to the North line of 
Section 26; thence South 09°57' West 741.18 feet to the point of beginning. 
Containing 11.77 acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 11; BEGINNING at the Southwest Corner of the Southwest Quarter of 
the Southeast Quarter of Section 23, Township 40 South, Range>7"West, Salt 
Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence East 10.23 chains; thence North 
80° West 6.36 chains; thence West 3.68 chains; thence South 1.0 chain to the 
point of beginning. Containing 0.74 acres, more or less. 
44 44 44 44 44 44 44 
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TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF KANE ) 
BEFORE ME, the undersigned Notary Public, personally appeared 
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, who stated under oath, as follows: 
That she has sold Real Property described hereinafter to Mark J. 
Brinkerhoff and Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff, and that she will defend the rights of own-
ership and also any rights of way of ingress or egress to the said Real Property. 
That she will enter into a lawsuit or any other procedure needed to protect these 
rights of ingress or egress, to said property. 
The real property is described as follows: 
BEGINNING at the South Quarter Corner of Section 23, Township 40 South, Range 7 
West, Salt Lake Meridian, Utah, and running thence East 10.23 chains; thence North 
80° West 6.36 cahins; thence West 3.68 chains; thence South 1 chain to the point 
of beginning. 
ALSO BEGINNING at the North Quarter Corner of Section 26, Township 40 South, Range 
7 West, Salt Lake Meridian, Utah, and running thence South 8.6 chalna; thence South 
73°45' East 14.6 chains; thence Northwesterly along the middle of the channel of 
the creek to the North boundary line of said Section 26; thence West 11.23 chains 
to the point of beginning. Containing 11.77 acres 
Total acres: 12.51 
That the Affiant will at any time help to defend and protect the 
rights of Mark J. Brinkerhoff and Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff as far as the Real Property 
is concerned. 
~&'£SA*4J?A Ar^t/k/^rJ^^/ 
Elsie Brinkerhoff Jy 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me t h i s / / day of Apr i l , A.D, 1971. 
My commission expires 
fefy/r?*-
EXHIBIT "C" 
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BISHOP & RONNOW, P.C. 
Willard R. Bishop 
Attorney for P l a i n t i f f s 
P. 0. Box 279 
Cedar City, UT 84720 
Telephone: (801) 586-9483 
iHLL-D FOR RE/~pF"i) 
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF KANE COUNTY 
STATE OP UTAH 
MONT R. ANDERSON, Personal 
Representative of the Estate 
Of CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF, LENA 
BRINKERHOFF, and MARK J. 
BRINKERHOFF, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, GOLDA B. 
ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF, 
ARLENE B. GOULDING, and 
JOHN DOES I through V, 
Defendants. 
ANSWER OF ELSIE BRINKERHOFF 
TO CROSS-CLAIM 
Civil No. 1826 
COMES NOW ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF, by and through counsel, who 
answers the Cross-claim of Defendants ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF 
and GOULDING, admitting, alleging and denying as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
1. The allegations of paragraph 1 of the General 
Allegations are admitted upon information and belief. 
2. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the General Allegations are 
admitted. 
3. Paragraph 1 of the First Cause of Action is denied. In 
any event, even, if certain sums were not paid, they were forgiven 
by ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, and Cross-claimants have no standing to 
assert otherwise. 
V 
4. Paragraph 2 of the First Cause of Action is emphatically 
denied. At no time did ELSIE BRINKERHOPP demand payment of 
alleged past due sumsf nor did she ever declare any default or 
give any notice, orally or in writingf of any alleged default of 
MARK J. BRINKERHOPP and CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF, giving any time, 
reasonable or otherwise, in which to cure any alleged default. 
5. Answering paragraph 3 of the First Cause of Action, 
ELSIE ^BRINKERHOFF admits that on or about June 4, 1979, someone 
improperly induced her to place a signature on a deed, without 
informing her that it was a deed and without telling her the 
purpose for requesting her signature. ELSIE BRINKERHOFF 
affirmatively asserts that she did not read the document signed 
by her, that she did not intend the document to convey real or 
personal property, and that the document was never delivered by 
her to any one or more of the named grantees. Likewise, no 
consideration supported the document. The document was later 
recorded, but not by reason of any request of ELSIE, CLOYD H., or 
MARK J. BRINKERHOFP. 
6. Answering paragraph 4 of the First Cause of Action, this 
Defendant admits that CLOYD H. BRINKERHOPF died on or about 
October 14, 1979. All other allegations of said paragraph 4 are 
denied, the June 4 1979 "deed" having no legal effect, being 
invalid for the reasons stated above, among others. 
7. The allegations of paragraph 5 of the First Cause of 
Action are denied. Any documents relied upon by Cross-claimants 
were obtained without the knowledge, intent or agreement of ELSIE 
BRINKERHOFP, and in full knowledge of the existence of the 1966 
-2-
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or 1967 contract conveying the land to CLOYD H. and MARK J. 
BRINKERHOPF which had never been terminated by ELSIE J. 
BRINKERHOFF. 
8. Answering paragraph 6 of the First Cause of Action, 
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF admits that one CLYDE GOULDING, or other 
individuals, obtained her signature on various documents which 
are relied upon by Cross-claimants, but asserts that she had no 
intent to convey property, which intent is required by law, that 
she did not read the documents, that no one told her what they 
were, that there never was a meeting of minds, and that had she 
been told the Cross-claimants would claim her signature would 
have the effect they now claim to have, she would never have 
signed said documents. All other allegations in paragraph 6 are 
denied. 
9. Answering paragraph 7, ELSIE BRINKERHOFF admits that 
upon the incorrect and bad advice of some unknown person, she 
refused one or two contract payments. All other allegations of 
paragraph 7 are denied. 
10. Paragraph 8 of the First Cause of Action is admitted 
upon information and belief. 
11. Answering paragraph 9, ELSIE BRINKERHOFF admits that 
she attended one meeting in the office of Hans Q. Chamberlain. 
All other allegations of said paragraph 9 are denied, ELSIE 
BRINKERHOFF never having been given any opportunity to object to, 
or to approve, any actions taken by Hans Q. Chamberlain, who was 
actually acting for Cross-claimants. 
-3-
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12. Answering paragraph 10, ELSIE BRINKERHOPF admits upon 
information and belief that CHARLES A. BRINKERHOFP and BETTY B. 
ESPLIN executed certain deeds in favor of MARK J. and LENA 
BRINKERHOFP. All other allegations of paragraph 10 are denied, 
13. Answering paragraph 11 of the First Cause of Action, 
ELSIE BRINKERHOFP admits that she terminated the services of Hans 
Q. Chamberlain, but denies all other allegations in said para-
graph 11. 
14. Answering paragraph 12, ELSIE BRINKERHOFP admits that 
in September of 1984, she executed a certain Stipulation in order 
to resolve any differences with Plaintiffs on the terms therein 
contained. All other allegations of paragraph 12 are denied. 
15. The allegations of paragraph 13 are denied, and Cross-
claimants have no standing to assert that the Stipulation is void 
and of no legal ffect. 
16. Paragraph 14 of the First Cause of Action is denied. 
17. Answering paragraphs 15 and 16 of the Second Cause of 
Actionf ELSIE BRINKERHOPP denies the same. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
18. The Cross-claim fails to state a claim upon which 
relief may be granted. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
19. The documents upon which Defendants rely were obtained 
through misrepresentation and/or fraud. 
FODRTH DEFENSE 
20. Cross-claimants have not done equity, have unclean 
hands, and are not entitled to any equitable relief. 
-4-
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FIFTH DEFENSE 
21. Cross-claimants have no standing to contest the 
September, 1984 Stipulation. 
SIXTH DEFENSE 
22. Any deeds relied upon by Cross-claimants were and are 
void and of no legal effect for the following reasons, among 
others: 
A. No intent to convey title to real or personal 
property on the part of the grantor, or on 
the part of the grantees with respect to the 
June, 1979 deed. 
B. No delivery to all named grantees, or any of 
them, as applicable. 
C. No acceptance by named grantees. 
D. Lack of proper attestation and/or acknowledg-
ment. 
E. U.C.A. 57-3-3, et seq (1953, as amended). 
F. Actual notice on the part of Cross-claimants 
of the conveyance to MARK J. and CLOYD H. 
BRINKERHOFF by ELSIE BRINKERHOFF. 
G. Constructive and "inquiry" notice through the 
actual possession of MARK J. and CLOYD H. 
BRINKERHOFF, and his successors. 
H. Lack of any termination of the 1966 or 1967 
contract. 
I. Mistake. 
J. Lack of consideration. 
-5-
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i - SEVENTH DEFENSE 
23. Qross-claimants are barred and estopped by their 
actions from maintaining their Cross-claim against ELSIE 
BRINKERHOFF. 
EIGHTH DEFENSE 
WHEREFORE, having fully answered the Cross-claim, ELSIE 
BRINKERHOFF prays that the same be dismissed, and that she be 
awarded her costs and such other relief as the Court deems 
appropriate. 
DATED this / V T A day of February, 1985, 
WILLARD R. BrSHOl 
Attorney for ELSIE BRINKERHOFF 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the H7^ day of February, 1985, I 
mailed a full, true and correct copy of the above and foregoing 
instrument to Mr. Hans Q. Chamberlain, CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE, 
Attorneys at, Law, 110 North Main Street, Suite G, Cedar City, 
Utah 847 20, by first-class mail, postage fully prepaid. 
LC& TJL^LM^&UVJMM 
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BISHOP AND RONNOW, P.C. 
WILLARD R. BISHOP 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
P.O. Box 279 
Cedar City, UT 84720 
:i'.r:DT-OR RECORD} 
Clark ot the District Court. 
Telephone: 586-9483 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF KANE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
MONT R. ANDERSON, Personal 
Representative of the Estate 
of CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF, LENA 
BRINKERHOFF, and MARK J. 
BRINKERHOFF, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, GOLDA B. 
ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF, 
ARLENE B. GOULDING, and 
JOHN DOES I through V, 
Defendants. 
PRETRIAL ORDER 
Civil No. 1826 
This matter came before the Court on Friday, 2 December 
1983, for pretrial conference. Plaintiffs were represented 
by their attorney, Mr. Willard R. Bishop. Defendants other 
than ELSIE BRINKERHOFF were represented by Mr. Hans Q. 
Chamberlain. Defendant ELSIE BRINKERHOFF was not represented 
by counsel. The matter was again treated by the Court on 
Wednesday, 12 September 1984, during a telephonic conference 
between the Court and counsel. The status of the case was 
reviewed, and the following actions were taken and noted: 
2 
1. JURISDICTION AND VENUE were admitted by counsel, 
and were found by the Court to be proper. 
2
• GENERAL NATURE OF THE CASE AND CLAIMS OF THE PARTIES:-
A. Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint, and 
Stipulation: 
(1) Plaintiffs brought this action against 
Defendants seeking to quiet title to certain real property, 
water and grazing rights, and personal property in Plaintiffs, 
claiming ownership of the same under an Agreement dated 26 
October 1966 or 10 December 1967 between Defendant ELSIE 
BRINKERHOFF as seller, and MARK J. BRINKERHOFF and CLOYD H. 
BRINKERHOFF as buyers. As against ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, Plaintiffs 
seek an order requiring specific performance of the Agreement 
and recognition of the same, and originally sought an award 
of damages as alternative relief against ELSIE BRINKEELHOFF. 
Plaintiffs and ELSIE BRINKERHOFF have composed their differences, 
however, in the form of a Stipulation over the duly-verified 
signatures of ELSIE BRINKERHOFF and counsel for Plaintiffs, 
which Stipulation has been filed. In the event Defendants 
ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF and GOULDING prevail as to title, 
Plaintiffs seek an award of damages against them for interference 
with contract. 
(2) Defendants GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF 
and ARLENE B. GOULDING are deemed to have answered Plaintiffs' 
Second Amended Complaint, and have denied that Plaintiffs 
J\!rfi A-131 
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are the owners of the property in dispute, claiming that the 
Agreement of 26 October 1966 or 10 December 1967 is void as 
a matter of law, with or without notice; that the Agreement 
of 26 October 1966 or 10 December 1967 was voluntarily 
terminated, abandoned, rescinded, or reformed by the parties 
to it, the same becoming joint tenants in the property 
involved; that the death of CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF severed the 
joint tenancy, leaving MARK J. BRINKERHOFF and ELSIE BRINKERHOFF 
as equal tenants in common; and assert waiver, estoppel, 
laches, accord and satisfaction, perfect tender rule and the 
doctrine of unclean hands as affirmative defenses, along 
with failure to mitigate damages and any other defense to 
which the Court deems them entitled. 
B. Second Amended Counterclaim of Elsie Brinkerhoff 
and Crossclaim Against Mark J. Brinkerhoff: All claims and 
issues raised in the Second Amended Counterclaim of ELSIE 
BRINKERHOFF and Cross-claim Against MARK H. BRINKERHOFF are 
claimed to have been resolved by the Stipulation now on 
file, between Plaintiffs and ELSIE BRINKERHOFF. 
C. Second Amended Counterclaim of Golda B. Adair, 
Warren Brinkerhoff and Arlene Goulding, and Amended Crossclaim 
of Said Defendants Against Mark J. Brinkerhoff: 
(1) Defendants ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF and 
GOULDING seek a decree quieting title in them as to their 
claimed interests in the property which is the subject of 
4 
this action, including water and grazing rights, said 
interests to be determined by the Court, and also seek an 
accounting from MARK J. BRINKERHOFF, and judgment against 
him for any amount allegedly due to Defendants ADAIR, GOULDING 
and WARREN BRINKERHOFF by reason of their alleged ownership 
interests, from rents, profits, or proceeds from the property. 
(2) Plaintiffs deny the allegations made by 
ADAIR, GOULDING and WARREN BRINKERHOFF, and assert as defenses 
those matters set forth in their Second Amended Complaint, 
together with lack of standing to attack the Agreement of 26 
October 1966 or 10 December 1967; knowledge of the existence 
of said Agreement; lack of any lawful termination of said 
Agreement, including lack of any sufficient notice or 
reasonable time to cure alleged defects in performance; 
waiver of conditions by ELSIE BRINKERHOFF; accord and 
satisfaction between Plaintiffs and ELSIE BRINKERHOFF; lack 
of intent, lack of delivery, mistake, and lack of acceptance 
in connection with a Warranty Deed dated 4 June 1979; the 
same defenses with respect to a Warranty Deed of 15 August 
1980 and a Quitclaim Deed of 9 September 1980; actual and 
constructive notice and knowledge of Plaintiffs1 claims, 
interest, use and possession of the land, and of the Agreement 
of 26 October 1966 or 10 December 1967; laches; estoppel; 
waiver; lack of proper acknowledgement and recordation; and 
any other defense to which the Court may deem them entitled. 
obi 
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D. Cross-claim of Defendants G0ULD1NG, ADAIR and 
WARREN BRINKERHOFF Against ELSIE BRINKERHOFF: As a result 
of the position taken by ELSIE BRINKERHOFF in the Stipulation 
recently filed in this matter, Defendants assert the following 
claims against ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, and seek the relief indicated: 
(1) That the Agreement of 26 October 1966 or 
10 December 1967 become null and void as a matter of law. 
(2) That ELSIE BRINKERHOFF agreed to convey 
to Defendants her 1/2 interest in the property in exchange 
for Defendants promise to pay her as per the terms of the 
Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note. 
(3) That the Stipulation entered into by 
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF and MARK J. BRINKERHOFF is void and of no 
legal effect. 
(4) That the deed under which Defendants 
claim should be given legal effect. 
(5) That in the event ELSIE BRINKERHOFF is 
entitled to recant, withdraw and cancel the deed she issued 
to Defendants, the Defendants have lost the benefit of their 
bargain and are entitled to damages over and against ELSIE 
BRINKERHOFF in an amount to be proven at the time of trial. 
(6) For damages against ELSIE BRINKERHOFF 
for breach of contract, breach of warranty of title, and 
unjust enrichment. 
Defendant ELSIE BRINKERHOFF has generally and specifically 
6 
denied the operative allegations of the Cross-claim against 
her, and has asserted affirmative defenses, including failure 
to state a claim, misrepresentation and/or fraud, failure to 
do equity, unclean hands, lack of standing, mistake induced 
by Cross-claimants, no intent to convey title, no delivery, 
no acceptance, lack of proper attestation or acknowledgement; 
actual, constructive and inquiry notice to Cross-claimants; 
no termination of 1966 or 1967 contract, lack of consideration, 
estoppel and such other defenses to which the Court deems 
her entitled. 
3. UNCONTROVERTED FACTS as established by admissions 
in the pleadings or otherwise, are as follows: 
A. ELSIE BRINKERHOFF is the widowed mother of 
MARK J. BRINKERHOFF, CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF, deceased; WARREN 
BRINKERHOFF, ARLENE GOULDING, CHARLES BRINKERHOFF and BETTY 
ESPLIN. She is the mother-in-law of LENA BRINKERHOFF. 
B. On or about 26 October 1966, or 10 December 
1967, ELSIE BRINKERHOFF executed a certain Agreement covering 
the sale of certain real and personal property to MARK J. 
BRINKERHOFF and CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF. All the family members 
were and are aware of the existence of the contract. The 
purchasers went into and remained in possession. 
C. Upon completion of the contract, MARK J. 
BRINKERHOFF and CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF were to be given title 
to an undivided one-half (1/2) interest each in the property 
Mpi 
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covered by the Agreement, as joint tenants with right of 
survivorship with their respective spouses. 
D. At various times and places, and in various 
forms, payments were made to ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, the amounts 
and manner of payments of which are in dispute by Defendants. 
E. On or about 4 June 1979, ELSIE BRINKERHOFF 
issued a deed to herself, MARK J. BRINKERHOFF, and CLOYD H. 
BRINKERHOFF, covering certain real property also included in 
the Agreement. The deed did not include all items covered 
in the Agreement, nor did it name the wives of MARK J. and 
CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF. The deed was subsequently recorded in 
the office of the Kane County Recorder, and purported to 
create a joint tenancy with right of survivorship in the 
three. 
F. CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF died 14 October 1979, 
rather unexpectedly. 
G. On or about 15 August 1980, ELSIE BRINKERHOFF 
issued a deed to GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF, ARLENE 
B. GOULDING, BETTY B. ESPLIN and CHARLES A. BRINKERHOFF, in 
undivided one-fifth (1/5) interests. This deed was subsequently 
recorded. 
H. On or about 15 August 1980, GOLDA B. ADAIR, 
WARREN BRINKERHOFF, ARLENE B. GOULDING, CHARLES A. BRINKERHOFF 
and BETTY B. ESPLIN issued a Trust Deed With Assignment of 
Rents, in favor of ELSIE BRINKERHOFF which was later recorded. 
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I. On or about 9 September 1980, ELSIE BRINKERHOFF 
issued a Quit-Claim Deed covering certain water rights, to 
GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF, ARLENE B. GOULDING, 
BETTY B. ESPLIN and CHARLES A. BRINKERHOFF. This deed was 
also recorded later. 
J. Later, CHARLES A. BRINKERHOFF and BETTY B. 
ESPLIN delivered Warranty Deeds covering their interests, to 
MARK J. BRINKERHOFF and LENA BRINKERHOFF. 
K. On 9 September 1984, ELSIE BRINKERHOFF executed 
a certain "Stipulation". 
4. ISSUES OF FACT, including any implicitly raised in 
paragraphs 2 and 3, above, remain for trial as follows: 
A. Did Plaintiffs comply with the contract dated 
26 October 1966 or 10 December 1967, including payment of 
all sums required thereunder? 
B. Did ELSIE BRINKERHOFF demand full compliance 
with the contract, including payment of all sums due and 
owing? 
C. Was there any type of understanding between 
the parties to the 26 October 1966 or 10 December 1967 
contract whereby full payment was not required by the buyers 
on a timely basis? 
D. Did Plaintiffs obtain title to some of the 
property sold under the 26 October 1966 or 10 December 1967 
contract in violation of the terms of said contract, and if 
J ^ A-137 
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so, what were the circumstances surrounding the same? 
E. Was an escrow ever properly established at a 
financial institution and were deeds properly deposited 
therein, if so, were said deeds ever removed from said 
escrow, and if so, by whom and under what authority? 
F. At all times relevant herein, was ELSIE BRINKERHOFF 
competent to act for and on her behalf, and to sign all 
documents relevant to this action? 
G. At all times herein, was ELSIE BRINKERHOFF 
under the undue influence of any party or family member, and 
if so, whom? 
H. With respect to the Warranty Deeds dated 4 
June 1979 and 15 August 1980: 
(1) What was the understanding and intent of 
the grantor? 
(2) Who caused it to be prepared, and under 
what circumstances? 
(3) Was it ever delivered, and if so, when 
and to whom? 
(4) Was it ever accepted, and if so, when 
and by whom? 
(5) Was it properly acknowledged and recorded? 
I. With respect to the Trust Deed dated 15 August 
1980: 
(1) Who caused it to be prepared? 
10 
(2) Was it ever delivered, and if so, to 
whom? 
(3) Was it ever accepted, and if so, by whom 
and when? 
(4) Was it properly acknowledged and recorded? 
J. With respect to the Quit-Claim Deed dated 9 
September 1980: 
(1) What consideration, if any, was given 
the grantor? 
(2) Who caused it to be prepared, and why? 
(3) Was it ever delivered, and if so, when 
and to whom? 
(4) Was it ever accepted, and if so, when 
and by whom? 
I (5) Was it properly acknowledged and recorded? 
K. What properties and rights covered by the 
Agreement were not included in the deeds of 4 June 1979, 15 
August 1980, and 9 September 1980? 
L. What actions, if any, were taken by the parties, 
to terminate it? 
M. Have Defendants ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF and 
GOULDING wrongfully interfered with Plaintiffs' contract 
with ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, and if so, how? 
N. If so, have Plaintiffs1 been damaged, and in 
what amount? 
Jarr 
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0. If Plaintiffs have suffered damages, have they 
failed to mitigate the same, and if so, how? 
P. Did Plaintiffs or their successors in interest 
wrongfully obtain title to grazing and water rights, and if 
so, when and in what manner? 
Q. If Defendants ADAIR, GOULDING and WARREN 
BRINKERHOFF own an interest in the real property in this 
action, what use has been made of the property by MARK J. 
BRINKERHOFF since 15 August 1980? 
R. What rents, profits, proceeds or other monies 
has MARK J. BRINKERHOFF received from the real property 
which is the subject of this action, since 15 August 1980? 
S. Did ELSIE BRINKERHOFF declare the Agreement in 
default, or did she ever give notice, verbally or in writing, 
to MARK J. BRINKERHOFF and/or CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF, or their 
respective spouses, of any alleged default and its nature, 
or did she grant any reasonable time for cure? 
T. Have Cross-claimants been damaged by any 
improper acts of ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, and if so, in what 
amount.? 
5. ISSUES OF LAW, including those implicitly raised by 
the matters set forth in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4, above, 
remain for disposition as follows: 
A. Are Defendants entitled to the benefit of any 
affirmative defenses against Plaintiffs1 claims, and if so, 
what? 
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B. Are Plaintiffs entitled to the benefit of any 
affirmative defenses against Defendants' claims, and if so, 
what? 
C. Is ELSIE BRINKERHOFF entitled to any affirmative 
defenses against the Cross-claim, and if so, what? 
D. Are Plaintiffs entitled to a judgment and 
decree quieting title as against Defendants ADAIR, GOULDING 
and WARREN BRINKERHOFF? 
E. Are Plaintiffs entitled to judgment against 
Defendants for interference with contract, and if so, in 
what amount? \ 
F. Are Defendants ADAIR, GOULDING and BRINKERHOFF 
entitled to a judgment and decree quieting title as against 
Plaintiffs, and if so, to what interests in what property 
and/or rights, if any? 
G. Are Cross-claimants entitled to judgment 
setting aside the September 1984 Stipulation signed by 
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF? 
H. Are Defendants ADAIR, GOULDING and WARREN 
BRINKERHOFF entitled to judgment against Plaintiff MARK J. 
BRINKERHOFF for rents, profits or proceeds from real property 
since 15 August 1980, and if so, in what amount? 
I. Are Cross-claimants entitled to a judgment 
against ELSIE BRINKERHOFF for damages, and if so, in what 
amount? 
J. Is any party entitled to an award of costs? 
Att A-141 
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K. Are any parties entitled to judgment against 
any other parties, and if so, upon what theories? 
6. EXHIBITS were marked, offered and received as 
follows: 
EXHIBIT 
NUMBER DESCRIPTION OFFERED BY RECEIVED 
P-l Copy of Agreement dated Plaintiffs Yes 
26 October 1966, between 
ELSIE BRINKERHDFF as seller, 
and MARK J. BRINKERHOFF and 
CLOYD H. BRINKERHDFF, as 
buyers. 
P-2 Copy of Agreement dated Plaintiffs Yes 
10 December 1967, between 
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF as seller, 
and MARK J. BRINKEFHOFF and 
CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF as 
buyers. 
P-3 Affidavit signed by ELSIE Plaintiffs Yes 
Brinkerhoff, dated 13 April 
1971. 
P-4 Copy of document dated 6 April Plaintiffs Yes 
1977, signed by ELSIE 
BRINKERHOFF, acknowledging 
payment to her of $23,000.00. 
D-5 Copy of Warranty Deed dated Defendants Yes 
4 June 1979, running from 
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF to ELSIE 
BRINKERHOFF, MARK J. 
BRINKERHOFF and CLOYD H. 
BRINKERHOFF. 
D-6 Copy of Warranty Deed dated Defendants Yes 
15 August 1980, running from 
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF to GOLDA B. 
ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF, 
ARLENE B. GOULDING, CHARLES 
A. BRINKERHOFF and BETTY B. 
ESPLIN. 
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D-7 Copy of Trust Deed dated 15 Defendants Yes 
August 1980, running from 
GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN 
BRINKERHOFF, ARLENE B. GOULDING, 
CHARLES A. BRINKERHOFF and 
BETTY B. ESPLIN to Southern 
Utah Title Company, Trustee, 
for ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, 
Beneficiary. 
D-8 Copy of Quit-Claim Deed dated Defendants Yes 
9 September 1980, running from 
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF to GOLDA B. 
ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF, 
ARLENE B. GOULDING, CHARLES A. 
BRINKERHOFF and BETTY B. ESPLIN. 
P-9 Warranty Deed dated 24 August Plaintiffs Yes 
1982, running from BETTY ESPLIN 
to MARK J. BRINKERHOFF and LENA 
BRINKERHOFF. 
P-10 Warranty Deed dated 24 August Plaintiffs Yes 
1982, running from CHARLES A. 
BRINKERHOFF to MARK J. 
BRINKERHOFF and LENA 
BRINKERHOFF. 
P-ll Copy of letter from ELSIE Plaintiffs 
J. BRINKERHOFF to Hans Q. 
Chamberlain, dated 13 August 
1983. 
P-12 Certificate of Death of Plaintiffs 
CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF. 
D-13 Last Will & Testament of Defendants 
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF. 
C D-14 Accounting from State Bank of Defendants Yes 
Southern Utah re: payments 
made by Defendants to ELSIE 
BRINKERHOFF pursuant to Trust 
Deed. 
P-15 Copy of deposit slip for Plaintiffs Yes 
$706.00, and of check for 
$1,300.00, dated 13 November 
1979 and 24 February 1980, 
constituting 1979 contract 
payment. 
Ml 
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P-16 Envelope and check to ELSIE Plaintiffs Yes 
BRINKERHOFF, FOR $2,000.00, 
for 1980 payment on contract. 
P-17 Letter dated 14 October 1981 Plaintiffs Yes 
from Willard R. Bishop to ELSIE 
BRINKERHOFF, with check for 
$2,000.00 for 1981 contract 
payment, with envelope by which 
check was returned. 
P-18 Copy of letter dated 29 Plaintiffs Yes 
October 1982, from Willard R. 
Bishop to ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, 
with letter from Hans Q. 
Chamberlain to Willard R. 
Bishop dated 2 December 1982, 
with check in the amount of 
$2,000.00 for 1982 contract 
payment. 
D-19 Copy of Entry Book, Kane County Defendants Yes 
showing recordation of Exhibit 
D-5, and of warranty deed from 
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF to CHARLES A. 
BRINKERHOFF. 
D-20 Copies of Promissory Notes (5), Defendants Yes 
and Escrow Agreements (5) running 
to ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, signed by 
GOLDA B. ADAIR, CHARLES A. 
BRINKERHOFF, WARREN BRINKERHOFF, 
BETTY B. ESPLIN, and ARLENE B. 
G0ULDING. 
D-21 Copy of Affidavit of survivng Defendants Yes 
joint tenant, dated 9 September 
1980, signed by ELSIE BRINKERHOFF. 
D-22 Schedule of payments to ELSIE Defendants Yes 
BRINKERHOFF, prepared by MDNT 
ANDERSON. 
If other exhibits are proposed, copies shall be provided 
to opposing counsel prior to trial. 
A 
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7. WITNESSES at trial will be called as follows: 
PARTIES CALLING NAME 
MARK J. BRINKERHOFF 
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF 
LENA BRINKERHOFF 
CHARLES A. BRINKERHOFF 
GOLDA B. ADAIR 
WARREN BRINKERHOFF 
ARLENE B. GOULDING 
JAMES B. ADAIR 
DALE BRINKERHOFF 
MONT ANDERSON 
WEB ADAIR 
BARRY JUDD 
Plaintiffs 
Plaintiffs/Defendants 
Plaintiffs 
Plaintiffs 
Defendants 
Defendants 
Defendants 
Defendants 
Defendants/Plaintiffs 
Defendants 
Defendants 
Defendants 
Witnesses MONT ANDERSON, MARK J. BRINKERHOFF, LENA 
BRINKERHOFF, GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF. ARLENE B. 
GOULDING, JAMES B. ADAIR and DALE BRINKERHOFF will be present 
to testify at trial without the necessity of issuing and 
serving subpoenas. 
In the event that other witnesses are to be called at 
trial, a statement of the names and addresses of such witnesses 
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and of the general subject matter of their expected testimony 
shall be provided to opposing counsel prior to trial. 
8
- DISCOVERY shall continue until the time of trial. 
9- AMENDMENTS to the pleadings may be made, if desired, 
in order to conform them to this Pretrial Order, or may be 
made by agreement or upon application to the Court, good 
cause being shown. 
10. MODIFICATION AND INTERPRETATIONS: This Pretrial 
Order will control the course of trial, but may be amended 
by consent of the parties or by order of the Court in the 
interests of justice. The pleadings are deemed merged 
herein. In the event of any ambiguity of this order, reference 
may be made to the record of the Pretrial Conference to the 
extent reported by stenographic notes and to the pleadings. 
JL1. : TRIAL: This matter has been set for non-jury trial 
before the Honorable Don V. Tibbs, on 21 and 22 February 
1985. 
12. POSSIBILILITY OF SETTLEMENT is considered remote. 
DATED: ' " February 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
DON V. TIBBS, District Judge 
A *-/>//_ 
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APPRO 
WILLARD R. BISHOP 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
and Defendant ELSIE BRINKERHOFF 
/HAj*S' Q. CHAMBERLAIN 
Aiftorney for Defendants 
\ADAIR, GOULDING, and 
WARREN BRINKERHOFF 
WILLARD R. BISHOP 
BISHOP & RONNOW, P. C. 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
P. 0. Box 279 
Cedar City, UT 84720 
Telephone: (801) 586-9483 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT CODRT OF KANE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MONT R. ANDERSON, personal 
representative of the Estate 
Of CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFP, 
LENA BRINKERHOFF, and MARK J. 
BRINKERHOFF, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ELSIE BRINKERHOFP, GOLDA B. 
ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF, 
ARLENE B. GOULDING, and JOHN 
DOES I through V, 
Defendants. 
FIRST AMENDED FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 1826 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial to the 
Court, sitting without a jury, on Thursday and Friday, February 
21 and 22, 1985. Plaintiffs MONT R. ANDERSON, as personal 
representative of the Estate of CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF, LENA 
BRINKERHOFF, and MARK J. BRINKERHOFF appeared personally and were 
represented by their counsel of record, Mr. Willard R. Bishop. 
Defendant ELSIE BRINKERHOFP appeared personally and was 
represented by her attorney of record, Mr. Willard R. Bishop. 
Defendants GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF, and ARLENE B. 
GOULDING also appeared personally, and were represented by their 
attorney of record, Mr. Hans Q. Chamberlain. CHARLES A. 
BRINKERHOFF and BETTY B. ESPLIN were present. The Court noted 
A-ltJG-, 
that originally, CHARLES A. BRINKERHOFF and BETTY B. ESPLIN had 
been named as Defendants, but had been dismissed from the lawsuit 
by reason of having settled their differences with Plaintiffs. 
Witnesses were sworn and evidence was presented. Argument was 
had. Based upon the evidence, good cause appearing, the Court 
now makes and enters its: 
FINDINGS OP PACT 
1. Prior to to August of 1960, MERLE BRINKERHOFF and ELSIE 
J. BRINKERHOFF were husband and wife, residing in Kane County, 
Utah. MERLE ERINKSREOFF was a farmer and rancher, and 
accumulated various farming and ranching properties in Kane 
County, Utah, and in Northern Arizona. 
2. MERLE and ELSIE BRINKERHOFF were the parents of MARK J. 
BRINKERHOFF, CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF, now deceased; WARREN 
BRINKERHOFF, ARLENE B. GOULDING, CHARLES BRINKERHOFF, BETTY B. 
ESPLIN, and GOLDA B. ADAIR. Plaintiff LENA BRINKERHOFF is the 
surviving widow of CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF. 
3. In or about August of 1960, MERLE BRINKERHOFF died. As a 
result of the normal probate process, the farming and ranching 
property owned by MERLE BRINKERHOFF passed to Defendant ELSIE J. 
BRINKERHOFF. 
4. On or about October 26, 1966, or December 10, 1967, ELSIE 
BRINKERHOFF executed a certain agreement covering the sale of 
certain of the farm and ranch real and personal property to MARK 
J. BRINKERHOFF and CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF. The contract was the 
result of arm's length bargaining, and was entered into by ELSIE 
BRINKERHOFF with the advice of counsel. At the time of entering 
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into the agreement, ELSIE BRINKERHOFF was fully competent, 
legally and in every other sense. 
5. Prior tof concurrent with, and subsequent to the 
execution of the agreement between ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, MARK J* 
BRINKERHOFF and CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF, all the family members were 
and still are aware of the existence of the contract. 
6. Upon execution of the contract, the purchasers, MARK J. 
BRINKERHOFF and CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF went into and remained in 
possession of the real property covered by the agreement. As of 
the date of trial, MARK J. BRINKERHOFF, and the personal 
representative and heirs of CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF, still remained 
in possession of the real property, including grazing and water 
rights. If any other children of ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF desired to 
use or graze livestock upon the property, they were permitted to 
do so without objection. 
7. Basically, the agreement provided that in return for 
conveyance of the personal and real property to MARK J. 
BRINKERHOFF and CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF, the buyers would pay the 
minimum sum of $53,388, payable at the rate of $2,000 per year, 
without interest, during the lifetime of ELSIE BRINKERHOFF. In 
the event that the total minimum price of $53,388 was not paid by 
the time of the death of ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, the contract was 
ambiguous with respect to the disposition and payment of the 
unpaid, amount of the minimum. The contract provided that it and 
documents of .conveyance were to be placed in escrow in the 
Hurricane Branch of the Bank of St. George, so that upon full 
performance by the purchasers, MARK J. BRINKERHOFF and LEAH 
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BRINKERHOFF, his wife, would receive legal title to an undivided 
one-half (H) interest in the property, as joint tenants; and 
CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF and LENA BRINKERHOFF, his wife, would 
receive an undivided one-half (*$) interest in the properties, as 
joint tenants. Payments were to be made to the Hurricane Branch 
of the Bank of St. George. 
8. The only documents which were ever actually deposited 
with the escrow agent, consisted of a Warranty Deed from ELSIE 
BRINKERHOFF to MARK and LEAH BRINKERHOFF, and a Quit Claim Deed 
from ELSIE BRINKERHOFF to MARK and LEAH BRINKERHOFF. No other 
documents were ever deposited into the bank escrow, and no 
payments were made to the escrow holder. 
9. Payments were made by the purchasers to ELSIE BRINKERHOFF 
outside the escrow, as follows: 
A. 
B. 
C. 
D. 
E. 
F. 
G. 
H. 
I. 
J. 
K. 
L. 
M. 
$2,000.00 paid on or before November 
$2,000.00 paid on or before November 
$430.75 
$780.00 
$500.00 
$500.00 
$780.00 
$500.00 
$600.00 
$500.00 
$400.00 
$706.00 
$1,300.1 
paid 
paid 
paid 
paid 
paid 
paid 
paid 
paid 
paid 
paid 
30 pa: 
June 17, 1972. 
November 17, 1972. 
March 19, 1973. 
October 26, 1973. 
November 28, 1973. 
Hay 13, 1974. 
January 20, 1975. 
December 15, 1975. 
in December of 1976. 
November 13, 1979. 
id on November 13, 1979. 
LpzzoL
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N. $2,000.00 paid November 6, 1983. 
0. $2,000.00 paid November 4, 1984. 
As of the date of trial, contract payments totalled $14,996.75. 
10. On various occasions and at various times, Plaintiff 
MARK J. BRINKERHOFP and CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFP, now deceased, 
claimed to have made additional payments to ELSIE BRINKERHOPF in 
the nature of support and assistance, as required and requested 
by ELSIE BRINKERHOFF. The Court finds that such additional 
payments and contributions were not intended to be payments under 
the contract by which MARK J. BRINKERHOFF and CLOYD H. 
BRINKERHOFF were purchasers, but were supplied to ELSIE 
BRINKERHOFP in the nature of gifts and support which sons would 
normally provide to their widowed mother. 
11. At no time from and after the inception of the agreement 
between ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF, MARK J. BRINKERHOFF, and CLOYD H. 
BRINKERHOFF and the time of trial, did ELSIE BRINKERHOFP ever 
\t 
declare herself dissatisfied with the performance of the 
purchasers under the contract, nor did she declare the contract 
in default or attempt to terminate the contract. That contract 
is still in existence, in full force and effect. 
12. Although the agreement provided for no interest on 
delinquent amounts, the Court finds that ELSIE BRINKERHOPF was 
and is entitled to receive interest at 6% per annum on delinquent 
amounts accruing prior to May 14, 1981, and is entitled to 
receive interest at 10% per annum on delinquent amounts accruing 
after May 14, 1981. 
-5-
/4-/52-
13. The Court finds the following to be a true and correct 
accounting of amounts due, payments made, and the balance due 
through January 31, 1986, on the contract between ELSIE 
BRINKERHOPF, MARK J. BRINKERHOFP, and CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF: 
CONTRACT ACCOUNTING 
(6% interest on delinquent amounts 
accruing prior to May 14, 1981) 
NOV 1, 1964 Payment due 
Payment made 
NOV 1, 1965 Payment due 
Payment made 
NOV 1, 1966 Payment due 
NOV 1, 1967 1 year interest 
at 6% on §2,000 
Payment due 
NOV 1, 1968 1 year interest 
at 6% on §4,000 
Payment due 
NOV 1, 1969 1 year interest 
at 6% on §6,000 
Payment due 
§ 2,000.00 
• 2,000.00 
2, 
2 
2 
- 0 -
,000, 
r 000 , 
- 0 -
,000, 
120, 
,000 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
• III! • * » 4,120.00 
240.00 
2,000.00 
6,360.00 
360.00 
2,000.00 
8,720.00 
§120 accrued in-
terest, §4,000 
principal 
§360 accrued in-
terest, §6,000 
principal 
§720 accrued in-
terest, §8,000 
principal 
NOV 1, 1970 1 year interest 
at 6% on §8,000 
Payment due 
-6-
480.00 
2,000.00 
11,200.00 
IrZtl 
§1,200 accrued in-
terest, §10,000 
principal 
A-153 
NOV 1, 1971 1 year interest 
at 6% on $10,000 
Payment due 
JUN 17, 1972 229 days interest 
at 6% on $12,000 
Payment made 
NOV 1, 1972 137 days interest 
at 6% on $12,000 
Payment due 
NOV 17, 1972 16 days interest 
at 6% on $14,000 
Payment made 
MAR 19, 1973 122 days interest 
at 6% on $14,000 
Payment made 
OCT 26, 1973 221 days interest 
at 6% on $14,000 
Payment made 
NOV 1, 1973 6 days interest 
at 6% on $14,000 
600.00 
2,000.00 
13,800.00 
451.72 
430.75 
13,820.97 
270.25 
2,000.00 
280.76 
500.00 
15,128.80 
508.60 
500.00 
15,137.40 
13.81 
$1,800 accrued in-
terest, $12,000 
principal 
$1,820.97 accrued 
interest, $12,000 
principal 
16,091.22 
36.82 
780.00 
15,348.04 
$2,091.22 
interest, 
principal 
$1,348.04 
interest, 
principal 
accrued 
$14,000 
accrued 
$14,000 
$1,128.80 accrued 
interest, $14,000 
principal 
$1,137.40 accrued 
interest, $14,000 
principal 
Payment due 
NOV 28, 1973 27 days interest 
at 6% on $16,000 
Payment made 
MAY 13, 1974 166 days interest 
at 6% on $16,000 
2,000.00 
17,151.21 
71.01 
•_ 780.00 
16,442.22 
436.60 
$1,151.21 accrued 
interest, $16,000 
principal 
$442.22 accrued 
interest, $16,000 
principal 
NOV 1, 1974 
Payment made 
172 days interest 
at 6% on $16,000 
500.00 
16,378.82 
452.38 
$378.82 accrued 
interest, $16,000 
principal 
Payment due 
JAN 20, 1975 80 days interest 
at 6% on $18,000 
2,000.00 
Payment made 
NOV 1, 1975 285 days interest 
at 6% on $18,000 
Payment due 
18 
— 
18 
2 
, 8 3 1 . 
236, 
600, 
,467 , 
843, 
,000 
.20 
.71 
.00 
.91 
.28 
.00 
21,311.19 
$831.20 accrued 
interest, $18,000 
principal 
$467.91 accrued 
interest, $18,000 
principal 
$1,311.19 accrued 
interest, $20,000 
principal 
DEC 15, 1975 44 days interest 
at 6% on $20,000 
144.66 
Payment made 
NOV 1, 1976 321 days interest 
at 6% on $20,000 
-8-
500.00 
20,955.85 
1,055.34 
$955.85 accrued 
interest, $20,000 
principal 
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Payment due 
DEC 1, 1976 30 days interest 
at 6% on $22,000 
Payment made 
NOV 1, 1977 335 days interest 
at 6% on $22,000 
Payment due 
NOV 1, 1978 1 year interest 
at 6% on $24,000 
Payment due 
NOV 1, 1979 1 year interest 
at 6% on $26,000 
Payment due 
NOV 13, 1979 12 days interest 
at 6% on $28,000 
Payment made 
Payment made 
NOV 1, 1980 353 days interest 
at 6% on $28,000 
Payment due 
-9-
2,000.00 
24,011.19 
108.49 
• 400.00 
23,719.68 
1,211.51 
2,000.00 
26,931.19 
1,440.00 
2,000.00 
30,371.19 
1,560.00 
2,000,00 
m, » l » i > i >••< tm 
33,931.19 
55.23 
706.00 
- 1,30Q,00T 
31,980.42 
1,624.77 
.. 2#000.00 
35,605.19 
$2,011.19 accrued 
interest, $22,000 
principal 
$1,719.68 accrued 
interest, $22,000 
principal 
$2,931.19 accrued 
interest, $22,000 
principal 
$4,371.19 accrued 
interest, $26,000 
principal 
$5,931.19 accrued 
interest, $28,000 
principal 
$3,980.42 accrued 
interest, $28,000 
principal 
$5,605.19 accrued 
interest, $30,000 
principal 
A _/«r/_ 
JAN 31, 1986 5 years, 92 days 
interest at 6% on 
$30,000 
9,453.69 
Payment made 
p o s t - t r i a l after 
rul ing by Court 
CREDIT (Applied 
below) 
-50,262.95 
( 5,204.07) 
CONTRACT ACCOUNTING 
(10% interest on delinquent amounts 
accruing after Nay 14, 1981) 
NOV 1, 1981 Payment due 
NOV 1, 1982 1 year interst at 
10% on $2,000.00 
$ 2,000.00 
200.00 
Payment due 
NOV 1, 1983 1 year interest at 
10% on $4,000.00 
Payment due 
NOV 6, 1983 5 days inteest at 
10% on $6,000.00 
Payment made 
NOV 1, 1984 360 days interest 
at 10% on $4,608.22 
Payment due 
NOV 4, 1984 3 days interest at 
10% on $6,608.22 
Payment made 
2,000.00 
4,200.00 
400.00 
2,000.00 
6,600.00 
8.22 
- 2 ,000.00 
4 ,608.22 
454.51 
2,000.00 
tm« mi l i t • ••• >M»U III 
7,062.73 
5.43 
- 2,000.00 
$200.00 accrued 
interest, $4,000 
principal 
$600.00 accrued 
interest, $6,000 
principal 
$4,608.22 principal 
$454.51 accrued 
interest $6,608.22 
principal 
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NOV 1, 1985 361 days interest 501.26 
at 10% on $5,068.16 
Payment due 2,000.00 
7,569.42 $501.26 interest, 
7 ,068.16 principal 
NOV 15, 1985 14 days interest at 27.11 
10% on $7,068.16 
Payment made - 2,115.0Pr 
5,481.53 $5,481.53 principal 
JAN 31, 1986 77 days interest at 115.64 
at 10% on $5,481.53 
CREDIT APPLIED - 5,204.07 
$ 399.10 $399.10 principal 
14. As of the date of trial in February of 1985, ELSIE 
BRINKERHOFF was 86 years of age, and is a wonderful and 
beautifully aged lady. 
15. The Court finds by the clear and convincing weight of 
the evidence presented at trial that, although ELSIE BRINKERHOFF 
was fully competent in all senses of the word at the time she 
entered into the agreement between herself as seller and MARK J. 
BRINKERHOFF and CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF as buyers, in 1966 or 1967, 
because of her age, and beginning in or about 1970, ELSIE 
BRINKERHOFF had to rely on others to do things for her, 
especially concerning her financial and legal affairs, and she 
has relied upon her sons, daughters, members of her family, and 
grandsons, and that from and after 1970, ELSIE BRINKERHOFF signed 
documents that were presented to her without understanding the 
legal or other significance of such documents. She lacked 
sufficient power to comprehend the subject of such documents, 
including will, deeds, contracts and promissory notes, their 
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naturef and their probable consequences, and was not able to act 
with discretion in relation thereto. Prom and after 1970r ELSIE 
J. BRINKERHOPP was and still is, legally incompetent. 
17. Prom and after 1970, when ELSIE BRINKERHOFP signed any 
contractual, financial or legal documents, or took certain legal 
stands and positions, she did so in total and strict reliance 
upon her sons, daughters, grandsons or whomever else came to her 
requesting her signature or requesting that she take certain 
legal positions, all without knowing the nature and probable 
consequences of such documents, and without knowing the nature 
and probable consequences of the legal positions she was 
requested to take. 
18. The Court finds that the purpose of the 1966 or 1967 
Agreement was to furnish ELSIE BRINKERHOPP with support for as 
long as she lived, and that Agreement and that purpose were never 
abandoned. 
19. The Court finds that all of the children and certain 
grandchildren of ELSIE J. BRINKERHOPP, from their respective 
viewpoints, and because of what they perceived as being others 
taking advantage of their mother or grandmother by such other 
parties, used their own influence to convince ELSIE BRINKERHOPP 
to execute documents and take legal positions in order to 
accomplish what they, the children and/or grandchildren or other 
relatives, thought was for ELSIE BRINKERHOPP's best interest. 
20. The Court finds that the children and grandchildren who 
prevailed upon ELSIE BRINKERHOFP to execute documents and take 
legal stands after 1970 did not intend to take advantage of her 
-12-
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for their own purposes. Nevertheless, they did take advantage of 
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF for the purpose of benefiting her in their own 
mindsf from their own points of view. As a result, those persons 
who persuaded and induced ELSIE BRINKERHOFF to sign contractual, 
legal and financial documents, including deeds, and to take 
certain legal positions from and after 1970, used improper 
constraint or urgency of pursuasion, whereby the will of ELSIE 
BRINKERHOFF was overpowered, and she was induced to do or 
forebear an act which she otherwise would not do, or otherwise 
would do if left to act freely. 
21. The unfair persuasion of ELSIE BRINKERHOFF on various 
occasions from and after 1970 generally took place in private. 
The persons pursuading her to sign legal and financial documents 
were able to obtain her signature because of her age, 
psychological dependency, and existing confidential and/or family 
relationships. 
22. The transactions leading to the signing of financial and 
legal documents by ELSIE BRINKERHOFF were initiated by her family 
members, not by herself, under circumstances in which ELSIE 
BRINKERHOFF lacked reasonable access to independent, 
non-confidential advice. 
23. Following 1970, ELSIE BRINKERHOFF executed the following 
financial and legal documents, among others: 
A. On or about April 13, 1971, ELSIE BRINKERHOFF 
executed a certain affidavit, admitted in evidence 
as Exhibit P-3. 
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On or about April 6, 1917, ELSIE BRINKERHOFF signed 
a document acknowledging that she had received 
$23,000 from MARK J. BRINKERHOPP and CLOYD H. 
BRINKERHOFF as of that date. The receipt was 
prepared by Plaintiff MONT ANDERSON, ELSIE 
BRINKERHOPP'S grandson-in-law, who was and is a 
Certified Public Accountant. The receipt was 
prepared by him for the benefit of giving MARK J. 
BRINKERHOFF and CLOYD H. BRINKERHOPP certain "tax 
breaks", and the receipt was prepared and obtained 
without regard to the tax consequences for ELSIE 
i 
BRINKERHOFF. The receipt was admitted as Exhibit 
P-4. 
On or about June 4f 1979, ELSIE BRINKERHOPP executed 
a Warranty Deed running from herself, as grantor, to 
herself, MARK J. BRINKERHOPP, and CLOYD H. 
BRINKERHOPP, as joint tenants. This document was 
i 
admitted as Exhibit D-5. 
On or about August 15, 1980, ELSIE BRINKERHOFF was 
induced to execute a Warranty Deed running from 
( 
herself, as grantor, to GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN 
BRINKERHOFF, ARLENE B. GOULDING, CHARLES A. 
BRINKERHOFF, and BETTY B. ESPLIN, each as to an 
undivided 1/5 interest. See Exhibit D-6. 
On or following August 15, 1980, GOLDA B. ADAIR, 
WARREN BRINKERHOFF, ARLENE B. GOULDING, CHARLES A. 
BRINKERHOFF, and BETTY B. ESPLIN executed a Trust 
-14-
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Deed in favor of ELSIE BRINKERHOFF as beneficiary. 
See Exhibit D-7. The Trust Deed was to secure notes 
running to ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, one being executed by 
each of the grantors named in the Trust Deed. See 
Exhibit D-20. 
F. Also on or about August 15, 1980, ELSIE BRINKERHOFF 
was induced to execute certain "Escrow Agreements". 
See Exhibit D-20. 
G. On or about September 9, 1980, ELSIE BRINKERHOFF was 
induced to execute a Quit Claim Deed, conveying 
interests in water rights to GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN 
BRINKERHOFF, ARLENE B. GOULDING, CHARLES A. 
BRINKERHOFF, and BETTY B. ESPLIN, each as to an 
undivided 1/5 interest. See Exhibit D-8. 
H. On or about September 9, 1980, ELSIE BRINKERHOFF was 
induced to execute a certain affidavit. See Exhibit 
D-21. 
I. On or about April 23, 1982, ELSIE BRINKERHOFF 
executed a document entitled "Last Will and 
Testament of ELSIE BRINKERHOFF". 
J. On or about September 9, 1984, ELSIE BRINKERHOFF was 
induced to execute a certain "Stipulation". See 
Exhibit P-40. 
24. The Court specifically finds that with respect to each 
and all of the documents listed in the preceding paragraph, the 
same were signed by ELSIE BRINKERHOFF when she was legally 
incompetent, and was acting and functioning under the undue 
influence of the persons who obtained her signature, or who 
requested her to take the legal positions indicated by said 
documents. As a result, the Court finds that all legal, 
contractual financial and testamentary documents executed by 
ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFP from and after 1970, as between and as 
related to the parties to this action, are null, void, and of no 
force or effect whatever, and should be declared cancelled. 
25. On or about August 15, 1980, GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN 
BRINKERHOFP, ARLENE B. GOULDING, CHARLES A. BRINKERHOFF and BETTY 
B. ESPLIN executed notes in favor of ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFP in 
connection with the Warranty Deed, Trust Deed, and Escrow 
Agreement mentioned in paragraphs 23D, 23 E, and 23F, above. 
Thereafter, certain payments were made by the promisors to ELSIE 
J. BRINKERHOFF. The notes bore interest at the rate of "NONE 
percent (0%) per annum". 
26. At trial, the Court inquired of GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN 
BRINKERHOFF, ARLENE B. GOULDING, CHARLES A. BRINKERHOFF, and 
BETTY B. ESPLIN whether they desired the return of funds paid by 
them to ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFP under the transactions mentioned in 
light of the Court's ruling that said transactions were null, 
void, and of no effect. CHARLES A. BRINKERHOFF and BETTY B. 
ESPLIN informed the Court that they did not desire any repayment. 
Defendants GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF, and ARLENE B. 
GOULDING requested that their money be returned to them by ELSIE 
J. BRINKERHOFF, who requested that the Court grant her the 
privilege of repaying said Defendants. The Court finds that the 
notes to ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF, the Trust Deed, the Escrow 
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Agreement and all other documents related to the transactions 
described above are nullf void, of no effect and should be 
cancelled and set aside. 
27. As of February 28, 1985, ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF is 
indebted to Defendants GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF, AND 
ARLENE B. GOULDING in the principal amount of $1,620.00 plus 
accrued interest at the rate of 10% per annum in the amount of 
$356.40, for a total amount of $1,976.40, each. 
28. As stated in paragraph 7, above, the contract between 
ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF, MARK J. BRINKERHOFF, and CLOYD H. 
BRINKERHOFF was and is vague and ambiguous with respect to 
disposition of any portion of the $53,388.00 minimum which might 
remain unpaid as of the date of death of ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF. 
The Court finds that it was the intent of the parties to the 
contract that any part of the minimum amount remaining unpaid as 
of the death of ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF be paid and divided equally 
between her children, or any surviving ' heirs if any child 
predeceased her, and the contract should be reformed to express 
clearly this disposition and intent. As of the dates of trial, 
all children of ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF, including the surviving 
spouse of CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF, consented to such reformation, 
with the exception of Defendants ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF, and 
GOULDING, who originally agreed to such reformation but changed 
their minds. Likewise as of the time of trial, all children of 
ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF except Defendants ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF, 
and GOULDING were in agreement that any and all funds left in a 
trust account mentioned below, as of the date of death of ELSIE 
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J. BRINKERHOFF, be divided and distributed equally between them 
and LENA BRINKERHOFF. Defendants ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF and 
GOULDING originally agreed, but changed their minds. The Court 
finds that all funds referred to in this paragraph should be 
distributed, upon the death of ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF, equally to 
her children, with LENA BRINKERHOFF receiving the share allocable 
to her deceased husband, CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF. 
29. Any amounts awarded to ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF should be 
paid to Mr. Kirk Heaton in trust for the benefit of ELSIE J. 
BRINKERHOFF, and for the use and benefit of her now-surviving 
children and LENA BRINKERHOFF. Mr. Heaton was present in Court 
at the time of the Court's ruling and consented to be appointed 
as trustee and guardian of the financial, business and legal 
affairs of ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF, under the supervision of the 
Court. Mr. Kirk Heaton should be appointed as such trustee and 
guardian for the purpose of receiving such funds awarded to ELSIE 
J. BRINKERHOFF, depositing them in a trust account at Zion's 
First National Bank, and disbursing them appropriately, but not 
to any of ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF1S children except as specifically 
ordered by the Court. He should qualify by taking the 
appropriate oath, and should serve without bond or any stated 
fee, but should be permitted to apply to the Court for reasonable 
fees upon appropriate showing and notice. 
30. When this action was originally commenced, Willard R. 
Bishop, attorney for Plaintiffs, brought suit against ELSIE 
BRINKERHOFF and other named Defendants. Thereafter, the 
interests of ELSIE BRINKERHOFF were represented by Hans Q. 
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Chamberlain, who also represented other named Defendants. ELSIE 
BRINKERHOFF then requested in writing that Hans Q. Chamberlain 
withdraw as her attorney of record, which he did in September of 
1983, The letter wherein she requested Hans Q. Chamberlain to 
withdraw as her attorney was prepared by her grandson, DALE 
BRINKERHOFF. Thereafter, following signing of the September 9, 
1984 Stipulation by ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF, and following receipt 
of a written request from ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF dated October 16, 
1984, Willard R. Bishop, entered an appearance on her behalf and 
represented ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF even though he had originally 
sued her on behalf of Plaintiffs in the first instance. Hans Q. 
Chamberlain had by then sued ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF in behalf of 
the other named Defendants even though he originally represented 
her, by a Crossclaim dated September 28, 1984. 
31. During the first day of trial, to-wit, February 21st, 
1985, the Court determined that the interests of ELSIE 
BRINKERHOFF were not being fully protected, and by reason of that 
fact, she needed separate counsel to represent her interests. 
The Court determined that it would watch out for the interests of 
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, and that the trial would continue without 
obtaining counsel to represent her during the course of the 
trial. Therefore, during part of the first day of trial and 
during the entire second day of trial, ELSIE BRINKERHOFF was not 
represented by counsel. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and 
enters its: 
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CONCLUSIONS OP LAW 
1. That any and all legal, financial, testamentary, 
contractual and/or other documents executed by ELSIE J. 
BRINKERHOPP from and after the year 1970, as between and as 
related to the parties to this action, were and are null, void 
and of no effect by reason of the legal incompetency of ELSIE J, 
BRINKERHOFP and the exercise of undue influence over her in 
connection with the execution of said documents, by certain of 
her children and grandchidren, and should be declared to be null, 
void, cancelled terminated, and of no effect whatever, as should 
any promissory notes, trust deeds, escrow agreements and any 
other documents executed by others, but related thereto, 
2. The Agreement between ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFP as seller, and 
MARK J. BRINKERHOPF and CLOYD H. BRINKERHOPF, deceased, dated 
October 26, 1966 or December 10, 1967, is and at all times 
pertinent has been, in existence, and in full force and effect. 
3. That the vague and ambiguous terms of said Agreement 
pertaining to disposition of any part of the minimum amount of 
$53,388.00 remaining unpaid as of the death of ELSIE J. 
BRINKERHOPP, should be reformed to provide for an equal division 
of any amounts so remaining between MARK J. BRINKERHOPP, LENA 
BRINKERHOPF, CHARLES A. BRINKERHOFP, BETTY B. ESPLIN, GOLDA B. 
ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFP, and ARLENE B. GOULDING, share and 
share alike. 
4. Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment and a decree quieting 
title with appropriate injunctive relief in favor of LENA 
BRINKERHOPF and MARK J. BRINKERHOFF in the real and personal 
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property, grazing rights and water rights which are the subject 
matter of this actionf as tenants in commonr each owning an 
undivided one-half (*$) interest therein, subject to the terms of 
the Agreement dated October 26, 1966 or December 10, 1967 , as 
reformed, running to ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF as seller, free and 
clear of any claim whatever on the part of Defendants GOLDA B. 
ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF, and ARLENE B. GOULDING. Because of 
the legal incompetency of ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF, upon payment of 
all amounts due under said Agreement, any judgment and decree 
issued in this matter should function and operate as a judicial 
deed conveying to Plaintiffs MARK J. BRINKERHOFF and LENA 
BRINKERHOFF, the interests stated above. In the event that 
Plaintiffs deem it necessary, a judicial deed should issue upon 
appropriate application and notice. 
5. That Mr. Kirk Heaton should be appointed as trustee and 
guardian of the financial, business and legal affairs of ELSIE J. 
BRINKERHOFF, under the supervision of the Court, he to take the 
appropriate oath and to serve without bond or stated fee. As 
such trustee and guardian, Mr. Heaton should receive amounts 
awarded ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF, should deposit them in a trust 
account at Zionfs First National Bank, and should disburse such 
funds for the benefit of ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF, but not to her 
children, except as such disbursements to children may be ordered 
by the Court. Upon appropriate notice, Mr. Heaton should be 
permitted to apply for reasonable fees in his capacity as trustee 
and guardian of the financial business and legal affairs of ELSIE 
J. BRINKERHOFF. Mr. Heaton should be permitted to pay his 
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reasonable costs incurred for his administration of the account, 
from the account. 
6. That Plaintiffs should be required to pay to Kirk Heaton, 
in trust for the use and benefit of ELSIE J. BRINKERHOPF, the 
amounts due on the Agreement as stated above, plus any accrued 
interest, said amounts to be paid within ninety (90) days of the 
execution of any judgment by the Court in this matter. 
7. That from amounts received by Mr. Kirk Heaton for the 
benefit of ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFP, Mr. Heaton should be required to 
disburse to Defendants GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF, and 
ARLENE B. GOULDING, the amount of $1,976.40 each, together with 
interest upon said amount at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per 
annum from and after March 1, 1985, all without further order of 
this Court. 
8. That upon the death of ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF, Kirk Heaton, 
in his capacity as trustee, should be required to pay and 
distribute any and all funds still being held by him in trust for 
ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF, together with any funds received by him 
thereafter in connection with the Agreement of October 26, 1966 
or December 10, 1967, to MARK J. BRINKERHOFF, LENA BRINKERHOFF, 
i 
BETTY B. ESPLIN, CHARLES A. BRINKERHOFF, GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN 
BRINKERHOFF, and ARLENE B. GOULDING equally, share and share 
alike. 
I 
9. That all other claims and pleadings of any party 
requesting affirmative relief other than or inconsistent with the 
above conclusions, should be dismissed, with prejudice and upon 
the merits. 
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10. The parties should be required to bear their own costs 
and attorney fees. 
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY. 
DATED this A r day of
 J / i f f frVK ^  > 1 9 8 6 . 
BY THE COURT: 
< - .rx.** 
-^ . . . ' or,, i „ 
DON V.VflBBS, D i s t r i c t Judge <T\^\ffl 
APPROVED, AS TO FORM: 
^LA-v^M^r? 
BMiifc.a»>!!>•• niii»iMni <n<Hi,a>i»i>ii<<»i.fcni«WiiM^iirii> n %%% WILLARD R. BIS.HOP 
Attorney for P l a i n t i f f s 
/ A 
/ M n 4 n nai f .•>.»w«»>i'i*»iii«»/iM>iw*>«<>ii.iiili«il|ii<>wi nrrii • lii n >!•>*> 
' J1ANS Q. CHAMBERLAIN 
/ A t t o r n e y for Defendants ADAIR, 
' GOULDING, and WARREN BRINKERHOFF 
CERTIFICATE;, OF MAII, m? 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a full, true and correct copy 
of the above and foregoing FIRST AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to Mr. Hans Q. Chamberlain, of CHAMBERLAIN & 
HIGBEE, Attorneys at Law, 250 South Main Street, Cedar City, Utah 
84720? to Mr. Kirk Heaton, Attorney at Law, 70 North Main Street, 
Kanab, Utah 84741; and to Mrs. Elsie J. Brinkerhoff, Glendale, 
Utah 84729, all by first class mail, postage fully prepaid this 
<2gN*y ot TEfeeuAeV me. 
%MmmhM2. 
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WILLARD R. BISHOP 
BISHOP & RONNOW, P.C. 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
P. 0. Box 27 9 
Cedar City, UT 84720 
Telephone: (801) 586-9483 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF KANE CODNTY 
STATE OF DTAH 
MONT R. ANDERSON, personal 
representative of the Estate 
Of CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF, 
LENA BRINKERHOFF, and MARK J. 
BRINKERHOFF, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, GOLDA B. 
ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF, 
ARLENE B. GOULDING, and JOHN 
DOES I through V, 
Defendants. 
FIRST AMENDED JUDGMENT AND 
DECREE QUIETING TITLE 
Civil No. 1826 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial to the 
Court, sitting without a jury, on Thursday and Friday, February 
21 and 22, 1985. Plaintiffs MONT R. ANDERSON, as personal 
representative of the Estate of CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF, LENA 
BRINKERHOFF and MARK J. BRINKERHOFF all appeared personally and 
were represented by their counsel of record, Mr. Willard R. 
Bishop. Defendant ELSIE BRINKERHOFF appeared personally and was 
represented by her attorney of record, Mr. Willard R. Bishop. 
Defendants GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF, and ARLENE B. 
GOULDING also, appeared personally, and were represented by their 
attorney of record, Mr. Hans Q. Chamberlain. CHARLES A. 
BRINKERHOFF and BETTY B. ESPLIN were present. The Court noted 
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hat originally, CHARLES A. BRINKERHOFF and BETTY B. ESPLIN had 
been named as Defendants, but had been dismissed from the lawsuit 
by reason of having settled their differences with Plaintiffs. 
Witnesses were sworned and evidence was presented. Argument was 
had. The Court being fully advised in the premises, and having 
heretofore made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, and good cause appearing, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as 
follows: 
1. That any and all legal, financial, testamentary, 
contractual and/or other documents executed by ELSIE J. 
BRINKERHOFF from and after 1970, as between and as related to the 
parties to this action, were and are now, null, void, and of no 
effect whatever, by reason of the legal incompetency of ELSIE J. 
BRINKERHOFF and by reason of the exercise of undue influence over 
her in connection with the execution of said documents, by 
certain of her children and grandchildren, and said documents 
should be and they hereby are, declared to be null, void, 
cancelled, terminated, and of no effect whatever, together with 
any and all related promissory notes, trust deeds, escrow 
agreements, and any and all other documents executed by others 
related to in any way to the null and void documents executed by 
ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF. The documents which are hereby declared 
I 
null, void and of no effect include, but are not limited to, the 
following: 
A. A certain affidavit executed by ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF 
on or about April 13, 1971. 
~
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A certain document executed by ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFP 
on or about April 6, 1977, acknowledging that she 
had received $23,000.00 from MARK J. BRINKERHOPF and 
CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF as of that date. 
A certain Warranty Deed dated June 4, 1975, running 
from ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFP, as grantor, to herself, 
MARK J. BRINKERHOFF, and CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF, as 
joint tenants. 
A certain Warranty Deed dated August 15, 1980, 
running from ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF, as grantor, to 
GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF, ARLENE B. 
GOULDING, CHARLES A. BRINKERHOFF, and BETTY B. 
ESPLIN, each as to an undivided one-fifth (1/5) 
interest. 
A certain Trust Deed executed by GOLDA B. ADAIR, 
WARREN BRINKERHOFF, ARLENE B. GOULDING, CHARLES A. 
BRINKERHOFF, and BETTY B. ESPLIN, running to ELSIE 
J. BRINKERHOFF, as beneficiary, together with 
certain trust deed notes running to ELSIE J. 
BRINKERHOFF from GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF, 
ARLENE B. GOULDING, CHARLES A. BRINKERHOFF, and 
BETTY B. ESPLIN, executed on or about August 15, 
1980. 
Certain "Escrow Agreements" dated August 15, 1980, 
executed by ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF, and by GOLDA B. 
ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF, ARLENE B. GOULDING, 
CHARLES A. BRINKERHOFF, and BETTY B. ESPLIN. 
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G. A certain Quit-Claim Deed, purporting to convey 
interests in water rights to GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN 
BRINKERHOFF, ARLENE B. GOULDING, CHARLES A. 
BRINKERHOFF, and BETTY B. ESPLIN, each to an 
undivided one-fifth (1/5) interest, executed by 
ELSIE BRINKERHOFP on or about September 9, 1980. 
H. A certain affidavit, executed by ELSIE BRINKERHOFF 
on or about September 9, 1980. 
I. A certain "Last Will and Testament of ELSIE 
BRINKERHOFF", executed by ELSIE BRINKERHOFF on or 
about April 23, 1982. 
J. A certain "Stipulation" executed by ELSIE 
BRINKERHOFF on or about September 9, 1984. 
2. That the agreement between ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF as 
seller, and MARK J. BRINKERHOFF and CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFP, 
deceased, dated October 26, 1966 or December 10, 1967, should be 
and it hereby is, declared to be in existence, and in full force 
and effect. 
3. That the terms of said agreement pertaining to 
disposition of any part of the minimum amount of $53,388.00 
remaining unpaid as of the death of ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF, should 
be and they hereby are, reformed, to provide for an equal 
division of any amounts so remaining between MARK J. BRINKERHOFF, 
LENA BRINKERHOFP, CHARLES A. BRINKERHOFP, BETTY B. ESPLIN, GOLDA 
B. ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFP, and ARLENE B. GOULDING, share and 
share alike. 
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4. That Plaintiffs LENA BRINKERHOFP and MARK J. BRINKERHOFF, 
own in fee simple and are entitled to the quiet and peaceful use, 
possession and enjoyment of that certain real and personal 
property, including grazing rights and water rights, as tenants 
in common, each owning an undivided one-half (^ ) interest 
therein, subject to the terms of the Agreement dated October 26, 
1966, or December 10, 1967, as reformed, running to ELSIE J. 
BRINKERHOFF as seller, said real and personal property, including 
grazing and water rights, being more particularly described as 
follows: 
REAL PROPERTY IN MILLARD COUNTY, UTAH: 
Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4, Block 25, Plat "A", Delta 
Townsite. 
Lot 2, Block 26, Plat WA", Delta Townsite. 
REAL PROPERTY IN KANE COUNTY, UTAH: 
Township 39 South, Range Ah West, Salt Lake 
Meridian: 
West Half of Section 25, containing 320 acres. 
Northwest Quarter; Southeast Quarter and the 
South Half of the Northeast Quarter containing 
400 acres, all in Section 26, Township 39 
South, Range Ah West, Salt Lake Meridian, 
containing 400 acres, more or less. 
Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4; Southeast Quarter of the 
Northwest Quarter; Northeast Quarter of the 
Southwest Quarter; East Half of the East Half; 
Southwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter; 
Northwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter of 
Section 27, Township 39 South, Range Ah West, 
containing 478.80 acres. 
East Half of the Northeast Quarter; South Half 
of the Southeast Quarter; Northwest Quarter of 
the Southeast Quarter of Section 35, 
containing 200 acres. 
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Township 40 South, Range 4H Westf Salt Lake 
Meridian: 
Section 29: Southwest Quarter of the 
Northeast Quarter; West Half of the Southeast 
Quarter and the Southeast Quarter of the 
Southwest Quarter, containing 160 acres. 
Section 30: Northwest Quarter; East Half of 
the Southwest Quarter, containing 238.99 
acres. 
Section 5: Lot 2, containing 39.08 acres. 
Township 40 South, Range 4 West, Salt Lake 
Meridian: 
Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of 
Section 8, containing 40 acres. 
Township 40 South, Range 7 West, Salt Lake 
Meridian: 
Beginning at the Southwest Corner of the 
Southwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter of 
Section 23, Township 40 South, Range 7 West, 
Salt Lake Meridian and running thence East 
10.23 chains; thence North 80° West 6.36 
chains; thence West 3.68 chains; thence South 
1 chain to beginning, containing .74 acres. 
Beginning at the Northwest Corner of the 
Northwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of 
Section 26, Township 40 South, Range 7 West, 
and running thence South 4.30 chains; thence 
South 70° East 15 chains to the middle of the 
channel of the creek; thence Northwesterly 
along the middle of the channel of said creek 
to the North line of said Northwest Quarter of 
the Northeast Quarter; thence West 11.23 
chains to the place of beginning. 
Beginning 4.30 chains South of the Northwest 
Corner of the Northwest Quarter of the 
Northeast Quarter of Section 26, Township 40 
South, Range 7 West, Salt Lake Meridian and 
running thence South 70°east 15 chains to the 
middle of the channel of the creek; thence 
Southerly along the middle of the channel of 
said.creek to the South Line; thence North 73 
45' West 14.60 chains; thence North 4.30 
chains to the place of beginning, containing 
5.60 acres. 
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The above three tracts being part of land 
situtated in Sections 23 and 26 of said 
township and range, sometimes referred to 
unofficially as Lot "A". 
Township 40 South, Range 4^ West, Salt Lake 
Meridian: 
Lot 1; Northeast Quarter of the Northwest 
Quarter of Section 31, containing 79.30 acres. 
PERSONAL PROPERTY: 
The following described water and reservoir 
rights: 
A one-fourth interest in Hobble Canyon 
Reservoir (9-36-12) in Mohave County, Arizona. 
A one-half interest in Sullivan Reservoir in 
Mohave County, Arizona. 
And all grazing privileges and permits annexed 
to or based upon any of the foregoing real, 
personal, reservoir, or water rights as 
commensurate. 
5. That the claims of Defendants GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN 
BRINKERHOPP, and ARLENE B. GOULDING, and the claims of any and 
all persons claiming with, by, through or under said Defendants, 
are without any right whatever, and Defendants GOLDA B. ADAIR, 
WARREN BRINKERHOPP, and ARLENE B. GOULDING and any and all 
persons claiming with, by, through or under them, have no estate, 
right, title, lien or interest in or to said property or any part 
thereof. 
6. That Defendants GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOPP, and 
ARLENE B. GOULDING, and any and all persons claiming with, by, 
through or under them, should be and they hereby are, permanently 
enjoined and restrained from claiming any estate, right, title, 
lien or interest in or to the described property or any part 
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thereof adverse to the interests and title of MARK J. BRINKERHOFF 
and LENA BRINKERHOFF. 
7. That because of the legal incompetency of ELSIE J. 
BRINKERHOFF and the fact that a complete set of documents of 
conveyance was never deposited into the escrow anticipated by the 
agreement dated October 26
 r 1966 or December 10 f 1967f this 
Judgment and Decree Quieting Title shall, upon the death of ELSIE 
J. BRINKERHOFF, function and operate as a judicial deed conveying 
to MARK J. BRINKERHOFF and LENA BRINKERHOFF the interests stated 
above. In the event that MARK J. BRINKERHOFF and/or LENA 
BRINKERHOFF deem it necessary, a judicial deed shall issue upon 
appropriate application and notice. 
8. That Mr. Kirk Heaton, Attorney, of Kanab, Utah, should be 
and he hereby is, appointed as guardian of the financial, 
business and legal affairs of ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF, and as 
trustee of all funds flowing to ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF from the 
Agreement of October 26, 1966 or December 10, 1967, for the use 
and benefit of ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF, and also for the use and 
benefit of MARK J. BRINKERHOFF, LENA BRINKERHOFF, BETTY B. 
ESPLIN, CHARLES A. BRINKERHOFF, GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN 
BRINKERHOFF, and ARLENE B. GOULDING, said appointments being 
subject to the supervision of this Court. Mr. Kirk Heaton shall 
take the appropriate oath and shall serve without bond or stated 
fee. As such trustee, Mr. Heaton shall receive all amounts 
awarded ELSIE. J. BRINKERHOFF herein, together with any proceeds 
from the agreement dated October 26, 1966 or December 10, 1967, 
as reformed above, and shall deposit them into a trust account at 
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Zion's First National Bank, and shall hold and disburse such 
funds for the use and benefit of ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF, but not to 
her children, except as such disbursements to children may be 
specifically authorized herein, or otherwise ordered by the 
Court. Upon appropriate application and notice, Mr. Kirk Heaton 
shall be permitted to apply for reasonable fees in connection 
with his administration of the trust, and in connection with his 
guardianship of the financial, business and legal affairs of 
ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF. Mr. Kirk Heaton shall be permitted to 
deduct his reasonable and normal costs incurred in connection 
with his administration of the trust, from the trust corpus. 
9. That Plaintiffs should be and they hereby are, required 
to pay to Kirk Heaton, as trustee, for the use and benefit of 
ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF and for the use and benefit of MARK J. 
BRINKERHOFF, LENA H. BRINKERHOFF, BETTY B. ESPLIN, CHARLES A. 
BRINKERHOFF, GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF, and ARLENE B. 
GOULDING, the sum of $399.10, being the amount due and unpaid on 
the agreement as of January 31, 1986, plus any accrued interest 
at ten percent (10%) per annum upon principal, and less any 
payments made after January 31, 1986, said amount to be paid 
within ninety (90) days of the execution of this First Amended 
Judgment, Plaintiffs having already paid the sum of §50,262.95 on 
January 31, 1986, and $2,115.00 on November 15, 1985, after the 
initial ruling by the Court. 
10. That, from amounts received by Mr. Kirk Heaton as stated 
above, and as received by him prior to February 1, 1986, Mr. 
Heaton should be and he hereby is, required to disburse forthwith 
.9-
uw 
1 ( 
to Defendant GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF, and ARLENE B. 
GOULDING, the amount of $1,976.40 each, together with interest 
upon said amounts at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum 
from and after March 1, 1985, all without further order of this 
Court. 
11. That upon the death of ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF, Mr. Kirk 
Heaton, in his capacity as trustee, should be and he hereby is, 
required to pay and distribute any and all funds still being held 
by him in trust at the death of ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF, together 
with any funds received by him thereafter in connection with the 
agreement of October 26, 1966 or December 10, 1967, to MARK J. 
BRINKERHOFF, LENA BRINKERHOFF, BETTY B. ESPLIN, CHARLES A. 
BRINKERHOFF, GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF, and ARLENE B. 
GOULDING equally, share and share alike. 
12. That any and all other claims and pleadings of any party 
in this action requesting affirmative relief, other than or 
inconsistent with the above, should be and they hereby are, 
dismissed with prejudice and upon the merits. 
13. That the parties should be and they hereby are, required 
to bear their own costs and attorney fees. 
DATED this ;70 day of hthVuA 
BY THE CO 
r > < ,.,' 1986-
HHWVK 
K 
\ 
\ 
APPROVED AS TCLFQRM:. 
WILLARD R. BISHOP 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
••) JLN-^i 
DON V. TIBBS, D i ' s t r i c t Judge M~$ 
P-/ID 
- 1 0 - A~\Wt 
I 
\ 
HANS Q. CHAMBERLAIN 
Attorney for Defendants ADAIR, 
\GOULDING, and WARREN BRINKERHOPF 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a full, true and correct copy 
of the above and foregoing FIRST AMENDED JUDGMENT AND DECREE 
QUIETING TITLE, to Mr. Hans Q. Chamberlain, of CHAMBERLAIN & 
HIGBEE, Attorneys at Law, 250 South Main Street, Cedar City, Utah 
84720; to Mr. Kirk Heaton, Attorney at Law, 70 North Main Street, 
Kanab, Utah 84741; and to Mrs. Elsie J. Brinkerhoff, Glendale, 
Utah 84729, all by first class mail, postage fully prepaid this 
&$* day of fSe£/lA£V , 1986. 
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THIS AGREEMENT, made and entered into by nnd between ELSIE D R I N K S 
of Glendale, County of Kane, State of Utah, PARTY OF THE FIRST PART, hercin-
* ,VlV. 
1NKERHCF 
of Glev:<-'•"..' l e , County Q. IC:n<?, SI . i t s :>..'• LI 1 vj;i, IVtfVfl :.;3 .;.•? Tlli-' '.."I - . . i ! " . . ' 
'••'•• l : ; 4 | r T - f l al , nt  , t   t ,  R , r  
f'.'.•'.- ' ^ : a t + * r ^ W i t e ) t o d r ^ Wd'MARK 8RJNKE, 
crv/ohnntr' nnrj n r ro^nontn h e r e i n a f t e r T - t nH 
v -^V,*,. rs..'.v « J. 
a f t e r i v i a r r o u t o as the "BUYERS", 
l l i I i l£5.£!LILl : 
THAT WHEREAS, the SELLER is the owner of the real property, grar.ir.j 
privileges and water rights in the States of Utah unci Arizona; 
AND WHEREAS, the BUYERS desire.to purchase the same; 
AND WHEREAS, the parties have.agreed upon tor-Ms .m<! omni i i ;M>% i'Mr-
sale thereof; i . . 
' • " •
 / 
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and of the mutual 
•n % ~»r t i - ^ r ; :Oi 'Oi rt:r ' I «:r ':y.r r e "•'. ' : 
>..)(', ' ; o t v . c e . i , o n e .•.•Mother o s f o.l l o v . s : •.. .'£• •".'•*•••*•'.'• ^ * - , j ••'..• ' v - ; 
. . I. That for and in consideration of the total sum of FIFTY THREE 
THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED EIGHTY-EIGHT ($53,308.00) DOLLARS, as- the full consider 
tion therefor, the SELLER covenants and agrees, to selI and the BUYERS covenant 
and agree to buy the following described real property, grazing privileges end 
water and reservoir rights in the States of. Utah and Arizona: 
: REAL PROPERTY.IN MILLARD COUNTY, UTAH: 
l^ l - i : 1, 2, .!, and /», 'M :ck : r>, P lo t f , V , D-1 I M Tov.nsi to. 
». l...'i-.-y, i.?l.«::-k ;.-! , J - M r i ".V :, Uc i v.; .;•..•...»:-. i A 
••* •->''; ' -VREAL PROPERTY; IW; KANE COUNTY, UTAH: 
•:... Township 39 South, Range 4j West, So It.Lake Meridian: 
West Half of Section 25,'containing 3/0 acres. 
Mort.Vcst Quarter; Southeast Quar.'-cr a;uJ I v.o Sai:th Ho I f 
af tli-.: Northeast Quarter containing «'.0J acres, o I ! in 
Section 20, Township 3v South, Ran.je <\ l: West, Suit Lohe 
Miri c'iar,, containing .'.;.j .icrcs, no re or loss. 
f -puwnrrs. • icmmrtia..,, *,"r, ro* PfraClpAnoN i i 
Lots 1, 7, 3, and <i; Southeast Quarter oi the H o r t h -
v.os-l Quar te r ; Nor thoasf v u a r i c r of the Southwest 
J u a r t o r ; East Hal f o f the East l l o l f ; S:A, flv.vost ( / j a r to r 
of ti>o Nor theas t
 v i i a r t r r ; Nor lhv.es I y ' . o r i c r of the 
Southeast Quarter of Sec t ion ?7 Tv.n- .h in v* r . * i :*h 
*-<ti 
East Hal f of the Nor theast Quar te r ; South Ha Lf >ol the 
Southeast Quar te r ; Northwest Quarter of the Southeast 
•-•••• 3 ' - r -
/.ifo-'l fit . K ... 
<••:.. .W : 1 . ! V -
1
 111 ' ' 
s^iiliif 
^ o - b 3 
15 • £ 
• s f 
-3 .": 
S r r l i o n :"9: South.west
 Vji;-;C:!* : f..o !! •;•'. !.o,r, ; -.vi« :r »'•-r ; 
V.osi Half of t h e Soutliojs-I ',vartcr ;Jnci t!v: oO'/i'hc^v
 T.':rtcr 
or the Southwest Quarter, contai ni \\c 160 acres. 
Section 30: Northwest Quarter; East Halt of I ho Sou i hv:o*~. ! 
Quarter, containing 230.9(J acres. 
Section 5: Lot 2, containing 59.00 acres. 
Township 40 South, Range 4 West, Salt Lake Meridian: 
. Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Scolion 0, 
containing 40 acres. 
Township 40 South, Range 7 West, Salt Lake Meridian: 
, ; ^ i -Beginning at the^Sputhv/est Corner, of the Southwest Quarter of 
i:&j^f^ 40 South# Range 
<.:n .i i :j:.-rt; 
c h a i n s ; thorn.:'.? :3oi11*I• 1 »:h: i : i !•» b'?.{ji nn.i u 
ucrci\. 
f
'.o\\[ \ n i 
Beginning at the Northwest Corner of the Northwest Quarter of 
the Northeast Quarter of Section 26, Township 40 South, Range 
7 West, and running thence South 4.30 chains; thence South 70° 
East 15 chains to the middle of the channel of the creek; thence 
Northwesterly along the middle of the channel of-said creek to 
the North Aine of said Northwest Quarter of the Northeast 
Quarter; thence West 11.23 chains to the place of beginning. 
Beginning 4.30 chains South of the Northwest Corner of the 
Northwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of Section 2G, 
• Tr>w,v.:.hi .) 'C South. Hanjo 7 Wcr-t, Salt Lak;; Meridian and run-
uir. _ 'i :.«"-r.::'" .out:* 7 0 ° \'\-.\ '. • '.*:.'">i,v.; \r vr.c vii M I lo ;' •' t k o 
•:.'« •!»•.•..•• •-;,' •{ ::o ':reek; !>\sr. "• .1 n,|l'.:r|y :!";v; v".ux -ni J<.!!o o ' 
II.'.- •••;»;. •!.••: i ..•; ::•<. ic •;ror-i; " • v c: J tr '., i. i:v?; \\.~r.~'': '.JorV'n 
/- n \'.-' i.'^ st 1«! .00 <;haiirj; Ihcncc Norih »'.-.:>G chaifiS to tnc 
place of beginning, containing 5.60 acres. 
The above three tracts being part of land situated in Sections 
23 and 26 of said township and range, r.onictimcs r^iorred to 
unofficial ly ^ Lot ".•V. 
Township •»0'South, Range Aj V.'ost, S.ilt • L-ke I i^ ri cii -\m: 
Lot ". : N^rthonst Quarter of :'tc> N\;rthv.? 
31. cor. iai ni MO 7V.:'»0 acres. 
.irifT 3i J ^ C T i ;;n 
... ^ U A-19^ 
PERSONAL PROPERTY: 
I;» M o i , •••-'•••• C o u r t v y , « A r i :oo-. : . 
A one ho i v interest in Su i ! i v..:n [Reservoir in M^hovc "ovintv, 
' Ari r.ona. 
And oil grazing privileges and permits annexed So o." barx-d • 
upon any of the foregoing real, personal, reservoir, or water 
rights as commensurate. 
?. The parties agree that for and in consideration or the sole by th 
SELLER to the BUYERS of the foregoing real and personal property, water one-
reservoir rights and grazing privileges, the BUYERS will ji.iy \o II.o :>r„LLL.M :;.» 
sum of TOO THOUSAND ($2,000.00) DOLLARS, each year, beginning with the 1st ds\ 
.;of;November>r;1964,rqf which;payments due on November 1,, 1964 and November, 1, 
continue to poy annual installments ol It./,0'i'j. •!.)'./ »:» i if. ', :./i d ; 7 of liooo'irjor i-
each year thereafter beginning November 1, 1. 06' and continuing during the cr.; 
life of the SELLER. 
The BUYERS agree that they wi II pay the sum of 52,000.00 por year to 
the SELLER for the entire remainder of SELLER'S life irrespective of the ar.vju 
which may be paid under this contract whether it exceeds the total considerai 
hereinabove set out or whether that total amount shall not be paid by apilvin 
'inni.nl r.';iv:\v'r of 7,0,}J'>. 00 C'-"i.u"/ .'.'.-.^ ,:,jrc'*. :::o ^ricn d;;ri;v; th'? life t'v-
." '..v '•'.! !.«.'/•: ..-fi'.' in O...N:-i doro+i on .-o' m uuclr: r ; •. ai ,,.. u;''iiit iJ'JY.^ .'V-v '. o p^y t h e 
amount of $2*000.00 per year for the life of the SELLER irrespective of the 
amount which may be paid, the SELLER waives interest upon tl.o unpaid balance-. 
It is province!, however, M-.-.iv r;: •,:.»•.: Id the total consideration herein-
.'hove provided not be paid by the HUYLoS to tlv? SELLER riurirv;: SELLER'S lifcti 
then u;)on vr.c: c.'r-.rMi of the SELLER an--- -ir.iounts reoainin- un-j'.r tniii Agrconcni 
after crediting all payments which have been -aade Ucrounoir, shall l.o paid 
annuo! I, as provided herein in equal shores, shares and share alike, to 
V/arren B r i nkc rho f f and Char ley- Ar land Hri nkcrnof i I •V.O-'.'DVOH i Ls ( / 7 / i L s ) ( l / ' i 
, t o each) of -:thei balances due, ( j t , bei ng s t i p u l a t o d . t h a t - t ^ a J3UYERS together wi t 
V'arrer: pr ! n '^rV^f •, ^ e r l r v \ r ! : . ' v ' ?••' -J: •:'•..:'• . Pel ' •- P. r-:» »t - . r . L . ' - n,. /• ' • ! :• 
o t h e r p r o v i s i o n has boon r.uuio ;":,r iiir- i. »*! i or t h r o . * u.r;»«*d i;«»i . • * ) , i'»«i« t . n r ..» •' 
i n t e r e s t a t fou r ( ' £ ) per cent per annum on the d e f e r r e d d e c l i n i n g b a l a n c e . 
Tho3UYERS m?y, a t any t i m e , prepay a l l or any pa r t of t he rcmoin i rv . 
p r i n c i p a l due under t h i s c o n t r a c t . , 
:>. The ScLLLR s h a l l execute n t.\.irr>-inty D'od t o ! he r e a l p rope r i y 
hereinabove:; closer i bod and • | i i i t "c la im < nvoyan< ../•«. I > I!,*' v^.hr ..:.«» i ^ ' i ' - rv . / i r 
r i g h t s here inafovc desc r ibed , of an und iv ided one h a l f i n t e r e s t t o each BUYER 
ivand, his .wife as j o i n t , tenants w i t h ^ fu l I r i g h t s o f s u r v i v o r s h i p , and sha l ! 
. ; • • • ; >•• I ' ' : • ; . . ' f ' • . .' ." ' : i ." '.' ' • '','•"'• • •' : ) • ' ' : ' . • • . . . » ' i " r • ;* T . - ' . ' . ' ? » " • * * . , 
•...hie!) sha I I 'uale those documents ; n tr.ist and i;i os'jrov. '.:\\>\r.:-vr to the ;';!l..'. • 
ESCROW I NSTiAUCTIONS 
If the BUYERS shall make all payments of ;ri :i: i ;>» 1 one! interest herei-
provided and perform all the other covenants and agreements heroin contained, 
then upon payment 6i the final installment due hereunder the Escrov: Depositor 
shalI. deliver to the BUYERS all the escrowed documents. 
In the event of a default in the payment of any installment of princi 
or i iv! crest ;:r.d :;. Y'-O event ;v'- •:> -;r:•'•. •• • •' i e ?.r.\- ri her term .:.r condition here 
nci If •'•':*** i.'.••:•;.'.• ...-\'i;:«- .-> ' :\ e'r •/.••: '* •''•-,- \ ' :r. ,' , e • • v e ; w ~ ?.. [ ,r ' ' rv\ \ yi \ •:':;:•_ 
interest shall be given to the BUYERS by the SELLER and a subsequent foi lure 
to remedy the same shall continue for a period of thirty (JO) days, then the 
SELLER may, nt Lor option, demand a redelivery to hr.r of all :;' 'he oscrov.ee' 
?.' .e:. i ;.t:: •..'hsreeper, V e C-jYERS '•  « I! v:;;:;:te an:! .loacoab ly zurrcrJ^r all of T:': 
^remi: e: j;e-ei r.ahove d^.-serihed -/MI; M:-. Si.LLi:!! 'j'.ay r*e-'-;i!er \n\\\ »•./.'./."»". i >:i ., 
t!ie same vitlrj:.:t 'uriiKN" procc;:r !-«i .!.••; r-otaii; as rent ar.d I i ruji d jted rfemj^e 
a!! rums ti-cretof ^ o p.vud by BUYERS under Ibis .vfjrco v.nt. 
A-l< 
:**','.' 
As an alternative remedy the SELLER may elect to reduce any paynem 
. ' • • • ' '•• '• ' ( '•» i l
 if ' i - . • ' . » • ' ' < » ' • » • - j t f ' . ' * ^ T 1 * 
;->'*:'W^ • ; - | ^ :prfrici-paf 
2 
2« 
Id J 
as* 
ano 
: : oss i vc o r i rr.'or ni t i o n v o c c a s i o n s o'~ :•.*.•. r l c c t v : v r o . Y \w\". .\:;r\,o .iOii > as 
n o t e and mo r t gage p a s s i n g t i t l e t h r o u g h l a Mu- UJYi !/* •u.?' > ' r»v | : ; " - i , i f . !h 
i n t h e manner p r o v i d e d by law. 
D u r i n g t h e p e r i o d t h e BUYERS a r c c o m p l y i n g v.i Mi t h e tor.MC o f t h i s 
A g r e c m r n l . t h e y s h a l l he e n t i t l e d I a i t i e s o l o , o% r lur . i w , nuc! h o n o f i c i a I <:r.-: 
occupancy , and e n j o y m e n t o f t h e above d e s c r i b e d p r e n i s n e s u h i ' m t i J . 
r i g h t s o f t h e SELLER t o i n s p e c t t h e SJ:.JO a t r e i s e r . .b !e t i . i . . s . 
4 . The BUYERS have i n s p e c t e d s a i d p remises and f i n d the same i n c 
^ M ^ B ^ c o v e n a n t s o r w a r r o n t i e s o t h e r 
\ od " 
< 5 » i f J < r» £ 
en * 
0 
:;na i I j o or t h e c;.:-c.-nv ror:r.s , !K: <;:..;.'- » , i o 
t h i s Agreement w h i c h s!v?l I b i n d and i nu ro t o t h e b e n e f i t o.f 1 he h e i r s , s u c -
c e s s o r s , and a s s i g n s o r t h e p a r t i e s h ? r e t o and t h e ;. iarty i n c i c f a u l v a c r o s s 
pay a l l c o s t s and ^ r e a s o n a b l e a t t o r n e y ' s roe i n t h e e v e n t e.: -. 'or:;c :»c.n Y o , t ; 
c o n t r a c t i s r e q u i r e d . 
WITNESS t h e hands o f t h e p a r t i e s h e r e t o t h i s Jl.L day or ( Q ^ K J ^ 
1900. 
s? • a 
./? 
£1££.<-•.<*> lz. .;$>.^/3v!v::7<JX> 
SELLER 
' / 
C r a y ! | ; . | ; r i h l ' ^ rh .^r '< 
M^MS^M^Jy^k i /7/ . lir i v.-;<:rn ,. 
ivp^e OL'YC 
A i n c t 
^ ,/$5i> 
A G 
V^r/;>-^i^\-^? // 
ntEi iEH Y ^ ^ > ^ ' /
 ; OS«.W / / 
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THIS AGREElEffT, m*do «nd ontcrod Into by find between ELSIC^i:L^RHCFr| 
of Giondalo, County of tone, State of Utah, PARTY OF TI& FIR3T PART, horcln-
a f tor roforrod to es tho "SELLCR" and CLOYD H. GRINISKIOFF ond MARX VUlSZftiXir 
of Glondolo, County of fona, State of Utah, PARTIES OF TH3 SECOfiO PART, torsin-
of to r referred to as tho ,!CUYCRS"# 
liiI]!£iS.£IIis 
THAT WF.REAS, tho SuLLCR Is the owner of tho re-sl property, $r?.zln;: 
privi leges ond water r ights \n tho Sister, of Utah ond Arizona; 
AHD V.1CREAS, tho EUYEES dsslro to purchaso tho swaa; 
Al£> WHCPvEAS, tho parties havo agreed upon terms and conditions (or th 
safe thereof; 
NCW TlERCFCMI, In consideration of tho prenlscs end of tr-e iwtual 
covenants and agrocaisnto hereinafter set a i t tho part I or. hereinafter ^qrio »1 rh 
and bolvoen one another as fo l lowr»i 
1« That for and In consideration of tho to ta l sim ot FIFTY Tllfc'E 
TM0U3Atf) THREE HIJNSRED EICHTtf-EIGKT ($53,32S.o;» DOLLYS, cs tho f u l l car-sidcr* 
t l o n thorefor , tho SELLER covenants end ogroos to ce l l and tho BUYERS covor-or.t 
end egrco to buy tho following described real property, orsjrlng privi leges snd 
voter ond rosorvolr r ights In tho Statoo of Utah and Arizona* 
REAL PROPERTY IN MILLARD COUMTY, UTAHt 
Lots t , 2 , 3 , and 4 , Block 25, Plot "A", Oolta Tamst te . 
Lot 2 , Block 26, Plot W , telta Townslto 
REAL PROPERTY i n KANE COUNTY, UTAHI 
Township 39 Sooth, Rang<> 41 V,er.t, S^lt Lf:!;o Meridian: 
Vest Iks 11 oi Section 25, containing 320 ecrcs, 
ttortlwest Quortorj Southeast Quarter and tho South Ho If 
of ihn tbrtltonst Quarter c:;ntr.lnh;g 0 0 sores, a l l In 
Section ?/:, Tounnnlp :>J South, fidixj* <f V*s t , Salt Loko 
Meridian, containing 400 acrcv, » W Q or loss. 
Lot* 1 , 2, 3, and /.; Southeast Quarter of tho North-
west Quortor; Martheart Quarter of tho Southwest 
Qji irtor; Cost lb If of tho Cost K u f ; S-^tln.-ost y jur tcr 
of the Northeast Cuorlcr; Ibrthvoct Vv^rtor of t t o 
S:x»tho.ist p o r t e r of Section 27, lovmshlp 3*; South, 
lUv.go **i \czt, contolr.Jng i/O.a^ tcroa. PUINTIFF'S 
EXHIBIT NO 
FOR «mWfAJ 
0*T^1985»TR:HW 
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East Half of tho Morthoost Quarter* South Half of the 
Southeast Qiwrtor; Northuont Quarter of tho Southeast 
Quarter of Section 35, containing 200 acres. 
Township AO South, Rango 4{ Woof, Sal t lako Meridian: 
Soctlon 29: South^ost Quarter of tho K'orthoast Quarter; 
V.ost I b l f of tho Southeast Quartor and the Southoost .Quarter 
of tho Southwest Quarter, containing 160 acres, 
Soctlon 30: Northvost Quarter; East I b l f of tho Southwost 
Quertor, containing 233.59 acres, 
Soctlon 5; Lot 2, containing 32.93 ecros. 
Township 40 South, Range 4 Vest, Salt lake Merldlon: 
Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Soctlon 8, 
containing 40 ceres. 
Township 40 South, tango 7 West, Salt lake Merldlon: 
Beginning et tho Southv/ost Cornor of the Southwest Quartor of 
tho Southeast Qusrtor of Section ?3, Township 40 South, Hanro 
7 Vtost, £-:>11* take Moridlen %>nd running thence Cast 10.73 
chains; thonco Worth 60* V.'ost 6.36 chains; thonco V.'ost 3.r>!> 
chains; thonco Sooth 1 chain to beginning, containing .74 
ceres. 
Beginning nt tho Northwest Cornor of the Northwest Quarter O T X 
the Northeast Quarter of Section 26, Township 49 South, Hinge 
7 V.'ost, end running thonco South 4,30 chains; thence South 70* 
East 15 chains to tho middle of the channel of tho creek; thonco 
Northwesterly olong tho *nlddlo of the channel of sold crock to 
tho North Lino of sold Northtvast Quortor of tho Northeast 
Quarter; thonco V.'ost 11.23 chains to tho place of beginning. 
Beginning 4.30 chains South of the Korthuoat Cornor of tho 
Northwest Qvirlcr of tho Northeast Quortor of Section ?t, 
Tov/nshlp 40 South, Range 7 l o s t . Sa l t Lake Mori dl en 3nd run-
ning thonco South 70* East 15 chains to tho middle* of the 
channel of the crock; thonco Southerly along tho middlo of 
tho channel of sold creek to tho South l i n e ; thonco North 
73*45 f Vest 14.CO chains; thonco North 4.30 chains to tho
 y 
pleco of beginning, containing 5.60 ecros. ^ / 
The ebovo thrco treets being pert of lend situated In Sections 
23 ond 26 of sold township ond rongo, sonetlmes reforrod to 
unof f ic ia l ly es to t "A". 
Totvnshlp 40 South, tango 4 l V.'ost, Siift take Mori dl on: 
l o t \\ Korthcnst Quortor of tho Northwest Quarter of Section 
3 1 , containing 73.30 ecro3. 
M 3 *•'-
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PERSONAL PR'QPCRTYl 
s\ Tho following doscrlbod voter ond reservoir rights* 
A one-fourth Interest In tlobblo Cjnyon Reservoir (9-36-1?) 
In Mohovo County, Arizona, 
A one half Interest In Sullivan Reservoir In Mohauo County, 
Arizona. 
And a l l grazing prlvl legos end pomlts annexed to or fctsod 
upon any of tho vorogoing real , personal, reservoir, or fairer 
right6 os caivcnsurato. 
2. Tho parties ?greo that for and In consideration of tho sale by tho 
SELLER to tho BUYERS of the foregoing rai l and personal property, v;ator md 
reservoir righto and grazing prlvliogos, tho BUYERS will pay to tho SCLLCft ii^ a 
sutj of TOO THOUSAND ($2,033.03) DOLLARS, each year, beginning with the 1st djy 
of Movombor, 1964, of thlch payments duo on November \t 1SG4 and ibweuhcr 1, 
1-/C5 aro hereby acknowledged by tho SELLER froa tho BUYERS and the VU'tVrS fcl II 
continue to pay annual Inctallttonis of $2,003.03 on tho 1st day of November In 
each year thcroafter beginning November 1, 1966 and continuing during the cnt lr i 
11 fo of tho SELLER. 
Tho BUYERS cgroe that they wil l pay tho sun of S2,003.03 per yo:ir to 
tho SELLER for tho entire rcraalndor of SELLERS II fo Irrespective of tho amount 
uhlch way bo paid under this contract whother I t oxcoods the total consideration 
horclnabovo sot out or whether that total amount shall not be fvsld by applying 
annual payments of 52,030.03 ogolnst tho purchaso price during the l i fe thio of 
tho SELLER and In conslderation of an undertaking by tho ESJfERS to pay tho 
Mount of $2,003.03 per year for tho l i fe of tho SELLER Irrespoctlvo of tho 
iracwnt which cvay bo paid, the SELLER waives Intoroct upon the unpaid balances. 
I t Is provided, howovcr, that should tho total consideration herein-
above provldod not bo paid by tho BUYERS to tho SELLER during SELLER'S lifolino 
then upon tho death of the SELLER ony onounts remaining undor this Agrec*rcnt 
of tor crediting a l l payments Uilch l>avo boon nodo horoundar, shall bo paid 
annually o* provided heroin In oqual sheroo* sltoros ttr\tl chero ullko, to 
t-
4 
I'orrcn Brlnkerhoff and Charley Arland Brlnkerhoff tvo~soventh3 (2/7ths) (1/7ths 
to ceveh) of tho balances duo ( I t being stipulated that tho WfT.TS togother with 
Karron B^inkorhaff! Charley Arlond Brlnkorhoff, t&tty 0. Esplln, Golda B. Adjlr, 
tnti Arlono B. Gouldlng constitute a l l tho heirs at law of tho SELLER and that 
other provision tvss been asdo for tho latter threo no-nod holrs)j together kith 
Interest ot four (<#) tvr cont per ennun on tho doferrod declining balances | 
Tho BUYERS way, ot eny time, prepay oil or any pirt of tho rcr.v3inlng | 
principal duo undor this contract. i 
3# The SELLER chnfI oxocufo o Warranty Dood to the res I property 
hereinabove described and quitclaim conveyances to tho water ond reservoir 
rights hcrolnsfove described, of ci\ tindlvldod one half interest to csch BUYER 
end his wife cs Joint tenants with ful l rights of survivorship, and thai I 
deposit said Instruments In tho llurrlcano Branch of tho Bank of 51. George 
vhlch shall hold those documents In trust ond In escrov subject to tho follcn.inq 
ESCR0Wt IWSTmCTiqiS 
" ^ ^ S ^ ^ s — ^ m n , c 0«—' P^V^nts of principal and Interest herein 
provldod and perform oi l the other covenants and agreements herein eontstnod, 
then upen payment of tho final Installment duo' tieixnjndgr Jfho Esc ro*\ Depositary 
shall dollvor to tho BlATttS oi l tho cscrovod drcuirants, 
In the ©vent of a default In tho payment of any Installment of principal 
or Interest and In tho ovont of a default In any other term or condition heroin 
end In tho ovont notice of o dofeult other than for payment of principal end 
Interest shall bo given to tho BIATRS by the SELLER and a subsequent fel luro 
to rcnedy tho sm»o shall continue for a period of thirty (30) days, then tho 
SELLL'R ney, at her option, tiooand a redelivery to hor of al l of the escrowed 
documents vhoreupon the BITTERS will vacate and peaceably surrentior nil of tho 
premises hereinabove doscrlbod and the SELLER rosy ra-entor Into possession of 
tho saroe without furthor process and any retain as ront ond IIC^JI dated donagos 
o i l turns thorotoforo pold by BUYERS undor this Agrounont. 
As an alternative rorody th* SELLER may eloct to roduco any payment 
jor a l l payments, accelerating and ttttvrlng tho entlr* balance of principal ond 
Intcrost Inroodlatoly, to Judgraont or uuy have said ronedy on one or nor© suc-
cessive or Intermittent occasions or way oloct to troat this Agreement as a 
noto ond nortgaga passing t l t l o through to the BUYERS ond foreclosing tho saso 
In tho cunocr provided by lay. 
During tho porlod tho BUYERS Gro complying with tho terms of this 
Agreement, thoy shall bo entitled to tho sole, exclusive, andbeneficial use, 
occupancy, and onjoyaont of tho above described promises subject only to iho 
rights of tho SELLER to inspect tho sarao ot rosaon^lo times. 
4« Tho BUYERS have Inspected said provisos and find tho same in a 
aannor satisfactory to then tind thoro erono covenants or warranties oihor 
than expressly sot forth heroin, 
5t Time shall bo of tho essence 03 to a l l tho terms end conditions of 
this Agreement which shall bind end Inure to tho borioflt of tho heirs, suc-
cessors, end assigns of the parties hereto and tho party In default agrees to 
pay ni l costs and a reasonable attorney^ foe In the ovent enforcement of this 
conlract Is roqulrod. 
WITUESS the hands of the parties hereto this ^4? day of y ^ ^ , 
/ ^ 
. :fi^if^u^jL?i ftcij&j^H^ 
ElsiOyUrliiKorlioff ^py 
^ SELLER 
JlL&iiJ^L^L^i2L 
.1 Cloycl H. Drir.UcrloTF 
/nh^^^J^^:. 
1
 H-UK OrfnliorhDv* /(/ 
DUVERS 
/&• £y<*^^ 
A-200 
: ss 
COUNTY OF KANE ) 
BEFORE ME, the undersigned Notary Public, personally appeared 
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, who stated under oath, as follows: 
That she has sold Real Property described hereinafter to Mark J. 
Brlnkerhoff and Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff, and that she will defend the rights of own-
ership and also any rights of way of ingress or egress to the said Real Property. 
That she will enter into a lawsuit or any other procedure needed to protect these 
rights of ingress or egress, to said property. 
The real property is described as follows: 
BEGINNING at the South Quarter Corner of Section 23, Township 40 South, Range 7 
West, Salt Lake Meridian, Utah, and running thence East 10.23 chains; thence North 
80° West 6.36 cahins; thence West 3.68 chains; thence South 1 chain to the point 
of beginning. 
ALSO BEGINNING at the North Quarter Corner of Section 26, Township 40 South, Range 
7 West, Salt Lake Meridian, Utah, and running thence South 8.6 chains; thence South 
73°45* East 14.6 chains; thence Northwesterly along the middle of the channel of 
the creek to the North boundary line of said Section 26; thence West 11.23 chains 
to the point of beginning. Containing 11.77 acres 
Total acres: 12.51 
That the Affiant will at any time help to defend and protect the 
rights of Mark J. Brinkerhoff and Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff as far as the Real Property 
is concerned. 
~€? £l*cXdtfAA<^ri/f?fS<d<t ** 
Elsie Brinkerhoff jrp 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this / .' day of April, A.D, 1971, 
^V / /? . Q sz^*- CC/isCf*^'*-^^^ —
 m 
V
 NTt 
My commission expires , • \s 
-ij^Z^/^'' 7 
^PUMTIFF'S 
EXHIBIT **> P ~ 3 
X FOn lOCNTOJCATfON 
I OAT* 1 9 8 > ™ ; HW 
To whom It nay concern: 
I, Elsie Brlnkcrhofff have received from Clqyd 
, jnd Kark Brlnkcrhoff
 f *s payrrent on property, 
Jf3hfiCs& 
Signed: ~ £ ^ £ ^ X ^ ^ ^ 
STATE OF UTAH J SS. 
County of Kane 
0 n t h l s (rfti d&y o f &Fiul 
appeared before rae Elsie Brinkerhoff 
n7J2 , personally 
f the signer 
of the above and foregoing instrument, v/ho duly acknowledged 
to me that she executed the same. 
iTi'tic, .n^w^i,i,T>t, 
Notary Public 
Residing at A/Xt^^l^^ Utlj/', 
i- PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT no. P - 4 FOR IfgWfICATION 
1 QATI-1 Qfit; o « . ur? 
Rtcordfd it Request of :— 
it . M. F M Piid $ 
By Dip._ 
County Recordir 
MuT tix notki to . _Lr.an.teLe^.. 
Book Pegi 
Address.... 
Rit.: .... 
..fil£nda.l£*..iltah.-.a4729. 
WARRANTY DEED 
Elsie Br inkerhof f , a widow, 
of Glendale • , County of Kane 
grmtor 
, Stat* of Utih, hireby 
CONVEY md WARRANT to ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, a widow, MARK J . BRINKERHOFF, a 
married man, 9t\<\ CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF, a marr ied man, 
a l l as Jo in t Tenants w i th f u l l r i gh ts of surv ivorsh ip , 
and not as Tenants in Common, 
of Glendale, Utah 84729 
S10.00 & other valuable considerat ion-
tht following described tracts of land in KANE 
Statf of Utih: 
gnnttts 
for tht turn of B 
— -(DOLLARS, 
County, 
SEE SCHEDULE "A" ATTACHED HERETO AND BY THIS REFERENCE MADE A PART HEREOF. 
3 >J 
SM 
it 
5 
a •• " 
o «4 -• 
Mi 
«s 
WITNESS, thi htnd of i&id grmtor , this 4th diy of June A. 0. 19 79. 
Signtd in thi Presence of JjJUi^LjL^^t 
Elsie Brinkerhoff 
v, 
HATE OF UTAH ) 
} SS 
County of Kane ) 
( ^ m^ On thi 4 th diy of June A. 0., 19 79 personally 
V \ 
f W r i T M l Y ^ » ippeired before me Els ie Br inkerho f f , a widow, 
PUBLIC . . 
the signer of the within instrument who duly icknowltdgtd 
to me that s he executed the tame. 
M A 7 > : ^ . J ^ L ^ 
James B. Adair
 N o t a r y pu b l i c 
My Commission expire* _ June .19... 1979 My residence is j ^ r f f f r v 1 1 1 p - \[\j£ 
SCMEDOU "A" 
PARCEL 1: The West Half of Section 25, Township 39 South, Range 4S West. 
ITlt Lake Base and Meridian, containing 320.0 acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 2: The Northwest Ouarter (NW-J; the Southeast Ouarter (SE^a) and the 
South Half of the Northeast Ouarter (S»,NEl«) of Section 26, Townshio 39 South, 
Range 4S West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, containing 400.0 acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 3: Lots 1. 2. 3. and 4; the Southeast Ouarter of the Northwest Quarter 
( S E V M ) ; the Northeast Ouarter of the Southwest Ouarter (NE^SW^); the East Half 
of the East Half (ESES); the Southwest Ouarter of the Northeast Quarter (SW«*NE>*) 
and the Northwest Ouarter of the Southeast Ouarter (NVAiSE^) of Section 27, 
Townshio 39 South. Range 4H West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, containing 478.80 
acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 4: The East Half of the Northeast Quarter (ESNE^j); the South Half of 
the Southeast Ouarter (SSSE^) and Northwest Ouarter of the Southeast Ouarter 
( N W W O of Section 35, Townshio 39 South, Ranoe 4S West, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian, containing 200.0 acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 5: The Southwest Ouarter of the Northeast Ouarter (SWfcNE1*); the West 
Half of the Southeast Ouarter (WSSE»a) and the Southeast Quarter of the Southwest 
Ouarter (SE^SW1.) of Section 29. Townshio 40 South, Range 4S West, Salt Lake Base 
^nd Meridian, containing 160.0 acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 6: The Northwest Ouarter (NV,) and the East Half of the Southwest 
Ouarter of Section 30, Townshio 40 South, Ranoe 4S West, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian, containino 238.99 acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 7: Lot 2, Section 5, Townshio 40 South, Range 4S West, Salt Lake Base 
and Meridian, containino 39.08 acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 8: The Southwest Ouarter of the Northwest Ouarter (SWVAft) of Section 
B. Townshio 40 South, Ranoe 4 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, containing 
40.0 acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 9: Lot 1 and the Northeast Ouarter of the Northwest Ouarter (NEWW**) 
of Section 31, Townshio 40 South, Ranae 4l, West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, 
containing 79.30 acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 10: BEGINNING at the North Quarter Corner of Section.26, Township 40 
South, Range 7 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence South 
0°35' West 567.60 feet; thence South 78°00* East 963.6 feet; thence North-
westerly along the creek bed, 808.0 feet, more or less, to the Worth line of 
Section 26; thence South 09°57' West 741.18 feet to the point of beginning. 
Containing 11.77 acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 11: BEGINNING at the Southwest Corner of the Southwest Quarter of 
the Southeast Quarter of Section 23, Township 40 South, Ranged West, Salt 
Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence East 10.23 chains; thence North 
80* West 6.36 chains; thence West 3.68 chains; thence South 1.0 chain to the 
point of beginning. Containing 0.74 acres, more or less. 
• 4 •• +•• •• •• ++ •• 
<W 
A-,204 
Recorded i\ Request of 
at M. Fee Pari 5; 
By Hep Bonk |'a-|i! 
Mail tax notice to AdJnrss 
County fkc.crder 
WARRANTY DEED 
Elsie Brinkcrhoff, a widow, 
0I Glendale CMIM'UV of Kan...« 
.jrantnr 
, Sut? of Utr.h. hneby 
CONVF.Y and WARRANT tn • GOLL'A B. A0AIR, a married woman, as to an undivided 1/5 
interest; WARREN 
BRINKERHOFF, a married man, as to an undivided 1/5 interest; ARLFNE B. GOULOING, 
a married woman, as to an undivided 1/5 interest; CHARLES A. RRINKr'RHOFF. a 
married man, as to an undivided 1/5 interest and BETTY B. ESPLIN, a married 
woman, as to an undivided 1/5 interest, 
of Orderville, Utah fo 
$10.00 b other valuable cons ideration-- COLLARS. » 
the following described tiatt of l.siicf in KANii r — ' 
State of Utah: 
n a r r
 i : < | 
w a i t e r s '"J 
or the sum of J 
Cu:mrv 
SEE" SCHEDULE "A" ATTACHED HERETO AIM BY THIS RLf'LRLNCF MADE A PART HEREOF: 
WITNESS, the hand of said grantor , this 1 5 t h day of A u g u s t
 t A. D. 19 20 
B H 
i* 
5 ^ 
u. Signed in the Presence of \ ..C:A^<. < , JO- l.:.,Y^±^:L:A,^: 
\ E l s i e B r i n k e r h o f f 
STATE OF UTAH 
County of Kane 
) 
) SS. 
) 
) 
On the 1 5 t h day of A u g u s t A. 0. . 19 3 0 personally 
appeared before me E l s i e B r i n k e r h o f f , a w i d o w , 
the signer of the with.n instrument who duly ac' nOA-lcdynd 
to me that She txciuted the same. 
My Commission expires •• .'JllHC I 9 . . . 1 W J 3 ... 
<#AL ^ 
'/James B. Adair Notary Puhlis f\ ~ 3 - ° 5 
My residence is 0r.<lt\r.V i..11.<?.»...Ut«ih.... | IjKrTIIDMITO | 
AN UNDIVIDED ONE-HALF (1/2) INTEREST IN AND TO THE FOLLOWING PROPERTY: 
SCHEDULE "A" 
PARCEL I: The West Half of Section 25, Towi^hin 39 South, Rar.qe 4'j, West, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian, containinq 320.0 acres, core or less. 
PARCEL 2: The Northwest Quarter (NW1.,); the Southeast nuarter (SL^) and the 
South Ma 1 f of the Northeast Ouarter (Sl,NElJ of Section 26, Townshio 39 South, 
Ramie 4~, West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, containing 400.0 acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 3^ Lots lt 2, 3, and 4; the Southeast nuartcr of the Morthwest Quarter 
T S E \ N W 1 ; ) ; the Northeast Ouarter of the Southwest Ouarter (NE^SW5*); the East Half 
of the East Half (E',El>); the Southwest Ouarter of the Northeast Quarter (SWU«E!,, 
and the Northwest Ouarter of the Southeast Ouarter (NW-«SE^) of Section 27, 
Townshio 39 South, Range 4\, West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, containing 478.c^ 
acres, more or less. 
PAJRCiLJLi The East Hjlf of the Northeast Quarter (E^NE\j); the South Half of 
"the Southeast Ouarter (SKSE^) and Northwest nuarter of the Southeast Ouarter (NWsSE1*) of Section 3S, Townshio 39 South, Ramie 4S, West, Silt Lake Base and 
Meridian, ccntainin':j 200.0 azrvr,, no re or l<;ss. 
PARCEJ. 5: Th'- Southwest Ouarter of the Northeast Ouarter (SWvU/i); the West 
H a T f o T the Southeast Ouarter (w!,SE^) and the Southeast Quarter of the v.^thwes*. 
Ouarter (SLVSW'1,) of Section 29, Townshio 40 South, Ranqe 4S West, Salt l^e Da:e 
and pridian, containing 160.0 .icres, more or less. 
PAi?Ca„i_i. Thl- Northwest Quarter (NW**) and the East Half of the Southwest. 
O'uaVter of Section 30, Townshio 40 South, Pan no 4'-j West, Salt Lake Bisc- .«.r,d 
teridian, containinq 238.99 acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 7: Lot 2, Section 5, Townshio 40 South, Range 4^ West, Salt Lere Base 
and Meridian, containina 39.08 acres, more OJ less. 
>'WSt-L3^. The Southwest Ouarter of the Northwest barter (SWVW 4) of Section 
8", "TowfisTVio 40 South, Ranoe 4 West, Salt L?ke Base and Meridian, containing 
40.0 acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 9: Lot 1 i\nc\ the Northeast Ouarter of the Northwest Ouarter (NEV.W'i) 
of Section 31, Townshio 40 South, Ranqe 4l, West, Salt Lake Base and tteri'Han, 
containinq 79.30 acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 10: BEGINNING at the North Quarter Corner of Section 26, Township 40 
South, Range 7 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence South 
0°35* West 567.60 feet; thence South 78°00' East 963.6 feet;%thence North-
westerly along the creek bed, S03.0 feet, more or less, to the North line of 
Section 26; thence South 89°57' West 741.18 feet to the point of beginning. 
Containing 11.77 acres, more or less. 
. PARCfL.lL: BEGINNING at the Southwest Corner of the Southwest Quarter of 
the Southeast Quarter of Section 23, Township 40 South, Range 7 West, S a H 
Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence East 10.23 chains; thence North 
30 3 West 6.36 chains; thence West 3.6a chains; thence South 1.0 chain to the 
point of beginning. Containing 0.74 acres, trore or less. 
j& 
Elsie B'rinkerhbff 
.^AA^^ 
'BSST 
i 
or\£ 
•M& 
WHEN RECORDED, MULT 
....Southern..Utah. Title Company . 
....P.-...P.:. Box M r 
...^
a
..n^.b.»..^ t9h.. M?1)} Space Above This Lino For Recorder 's t > e 
TRUST DEED 
With Assignment of Rents 
T H I S T R U S T D E E D , made this . . 1 5 t h . . . d a y o f . . A u g u s t .19.1*9... 
between GoJ.da. B.. Ada i i v a ..nuirriocf .woman; .. Warren.. 
Br inkerhof f , a married man; ArU-nc G. Gouldinn, a married woman-; Charles 
ft. Br inkgrhp f f , a i rarned rcan « Hetty. B, Esp l in , a narriQd. womjn;
 ns TRUSTOR, ' 
8 ! 
whose address is Ordervi 1 le .?«. Glendale Utah g j 
(SMrH HI,-I MI'UITI I {• T.v) IS-.itr» t> . J 
& v; 
..SQUIJ.IE R.N...UTAH TITLE COMPANY., n l i?ah. C o r p o r a t i o n
 : r , T R U S T E E / ur.d 
c ^i 
Elsie...Br.mker.hoff, a widow , as PENEFICIARY, NJ , 
W I T N E S S E T H : Tha t Trus tor CONVEYS AND W A R R A N T S TO T R U S T E E IN T R U S T , 3 ^ 1 
W I T H P O W E R OF SALE, the following described property, s i tuated in KANE B ^ 
County, S t a t e of Utah: P V-
SEE SCHEDULE "A" ATTACHED HERETO AND BY THIS REFERENCE MADE A PART HEREOF: 
Together with all buddin;^, fixtures and improvements thereon am! all water right-*?, rights of 
wny, casements, rents , issues, profits, income, tenements , hereditament >. privilege* and appurtenances 
thereunto belonging, now or hereafter used or enjoyed with said property, or any part thereof, 
S U B J E C T , H O W E V E R , to the right, power and au thor i ty hereinafter given to and conferred upon 
Beneficiary to collect and apply such rents, issues, and profits; 
FOR T H E P U R P O S E OF S E C U R I N G (1) payment of the indebtedness evidenced by 5 pro-
missory notesof even da te herewith, m the principal sum of $ . 5 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0
 t made by 
Trus tor , payable to the order of Beneficialy nf the times, in the mumter and with interest as therein 
set forth, and any extensions a n d / o r renewals or modifications thereof; r j l the performance of 
each agreement of Trus to r herein contained; CO the payment of such additional loans or adv.ince.-i as 
hereafter may be made to Trus tor , or his successors or assigns, when evidenced bv a promissory 
note or notes reciting that they are secured by thin Tried. Deed; and (1) the payment of all sums 
expended or advanced hy Pencficiary under or pursuant to the terms hereof, together with interest 
thereon as herein provided. ~ - j ft-J*t 
•NOTK: Trustr* mini IK? »I m'-rnhrr of tin- Ttrih State H-ir; a l.;mk. IniiMint' in I loan a s w i a t i o n <•, ...v.inm 
and lonn iM9oriftti<iri atithi.ti/.d to ,|„ ,.», J, )tW*itws* ,,, I !.-,», ., «,„,. .„;,ti, in .iiitliori/cd to tf» a tnnt l.n.it..-.* m 
u.ffh: or o title insiiiiuit'0 i»r al^frut company nufhori/iil !<• <!.. .u»I. IMMIM.-IH m Ui.»li gmmmmmmmmmmmmm^ 
T O P H O T E C r T l l i : S l - X ' P W T Y 01 T H I S T l t U S r DKI I). T H C S T O H A C i n i ' S : 
1. T o keep .'.»id property in go.Hl condition and repair , not >.• remove or <h moli . h .in. building th< f o n , to 
Complete or restote pminpl lv .ind in |;*•«•<I and workmaali l e manner anv huil.imc. .• hi. ii :r,.i. | .• t n ' i te t . -d 
damaged or destroyed t h e n o n . to c.unplv w i 111 ;ill lav.
 v H A , -nam.-, .mil n^ l r i . II.IIC. a l l . r i i ! . , ' aid pc ; H I ! V . :.<;! 
to curnnut or permit *a-.te thereof, not to ivnnml , sufh-r o r permit an*, at I upon .-aid pr«>p«Tly HI •. i« •';• 11« >n • I l a * . 1: 
do nil other acts whul i fit.in I hi' ( harat It- r or us..- of said pri>p.'il\ ma', he leasonahb. ueees- wy, the S|M i die 
enumera t ions herein IH>1 ix . I n.linu* the general , and. it the I-,.IM M-< nr.-d hereby or anv part il.»-n of is I eon: <•)> 
taincd b»r the p u r p o e of li:i.m< uig construction of impro .eiea nl-. on --ail p m p e i U . Trus tor further .upees 
(a) To commence (oii-.tinclioii promptly and to put \i<- ->.uue with re.i-...nahlc ilili,:t-iu> to i omj.J.Hon 
in a r c u d a n e e with plans and specification-* s i t : -factory to I d u e f u i iry. and 
(h) T o allow 1»« m fi.aary to inspect said property at a!I limes cliiriait* cot.strui lion 
Trus tee , upon presentation to it of an affidavit si.tmil hy Hem liciarv. -.eHiiii; forth l.m.s showing a d. fault 
l»y Trus to r under this numht red paragraph, is aut 'nori/"d to accept a ; t i ne and conducive all f . i th and Male-
rnciiLs therein. and to act tin icon hereunder . 
2. T o provide and maintain insurance, of such type «T P. p-s and amount's as Iduel ic ! ar- may !«••,,nr<\ en 
the improvements now e \ i - img or hereafter erected ei placed on -aid propei iv .^mh UMir.iiuv shall \»- l a r rwd 
in companies approved hv Henefmary \silh |n,s payable rlau-.es in favor oj ami in foim .n i ty i able lo l i r e li. i.'.ry. 
In cvvnt of loss. Trus tor shall g iw immediate noliee to fleuofici.ii v. who tnav make proof at loss, and each in- iir;::i<y 
company concerned is heri'hy authorized and directed to make pavment tor MH h l i s . d i r n i l y to I'.. ie 1 av.iry 
instead of to Trus tor and Id-m-l M iar\ jointly, ami the wi.uianee proceed-.. ,.-r any p u t th. r io j . ma> he a p ; l » d 
hy lleneficiary, at its option, to reduction of tin? iudehlednc-.s heiehy s< < ured or to the r« v o r a t i i n or !.-pa;r o| 
the proper ty damaged 
3. T o deliver to. pay for and maintain with Beneficiary unlil the indebtedness si cured I rebv is p nd in full, 
such evidence of title a; l ien. le. iary may requite, in< ludm,: al>ar.i. t.-. ot ni l . o» poliej.•;, <•! titie i n su i an i e and 
any extensions or renewals thereof or supplements thereto. 
4. T o appear in and d ' fend anv action or pr:.ceedin:; purporting to affe. t the s r enn tv hereof, tu^ title to 
said j)roperty. or th.- rights or pi»wets of I iemfi . ia ry or Trus tee , and should I temficiarv or Trus tee ehv.-t to 
also a p p i a r in or dtfetr.l any such action or pr.K as-dm^. t» pav all ir . , ts and expenses, ifuhidinc «o.-t if evi-
dence of title and ait uney"; tee-, in a reasonable sum incurred by Mencf ieiai y or '[ rujtee. 
6. T o pay at least id days before deliixpiencv all taxes and assesanenls affe. lim; s»id prr-perty, in ' ludinf 
all assessments upon water cuinpauv stock and ail rent; , as:.e>smeiits aiul eharces for water, appur tenant t> or 
used in connection '.".ith :-aid proper ty; to pa.'., when due . all encumbrances, i barj,'''s, .'•/».! IMT.S \%ii!\ i:if«.«reit, 
on said property or anv piirl thereof, which at any time appear to l».- p n o r c.t superior hereto, to pay al) c . ' .n . 
fees, and e i p e a s e s of this '\ rust. 
ii. Should Trus to r fail to make any p i y m e n t or 1<> do any a« t as herein |«rn\ jdcJ. then Panefi* i.»ry or 
Trustee , but without »>bhj;ation i.i to do and without notice to or demand upon Trustor and without nb-a^ii.c. 
T rus to r from any . Miration hereof mny: Make or do the ±;\mv in such manner and to such extent as either n u y 
deem necessary to protect th.e security hereof, i ienelieiary or Trustee heim; a>ithorr/ed \u enter •!;•«•:» .said 
proper ty for such purposes; co tnnvner . appear in ;in:l defend any indi«>n or (iroeeednu'. purpcrtirj , ' to a'fect U:e 
security hereof or the rii;hU .f p o w e n of Itcnefjciaiy *r Truster, pay. purcha .e , .onUst , K.T <-ompiomis.' «ir.y 
encumbrance, charge or I nn whii h in the jiu!i;jr;«:it of ei ther appear*- to IK- prior or superior hereto; and in ex-
ercising any *uch powers, incur ar.y liability, evpend whatever amounts in ds ah .obi te dis« r« 'ir>rj it may c*-:m 
necessary therefor, including o-st of evidence of title, employ counsel, and pay his reasonable fees 
7. T o pay inum.iliately ae.d w i t l e u l demand ail sums i<vpi aded hereuirb-i by lb :. 'fi-iar y or Tru- te* . 
with interest from dale of expendi ture at the rate oi ten p.-r cent, i 10'; ) per ai ir i im ur.td paid. an.', the r\ j . :y-
ment thereof shall be secured l v a b y . 
I T IS M U T U A L L Y AGHKITJ T H A T : 
8. Should said property or any part Ihon-of be taken or damarcd by teas »n of aav mjblie impr-..<r:.'?nt \ 
or condemnat ion proo-e Utv,', or fjam^Kci by file, or earth.p.i..l;e, or :n anv other maimer . Id scficiary .ball h* • 
entitled to all (on-.pen di >n. awards, and other payments or relief therefor, and .-hall !••• er.s-tled at ;t> opiicn 
to coir.raer.ce. appear m irwi pro'.e. ute m \\* own name , any action or p v . . , duurs. or io make .\r,\ I U : I , | I J -
mise or sett lement, in owino-lii i i with Mich taking os damage. Al! s;:ch conineie;.«!io;). awani .iaieawv... rf.;i;L< 
of action and proceeds, including tin: proceeds of any police-: of fire and ( th r insurance aff.'itm,; said pr.i|><»ily, 
are hereby assigned to Hi-ni fu ia iy . who may. alter tbduct ia , : lie refiom ali its .-xp. rises, w.cb.da.i' a t torn ' \ "s leey. 
apply the same on anv indebtedness .seemed hi reby. 'Trustor ;i;-r.ei to execute MI.-h l u i t b . i a - -i«iirra-ni< of an> 
compensation, award. ilamaj;es. and riK'its of ai-lioii am! pr<«e,-,|s va Ib-neflciary or 'J'ni.>t* e may requj"- . 
9. At any t«m«' and from time to time upon wri t tdm rerpn^d nf llenefi. i try. payment of i{; fees a.-.d pre-
sentation of this Trust Deed and the note for endorsement (in v;i<v of full re.-onvevance. for canceilaii wi and 
re tent ion) , without affecting the liability of any person b i the (Mvnvnt of ih*« indebt'd.-;. , . '—.•in-ed herr-by. 
Trus tee may (a) enn-ent to the making of any majj o r plat ef >aid proper ly; fh) join in /jrantmK anv ex**.* 
mea t or creat ing any restriction thereon; (e) join in any sultoi'dination or either a ^ i n i m nt affe'-tic.;: this 'Tru-.t Deed 
or the lien or charge :b. reed. i'di reconvev, wp.'uait. warranty , id I or any p u t of said properiv 'The »'iant/»e in 
any reconveyance may h<; de:»rriU-d as "I he pers »n «>r persons mt i tb^ l thereto", and the recitals tie i. in <f any 
mat ters or facts shall b«? conclusive proof of truthfulness thereof Trus tor agrees to pay n.isoi .able 'IrusU-e's 
fees for any of the M'rvsces mentione«l in thii para^rap.h. 
10. As additional security. Trus to r hereby av.u.ns fieaefi. iarv, dur im; the continuance of these in.:••••., all 
rents, issues, royall i ts , an 1 f>rofit-> of the property at /eeied by t in ; 'Tried l>«-etl and of any personal property 
located thereon. I 'nti l 'Trustor shall default in the payment of any indebtedness securer! hep by or in the per-
formance of any agreement bere.mder. 'Trustor shall have the nr.bt to <o|het all such rents, i> ues. royalties. 
arid profits earned prior to default us they become due and payable, li Tru.dor shall default as a fore .a i l , 
Trus tor ' s right to collect any of S J . h moneys shall cease and Heneficiaiy shall have th» rn;ht. with or v. iihotii 
taking posseision of the property affected hereby, to collei t all rent.s, royalties, issues, and profits Fai lure or 
discont inuance of l i e :ud inars «t »«ny time or from t ime to hrne to collect any such mom-vs f,hall iv-i in any 
manner affect th»? subse<picnt erdorcemeat by Iteiieficiary of the ri^ht. power, arid iuithoritv to colb« i the* >.am>. 
Notinng contained herein, nor the exercise of tie* rii;ht Iv.' fieriefinary tr» eo||..-et. -.hall l»e. or be construed to 
be. an nffimudion by H« neficiary of any tenancy, l"i»s#» or option, nor an assumption of liability under, nor n 
subordinat ion of the ben or charge of this T n : s l D^-d to any such tenancy, lease or option 
11. Upon any defuult by Tras to r hereunder , Beneficiary may nt any lime wifh-uit notice, ei ther in 
fterson, by agent, or by a receiver to l>e appointed by a court (Trus tor herebv eun:»eatin»; to the ;ippomtir»-nt of l«uieficiary aa such receiver), and without regard to Iho adecpiacy <jf any security b»r the wtdehtrduesi hereby 
secured, enter upon and take possession of said property <»r any part thereof, in it*- own nata'» -m- b.r t r 
oliierwistT collect said t^ -ntM. iviucs. ami profiL;, including thos*- past due arul unpaid. ;:nd apply the >ame, W:* 
cosU ami expenses of operation and collection, including reav>n-ible a t torney 's frs.-s. upor. any i.i lebiednt-ai 
necurcd hereby, and in such order tu Hen. ficiary may determine. 
12. T h e entering upon ai»<l Uikins possession t»f said property, tin* colh.cton of siu It renf.s. i c m s and 
profits, or the proci»c<is of fire and other insurance policies or compensation or aw.irm f..r any taking or 
damage of said property, and t i e application or release then .f as aforesaid, shall n ( c ;n; or v.ae.e anv 
default or notice of default hereunder or invalidate a n y art doa»- pur:-mint to such aotn.e. 
13. T7ie failure on the part of lleneficiary to promptly cnlttrco any rjfdit he reunder «-hdl not op»-rat» na 
a waiver of such right and the *.'juvc. L<y iienefieiaiy of any d . l au l t shall not caustitx.te a waiver of any otl»er 
or subsequent default. 
H . T i m e is of the e.sen< t- hereof. Upon default by Trustor in the pavr ran t of any ituh.'bf^lness teoirecl here-
by or in th«; pcrform.irice of any ogreenient hereunder, oil sums v-cure l hereby shall i.nme.Ji id ly Income due 
Aiul payable at the option of Ilen-fi*aary In the e \ent of such default. Iienefieiaiy may execute or c:iu«e 'Trustee 
to execute a writ ten notice A default and of vlsjctic.n t o cause said property to IK? s«dd to satisfy U'.e obligations 
hrre«f. iuad Trus tee khul! fde such notice f(»r ree^id in each county wherein said prop" i t \ or Koine par t or 
parcel thereof is situated JWaeficiary also shall depouit with 'Trustee, the note and all documenta evidencing 
expendi tures secured hereby. 
3& 
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15. Aft#r the laps** of such tune as may then ho rrqniicd 
default, and notice of default nod notice of s.»i<> having be, n civ. 
on Trustor, shall sell so i l property on tho. date mid ;.t the rune 
a whole or in separate parcels, and in such order a> it_ may defem 
direct the order in which such property, if const-imp of M 
hy law folio* iff, the 
i ;n then requir.fl hy I 
md pl;uc deviirnat.'-il n 
mi- <l>t;t .'.object lo anv 
il ki».wn |.>( 
vcordati'.n of said no'.ice of 
iw, 7 rusUc, \\ilh'.u! «hv:iand 
: -ml n "e „f *.i|.'. either ai 
'.(•ilutory iii;ht of I ruslor to . 
p . inch, shall be sold.). at public 
auction U> the highest bidder, tho nurcha.ie price pa>able in l.i^'ful mjf.e;, « t the United Sf.tte* at 'he '..ue o f 
tale. Tl>c person conducting the sale may, for any cause h«' dr.irv expedient, postpone the tab* from time to 
lima until it shall be completed and, in every CHU', notice of pn;'p"rienu>nt shall lw Rivtn by p.iblic tied irMi<»n 
thereof by such pernm at the time and place l.i.t appointed for the side, prove). <l, if the s.ile i? p»• spoiled 
for longer than out* day beyond the day deKigimted in the rK.ti.t- id sale, notice thereof tdiall be riven in the 
same manner as the original notice of sale. Trustee shall execute ioid deliver to * I *«• pirn INCUT it. Deed c ;n 
veyirif said property so wild, but without any covenant or warranty. e«pr»-s«c or implctl. Th«* recitM* in th;-
Deed of any mutters or facts shall be conclusive proof of the truthlulnes*: thereof Any tvrv.n. includiri:'. B<»r.e 
ficiary. mav bid at the sale. Trustee shall apply the proceed* of the sale !«» payment of (I) the' c.st.s ant' 
expenses of exercising the jnwer of sale and of the sale, inclulini; the pa> merit if the Trustee's and attorney's 
fees; (2) cost of any evidence of title procured in connection with s jch sale an I revenue :-tanips on Trustee'* l)tt<\. 
(3) aJI sums expended under the terms hereof, not then repaid, v.ith accrued ir.*'i^est at 10'v- per annum from date 
of expenditure; (4) all other sums then secured hereby; end (5) the remainder, if any, to the person or perjoru 
legally entitled thereto, or the Trustee, in its discretion, may deposit the balance of such proceeds with, the County 
Clerk of the county in which the sale took place. 
16. Upon the occurrence of any default hereunder, l',en<fi< iary shall have the option to declare all sums 
secured hereby immediately due and payable and foreclose this Trust Deed u\ the manner provided bv lr* 
for the foreclosure of mortgages on r--»al property <md FUnefi.KH> shall be entitled t> n e v e r in such proceed-
ing all costs and expenses incident thereto, including u reasonable attorney's fee in such anvu:nt as shall be 
fixed by the court. 
17. Beneficiary may npp'int a »uccossor trustee at any ti"ie by fdiru: for record in th<? office of the County 
Recorder of each county in which said property r»r some part thereof i*; spoi led , a substitution of tr.J !•••• From 
the time tlic substitution is filed for record, the new trur.tr-e .shall sueroej ta ull fI»4» powers, duties, nathirity 
and title of the trustee named ho^in or of any Mjco-vsor tru-tee Kuch «.uch substitution ih.*dl lie executed and 
acknowledged, and notice thereof shall In* fiiven and proof thereof rn-ide, in the manni. r provided by law. 
18. This Trust Deed shall apply to, inure to liie benefit of. and bird al! parties hereto, their heirs, lri^tee-s, 
devisc«s. adminstrat'ars, executors, s t r e s s o r s and assign.?. All obligations of Trustor hereunder «rc joint and 
several. The term "Uenefici irv" shall mean the owner ;ii-.d holder, ineludirii' any pledgee, of the noU» secured 
hereby. In this Trust Deed, whenever the context i equips , tho masculine t:«t.'ier includes the feminine .-uid/or 
neuter, and the singular number includes the plural 
19. Trustee accepts thin Trust when this Trust Dof-.-l. duly 
record as provided by law Trustee is not obligated to notily any 
Trust Deed or of any action or proceeding in which Trustor, lie; 
brought by Trustee. 
20. This Trust Deed shall be construed according to the 
21. The undersigned Tiustor requests thai u copy of any notice 
hereunder be mailed to him ut the address hereinbefore set forth. 
executed and afl:nr> vleil^.-d. is made a public 
pa;»> hereto of pending r;a?e under any other 
icficmry, or Truatcv shall be a pntty, utde» 
laws of the State of Uteh 
<f default end of .• notice, of sale 
Gbl 
Signature of Truster 
.I....U ;..::.. ;..;\n„i.;\.t.£,...{.'.'. Iu^:\..t..,7.r.l../J.» ^-W-. 
3 iJa B., Ada j.r> . J Be tty p. E5p_l!i ri / 
m&lKtfMHm 
Warren SrinkeHioff 
(If Trustor an Individual) 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF Kane 6S-
On the ...15th
 d a y o f August * D§ I 9 AO ., nCr5onaUy 
Golda B. Adair, Betty B. Esplin, Charles A. BrinkerhofT, 
appeared before me ...Arlpn(?..P....Gpulding, "...*.K?.r.f?.n...^r.V^f-rflP.ff..., 
the signer(t) of the? above instrument, %vho duly acknowledged to mo that they, executed the 
j s? s<t>J^$K 
../^r^'£./%^ At^T^xf: 
cf Notary Public resifinjj/aj;rr •"*. V ,V\ 
My Commission Expires: 
June 19, 1983 * Order v.i.Ue^...Utah 
3£? 
(If Trustor a Corporation) 
STATE OK UTAH 
COUNTY OF ss* 
VV;\ 
On the day of , A.D. W , personally 
appeared before me , who lehvt: by mc duly sv,r>m, 
says that he is the of , 
tho corporation that executed the above and foregoing instrument and thai said insfrument was 
signed in behalf of said corporation by authority of its by-laws (or by authority of a resolution 
of its board of directors) and said ackiiuwledgud 
to me that said corporation executed the same. -
k-V>1 
O V . I C 3 ) 1'iui u \j i iv. J J . 
PARCEL 4: The East Half of the Northeast Quarter (ESHE*s); the South Half of 
the Southeast Ouarter (SSSEV; and Northwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter 
(NW^SE^i) of Section 35, Townshio 39 South,, R.NUIO 4^ West, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian, containing 200.0 acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 5: The Southwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter (SW^NEV); the West 
H~aT7 ofThe Southeast Quarter (W'iSE**) and the Southeast Quarter of the Southwest 
Quarter (SEUSW1-,) of Section 29, Townshio 40 South, Ranqe 4>a West, Salt Lake Base 
and Meridian, containing 160.0 acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 6: The Northwest Ouarter (NWVi) and the East Half of the Southwest 
ftuarter of Section 30, Townshio 40 South, Ramie 4S West, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian, containinq 238.99 acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 7: Lot 2, Section 5, Townshio 40 South, Range 4^ West, Salt Lake Base 
and MericTian, containina 39.08 acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 8: The Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Ouarter (StfVJW^) of Section 
BTHT owns fin o 40 South, Ranoe 4 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, containing 
40.0 acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 9: Lot 1 and the Northeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter ( N E W * ) . 
of Section 31, Townshio 40 South, Range 4l, West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, 
contairv-nq 79.30 acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 10: BEGINNING at the North Quarter Corner of Section 26, Township 40 
South, Range 7 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence South 
0°35' West 567.60 feet; thence South 78°00' East 963.6 feet; thence North-
westerly along the creek bed, 808.0 feet, more or less, to the North line of 
Section 26; thence South 89°57' West 741.18 feet to the point of beginning. 
Containing 11.77 acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 11; BEGINNING at the Southwest Corner of the Southwest Quarter of 
the Southeast Quarter of Section 23, Township 40 South, Range 7 West, Salt 
Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence East 10.23 chains; thence North 
30° West 6.36 chains; thence West 3.68 chains; thence South 1.0 chain to the 
point of beginning. Containing 0.74 acres, more or less. 
,M7 ++ ++ ++ 
•••Si. 
Recorded at Request of 
at M. Fc«Paid$. 
by Dep. Book Pai;c Rcf. 
Mail tax notice to ~ Address 
QUIT-CLAIM DEED 
E l s i e Br inkerhoff , a widow, yj-.nuor 
:.f Glendale , County or Kane , St.siv* ot Uuh , lurch) 
.\HJIT-CLAIM to G01.0A B. ADAIR, a marr ied woman,
 cv> ?.o an un<! ivinV-J ! ' 5 
i n t e r e s t ; WARREN BRINKERHOFK, a married mar;. as tc an undivicky) l,'1- ^ I ^ T C - I ; 
ARLENE B. GOULDING, a marr ied woman, *;; 1.0 an • j rdivir iH 1/5 in tore"* v. ''>!/'(=!.t'S 
A. BRINKERHOFF, a marr ied -ran, a:, to an undivided \/J i n t e r ^ t ; <-nd 3M1Y i :. 
ESPUN, a marr ied wcvr.cin, as to an undivided 1/5 i n t e r e s t , <r.iiucec. 
>}' Glendale & O r d e r v i l l e , Utah i-r rhv s-iui oi »,l 
SIO.OO ^ olf.or va luable cons irjrrat. ion- - J X>t l.AKS ^ 
County. 
.:he following described W^.^Jxxx:l».U>^i<M^ v,at<:. r r ; T' i - s in Kane 
Stare of Utah: 
Al l of Water Users Claim Number* 23-4, ?35, ?.'tt% *.'J7, 238, 23J, 
242, 243 and 244. 
WITNESS the hand of said grantor , this 9th 
September
 t A. D. one thousand nine hundred and e igh ty 
J 
A 
m 
5J ?-
#3 
Signed in the presence of j .:'.0'\ i<l •<-. 'r.lZlL/.-.U.Ji.-'C 
J F":si€» O i n k e r h o f f 
>• 3 
.•i •» 
o 
i 
B \n 
g I * g 
1$ 
33 
day of 
> - c y / 
- J 
>TATE OF UTAH, j 
»• s s . 
bounty of Kane J 
On the 9 th . 
:housand nine hundred and e i uh ty 
E l s i e Brinkerhoff, a widow 
i-
day of Sop ten le r 
personally appeared before me 
A. D. one 
.he signer of the foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledge to me that sile^/tJxeCutei 
f Y^J]-^i\mmmn. 
V 
August 13, 1983 
Mr. Hans Q Chamberlain 
Attorney at Law 
F.O. Box 726 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
RE: Brinkerhoff vs Brinkerhoff Civil No. 1826 
Dear Mr. Chamberlain: 
Based on the following facts and provisions, I am writing 
to inform you of my intent to withdraw completely from, the suit 
in question. 
A- This action has caused such a division in my family because 
of the underhanded manner in which the deeds were changed, that 
the feeling may be impossible th reconcile. 
B- Because the outcome of this action will be of no financial 
advantage to me, I will not assume any financial obligation that 
may arise from continued involvement. 
C- It is my intent and desire to restore all Property, Permits 
and Water Rights to thier rightful owners, Mr. Mark J. and 
Mrs. Lena A. Brinkerhoff. That the annual payment of Two 
Thousand be. due and payable outlined in the original agreement. 
D- That my son Warren may, with prior approval, have enough 
space to plant a garden and provide for the needs of his family. 
E- That all family members try to resolve thier differences 
and reunite as a family group. 
F- I also express my displeasure at the allegation of financial 
wrong doing against my son Mark, they are false and with out base. 
The record will show that this action is done of my own free will 
and choice, and represents my complete and total separation from 
any and all future involvement in this suit. 
.sie 
S/U^Jt^ 
Brinkerhoff 
cc: Mr. Willard R. Bishop 
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Sk^M^^MMmmMmM^ |:;£|iwjl;^;;f; 'M 
m J & M Dtl'ARIMENr OF SOCIAL SERVICES ^ ^ X t f f e ^ g f g * 
m^h DIVISION OF HEALTH . '.JB^^E^B^H^^ 
VITAL STATISTICS 
*m 
:lassified as 
ider the Utah 
P'actiMs Act. LOCAl FILE NUMBER 
9-01 CERTIFICATE OF DEATH STATE'OF UTAH - DIVISION OF HEALTH 
EDENT 
50NAL 
*TA 
NAMEOF DECEDENT 
Cloyd H a r r i s Brinkerhoff 
WAS OECEOENT OF SPANISH ORIGIN? YES Z NO V If yes. indicate type: 
Metican Z Puerto Rican Z'. Cuban 3 Other Z ( I ' other, specify) 
Male 
RACE (White, black. Am. Indian, etc.)' 
Specify
 t 
White 
OAIE OF BiRTH (Mo.. Pay. Year) 
. . July 13 , 1923 
DIRFHPLACE (State or foreign 
country) 
Utah 
CITIZEN ct whai country 
. U.S.A. 
MamMJ ^ 
Never 
Married 3 
Divorced G 
Widowed rJ 
Other D 
AGE (Last 
Birthday) 
,.56* Yn . 
JATF-. OF OfcATH (Mo.. Oay. Year) 
. October 1A, VMM 
IF UNDER lyaar 
Days 
cv>UCATI0/4—vi:pt?ci»y only higheal yade cornp-ettd) 
Elementary or Secondary jd-12) College (1CM6 or 17 + ) 
11. ^ 
USUAL OCCUPATION (Give Kind of work done during most of 
working life, even if retired ) 
13a> Wood Super in tenden t 
• KINO OF BUSiNSSS OA INDUSTRY Lumber 
i13b Kaibab I n d u s t r i e s 
NAME OF FATHER 
Merle Br inkerhoff 
IF UNDER 24 .M 
SOCIAL. SECURITY MUMSE* j 
12. 
NAME of surviving spouse (if, wife, er.tor maiden nam*.) 
Lena Adair 
MAIDEN NAME OF MOTHER 
E l s i e Jones 
Was decedent eve* in l 
Armed Forces? 
IT. Y E $ * N 
B 
hm 
;UAL 
DENCE 
I USUAL RESIDENCE—(S:reet ana number or location and Zip cede) 
21 South 200 East 8^729 
INSIUE CITY LIMITS? 
CITY OR TOWN 
Glendale 
ICOUNTY I 
jl8d. 
ISTATE 
I 
J YES S NO O 
110b. 
Utah 
NAME A MAILING ADDRESS OF INFORMANT 
Lena A. Br inkerhof f 
P .O. Box 21 
Glenda l e , Utah 84?29 
CEOF 
•ATH 
NAME of hospital, nursing home or other institution wh-sre death occurred. 
[(If outside an institution, give street address or location.) 
Gar f i e ld Memorial H o s p i t a l 20a. 
)^ In patient 
~ ED. patten! 
Z DOA 
iCITYORTOWN 
l20b. Pangui t 
. j COUNTY-, 
ch \ \ \j£\(\ Ga r f i e l d 
DICAL 
MINER 
OR 
ICIAN'S 
RTIFI-
TION 
.MEDICAL EXAMINER: I hereby certify that to the test ol rr./ Kncwifedgw the death occurred at the hour, 
[date and place stated above from the causes stated below based on examination of the oody and lot 
nvesiigation of the circumstances. 
Z19 Decedent was pronounced dead at: HOUR: DATE: 
PHYSICIAN: I hereby certify that to the best of my knowledge the daath occurred at jCERTlFleR'Sname and title (Type or print) 
hhe hour, date and place stated above from the causes stared below, that I attended the 1 
(decedent, and I last saw the decedent alive on.
 w _ S)Cf | ^ B r i a n I ' a n d l e V J l . D . 
I PHYSICIAN OH MEDICAL £XAMIN££ .SIGNATURE 4 l | 7JME of death U 
L> O A L W ^ I L I U W irx L 1 : 2 C 
/'» day ) ^ H not certified by medical examiner, was death reported to him? YES i r ' N O LJ If yes. 
enier the date and hour reported: (24 hour clock) 
22. HOUR: MO. 
Burial ^ Entombent L I D A T E 
Removal Z\ Cremation C' 
Other Z 
23a. 
A) DAY J£ YEAR 
I PATE SIGNED (Mo.. Day. Year) 
Jk CERTIFIER'S address and Jip code 
t . . .Garfield C l i n i c 2nn N ^m 
7? 
8,47-19
 U t ,___. 
AGO fr^Pangultd^^; 
JTTTAM ¥ MY3 
j LICENSE NU \\ 
JERAL 
ECTOR 
LOCAL 
iSTRAR 
CAUSE 
OF 
DEATH 
\zx> Oc t . 16,79 
SlGNAT'JPF'of Funeral d ' e c V " " " 
t / m v \ 
NAME AND LOCATION OF CEMETERY OR CREMATORY ' \S 
Glendale Cemetery, Glendale . Utah 
FUNERAL HOME—Name, address and license number 
a .Sp i l sbury & Graff Mortuary, Kc:| 
2«. 
jPART I. DEATH WAS CAUSED BY: IMMEDIATE CAUSE: 
,A)
 C'A7\ 
CONDITIONS IF ANY 
WHICH GAVE RISE TO DUE TO, OR 
THE IMMEDIATE CAUSE (B) 
(A). STATING THE UN-
DERIVING CAUSE LAST. DUE TO, OR AS A CONSEQUENCE OF 
Hate accepted for registrfttio«< 
27. 
(filter only «n«C #*-l 
AS A CONSEQUENCE OF H "( 1 '• \ j ~ ' 
MQ-AYQVCNI ^ v A ^ H , r v j 
Interval between onset v 
"^interval between onset a / 
I ! 
(C) ;
, \ 
|intervai between onset ar* 
PART It. OTHER SIGNIFICANT CONDITIONS-CONTRIBUTING TO DEATH, BUT NOT RELATED TO THE 
IMMEDIATE CAUSE GIVEN IN PART I. 
AUTOPSY l IF YES, were findings conf-
YES D N O ^ I , n d « w m i n , r * * * " * * ^ 
la. j 3 1 b V E S D N O G j 
\ V 
INJURY 
INFOR-
MATION 
Suicide 
Homicide 
./YA 
Pending Investigation 
Undetermined if Injured 
Accident!/ or Purposety 
DATE ol Injury (Mo . day. Ytar> 
A/A 
LOCATION OF INJURY-STREET AND NUMBER OR LOCATION ANO CITY OR TOWN. 
ITIME OF INJURY 
I {24HourC1l< 
_J.31b 
m 
j^uRYArwbnx? 
^yVft* 
PLACE OF INJURY (Specify home. farm. f»cl>». 
street, office buildings, etc^l / A 
NA 
.Distance from place of m|ury to 
DESCRIBE HOW INJURY OCCURHED (eotet sequence of events which resulted in Injury. NATURE OF INJURY 
SHOULD BE ENTEREO IN ITEM 29) 
j'jsuat residencei'tem.18) 
Nn 
Were laco'atOiy tests done for 
drugs or tot«c cf> 
3 7 Y E S / y N j 
Nh 
UHS • 12 Rev. 1/78 
Werw laboratory tests 
done for •1cgryfi?># 
IIf motor vehicle accident, specify if decedent was driver.passenger or pedestrian. 
40. 
£ This is to certify that this is a true copy of the certificate on file in this office. This certified copy is 
V issued under authority of Section 26-15-26 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as Amended. 
S Date Issued: OCT %$ 10 JQ 
SOUTHWESTERN UTAH %& e&4**&**f-
/ 5 r \ ^ ! W / ' ^ ^ ** • DIRECTORQF VITAL STATISTICS 
LT) I 
CO 
I 
X 
Q 
COUNTY: 
TRUST DEED NOTE 
DO NOT DESTROY THIS NOTE: When paid, this nole, with Trust Deed securing some, must be surrendered 
to Trustee for cancellation, before reconveyance will be made. 
$ l0.,0Q0.t00 ^ r ^ U e ? . . ^ 
August 15 ^
 l98p 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned, jointly and severally, promise to pay to the order of 
Elsie Brinkerhoff, a widow 
The Sum of 
Ten Thousand and no/100 - -
. : : . . : : : : : : : : : : : : : : " . . .DOLLARS ($..J.P.AP.?O !OO I>>)> 
together with interest from date at the rate of NUNt pCf c c m ^ U cjc) pcr annum on 
the unpaid principal, said principal and interest payable as follows: 
The Sum of $30.00 monthly, beginning September 15, 1980, and a like amount on 
the 15th day of each and every month thereafter, until the entire balance is 
paid in full. 
Each payment shall be applied first to accrued interest and the balance to the reduction of principal. Any 
such installment not paid when due shall bear interest thereafter at the rate of ?"!?.!:. per 
cent ( »•-•%) per annum until paid. 
If default occurs in the payment of said installments of principal and interest or any part thereof, or in 
the performance of any agreement contained in the Trust Deed securing this note, the holder hereof, at its 
option and without notice or demand, may declare the entire principal balance and accrued interest due and 
payable. 
If this note is collected by an attorney after default in die payment of principal or interest, either with 
or without suit, the undersigned, jointly and severally, agree to pay all costs and expenses of collection including 
a reasonable attorney's fee. 
The makers, sureties, guarantors and endorsers hereof severally waive presentment for payment, demand 
and notice of dishonor and nonpayment of this note, and consent to any and all extensions of time, renewals, 
waivers or modifications that may be granted by the holder hereof with respect to the payment or other pro-
visions of this note, and to the release of any security, or any part thereof, with or without substitution. 
This note is secured by a Trust Deed of even date herewith. 
&j2d*k. 
Gollfla B. Adair 
i-DEFENDANTS 
/V2£L iEXHIBIT M0. -__ PON IDENTIFICATION DATl: RPTftHt* ) 
PLANK NO. 013 © C I M PIG. CO. — sais so. 2*00 CAM — SALT LAHI CIIV 
A-214 
ESCROW AGREEMENT 
Escrow No.. 
..Au.gil.s.t..!5 19.80.. 
STATE RVNK OF SOLTIIEILt' UTAH 
Orderville,
 t Utah 
Gentlemen: 
The undersigned, (Seller) E.1.5.1e..J6r.iDX?.r.b.Q.f.fj..A..Wl4o.W 
hereinafter called "Grantor", whose address is filendale,..Utah 84729 
and (Buyer) ...Golda...B.....AdaJ.r,...a...rn.arrled..woinan., 
hereinafter called "Grantee", whose address is .Qrder.vi.lie*.. Utah....B4758 
herewith deliver to you in escrow, the documents and property hereinafter described, to be held and dis-
posed of by you in accordance with the following instructions and upon the terms and conditions herein-
after set forth, to which the undersigned hereby agree. 
PAPERS, INSTRUMENTS, MONEY and/or PROPERTY DEPOSITED: 
1. Trust Deed Note 
++ ++ ++ ++ +••- ++ ++ 
YOUR INSTRUCTIONS ARE AS FOLLOWS: 
You are hereby authorized and directed to deliver the above described documents and property to 
Grantee upon payment to you, at your above address, for the Grantor of the total sum of $.MXXXXXXXXX 
principal, ($ ?!/A having already been paid by the Grantee to the Grantor on an original prin-
cipal afnount of $ ..:..- ) and interest on the unpaid balance thereof at....Np.ne. per cent per 
annumjfrom N/A ,19 , to be paid as follows: 
The Sum of $30.00 monthly, beginning September 15, 1980, and a like amount on 
the 15th day of.each and every month thereafter, until the sum of $10,000.00 
has been paid or until the death of the Grantor above named, whichever occurs 
f i rs t . 
++ ++ 4+ ++ ++
 4 + + + 
t 
Remit payment to the account of the Grantor at State Bank of Southern Utah, 
Orderville, Utah. 
The undersigned hereby agree as follows: 
1. The State Hank of Southern Utah (hereinafter called the "bank"), is not a party, or 
bound by any agreement which may be evidenced by or arise out of the foregoing instructions. 
2. The bank is hereby authorized to receive any or all such payments or any part thereof at any 
time after the dates herein specified therefor and prior to receipt of notice of default delivered to the 
bank in writing by Grantor. 
3. The bank acts hereunder as a depositary only, and is not responsible or liable in any manner 
whatever for the sufficiency, correctness, genuineness or validity of any instrument deposited with it 
hereunder, or with respect to the form or execution of the same, or the identity, authority, or rights of 
any person executing or depositing the same. 
4. The bank shall not be required to take or be bound by notice of any default of any person, or 
to take any action with respect to such default involving any expense or liability, unless notice in writing 
is given an officer of the bank of such default by the undersigned or any of them, and unless it is indem-
nified in a manner satisfactory to it against any such expense or liability. 
5. The bank shall be protected in acting upon any notice, request, waiver, consent, receipt or other 
paper or document believed by the bank to be genuine and to be signed by the proper party or parties. 
6. The bank shall not be liable for any error of judgment or for any act done or step taken or 
omitted by it in good faith, or for any mistake of fact or law, or for anything which it may do or refrain 
from doing in connection herewith, except its own wilful misconduct. 
7. The bank shall not be answerable for the default or misconduct of any agent, attorney or em-
ployee appointed by it if such agent or employee shall have been selected with reasonable care. 
8. The bank may advise with legal counsel in the event of any dispute or question as to the con-
struction of the foregoing instructions, or the bank's duties thereunder and the bank shall incur no liabili-
ty and shall be fully protected in acting in accordance with the opinion and instructions of such counsel. 
9. The bank shall have a first lien on the property and papers held by it hereunder, for its com-
pensation and for any costs, liability, expense or counsel fees it may incur. 
10. In the event of any disagreement between the undersigned or any of them, and/or the person 
or persons named in the foregoing instruction, and/or any other person, resulting in adverse claims and de-
mands being made in connection with or for any papers, money or property involved herein or affected 
hereby, the bank shall be entitled at its option to refuse to comply with any such claim or demand, so 
long as such disagreement shall continue, and in so refusing the bank may make no delivery or other dis-
position of any money, papers or property involved herein or affected hereby and in so doing the bank shall 
not be or become liable to the undersigned or any of them or to any person named in the foregoing in-
structions for its failure or refusal to comply with such conflicting or adverse demands; and the bank 
shall be entitled to continue so to refrain and refuse so to act until: 
(1) The rights of the adverse claimants have been finally adjudicated in a court assuming 
and having jurisdiction of the parties and the money, papers and property involved here-
in or affected hereby; and/or 
(2) All differences shall have been adjusted by agreement and the bank shall have been no-
tified thereof in writing signed by all of the persons interested. 
11. No assignment or transfer of this escrow agreement or of any documents or property, includ-
ing money, held in this escrow or of any interest therein can be made, but said documents and property 
may be withdrawn and this escrow agreement terminated by mutual consent. 
12. The undersigned agree to pay to the bank the sum of $ as an acceptance 
fee with respect to its services hereunder for one year from the date hereof and further hereby agree to 
pay the bank an additional fee of one-tenth of one per cent of all funds received hereunder, provided how-
ever, that a minimum fee of $ shall be charged for each payment received. It is also 
agreed that additional compensation shall also be paid to the bank for any additional or extraordinary ser-
vices it may be required to render hereunder. Should any money, document or property remain in escrow 
after one year from date hereof, the undersigned hereby agree to pay the bank the sum of $ 
for each year or fraction of year that such money, document or property is held by the bank hereunder; 
and in the event such annual charge remains unpaid for a period of one year, the bank shall have the 
right and is hereby authorized and directed to close its records with respect hereto and destroy any docu-
ments held by it hereunder. 
iS.^WrrC,^ 
GRANTOR GRANTEE 
The State Bank of Southern Utah hereby acknowledges receipt of the letter of instructions 
of which the foregoing is a copy and of the papers, money or property therein referred to and agrees to 
hold and dispose of the same in accordance with said instructions and upon the terms and conditions 
above set forth. 
STATE RVVK OF SOUTHER* UTAH 
Date: 19 
By-
Received from The State Bank of Southern Utah all of the papers and documents referred 
to above. 
Date: 19. 
A-216 
TRUST DEKD NOTE 
DO NOT DESTROY THIS NOTE: When paid, this note, with Trust Deed securing same, must bt surrendered 
to Trustee for cancellation, before reconveyance will be made. 
$ 1°.!?9.Q-.9.Q ....Prderyi.].le,..Utah 
...Augus.t...15
 § 198Q... 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned, jointly and severally, promise to pay to the order of 
^Ui?...?T.l!}.^T.h9.fJ.>..?..^lf!P.V. 
The Sum of 
T E N . . T H 0 M N B . A N O <i.l.Q.,0P0.t.QP ), 
together with interest from date at the rate of HP.N.v... per cent ( V c/c) per annum on 
the unpaid principal, said principal and interest payable as follows: 
The Sum of $30.00 monthly, beginning September 15, 1980 and a like amount on 
the 15th day of each and every month thereafter, until the entire balance 
is paid in full. 
Each payment shall be applied first to accrued interest and the balance to the reduction of principal. Any 
such installment not paid when due shall bear interest thereafter at the rate of NONE. per 
cent ( 0—%) p*f annum until paid. \ 
If default occurs in the payment of said installments of principal and interest or any part thereof, or in 
the performance of any agreement contained in the Trust Deed securing this note, the holder hereof, at its 
option and without notice or demand, may declare the entire principal balance and accrued interest due and 
payable. 
If this note is collected by an attorney after default in the payment of principal or interest, either with 
or without suit, the undersigned, jointly and severally, agree to pay all costs and expenses of collection including 
a reasonable attorney's fee. 
The makers, sureties, guarantors and endorsers hereof severally waive presentment for payment, demand 
and notice of dishonor and nonpayment of this note, and consent to any and all extensions of time, renewals, 
waivers or modifications that may be granted by the holder hereof with respect to the payment or other pro-
visions of this note, and to the release of any security, or any part thereof, with or without substitution. 
This note is secured by a Trust Deed of even date herewith. 
tharles A. Brinkerhoff fc 
ESCROW AGREEMENT 
Escrow No 
August 15
 1 9 80 
STATE RANK OF MRTIIRRN UTAH 
Orderville, Utah 
_ ! . Utah 
Gentlemen: 
The undersigned, (Seller) EMe.BrM^^^ 
hereinafter called "Grantor", whose address is y.e.nf!?l?»..Mtd.n....3*IQ 
and (Buyer) £h$r!?.?.../!U..B^ 
hereinafter called "Grantee", whose address is Prderyi:lie,..Utah....84758 
herewith deliver to you in escrow, the documents and property hereinafter described, to be held and dis-
posed of by you in accordance with the following instructions and upon the terms and conditions herein-
after set forth, to which the undersigned hereby agree. 
PAPERS, INSTRUMENTS, MONEY and/or PROPERTY DEPOSITED: 
1. Trust Deed Note. 
++ ++ ++ 44 44 +4 ++ ++ 
YOUR INSTRUCTIONS ARE AS FOLLOWS: 
You are hereby authorized and directed to deliver the above described documents a n l j ? * g j i ^ ^ 
Grantee upon P&ynient to you, at your above address, for the Grantor of the total sum of $..l?*3®^^»¥^ 
principal, ($ having already been paid by the Grantee to the Grantor on an original prin-
cipal amount of $ H/A ) and interest on the unpaid balance thereof at !i9.n.?....per cent per 
annum from B/A ,19 , to be paid as follows: 
The Sum of $30.00 monthly, beginning September 15, 1980, and a like amount on the 
15th day of each and every month thereafter, until the sum of $10,000.00 is paid 
full or until the death of the Grantor above named, which ever occurs f i rst . 
++ +4 44 4+ ++ 4+ 4+ ++ 
Remit payment to the account of the above named Grantor in the office of State 
Bank of Southern Utah, Orderville, Utah. 
(OVER) 
A-218 
The undersigned hereby agree as follows: 
1. The State Dank of Southern Utah (hereinafter called the "bank"), is not a party, or 
bound by any agreement which may be evidenced by or arise out of the foregoing instructions. 
2. The bank is hereby authorized to receive any or all such payments or any part thereof at any 
time after the dates herein specified therefo• and prior to receipt of notice of default delivered to the 
bank in writing: by Grantor. 
3. The bank acts hereunder as a depositary mly, and is not responsible or liable in any manner 
whatever for the sufficiency, correctness, genuineness or validity of any instrument deposited with it 
hereunder, or with respect to the form or execution of the same, or the identity, authority, or rights of 
any person executing or depositing the same. 
4. The bank shall not be required to take or be bound by notice of any default of any person, or 
to take any action with respect to such default involving any expense or liability, unless notice in writing 
is given an officer of the bank of such default by the undersigned or any of them, and unless it is indem-
nified in a manner satisfactory to it against any such expense or liability. 
5. The bank shall be protected in acting upon any notice, request, waiver, consent, receipt or other 
paper or document believed by the bank to be genuine and to be signed by the proper party or parties. 
6. The bank shall not be liable for any error of judgment or for any act done or step taken or 
omitted by it in good faith, or for any mistake of fact or law, or for anything which it may do or refrain 
from doing in connection herewith, except its own wilful misconduct. 
7. The bank shall not be answerable for the default or misconduct of any agent, attorney or em-
ployee appointed by it if such agent or employee shall have been selected with reasonable care. 
8. The bank may advise with legal counsel in the event of any dispute or question as to the con-
struction of the foregoing instructions, or the bank's duties thereunder and the bank, shall incur no liabili-
ty and shall be fully protected in acting in accordance with the opinion and instructions of such counsel. 
9. The bank shall have a first lien on the property and papers held by it hereunder, for its com-
pensation and for any costs, liability, expense or counsel fees it may incur. 
10. In the event of any disagreement between the undersigned or any of them, and/or the person 
or persons named in the foregoing instruction, and/or any other person, resulting in adverse claims and de-
mands being made in connection with or for any papers, money or property involved herein or affected 
hereby, the bank shall be entitled at its option to refuse to comply with any such claim or demand, so 
long as such disagreement shall continue, and in so refusing the bank may make no delivery or other dis-
position of any money, papers or property involved herein or affected hereby and in so doing the bank shall 
not be or become liable to the undersigned or any of them or to any person named in the foregoing in-
structions for its failure or refusal to comply with such conflicting or adverse demands; and the bank 
shall be entitled to continue so to refrain and refuse so to act until: 
(1) The rights of the adverse claimants have been finally adjudicated in a court assuming 
and having jurisdiction of the parties and the money, papers and property involved here-
in or affected hereby; and/or 
(2) All differences shall have been adjusted by agreement and the bank shall have been no-
tified thereof in writing signed by all of the persons interested. 
11. No assignment or transfer of this escrow agreement or of any documents or property, includ-
ing money, held in this escrow or of any interest therein can be made, but said documents and property 
may be withdrawn and this escrow agreement terminated by mutual consent. 
12. The undersigned agree to pay to the bank the sum of $ as an acceptance 
fee with respect to its services hereunder for one year from the date hereof and further hereby agree to 
pay the bank an additional fee of one-tenth of one per cent of all funds received hereunder, provided how-
ever, that a minimum fee of $ shall be charged for each payment received. It is also 
agreed that additional compensation shall also be paid to the bank for any additional or extraordinary ser-
vices it may be required to render hereunder. ShHClkkXHXtfWRKWdsotxrao^^ 
JCt«*»lwx/«xi*xfttt»xMxtateM^ 
6c*xeeK^XK*tx*xxfmti«axtf^ 
*n<kxKxbb<xsx«rtx*MKb^ MWH> x^oJw 
tMgk k )axixlxl^ b(*reJti5^ »xt5iK)nKC x^RA xtt wxx*<x *a x '^tfxx JUxwcBxixawxlx xtt*R*#xlXW** xwdxdrtfxax xwax dwx*x 
tWMfefc hakfc toyxi* )!)©rxitn«UK rS 
Elsie' Br rnkerhbff '""char les A. Brlnlcerhoff r ^ 
^.:i;.:^i^/i^ 
GRANTOR GRANTEE 
The Stme Bunk of Southern Utah hereby acknowledges receipt of the letter of instructions 
of which the foregoing is a copy and of the papers, money or property therein referred to and agrees to 
hold and dispose of the same in accordance with said instructions and upon the terms and conditions 
above set forth. 
STATE IM.WCOF SOtTllERA UTAH 
Date: 19 
By.. 
Received from The State Bank of Southern Utah all of the papers and documents referred 
to above. 
Date: 19.. 
A.~:LI<? 
TRUST DEED NOTE 
DO NOT DESTROY THIS NOTE: When paid, this note, with Trust Deed securing same, must be surrendered 
to Trustee for cancellation, before reconveyance will be made. 
I 10a000s00 .....s.t:..^.or.^.!..^.tah. 
....August J5
 119. .80 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned, jointly and severally, promise to pay to the order of 
Elsie..Brinkerhoff, a 
The Sum of 
Ifcn.J.hp.us.«nrt..^ ($..J.o,P.oo.qp
 )% 
together with interest from date at the rate of ...!:.?.n.e. per cent (.. .*:. %) per annum on 
the unpaid principal, said principal and interest payable as follows: 
The Sum of $30.00 monthly, beginning September 15, 1980 and a like amount on the 
15th day of each and every month thereafter, until the entire balance is paid 
in full. 
Each payment shall be applied first to accrued interest and the balance to the reduction of principal. Any 
such installment not paid when due shall bear interest thereafter at the rate of ...9..... .....per 
cent ( Q-%) per annum until paid. 
If default occurs in the payment of said installments of principal and interest or any part thereof, or in 
the performance of any agreement contained in the Trust Deed securing this note, the holder hereof, at its 
option and without notice or demand, may declare the entire principal balance and accrued interest due and 
payable. 
If this note is collected by an attorney after default in the payment of principal or interest, either with 
ox without suit, the undersigned, jointly and severally, agree to pay all costs and expenses of collection including 
a reasonable attorney's fee. 
The makers, sureties, guarantors and endorsers hereof severally waive presentment for payment, demand 
and notice of dishonor and nonpayment of this note, and consent to any and all extensions of time, renewals, 
waivers or modifications that may be granted by the holder hereof with respect to the payment or other pro-
visions of this note, and to the release of any security, or any part thereof, with or without substitution. 
This note is secured by a Trust Deed of even date herewith. 
Warren Brinkerhoff ~*f~~ 
\ 
BLANK NO. 0 I S O GEM PIC. CO. — 320 to aeoo I * M — IALT LAMC CITV 
ESCROW AGREEMENT 
Escrow No _ 
August,15 19.80... 
STATE IIWK <» SOITIIKR* tTAII 
Orderville
 Uuh 
Gentlemen: 
The undersigned, (Seller) . ^ i e .Br inkerhof f , a widow 
hereinafter called ••Grantor", whose address is Gjendale, UtahL.8472? 
and (Buyer) Warren Br.inkerhpff 
hereinafter called "Grantee", whose address is 295. South 30.0 West, St... George,..Utah ...84770 
herewith deliver to you in escrow, the documents and properly hereinafter described, to be held and dis-
posed of by you in accordance with the following inst ructions and upon the terms and conditions herein-
after set forth, to which the underpinned hereby aprec. 
PAPERS, INSTRUMENTS, MONEY and/or PROPERTY DEPOSITED: 
1. Trust Deed Note 
++ ++ ++ + -K ++ 4 + 
YOUR INSTRUCTIONS ARE AS FOLLOWS: 
You are hereby authorized and directed to deliver the above described documents and property to 
Grantee upon payment to you, at your above address, for the Grantor of the total sum of $..^^M^^M^., 
principal, ($ N/A having already been paid by the Grantee to the Grantor on an original prin-
cipal amount of $ N/A ) and interest on the unpaid balance thereof at....Nohe per cent per 
annum from M/.A ,19 , to be paid as follows: j 
The Sum of $30.00 monthly, beginning September 15, 1980, and a like amount on the 
15th day of each.and every month thereafter, until the sum of $10,000.00 is paid 
or until the death of the Grantor above named whichever occurs first. 
•H- + + * + -H + ++ 
Remit payment to the account of the above named Grantor at State Bank of Southern 
Utah, Orderville, Utah 
<ovr.K) 
A~-XZ\ 
The undersigned hereby agree as follows: » 
1. The state Hank of Southern Utah (hereinafter called the "bank"), is not a party, or 
bound by any agreement which may be evidenced by or arise out of the foregoing instructions. 
2. The bank is hereby authorized to receive any or all such payments or any part thereof at any 
time after the dates herein specified therefor and prior to receipt of notice of default delivered to the 
bank in writing by Grantor. 
3. The bank acts hereunder as a depositary only, and is not responsible or liable in any manner 
whatever for the sufficiency, correctness, genuineness or validity of any instrument deposited with it 
hereunder, or with respect to the form or execution of the same, or the identity, authority, or rights of 
any person executing or depositing the same. 
4. The bank shall not be required to take or be bound by notice of any default of any person, or 
to take any action with respect to such default involving any expense or liability, unless notice in writing 
is given an officer of the bank of such default by the undersigned or any of them, and unless it is indem-
nified in a manner satisfactory to it against any such expense or liability. 
5. The bank shall be protected in acting upon any notice, request, waiver, consent, receipt or other 
paper or document believed by the bank to be genuine and to be signed by the proper party or parties. 
6. The bank shall not be liable for any error of judgment or for any act done or step taken or 
omitted by it in good faith, or for any mistake of fact or law, or for anything which it may do or refrain 
from doing in connection herewith, except its own wilful misconduct. 
7. The bank shall not be answerable for the default or misconduct of any agent, attpmey or em-
ployee appointed by it if such agent or employee shall have been selected with reasonable care. 
8. The bank may advise with legal counsel in the event of any dispute or question as to the con-
struction of the foregoing instructions, or the bank's duties thereunder and the bank shall incur no liabili-
ty and shall be fully protected in acting in accordance with the opinion and instructions of such counsel. 
9. The bank shall have a first lien on the property and papers held by it hereunder, for its com-
pensation and for any costs, liability, expense or counsel fees it may incur. 
10. In the event of any disagreement between the undersigned or any of them, and/or the person 
or persons named in the foregoing instruction, and/or any other person, resulting in adverse claims and de-
mands being made in connection with or for any papers, money or property involved herein or affected 
hereby, the bank shall be entitled at its option to refuse to comply with any such claim or demand, so 
long as such disagreement shall continue, and in so refusing the bank may make no delivery or other dis-
position of any money, papers or property involved herein or affected hereby and in so doing the bank shall 
not be or become liable to the undersigned or any.of them or to any person named in the foregoing in-
structions for its failure or refusal to comply with such conflicting or adverse demands; and the bank 
shall be entitled to continue so to refrain and refuse so to act until; 
(1) The rights of the adverse claimants have been finally adjudicated in a court assuming 
and having jurisdiction of the parties and the money, papers and property involved here-
in or affected hereby; and/or 
(2) All differences shall have been adjusted by agreement and the bank shall have been no-
tified thereof in writing signed by all of the persons interested. 
11. No assignment or transfer of this escrow agreement or of any documents or property, includ-
ing money, held in this escrow or of any interest therein can be made, but said documents and property 
may be withdrawn and this escrow agreement terminated by mutual consent. 
12. The undersigned agree to pay to the bank the sum of $ as an acceptance 
fee with respect to its services hereunder tor one year from the date hereof and further hereby agree to 
pay the bank an additional fee of one-ter.th of one per cent of all funds received hereunder, provided how-
ever, that a minimum fee of $ shall be charged for each payment received. It is also 
agreed that additional compensation shall also be paid to the bank for any additional or extraordinary ser-
vices it may be required to render hereunder. XkMKkkXKXWWXiX d^^ KawdXOW^ 
afe*9(;C>RKXWXiXxto»xri^  
fc*>w aciixy WCIXKX tfxxwxx^ 
ai^>iaxtf;<#aK*mxM^XHXMXiXxolxx^ 
ri gh K awirfxtexuawx^^ 
mK«^ J?KW<kXXJ^ H>OJM«5<J<'X 
Elsie""Brinkerhoff "Warren Brinker'hbff 
IK2<LIZBAZ. ZllSiS^ 
ORANTOK GRANTEE 
The Stan- lUnk of Southern l.toh hereby acknowledges receipt of the letter of instructions 
of which the foregoing is a copy and of tho papers, money or property therein referred to and agrees to 
hold and dispose of the same in accordance with said instructions and upon the terms and conditions 
above set forth. 
STVTK BAKK Of SOUTHERN UTAH 
Date: 10 
By -
Received from The Stan* H«nk of Southern Utah all of the papers and documents referred 
to above. 
Date; 11) - — 
TRUST DEED NOTE 
DO NOT DESTROY THIS NOTE: When paid, this note, with Trust Deed securing same, must be surrendered 
to Trustee for cancellation, before reconveyance will be mode. 
I 10,000., 00 0r^e.r.v. i..l1.e..v..uta.f1.. 
August 1 5 ^ ^30 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned, jointly and severally, promise to pay to the order of 
njj.e...exlnk.5xhpfiaL..a...wirJp.w. 
The..Surn..of. 
M I H O U S A N ^ ^ ($.1.Q.,000,00
 }> 
together with interest from date at the rate of !;."!*.!: per cent (.. .9 %) per annum on 
the unpaid principal, said principal and interest payable as follows: 
The Sum of $30.00 monthly, beginning September 15, 1980 and a like amount on 
the 15th day of each and every month thereafter, until the entire balance 
is paid in full. 
Each payment shall be applied first to accrued interest and the balance to the reduction of principal. Any 
l installment not paid when due s! 
cent ( -Q---%) per annum until paid. 
such hall bear interest thereafter at the rate of ...*:!?.•• per 
If default occurs in the payment of said installments of principal and interest or any part thereof, or in 
the performance of any agreement contained in the Trust Deed securing this note, the holder hereof, at its 
option and without notice or demand, may declare the entire principal balance and accrued interest due and 
payable. 
If this note is collected by an attorney after default in the payment of principal or interest, either with 
or without suit, the undersigned, jointly and severally, agree to pay all costs and expenses of collection including 
t reasonable attorney's fee. 
, The makers, sureties, guarantors and endorsers hereof severally waive presentment for payment, demand 
and notice of dishonor and nonpayment of this note, and consent to any and all extensions of time, renewals, 
waivers or modifications that may be granted by the holder hereof with respect to the payment or other pro-
visions of this note, and to the release of any security, or any part thereof, with or without substitution. 
This note is secured by a Trust Deed of even date herewith. 
^....^...t^^Lw... 
Betty 6/ Esplintf 
! 
ESCROW AGREEMENT 
Escrow No _ 
Augus t ,15 ? 1 9 go 
STATE IIAXK iW MHTIIKR\ UTAH 
Qrriervillfi , Utah 
Gentlemen: 
The undersigned, (Seller) E.l5.1eJr.lnk.erhDf.f#..a ..widow 
hereinafter called ''Grantor", whose address is....5.1enda.l.e.*..Utdh....B4729 
and (Buyer) B.eMy...BA..£5.Dli.n»..ft..mrrie(J..W.Qfn^n, 
hereinafter called "Grantee", whose address is Qrderyille.,.. .Utah 84758 
herewith deliver to you in escrow, the documents and property hereinafter described, to be held and dis-
posed of by you in accordance with the following instructions and upon the terms and conditions herein-
after set forth, to which the undersigned hereby agree. 
PAPERS, INSTRUMENTS, MONEY and/or PROPERTY DEPOSITED: 
1. Trust Deed Note. 
++ ++ ++ ++ ++ -M- ++ 
YOUR INSTRUCTIONS ARE AS FOLLOWS: 
You are hereby authorized and directed to deliver the above described documents and property to 
Grantee upon payment to you, at your above address, for the Grantor of the total sum of $~XX.XXXXMXX, 
principal, ($ ^/A having already been paid by the Grantee to the Grantor on an original prin-
cipal amount of $ N/A )
 a n d interest on the unpaid balance thereof at NOfte per cent per 
annum from WA ,19 , to be paid as follows: 
The Sum of $30.00 monthly, beginning September 15, 1980, and a like amount on 
the 15th day of each and every month thereafter, until the sum of $10,000.00 is 
paid in full or until the death of the Grantor above named, which ever occurs 
f i rs t . 
++ +• ++ + ++ ++ ++ 
Remit payment to the account of the above named Grantor in the office of State 
Bank of Southern Utah, Orderville, Utah. 
(OVER) 
The undersigned hereby agree as follows: 
1. The Stotc Rnnk of Southern t'tnh (hereinafter called the- "bank"), is not a party, or 
bound by any agreement which may be evidenced by or arise out of the foregoing" instructions. 
2. The bank is hereby authorized to receive any or all such payments or any part thereof at any 
time after the dates herein specified therefor and prior to receipt of notice of default delivered to the 
bank in writing by Grantor. 
3. The bank acts hereunder as a depositary only, and is not responsible or liable in any manner 
whatever for the sufficiency, correctness, genuineness or validity of any instrument deposited with it 
hereunder, or with respect to the form or execution of the same, or the identity, authority, or rights of 
any person executing or depositing the same. 
4. The bank shall not be required to take or be bound by notice of any default of any person, or 
to take any action with respect to such default involving any expense or liability, unless notice in writing 
is given an officer of the bank of such default by the undersigned or any of them, and unless it is indem-
nified in a manner satisfactory to it against any such expense or liability. 
5. The bank shall be protected in acting upon any notice, request, waiver, consent, receipt or other 
paper or document believed by the bank to be genuine and to be signed by the proper party or parties. 
6. The bank shall not be liable for any error of judgment or for any act done or step taken or 
omitted by it in good faith, or for any mistake of fact or law, or for anything which it may do or refrain 
from doing in connection herewith, except its own wilful misconduct. 
7. The bank shall not be answerable for the default or misconduct of any agent, attorney or em-
ployee appointed by it if such agent or employee shall have been selected with reasonable care. 
8. The bank may advise with legal counsel in the event of any dispute or question as to the con-
struction of the foregoing instructions, or the bank's duties thereunder and the bank shall incur no liabili-
ty and shall be fully protected in acting in accordance with the opinion and instructions of such counsel. 
9. The bank shall have a first lien on the property and papers held by it hereunder, for its com-
pensation and for any costs, liability, expense or counsel fees it may incur. 
10. In the event of any disagreement between the undersigned or any of them, and/or the person 
or persons named in the foregoing instruction, and/or any other person, resulting in adverse claims and de-
mands being made in connection with or for any papers, money or property involved herein or affected 
hereby, the bank shall be entitled at its option to refuse to comply with any such claim or demand, so 
long as such disagreement shall continue, and in so refusing the bank may make no delivery or other dis-
position of any money, papers or property involved herein or affected hereby and in so doing the bank shall 
not be or become liable to the undersigned or any of them or to any person named in the foregoing in-
structions for its failure or refusal to comply with such conflicting or adverse demands; and the bank 
shall be entitled to continue so to refrain and refuse so to act until: 
(1) The rights of the adverse claimants have been finally adjudicated in a court assuming 
and having jurisdiction of the parties and the money, papers and property involved here-
in or affected hereby; and/or 
(2) All differences shall have been adjusted by agreement and the bank shall have been no-
tified thereof in writing signed by all of the persons interested. 
11. No assignment or transfer of this escrow agreement or of any documents or property, includ-
ing money, held in this escrow or of any interest therein can be made, but said documents and property 
may be withdrawn and this escrow agreement terminated by mutual consent. 
12. The undersigned agree to pay to the bank the sum of $ as an acceptance 
fee with respect to its services hereunder for one year from the date hereof and further hereby agree to 
pay the bank an additional fee of one-tenth of one per cent of all funds received hereunder, provided how-
ever, that a minimum fee of $ shall be charged for each payment received. It is also 
agreed that additional compensation shall also be paid to the bank for any additional or extraordinary ser-
vices it may be required to render hereunder. Sh$i*l*!xi!W>*ttHKW 
*ft^&*a;4x^>d*»KxrixtahK)w>fx^ 
tot ttxtchx/ttwx H K rf xxotwo: x i x;*xwxt>b^x9odhxRKJwyx^ 
tt^ xtt > $ ^ W*n& *MRlx *MHp^ 
righk nailxaxbcor*toyxjwdbtox>w^ 
m**W*h*Wxfcx *x )hanMH*x»x 
ETsTe''Brinkerhbff '" Betty fi- Es'pl &,8&LL 
Jljfl 
~&*£:}U^j£A..L:xaJiAslJ*-&-s - :..-
4r 
GRANTOR GRANTEE 
The State Hunk of Southern Utah hereby acknowledges receipt of the letter of instructions 
of which the foregoing is a copy and of the papers, money or property therein referred to and agrees to 
hold and dispose of the same in accordance with said instructions and upon the terms and conditions 
above set forth. 
STATE IMAKOF SOUTHERN ITAI1 
Date: 19 By.. 
Received from The State Bonk of Southern Utnh all of the papers and documents referred 
to above. 
Date: li) -... 
A - ^ 
'r;*r~ 
TRUST DEED NOTE 
DO NOT DESTROY THIS NOTE: Whan paid, this note, wilh Trust Deed securing tome, mutt be surrendered 
to Trustee for cancellation, before reconveyance will be made. 
$. J.9>999:99 Glenda.le>..U.tah 
.....Auflust J.5
 t 19..80 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned, jointly and severally, promise to pay to the order of 
nsi^.Br.inkerh^ff.,..A..wijclow 
The..Sum..of 
TEN..TH0US^ ($..10,000.00. ), 
together with interest from date at the rate of NONE per cent (.. 0 */c) per annum on 
the unpaid principal, said principal and interest payable as follows: 
The Sum of $30.00 monthly, beginning September 15, 1980 and a like amount on 
the 15th day of each and every month thereafter, until the entire balance 
is paid in full. 
Each payment shall be applied first to accrued interest and the balance to the reduction of principal. Any 
such installment not paid when due shall bear interest thereafter at the rate of NONE per 
cent ( 0—%) p^r annum until paid. 
If default occurs in the payment of said installments of principal and interest or any part thereof, or in 
the performance of any agreement contained in the Trust Deed securing this note, the holder hereof, at its 
option and without notice or demand, may declare the entire principal balance and accrued interest due and 
payable. 
If this note is collected by an attorney after default in the payment of principal or interest, either with 
or without suit, the undersigned, jointly and severally, agree to pay all costs and expenses of collection including 
a reasonable attorney's fee. 
The makers, sureties, guarantors and endorsers hereof severally waive presentment for payment, demand 
and notice of dishonor and nonpayment of this note, and consent to any and all extensions of time, renewals, 
waivers or modifications that may be granted by the holder hereof with respect to the payment or other pro-
visions of this note, and to the release of any security, or any part thereof, with or without substitution. 
This note is secured by a Trust Deed of even date herewith. 
BLANK NO. 613 O CIM no co — »aio to a«oo CAST — SALT LAM CITV 
0 0 £ 
ESCROW AGREEMENT 
Escrow No _ 
AUSUSOS 19.B0... 
STATE IIAISK OF SOUTHERN UTAH 
Orderville, Utah 
_ ! , Utah 
Gentlemen: 
The undersigned, (Seller) £ l s j e j r j n ^ 
hereinafter called "Grantor", whose address is .?.]endale.,...Utah 84729. 
and (Buyer) -Ar.l£ne..R....Goulding,...a..married woman, 
hereinafter called "Grantee", whose address is .?J.?/?.d.?.l?.!.M*h..M?M 
herewith deliver to you in escrow, the documents and property hereinafter described, to be held and dis-
posed of by you in accordance with the following instructions and upon the tenns and conditions herein-
after set forth, to which the undersigned hereby agree. 
PAPERS, INSTRUMENTS, MONEY and/or PROPERTY DEPOSITED: 
1. Trust Deed Note. 
++ ++ ++ ++ -H ++ ++ ++ 
YOUR INSTRUCTIONS ARE AS FOLLOWS: 
You are hereby authorized and directed to deliver the above described documents and property to 
Grantee upon payment to you, at your above address, for the Grantor of the total sum of $.??M?.??.5f.!f.X 
principal, ($ HZ A. having already been paid by the Grantee to the Grantor on an original prin-
cipal amount of $ H/A ) and interest on the unpaid balance thereof at....?!?!??. per cent per 
annum from Jy.A ,19 , to be paid as follows: 
The Sum of $30.00 monthly, beginning September 15, 1980, and a like amount on 
the 15th day of each and every month thereafter, until the sum of $10,000.00 
has been paid or until the death of the Grantor above named, whichever occurs 
f i rs t . 
4+ + + + ++ ++ ++ ++ 
Remit payment to the account of the Grantor above named at State Bank ofSouthern 
Utah, Orderville, Utah. 
(OVER) ' £^~ yxTf 
The undersigned hereby agree as follows: 
1. The State Bank of Southern Utah (hereinafter called the "bank"), is not a party, or 
bound by any agreement which may be evidenced by or arise out of the foregoing instructions. 
2. The bank is hereby authorized to receive any or all such payments or any part thereof at any 
.time after the dates herein specified therefor and prior to receipt of notice of default delivered to the 
bank in writing by Grantor. 
3. The bank acts hereunder as a depositary only, and is not responsible or liable in any manner 
whatever for the sufficiency, correctness, genuineness or validity of any instrument deposited with it 
hereunder, or with respect to the form or execution of the same, or the identity, authority, or rights of 
any person executing or depositing the same. 
4. The bank shall not be required to take or be bound by notice of any default of any person, or 
to take any action with respect to such default involving any expense or liability, unless notice in writing 
is given an officer of the bank of such default by the undersigned or any of them, and unless it is indem-
nified in a manner satisfactory to it against any such expense or liability. 
5. The bank shall be protected in acting upon any notice, request, waiver, consent, receipt or other 
paper or document believed by the bank to be genuine and to be signed by the proper party or parties. 
6. The bank shall not be liable for any error of judgment or for any act done or step taken or 
omitted by it in good faith, or for any mistake of fact or law, or for anything which it may do or refrain 
from doing in connection herewith, except its own wilful misconduct. 
7. The bank shall not be answerable for the default or misconduct of any agent, attprney or em-
ployee appointed by it if such agent or employee shall have been selected with reasonable care. 
8. The bank may advise with legal counsel in the event of any dispute or question as to the con-
struction of the foregoing instructions, or the bank's duties thereunder and the bank shall incur no liabili-
ty and shall be fully protected in acting in accordance with the opinion and instructions of such counsel. 
9. The bank shall have a first lien on the property and papers held by it hereunder, for its com-
pensation and for any costs, liability, expense or counsel fees it may incur. 
10. In the event of any disagreement between the undersigned or any of them, and/or the person 
or persons named in the foregoing instruction, and/or any other person, resulting in adverse claims and de-
mands being made in connection with or for any papers, money or property involved herein or affected 
hereby, the bank shall be entitled at its option to refuse to comply with any such claim or demand, so 
long as such disagreement shall continue, and in so refusing the bank may make no delivery or other dis-
position of any money, papers or property involved herein or affected hereby and in so doing the bank shall 
* not be or become liable to the undersigned or any of them or to any person named in the foregoing in-
structions for its failure or refusal to comply with such conflicting or adverse demands; and the bank 
shall be entitled to continue so to refrain and refuse so to act until: 
(1) The rights of the adverse claimants have been finally adjudicated in a court assuming 
and having jurisdiction of the parties and the money, papers and property involved here-
in or affected hereby; and/or 
(2) All differences shall have been adjusted by agreement and'the bank shall have been no-
tified thereof in writing signed by all of the persons interested. 
11. No assignment or transfer of this escrow agreement or of any documents or property, includ-
ing money, held in this escrow or of any interest therein can be made, but said documents and property 
may be withdrawn and this escrow agreement terminated by mutual consent. 
12. The undersigned agree to pay to the bank the sum of $ as an acceptance 
fee W'ith respect to its services hereunder for one year from the date hereof and further hereby agree to 
pay the bank an additional fee of one-tenth of one per cent of all funds received hereunder, provided how-
gver, that a minimum fee of $ shall be charged for each payment received. It is also 
agreed that additional compensation shall also be paid to the bank for any additional or extraordinary ser-
vices it may be required to render hereunder. )(xbaM>AOW»ra>mxbojiM5^ 
a * ^ w * * m K * R ^ x * > t e x k 9 ^ 
f «K *JMtto x^wexwx imA MXk»*X)X»x AtxaX >aoxhxixup»iou<d«owroxHkx*xiww^ 
a»*xkfcXh«>©w<^xattiK»ja»M*kxhx^ 
riyfaxsKd xi )bernbr*xM*th»wiK<* xtreMk*RW^tocKk»K>4x^^ 
rawiU>b^al)4xjxit(>«K<>uwJorx / ^ i ) \ 
VV!I?.1;,vaU.^J.^..,.iiA.V:A:-
Elsie Brinkerhoff Arlene B. Goulding n •.JZZJ^IAJSA^ • -
"GRANTOR ""• GRANTEE 
The State Bank of Southern Utah hereby acknowledges receipt of the letter of instructions 
of which the foregoing is a copy and of the papers, money or property therein referred to and agrees to 
hold and dispose of the same in accordance with said instructions and upon the termg and conditions 
above set forth. 
STATE BANK CNP SOUTHERN UTAH 
Date: - 19 
By - - -
Received from The State Bank of Southern Utah all of the papers and documents referred 
/e. 
p a t e : 10 -••-
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To whom It may concern: 
If Elsie Brlnkerhoff, have received from Cloyd 
2.nd Hark Brlnkerhoff, as payment on property, 
Jf3 ?,<)&§
 : • ^ v 
Signed: 
STATE OF UTAH ) SS. 
County of Kane 
0 n t h is (^ h day of Q-^JLJ n ? ^ $ personally 
appeared before me Elsie Srinkerhoff
 9 the signer 
of the above and foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledged 
to me that she executed the same, 
' ftMress 
1 ? / ^ s XU i r V U Wl/irlT-* '«iy«» 
Notary Public 
Residing at JfXu^ht^ Ut&A, 
4-^3! 
r 
t. 
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BISHOP 6 RONNOW, P.C. 
Willard R. Bishop 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
P. 0. Box 279 
Cedar City, UT 84720 
Telephone: (801) 586-9483 
IN THB SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF KANE COUNTY, 
STATE OP UTAH 
MONT R. ANDERSON, Personal 
Representative of the Estate 
of CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF, 
LENA BRINKERHOFF, and MARK J. 
BRINKERHOFF, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, GOLDA B. 
ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF, 
ARLENE B. GOULDING, and JOHN 
DOES I through V, 
Defendants. 
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, Defendant in the above-entitled action, 
agrees and stipulates as follows: 
1. That the certain agreement dated October 26, 1966 
(hereinafter "Agreement" attached as Exhibit "A"), executed by 
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, Seller, and CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF and MARK J. 
BRINKERHOFF, Buyers, together with any other agreement containing 
substantially the same terms, is a valid and binding contract 
which she executed without coercion, and with full knowledge and 
understanding of its provisions and duties, 
2. That she agrees to conform to the terms of the Agreement, 
and perform all conditions and duties provided and imposed 
thereunder, including specific performance on her part. 
/ •'• I I. HI lIHJfl 
2 PLAINTIFFS 
m 
STIPULATION 
Civil No. 1826 
p,-^y 
3. That she recognizes she improperly attempted to convey 
land to others contrary to the terms of the Agreement, and hereby 
repudiates a certain Warranty Deed dated June 4, 1919, (Exhibit 
"B") purporting to convey to ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, MARK J. 
BRINKERHOFF, and CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF, as Joint Tenants, the same 
property conveyed under the Agreement, and further repudiates any 
other deeds or instruments of conveyance which have the effect of 
divesting or in any way diminishing the right, title, and 
interest of buyers and their wives, in the property specified in 
the Agreement. 
4. That she acknowledges the receipt of $2,000 from the 
Buyers, and/or their heirs, MARK J. BRINKERHOFF and LENA A. 
BRINKERHOFF, for the 1983 payment pursuant to the terms of the 
Agreement. 
5. That she forgives and waives all rights to any and all 
delinquent amounts currently due under the Agreement. 
6. That she recognizes the validity of a certain affidavit 
dated April 13, 1971, (attached as Exhibit nC") , and reaffirms 
the statements contained therein and further agrees to cooperate 
and assist Plaintiffs in the litigation of their claims against 
other named Defendants in the above-entitled action. 
7. That her Amended Counterclaim against the Plaintiffs and 
her Crossclaim against MARK J. BRINKERHOFF, as filed in this 
action, shall be dismissed with prejudice and upon the merits. 
8. That the Court shall enter a decree of specific 
performance against her. 
-2-
In consideration for the Stipulation specified above, 
Plaintiffs hereby stipulate as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs will not seek any award of damages against 
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF under their Second Amended Complaint. 
2. Plaintiffs will reimburse Defendants, GOLDA B. ADAIR, 
WARREN BRINKERHOFF, and ARLENE B. GOULDING for the amounts paid 
to ELSIE BRINKERHOFF for the purported transfer of properties 
specified under the Warranty Deed dated June 4, 1979, Exhibit 
"B", in return for the said Defendants1 Agreement to drop all 
their claims filed in the above-entitled lawsuit and dismiss the 
same with prejudice. If said Defendants do not dismiss said 
claims before 20 September 1984, Plaintiffs shall be under no 
obligation of reimbursement. 
3. That the above-entitled Court may enter its Order and 
judgment in conformance with this Stipulation and Plaintifffs 
prayer for relief as specified in their Second Amended Complaint. 
DATED this 0*- day of September, ,1984 . 
ELSIE B R j t f K E R H O F F j T 
STATE OF UTAH 
County of 
On the £ •a 
) 
:ss. 
) 
day of 5, *P , 1984, personally 
appeared before me ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, Defendant named in the 
I 
-3-
A~^>J 
above-entitled action, the signer of the above and foregoing 
instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that she executed the 
same. 
NOTAR ijUng at: / 
/^77X^ 
DATED th day-.of September, 
WILLARD R. BISHOP 
Attorney for Plaintiff*-
STATE OF UTAH 
County of 
ss. 
zA On the /0 day of r/n^ U^U < 1984, personally 
appeared before me WILLARD R. BISHOP, attorney for Plaintiff 
ANDERSON in the above-entitled action, the signer of the above 
and foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledged to roe that he 
executed the same. 
,M//M fwb. 
NOTARY PUBLIC, resi 
mmission expires: 
i/Mypti/ ?J 
My Co
iding at: 
•J/£MkJ> 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a full, true and correct copy 
of the above and foregoing STIPULATION to Mr. Hans Q. 
Chamberlain, CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE, Attorneys at Law, 110 North 
Main Street, Suite G, Cedar City, Utah 84720, by first class 
mail, postage fully prepaid this day of , 
1984. 
A--^37 
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T1US AGREEMENT, mado end entered Into by find botwon ElSIC'tRIHXCRHCFrl 
of GI coda to, County of t'ono, Stota of Utah, PARTY OF TIC FIR3T PART, herein-
a f t e r roforrod to t% tho '•SELLER" ond CLOYD H. GRIKICSHOFF ond MARC inirHCftCTF 
of Glondolo, County of tana, Stato of Virt, PARTIES OF P.IZ SECOND PART, tioreln-
e f t o r referred to as tho "BUYERS"| 
HiIli£I5.£I!iJ 
THAT Vir.REAS# tho SELLER U tho ovner of tho r e * I property, smzln;;. 
pr ivi leges ond voter r ighto In tho Slatos of Utah t\n6 Arizona; 
AlO VI ERE AS
 # tho EUYERS dcclro to purcLaso tho scoo; 
v AID WCREAS, tho prxtlos havo ogrood upon icmt ond condi l l tns \zr vh 
sale thareof; 
IKW THEREFOR!, In consideration of the prenlscs end of f ,o r i t u a l 
covenants ond agrocnonvo horolnaftor t c t a i t the pnrtler. hcrolnMtor :tc,r^-> V»1T;> 
ond t>e1vocn ooo oncthor os fof lo*sj 
1 . Thot for ond In consideration of tho t o t a l tun of F I R Y Tir.v-.E 
TH0U3A.\O TirXE HUMMED T.|C*nY-EIC«T (S53,30S%00) DOLLARS, as tho f u l l considcra-j 
t lon thorofor, tho SELLER covenants ct\4 ogrooe to t o l l and tl»o BUYERS covenant 
end agree to buy tho following tiascrlbcd rcol property, grsrlng pr iv i leges £n<! 
votor ond rosorvolr t ights In tho Statoo of Utah ond Arlzonai; 
REAL PROPERTY \U HILLASD COUTHY, UTAMi 
Lota 1 , 2 , 3 , and /., Block 25, Plot *A», Oolto Tar-melt*. 
l o t 2 , Block 26, Plot W , a?Its Tovnsltc 
HEAL PROPERTY 111 KANE COUNTY, UTAHt 
Township 39 South, Rango 4 j Kent, Salt Lcko Meridian: 
Vest To If of Section 25", containing 320 ocrcs. 
Ibrthv-cst Quortorj Southeast Charier and tho South it* I f 
of tho Ibrthcnst Quarter CDntrlnlr.g O D ocrcs, a l l In 
Section '/0, Township :>j Sooth, Konge l \ l o s t , Salt Laka 
Meridian, contolnlng 400 acrev, *a fe or loss. 
to t * 1 , ?# 3, ond /.; Sauthoast Qmartor of tho Nc.rth-
tcst Quartor; Uartheast Quirtor of tho Southwest 
Quarter; Lust lU l f of 1ho Lout l l \ i f ; S^l ln.ost v e r i e r 
of the i::»rthojst Qu*Tlcr; lbr»hv.-o?5t v»\;jrtor of tho 
Southeast O-'urtcr o< f t c t l o ^ 2?# 1o^i»r.hto 3'> Sojti\# 
IITACO '.J V.cst, containing V/D.O^ tcroa . 
EXHIBlf ''A1 
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Eost Half of tho Morthoist CiKJrtorj South Half of tba 
Southeast Qu.Mrtor; Northuort Quarter of tho Southeast 
^ jar tor of Soctlon 35, containing 200 ocros. 
Township 40 South, Rar\QQ 4 J West, Sal t Lako Meridian! 
Section ?0: Southvost Quarter of tho Karfhoant Quarter; 
lost lb If of tho Southeast Quarter and tho Southoast Quarter 
of tho Southwest Quarter, containing 160 acres. 
Soctlon 30: North-root Quarter; East lb If of tho Southwost 
Quartor, containing 23*J.W ocrcs. 
Soctlon 5t Lot 2, containing 3J.03 ocros. 
Township 40 South, Range 4 Vost, Salt Lako Meridian: 
Soutfnvoct Quarter of tho Northwest Quarter of Soctlon B, 
containing 40 ccros. 
Tovnshlp 40 South, Range 7 West. Salt Lo!;o Meridian: 
Poglnnlng at tha Southvost Corner of the Southv.ost Quarter of 
tho Southeast Qusrtor of Section 73, Township 40 South, Ranro 
7 Vost, Salt Luko Moridlcn and running thence Cast 10.23 
chains; thenco North 60* Vest 6.36 chains; thenco Kost 3.5?; 
chains; thonco South 1 chain to beginning, containing .74 
acres. 
Doglnnlng at tho Narth*est Corner of tha Narthwost Quarter of 
tho Northeast Quarter of Section 26, Tovnshlp 40 South, Ringo 
7 Kost, end running thenco Soulh 4,30 chains; 1 hence Ssuth 70* 
East 15 chains to tho middle of tho channel of 1ho creek; thenco 
Northwesterly olong tho mlddlo of tho channel of to ld crook to 
tho North Lino of sold Northeast Quartor of tho flarthoast 
Quarter; thonco Lost 11.23 chains to tho placo of boglnnlng. 
Doglnnlr.g 4.30 chains South of tb * Nortlmoat Corner of tho 
Northwest Quortcr of the Northeart Quarter of Section 2C, 
Township 40 South, Range 7 l o s t . Sa l t Loko Marldlan 9nd run* 
nlng thanco South 70* East 13 chains to tho middle of the 
chonnol of tho creek; thence Southerly along the middle of 
tho channel of said creek to tha South Line; thonco North 
73*45t vest 14.00 chains; thonco North 4.30 chains to tho 
placo of beginning, containing 5.60 ocros.
 y 
Thd obovo throo tracts bolng part of land situated In Soctlons 
23 ond 26 of said tounshlp end range, soaotlmes roforrod to 
unof f ic ia l ly as Lot MA". 
Tovnshlp 40 South, Ronyo 4 | Host, Sal t Lako Moridlon! 
Lot 1 ; Northeast Quartor of tho Uorthvost Quartor of Soctlon 
3 1 , containing 75.30 acres. 
M3 
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pcnsceiAi rropcRTYi 
*\ Tho following described water and reservoir r igh ts ! 
A ono«fourth Intorost In Mobblo Canyon Reservoir (9-56-1?) 
In Mohovo County, Arizona. 
A ona half Intarost In Sul l ivan Rocorvolr In Mohavo County, 
Arizona. 
And a l l grazing prlvl logos nnd p o m l t i annexed to or b'.iod 
upon any of tho vcrogolng r e a l , personal, reservoir , or terror 
r ights as co.nvcncuroto. 
2. Tho parties rgroo that for and In consideration of tho calo by tho 
SELLER to tl*> BUYERS of tho foregoing rani and pers:>:ial property, viitor ^nd 
rcccrvolr r ights and grazing pr lv l logos, tha SLIVERS w i l l w to tho SELLER t;ia 
su-3 of TWO THOUSAND (S?,0DD.0D) DOLLARS, each yoar, beginning v l t i i the 1st oV/ 
of Msvombor, 1964, of *hlch payments CKJO on fbvtnbor 1 , 19G4 and Ho tender 1 , 
r;C5 aro hereby acknowledged by tho SELLER f r o * tho DUVERS and the fX//;T.S * l I I 
contlnuo to pay annual In'Jtalloants of 12,033.03 on tho 1st day of N'ovou'jor In 
oach year thoroaftar beginning fbvettbor 1 , 1966 and continuing during tho cntlr<| 
I I fo of tho SELLER. 
Tho BUYERS agrco that thoy w i l l pay tho sum of S2,003.03 per your to 
tho SELLER for tho ontlro roaalndor of SELLER'S I I to Irrospoctlvo of tho Amount 
tihlch tvay ba paid undor th is contract whotlier I t axceods tho t o l a I consideration 
horclnabovo sot out or whothor that t o t a l amount shal l not be paid by applying 
annual paynonts of $2,003.03 against tha purchaco price d j r lng tho I I fo tlw> of 
tho SELLER and In conclderation of on undertaking by tho 0UYERS to pay tho 
asKXjnt of $2,000.03 por yoar lor tho I f f o of tho SELLER Irrcspoctlvo of tho 
ftaount which cway bo paid, tho SELLER walv03 Intorost upon tl*> unpaid balancos. 
I t I t provldod, howovor, that ohould tho t o t a l consideration horoln-
abovo provldod not bo paid by tho BUYERS to tho SELLER during SELLER'S l l fot lrx* 
than upon tho doath of tho SELLER any amount* remaining undor th is Agreement 
of tor credi t ing a l l psyoo.nta which havo boon nodo horoundar, fchall bo paid 
annually as provided horoln In oqual sharoo, ctoroa and t)wrx> a l l k o , to 
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lerren Orlnkorhoff ond Charley Arlond Drlnkorhoff tvo-sovonths (2/7ths) (1//ths 
to each) of tho balances duo ( I t belnrj ctlpuloted ttot the OLIVERS togothor * l th 
Karron Drlnkorhof<, Chorloy Arlond Crlnkorhoff, totty B. Esplln, Colda B. Adjir, 
end Arlono B. Gouldlng constitute a l l tho holrs at Inw of tho SELLER ond that 
other provision has been rasdo for the lattor thrc<i no-nod holrs), together kit;-, 
Interest at four itf) nor coat per ennua on the dofcrrod declining toloncca. 
The Ct/YCRS icy, nt ony time, prepay oil or cny pirt of tho regaining 
principal duo under this contract. 
3. Tho SELLER chnf f oxocuto o Varrnnty Dood to the roM pro^srty 
herolnebovo described and quitclaim convcynncos to tho v»atcr ot\d reservoir 
rights hcrolnefovc described, of en undlvtdod one ho If Interest to och GUYLR 
end his vlfe oa Joint tenants with ful l rights of survivorship, end ^h-sll 
deposit told Instruments In tho Hurrlcono Drnnch of tho Bnnk of St. George 
vhlch shall hold those documents In truot end In escrow subject to tho follovirnl 
ESCROW t risTntxrri crn 
If the BUYERS shell mako e l l payments of principal ond Interest herein 
provided ond perform oi l the other covenants and agreements herein eontelnod, 
then \$^ot\ payment of tho final Installmont due hereunder the Escrov Depository I 
shall dollvor to tho KJYCRS el l the cscrovod documents, j 
In the ovent of a default In the psynont of any Instoll^nt of principal 
or Interest tnd In, tho event of a default In any other term or condition herein 
end In tho event notice of a default other than for paymont of principal and 
Interest shall bo given to tho BUYERS by the SAILER and a subsequent fal lure 
to remedy the tome shall contlnuo for a porlod of thirty (30) days, iho<\ tho 
SELLER nsy# at her option, dorwnd a redelivery to her of oil of the occrovod i 
docuftwnts vhoreupon the BUYERS will vacate and peaceably currondor ni l of the 
promises herelnobovo descrlbod and the SELLER msy ro-entor Into poosossloncf 
the ***» without furthor process end my retain as rent ond liquidated dorv3£os 
e l l sums ti>orotof ore paid by BUYERS under this Agroonont. 
A ' ^ 
/ 
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As fin a l te rna t ive ronacdy tha SELLER raay olcct t o roduco any payment 
or a l l payments, accelerating ond entering tho ont t r * balenco of principal ond 
Intcrost Imaac'lotoly, to Judjwnt or mjy tovo cold rarady on ooo or ooro sue* 
coccivo or Intermittent occasions or uay oloct to t rea t th is Agroaiwnt us a 
noto ond mortgage passing t l t l o through to tha EtftfERS ond foreclosing tho SCJSO 
In tho oanocr provldud by low. 
During tho porlod tho OUYEHS oro complying with tho terms of th is 
Agreement, thoy shal l bo en t i t l ed to tho solo, cxcluslvo, and bonoflclcl use, 
occupancy, ond onjoy-wnt of tho above descrlbod provisos subjoct only to tho 
r ights of tho SELLER to Inspect tho saraa ot rosson^blo tlmos, 
4 , Tho BUYEGS havo Inspected sold prenlsos ond f ind tho SUAO in a 
^annor satisfactory to thea and thoro oro'no covenants or warranties orhor 
than cxprossly sot for th horoln. 
5. Tlrao shal l l>o of tho ossonca as t o a l l tho torms end conditions of 
th is Agreement which shal l bind and Inure to tho borioflt of tho ha i rs , suc~ 
cossors, end assigns of tho part ies hereto and tho party In default agrees to 
pay a l l costs and a reasonable attorney's foo In tho ovent onforco^ont of th is 
conlract Is roqulrod. " j 
UITUESS tha hands of tho parties hereto th is
 m /& , day of t„&*•*. # | 
fcifsl OyUrlnkor ho TT py 
SELLER 
V / C l o y d H. Drlr.Ucrh>?F 
OLWTRS 
/&* Sr-yf^tf: 
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Elsie Br inkerhof f , a widow, 
of Glendale 
CONVEY tnd WARRANT to 
, County of Kane 
grantor 
, State of Utth, htrtby 
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, a widow, MARK J . BRINKERHOFF, a 
married man, and CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF, a married man, 
a l l as Joint Tenants w i th f u l l r ights of surv ivorship , 
and not as Tenants in Common, t j 
of Glendale, Utah 84729 
$10.00 & other valuable considerat ion-
tht following described tracts of land in KANE 
Start of Utah: 
li grantat $ 
for tht turn of J 
-^•COLLARS, 
County, 
SEE SCHEDULE "A" ATTACHED HERETO AND BY THIS REFERENCE MADE A PART HEREOF. 
*** 
WITNESS, tht hand of said grantor , this 4th day of 
Signtd in tht Presence of 
June , A. 0. 19 7 9 . 
Els ie Br inkerhoff /< 
11 
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STATE OF UTAH 
County of Kane SS. ) 
On tht 4th day of June A. 0., 19 79 personally 
appeared btfort me E ls ie Br inkerhof f , a widow, 
the signer of tht within instniment who duly acknowledged 
to me that S ht txecuttd tht same. 
. . ^ j » ^ . . / ^ . ^ ^ L t _ 
James B. Adair Notary Public 
fcty frtftmibiiM txpires ..June...19.....1979. My residence is ...Orrtery.lU.B.t-.U.UIi.. 
IOVTMIM * f AM m i l CtMtANf . f • to. T - Rw* . * * MKI 
w. w..v UM^V i.iii i
 lL->io/% me. iouifiweu uuarier of the Northeast Quarter (SWliNEH) 
and the Northwest nuarter of the Southeast Ouarter (NW^SE1*) of Section 27, 
TownshiD 39 South, Range 4S West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, containing 478.80 
acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 4: The East Half of the Northeast Quarter (EV»E»*); the South Half of 
ihe Southeast Ouarter (SSSEM and Northwest Ouarter of the Southeast Ouarter 
(NWHSE**) of Section 35, Townshio 39 South, Ranne 4S West, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian, containing 200.0 acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 5: The Southwest Ouarter of the Northeast Ouarter (SWWE»*); the West 
flaYTof the Southeast Ouarter (WS>SEl4) and the Southeast Quarter of the Southwest 
Ouarter (SE»*SWV) of Section 29, Townshio 40 South, Ranqe 4S West, Salt Lake Base 
and Meridian, containing 160.0 acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 6: The Northwest Ouarter (NWHj and the East Half of the Southwest 
Quarter of Section 30, Townshio 40 South, Ranne 4S West, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian, containino 238.99 acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 7: Lot 2, Section 5, Townshio 40 South, Range 44 West, Salt Lake Base 
and Meridian, containino 39.08 acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 8: The Southwest Ouarter of the Northwest Ouarter (SW»iNW4) of Section 
8, TownlKio 40 South, Ranne 4 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, containing 
40.0 acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 9: Lot 1 and the Northeast Ouarter of the Northwest Ouarter (NEWW1*) 
bisection 31, Townshio 40 South, Ranae 4l, West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, 
contalnlnq 79.30 acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 10: BEGINNING at the North Quarter Corner of Section 26, Township 40 
South, Range 7 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence South 
0°35' West 567.60 feet; thence South 78°Q0' East 963.6 feet; thence North-
westerly along the creek bed, 808.0 feet, more or less, to the Horth line of 
Section 26; thence South 89°57l West 741.18 feet to the point of beginning. 
Containing 11.77 acres, more or less. 
PARCEL 11: BEGINNING at the Southwest Comer of the Southwest Quarter of 
tFe Southeast Quarter of Section 23, Township 40 SoOth, R a n g e d West, Salt 
Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence East 10.23 chains; thence North 
80° West 6.36 chains; thence West 3.68 chains; thence South i.O chain to the 
point of beginning. Containing 0.74 acres, more or less. 
+4 44 44 4 4 44 ++ 44 
W 
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COUNTY OF KANE ) 
BEFORE ME, the undersigned Notary Public, personally appeared 
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, who stated under oath, as follows: 
That she has sold Real Property described hereinafter to Mark J. 
Brinkerhoff and Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff, and that she will defend the rights of own-
ership and also any rights of way of ingress or egress to the said Real Property. 
That she will enter into a lawsuit or any other procedure needed to protect these 
rights of ingress or egress, to said property. 
The real property is described as follows: 
BEGINNING at the South Quarter Corner of Section 23, Township 40 South, Range 7 
West, Salt Lake Meridian, Utah, and running thence East 10.23 chains; thence North 
80° West 6.36 cahins; thence West 3.68 chains; thence South 1 chain to the point 
of beginning. 
ALSO BEGINKING at the North Quarter Corner of Section 26, Tovnship 40 South, Range 
7 West, Salt Lake teridian, Utah, and running thence South 8.6 chains; thence South 
73*45' East 14.6 chains; thence Northwesterly along the middle of the channel of 
the creek to the North boundary line of said Section 26; thence West 11.23 chains 
to the point of beginning. Containing 11.77 acres 
Total acres: 12.51 
That the Affiant will at any time help to defend and protect the 
rights of Mark J. Brinkerhoff and Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff as far as the Real Property 
is concerned. 
Qt^^JjAA+i^/H/A/fo* 
Elsie Brinkerhoff 
^ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this / / day of April, A.D. 1971, /? 
• - • ' - - ^-y / ' / > • 
Nota 
Residing i::T(Oa~>^ ^-^ 
My commission expires 
'l/.^/f^1-i \ / 
EXHIBIT "CM 
I) t-j \./ U-i 
OCT I 6 1984 
Y\ 
& 
Glendale, Utah 
October 7, 1984 
Willard R. Bishop 
36 No 300 West 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Dear Mr. Bishop, 
Request is hereby made to Mr, Willard R. Bishop to act 
as counsel for and in behalf of Elsie J. Brinkerhoff. 
Yours sincerely, 
Elsie J. Brinkerhoff 
§ 3 8 1 PLKADING 01A Am Jur 2d 
variance would result where the precise nature of the defect in the machinery 
or apparatus causing the injury is within the defendant's knowledge and any 
surprise which might exist from the defect proved would be to the plaintiil.M 
A variance as to the cause of the death of a person87 or an ; nimal88 from the 
wrongful acts of others may not be fatal. 
As hereinafter shown,69 a party cannot generally declare in u>rt and recover 
on proof of a contract. In such cases, of course, there is a variance between 
the allegations and the proof. But no variance arises in an action in tort where 
the evidence discloses a written contract, although the complaint merely 
alleges a contract in general terms by way of inducement.60 
XIX. CONFORMITY OF JUDGMENT TO PLEADINGS [§§ 382-388] 
A. IN GENERAL [§§ 382, 383] 
§ 382. Generally. 
Decrees in equity61 and judgments at law62 must have a basis in the pleadings 
and the evidence. A party's proof cannot materially vary from his allegations,63 
and the verdict64 and judgment65 must respond to the issues as raised by the 
pleadings. The parties should be confined in their recovery to that to which 
they are entitled within their allegations.68 It is not upon the evidence alone, 
but upon the pleadings and the evidence applicable to the pleadings, that the 
plaintiff can in any case recover.67 This seems to be a principle necessary to 
the due administration of justice in the courts,68 and its observance is neces-
sary in order to give the judgment the merit of finality of an adjudication 
between the parties.69 
56. Willey v Boston Electric Light Co., 168 
Mass 40, 46 NE 395. 
57. In Clinkenbeard v Reinert, 284 Mo 569, 
225 SVV 667, 13 ALR 485. it was held that 
there was no variance between an allegation 
that a person died from the effects of of the 
bite of a vicious dog and proof that he died of 
rabies caused by such bite. 
58. McKee v Trisler, 311 111 536, 143 NE 69, 
33 ALR 1298. 
59. § 387, infra. 
60. Lake S. & M. S. R. Co. v Teeters. 166 Ind 
335, 77 NE 599. 
61. See 27 Am Jur 2d, EQUITY § 247. 
62. American De Forest Wireless Tel. Co. v 
Superior Court of San Francisco, 153 Cal 533, 
96 P 15; Beckett v Cuenin. 15 Colo 281, 25 P 
167; Citizens Slate Bank v E. A. Tessman 8c 
Co., 121 Minn 34, 140 NVV 178; Slate ex rel. 
McManus v Muench, 217 Mo 124, 117 SW 25; 
Branz v Hylton, 130 Neb 385, 265 NW 16; 
Haney v Neace-Stark Co., 109 Or 93, 216 P 
757, reh den 109 Or 119, 219 P 190; Ft. Worth 
v Cause, 129 Te* 25, 101 SW2d 221; Roy v 
Bennett* 141 W Va 260, 89 SE2d 843. 
63. §5 368 ct seq., supra. 
368 
64. As to conformity of the verdict to the 
pleadings and proof, see 76 Am Jur 2d, TRIAL 
§§ 1133 et seq. 
65. United States v Seminole Nation, 299 US 
417, 81 L Ed 316, 57 S Ct 283; White v Ward, 
157 Ala 345, 47 So 166; White v Hamilton, 38 
Ariz 256, 299 P 124; Tarien v Katz, 216 Cal 
554, 15 P2d 493, 85 ALR 334; Angel v Mellen, 
48 Idaho 750, 285 P 461; Bloom v Nathan 
Vehon Co., 341 111 200, 173 NE 270, 72 ALR 
232; Samuels v Weikel, 195 Ky 552, 242 SW 
836; Bank of Monroe v E. C. Drew Inv. Co., 
126 La 1028, 53 So 129; Bemis v Bradley, 126 
Me 462, 139 A 593, 69 ALR 1399; Farrell v 
Manhattan Market Co., 198 Mass 271, 84 NE 
481; State v Black Bros., 116 Tex 615, 297 SW 
213, 53 ALR 1181. 
66. The Schooner Hoppet v United States, 11 
US 389, 3 L Ed 380; Benedict v Bray, 2 Cal 
251. 
67. Hetzel v Baltimore 1 O. R. Co., 169 US 
26, 42 L Ed 648, 18 S Ct 255. 
68. The Schooner Hoppel v United Slates, 11 
US 389, 3 L Ed 380. 
69. Reynolds v Stockton, 140 US 254, 35 L 
Ed 464, 11 S C t 7 7 3 . 
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Whether a judgment is supported by the pleadings depends, not on the 
allegations in the complaint alone, but on a reasonable construction of all the 
pleadings when considered together.70 It is the facts pleaded, and not the 
technical designation of the action, that constitute grounds of recovery.71 A 
judgment upon a matter outside of the issues raised by the pleadings must, of 
necessity, be altogether arbitrary and unjust, as it attempts to conclude a point 
upon which the parties have not been heard.78 Such a judgment cannot be 
saved by the fact that it conforms to the findings, the findings themselves 
being upon questions foreign to the issues.73 
§ 383. Restriction to relief claimed. 
As a general rule, in the absence of statute or rule, the relief awarded by the 
judgment will be restricted to that claimed by the party in his pleading.74 
Irrespective of what may be proved, a court cannot, without statutory author-
ity, adjudge to the plaintiff more than he claims in his pleadings.79 However, 
where judgment is improperly entered for more than the amount permitted 
under the rule requiring conformity to the pleadings and issues, the excess 
may be remitted and the remainder of the judgment will stand.76 
Relief proper under the pleadings and the facts may be granted although it 
is less than chat which the plaintiff demands in his pleading.77 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that except as to a party 
against whom a judgment is entered by default, every final judgment shall 
grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, 
even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings.78 
B. RESTRICTION TO CAUSE OF ACTION OR THEORY PLEADED [§§ 384-388] 
§ 384. Generally. 
A material variance arises where a party pleads one cause of action or 
defense and attempts to prove another and different one.70 It follows that a 
70. Hamm v Hamm, 30 Tcnn App 122, 204 
SVV2d 113, 175 ALR 523; Chesney v Chesncy, 
33 Uuh 503, 94 P 989. 
71. Thomas v Taylor, 224 US 73, 56 L Ed 
673, 32 S Ct 403. 
72. Reynolds v Stockton, 140 US 254, 35 L 
Ed 464, 11 S Ct 773; Falls v Wright, 55 Ark 
562, 18 SW 1044. 
73. White v Hamilton, 38 Ariz 256, 299 P 
124. 
74. United Slates v Seminole Nation, 299 US 
417, 81 L Ed 316, 57 S Ct 283; England v 
Valley Nat. Bank, 94 Ariz 267, 383 P2d 183; 
Angel v Mellen, 48 Idaho 750, 285 P 461; Ft. 
Jefferson Imp. Co. v Dupoyster, 112 Ky 792, 
66 SW 1048; Branz v Hylton, 130 Neb 385, 
265 NW 16; Tulsa Red Ball Transfer Co. v 
Whittaker, 176 Okla 29, 54 P2d 626; Re Seat-
tie, 59 Wash 41, 109 P 1052. 
As to the effect of the prayer on the scope of 
relief, see §§123, 124, supra. 
75. Cox v United States. 31 US 172, 8 L Ed 
359; Ex parte United States Cast Iron Pipe & 
Foundry Co., 211 Ala 159, 99 So 912; Meisner 
v Mcintosh, 205 Cal 11. 269 P 612; Sache v 
Gillette. 101 Minn 169, 112 NW 386; Charles v 
Wfhite, 214 Mo 187, 112 SW 545; Tulsa Red 
Ball Transfer Co. v Whittaker, 176 Okla 29, 54 
P2d 626; Seamster v Blackstock, 83 Va 232, 2 
SE36. 
76. Curtis v Herrick, 14 Cal 117; Tulsa Red 
Ball Transfer Co. v Whittaker, 176 Okla 29, 54 
P2d 626. 
77. Hughes v Union Ins. Co., 21 US 294, 5 L 
Ed 620; Murphy v Portrum, 95 Tenn 605, 32 
SW 633. 
78. § 123, supra. 
79. § 373, supra. 
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§ 62. Sufficiency of performance; avoidance of inequitable forfeiture. 
Literal and exact performance is not always necessary. Under certain circum-
stances, specific performance of a contract will be decreed in spite of the fact 
that the complainant has not wholly performed his part of the agreement,74 or 
where there has been substantial compliance with the terms of the contract,75 
as where a party in good faith seasonably offers and continues ready to comply 
with the stipulations of the contract although he may err in estimating the 
extent of his obligation.76 Generally, where the plaintiff has made a conscien-
tious effort fully and fairly to comply with his contract to purchase land, 
specific performance will be granted,77 as, for example, in a case in which 
compensation may be made for the injury occasioned by the complainant's 
noncompliance with the strict terms of the contract.78 
In administering equity in a specific performance case, a technical forfeiture 
of rights under a contract, in the absence of bad faith, is not favored where a 
preservation of the contract through specific performance will yield to each 
party that to which he is justly entitled.79 A court of equity has the power to 
relieve a defaulting purchaser from a forfeiture and to compel specific per-
formance by the seller when, in the court's judgment, to do otherwise would 
result in an unreasonable forfeiture.80 Specific performance may be granted 
despite a minor breach by the plaintiff, but the court should condition its 
decree on the performance of that matter by the plaintiff.81 Specific perform-
ance may properly be decreed despite a minor breach by the plaintiff involving 
no substantial failure, and in such a case the defendant has a right to 
compensation for the breach, which may be given either by an abatement in 
74. Breckcnridge v Clinkinbcard, 2 Litt (Ky) 
127; landau v St. Louis Public Service Co. 364 
Mo 1134, 273 SW2d 255, 48 ALR2d 1200; 
Albachten v Miller, 216 Or 379, 339 P2d 427, 
72ALR2dU22. 
75. Vendees under a land contract who have 
substantially complied with the terms of the 
contract are entitled to a decree for the specific 
performance thereof. Moore, K. 8c Co. v Ward, 
71 WVa393, 76SE807. 
76. Willard v Tayloe. 8 Wall (US) 557, 19 L 
Ed 501 (tender of United States notes when 
contract called for gold or silver coin). 
77. Northern Illinois Coal Corp. v Cryder, 
361 111 274, 197 NE 750, 101 ALR 1420; 
Claytcn v Proutt, 227 Md 198, 175 A2d 757; 
Four-G Corp. v Ruta, 25 NJ 503, 138 A2d 18; 
Albachten v Miller, 216 Or 379, 339 P2d 427, 
72ALR2d 1122. 
Where more than half the purchase price of 
land was paid in advance, and possession con-
tinued in the purchaser until alter the balance 
was due, and valuable improvements were 
made by him with the consent of the seller, and 
without any intimation of an intent to insist on 
the strict performance of the contract as to 
time of payment, the purchaser was held enti-
tled to specific performance. Ahl v Johnson, 20 
How (US) 51, 15 L Ed 1005. 
78. Hyde v Booraem, 16 Pet (US) 169, 10 L 
Ed 925; Wynn v Garland, 19 Ark 23. 
90 
79. Henschke v Young, 224 Minn 339, 28 
NW2d 766, 
80. Rothenberg v Foilman, 19 Mich App 383, 
172 NW2d 845 (where there was a default in 
an instalment, the property was purchased for 
$40,000, and the balance of the principal was 
only $7,500). 
The trial court may award a vendee specific 
performance and deny to the vendor the right 
to forfeit the contract according to its provi- j 
sions, where it appears that the vendee made a j 
down payment of $7,500—nearly one-fourth of 1 
the total purchase price—and made " Quite reg- j 
ular" monthly payments of $150 cacn on the j 
balance of the principal and interest, and there | 
was only $575.95 owing on the purchase price, 
and where the buyer had made valuable im- i 
provements of the property, which had appreci-
ated greatly in value after the execution of the i 
contract. Williams v De Lay (Alaska) 395 P2d j 
839, the court saying that it would be inequi-
table to enforce the forfeiture provision. 
81. Clayten v Proutt, 227 Md 198, 175 A2d 
757. 
Specific performance will not be decreed if 
the plaintiff has himself committed a material 
breach, unless refusal of the decree will effectu-
ate an unjust penalty or forfeiture, but specific 
performance may properly be decreed in spite 
of a minor breach or innocent misrepresenta-
tion by the plaintiff involving no substantial 
failure of the exchange. Landau v St. Louis 
Public Service Co. 364 Mo 1134, 273 SW2d 
255, 48ALR2d 1200. 
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the price or by making the decree conditional on the payment of reasonable 
compensation." And to defeat specific performance because of the plaintiffs 
nonperformance, it should appear that some injury has resulted to the 
defendant from such nonperformance. If the defendant has taken possession 
of land which is the subject matter of the contract, and has likewise executed 
the agreement in part, the court may consider him as having waived his 
objections to the complainant's default, and may decree a specific performance 
of the contract.63 
§ 63. Time of performance. 
The well-established general principle in equity, that time is not ordinarily 
regarded as of the essence of contracts unless it is so stipulated by the express 
terms thereof or it is necessarily to be so implied from the character of the 
obligations assumed,84 has been frequently reiterated and applied in actions 
for specific performance.85 This is especially true as regards executory con-
tracts for the sale of land which are considered in equity as vesting the 
equitable title in the purchaser subject to the claim of the vendor for the 
purchase money.86 Therefore, in the ordinary cases of sales of realty, the 
general object being to make a sale for an agreed sum, the time of payment is 
regarded in equity as formal, and as meaning only that the purchase shall be 
completed within a reasonable time, and substantially according to the con-
tract, regard being had to all the circumstances.87 Hence, specific performance 
may be decreed in cases where justice requires it, even though literal terms of 
stipulations as to time have not been observed.88 Thus, under an option 
agreement giving the optionee an option to purchase certain property on a 
specified date, but not prior thereto, upon giving the optionor not less than 30 
days' notice in writing of an intention to exercise the option on the specified 
date, the optionee may obtain specific performance notwithstanding a failure 
to give notice strictly in accordance with the contract, where the optionee 
attempted literal compliance in good faith, and where the optionor was not 
prejudiced or damaged by reason of the delay.89 Where a contract for the sale 
of lands fixes no time for its performance, and by its terms the payment of the 
price and the transfer of title are to be concurrent acts, a vendee does not lose 
his right to specific performance by any delay short of the period fixed by the 
82. Clayien v Proutt, 227 Md 198, 175 A2d 
757, wherein the plaintiff purchasers failed to 
remove certain underbrush and loose limbs 
from the property. 
83. Ramsay v Brailsford, 2 SC Eq 582. 
84. See 17 Am Jur 2d, CONTRACTS § 332. 
85. Taylor v Longworth, 14 Pet (US) 172, 10 
L Ed 405; Brashier v Gratz, 6 Wheal (US) 528, 
5 L Ed 322; Russell v Ferreli, 181 Kan 259, 
311 P2d 547; Wimer v Wagner, 323 Mo 1156, 
20 SW2d 650, 79 ALR 1231; Strasbourger v 
Hcsu Realty Co. 198 App Div 805, 191 NYS 
133; Meineke v Schwepe, 93 Ohio App 111, 50 
Ohio Ops 244, 111 NE2d 765; Albachten v 
Miller, 216 Or 379, 339 P2d 427, 72 ALR2d 
U22. 
86. Taylor v Longworth, 14 Pet (US) 172, 10 
I- Ed 405; Bank of Columbia v Hagner, 1 Pet 
(US) 455, 7 L Ed 219; Brashier v Gratz, 6 
Wheat (US) 528, 5 L Ed 322; Russell v Ferreli, 
181 Kan 259, 311 P2d 347; Wimer v Wagner, 
323 Mo 1156, 20 SW2d 650, 79 ALR 1231; 
Meineke v Schwepe. 93 Ohio App 111, 50 
Ohio Ops 244, 111 NE2d 765. 
Annotation: 79 ALR 1240. 
87. Russell v Ferreli. 181 Kan 259, 311 P2d 
347; Jones v Robbins, 29 Mc 351; Meineke v 
Schwepe, 93 Ohio App 111, 50 Ohio Ops 244, 
111 NE2d 765. 
88. Stinson v Dousman, 20 How (US) 461, 15 
L Ed 966; Taylor v Longworth, 14 Pet (US) 
172, 10 L Ed 405; Bank of Columbia v Hagner, 
1 Pet (US) 455, 7 L Ed 219; Brashier v Gratz, 6 
Wheat (US) 528, 5 L Ed 322; Wimer v Wagner, 
323 Mo 1156, 20 SW2d 650, 79 ALR 1231; 
Young v Rathbone, 16 NI Eq 224; Beckett v 
Kornegay, 150 Va 636, 143 SE 296. 
89. Albachten v Miller, 216 Or 379, 339 P2d 
427, 72 ALR2d 1122. 
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of motion to amend the pleadings to conform to 
evidence of estoppel would not he overturned 
absent a showing of abuse of discretion. Big 
Butte Ranch, Inc. v. Holm, 570 P.2d 690 (Utah 
1977). 
IV. RELATION BACK OF 
AMENDMENTS 
Relation back despite intervening stat-
ute of limitations. Amendments are allowed 
to complaints and process, even though the 
amendment relates back to the time of original 
filing and even though, but for the right to 
amend, the statute of limitations period would 
have run. Meyers v. Interwest Corp., 632 P.2d 
879 (Utah 1981). 
The amendment of a complaint dis-
missed for untimely service must also be 
dismissed. Cook v. Starkev, 548 P.2d 1268 
(Utah 1976). 
Subdivision (c) does not apply to an 
amendment which substitutes for or adds 
new parties to those brought before the court 
by the original pleadings, whether plaintiff or 
defendant; but an exception to this Rule oper-
ates where there is a relation back, as to both 
plaintiff and defendant, when new and old 
parties have an identity of interest, so that it 
can be assumed or proved that the relation 
back is not prejudicial. Doxey-Layton Co. v. 
Clark, 548 P.2d 902 (Utah 1976). 
Inapplicable to amended third-party 
complaint. The relation-back doctrine does 
not apply to amended third-party complaint 
where there was no identity of interest with 
the existing parties other than privity of 
contract, since privity of contract is insufficient 
identity of interest for purpose of subsection (c) 
of this Rule. Perry v. Pioneer Whsle. Supply 
Co., 681 P.2d 214 (Utah 1984). 
V. SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS 
Permitting supplemental pleadings is 
largelv discretionary with the trial court. 
Rowley v. Milford Citv, 10 Utah 2d 299, 352 
P.2d 225 (1960). 
Rule 16. Pre-Trial Procedure; Formulating Issues. 
In any action, the court may in its discretion direct the attorneys for the 
parties to appear before it for a conference to consider: 
(1) The simplification of the issues; 
(2) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings; 
(3) The possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and of documents 
which will avoid unnecessary proof; 
(4) The limitation of the number of expert witnesses; 
(5) Such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action. 
The court shall make an order which recites the action taken at the 
conference, the amendments allowed to the pleadings, and the agreements 
made by the parties as to any of the matters considered, and which limits the 
issues for trial to those not disposed of by admissions or agreements of 
counsel; and such order when entered controls the subsequent course of the 
action, unless modified at the trial to prevent manifest injustice. The court in 
its discretion may establish by rule a pre-trial calendar on which actions may 
be placed for consideration as above provided. 
I. General Consideration. 
II. Pretrial Order. 
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION 
Cited in Rasbury v. Bainum, 15 Utah 2d 62, 
387 P.2d 239 (1963); Rumsey v. Salt Lake City, 
16 Utah 2d 310,400 P.2d 205 (1965). 
II. PRETRIAL ORDER 
Issues of law may be decided in order. 
Subdivision (5) permits and contemplates that 
disputed issues of law should be recognized and 
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ruled upon, if possihle, before a case is called 
for trial; this will assist counsel in their 
attempts to settle the matter and, if settlement 
cannot be effected, then the parties will know 
better how to marshall the evidence for trial. 
DiEnes v. Safeco Life Ins. Co., 21 Utah 2d 147, 
442 P.2d 468 (1968). 
The pretrial order controls the issues of 
the case where it is made without objection 
and no motion is made to change it, unless it is 
modified at the trial to prevent a manifest 
injustice. Citizens Cas. Co. v. Beckett, 17 Utah 
2d 304,410 P.2d 767 (1966). 
But this rule is not to be read as preclud-
ing modifications thereof prior to trial for 
good cause shown. Lewis v. Moultree, 627 P.2d 
94 (Utah 1981). 
Pretrial orders are blueprints for the trial 
which ought not to be relaxed in the absence of 
good cause, but they are not hoops of steel and 
may always be modified in the interest of the 
administration of justice. Dugan v. Jones, 615 
P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980). 
This Rule must be rend in conjunction 
with U.R.C.P. 15(b), which provides for liber-
ality in allowing amendment cf the pleadings 
to conform to the evidence- Stubbs v. Hemmert, 
567 P.2d 168 < Utah 1977V 
But amendment of order to be less lib-
eral than amendment of pleadings. Where 
objection is made to evidence en the ground it 
is outside the pretrial order, the court should 
be somewhat less liberal in amending the order 
than it would be if mere pleadings were 
involved. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales, 
Inc. v. Lords, 23 Utah 2d 152, 460 P.2d 321 
(1969). 
Prejudicial effect of order to be factor in 
considering modification of order. In deter-
mining whether to modify a pretrial order in 
the interest of justice, the court should consider 
the possible prejudicial effects of its enforce-
ment of the order. Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 
1239 (Utah 1980). 
Amendment of order may be allowed 
prior to trial. If plaintiff is given ample 
opportunity to meet the issue, defendant may 
be allowed to raise a new issue and amend the 
pretrial order after the pretrial conference, but 
before trial. Page v. Utah Home Fire Ins. Co., 
15 Utah 2d 257, 391 P.2d 290 (1964). 
Order may be amended to conform to 
evidence. A pretrial order may be amended, 
even after trial, to conform the order to the 
evidence to be. or already, presented. Reich v. 
Christcpulos, 123 Utah 137, 256 P.2d 238 
(1953). 
Order deemed modified to conform to 
evidence. Where no objection has been made 
to the introduction of evidence outside a pre-
trial order, it is deemed that the court modified 
the pretrial order as a matter of its own 
discretion. Stubbs v. Hemmert, 567 P.2d 168 
(Utah 1977). 
No abuse of discretion in refusing modi-
fication of order. It was not an abuse of 
discretion for the trial court to rule that 
defendants could not inject a wholly inconsis-
tent i?sue they had failed to assert and have 
included in the pretrial order. Kaiser Alumi-
num & Chem. Sales, Inc. v. Lords, 23 Utah 2d 
152, 480 P.2d 321 (1969). 
No error in allowing evidence outside 
scope of order. It is not error for the trial 
court to refuse to admit evidence on issues 
outside the scope of the pretrial order even 
upon objection thereto by the opposing party. 
Stubbs v. Hemmert, 567 P.2d 168 (Utah 1977). 
PART IV. 
PARTIES. 
Rule 17. Parties Plaintiff and Defendant. 
(a) Real Party in Interest. Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of 
the real party in interest. An executor, adrr.inistrator, guardian, bailee, 
trustee of an express trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract 
has been made for the benefit of another, or a party authorized by statute may 
sue in his own name without joining with him the party for whose benefit the 
action is brought; and when a statute so provides, an action for the use or 
benefit of another shall be brought in the name of the state of Utah. No action 
shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the 
real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after objection 
for ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder or substitution of, 
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the real party in interest; and such ratification, joinder, or substitution shall 
have the same effect as if the action had been commenced in the name of the 
real party in interest. 
(b) Infants or Incompetent Persons. When an infant or an insane or 
incompetent person is a party, he must appear either by his general guardian, 
or by a guardian ad litem appointed in the particular case by the court in 
which the action is pending. A guardian ad litem may be appointed in any 
case when it is deemed by the court in which the action or proceeding is 
prosecuted expedient to represent the infant, insane or incompetent person in 
the action or proceeding, notwithstanding he may have a general guardian 
and may have appeared by him. In an action in rem it shall not be necessary 
to appoint a guardian ad litem for any unknown party who might be an infant 
or an incompetent person. 
(c) Guardian Ad Litem; How Appointed. When a guardian ad litem is 
appointed by a court, he must be appointed as follows: 
(1) When the infant is plaintiff, upon the application of the infant, if he 
is of the age of fourteen [14] years, or if under that age, upon the 
application of a relative or friend of the infant. 
(2) When the infant is defendant, upon the application of the infant if 
he is of the age of fourteen [14] years and applies within 20 days after the 
service of the summons, or if under that age or if he neglects so to apply, 
then upon the application of a relative or friend of the infant, or of any 
other party to the action. 
(3) When an infant defendant resides out of this state, the plaintiff, 
upon motion therefor, shall be entitled to an order designating some 
suitable person to be guardian ad litem for such infant defendant, unless 
the defendant or someone in his behalf within 20 days after service of 
notice of such motion shall cause to be appointed a guardian for such 
infant. Service of such notice may be made upon the general or 
testamentary guardian of such defendant, if he has one in his state; if not, 
such notice, together with the summons in the action, shall be served in 
the manner provided for publication of summons upon such infant, if over 
fourteen [14] years of age, or, if under fourteen [14] years of age, by such 
service on the person with whom such infant resides. The guardian ad 
litem for such nonresident infant defendant shall have 20 days after his 
appointment in which to plead to the action. 
(4) When an insane or incompetent person is a party to an action or 
proceeding, upon the application of a relative or friend of such insane or 
incompetent person, or of any other party to the action or proceeding. 
(d) Associates May Be Sued by Common Name. When two or more persons 
associated in any business either as a joint-stock company, a partnership or 
other association, not a corporation, transact such business under a common 
name, whether it comprises the names of such associates or not, they may be 
sued by such common name; and any judgment obtained against the 
defendant in such case shall bind the joint property of all the associates in the 
same manner as if all had been named defendants and had been sued upon 
their joint liability. 
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1W-19M Statutes 68-3-12 
\ tt-2-9. Effect 01 salts sad prosecutions pendlag. 
;. No suit or prosecution, pending when this repeal 
takes effect, for an offense committed, or for the 
^recovery of a penalty or forfeiture incurred, shall be 
' affected by the repeal, but the proceedings may be 
.conformed to the provisions of these revised statutes 
\ as far as consistent. my 
i i l - M O . "Heretofore" and "hereafter* defined. 
* The terms "heretofore" and "hereafter" as used 
pin these revised statutes, have relation to the time 
';. when the same take effect. ttt* 
Chapter 3. Construction 
tt-M. Cooaaoa law adopted. 
, 6&£-2. Statutes la derofjuiaa of coouaoa Uw BfceraQy 
cofirfraoi - Rules of equity prevail. 
61-3-3. Kettstd tt&tates aot retroactive. 
Ur%4. QtO gad eriaiiaal remedies cot isergsd. 
41-3-5. Effect of rtpcaUag a statute. 
4t-3-6. lacattea! provision* deemed a eoatiaaatloa, aot 
a*w eaactoBtat. 
tt-V7. That, how compatcd. 
O-J-8. Wbeo a day appointed is a hoUdty. 
tt44. Seal, bow afftsed. 
' 6&-M0. Jotat authority b anthortty to majority. 
• *g>Ml. Raits of cociU action as to words and phrases. 
414-12. Roles of ccostractloa as to these statutes. 
68-3-1. Common law adopted. 
The common law of England so far as it is not 
repugnant to , or in conflict with, the Constitution 
or laws of the United States, or the Constitution or 
laws of this state, and so far only as it is consistent 
with and adapted to the natural and physical condi-
tions of this state and the necessities of the people 
hereof, is hereby adopted, and shall be the rule of 
decision in all courts of this state. 1953 
61-3-2. Statates In derogation of common law 
l liberally construed - Roles of equity prevail. 
i The rule of the common law that statutes in dcr-
* ogation thereof are to be strictly construed has no 
i application to the statutes of this state. The statutes 
r establish the laws of this state respecting the 
f subjects to which they relate, and their provisions 
; and all proceedings under them are to be liberally 
£' construed with a view to effect the objects of the 
statutes and to promote justice. Whenever there is 
*•' any variance between the rules o f equity and the 
ruks of common law in reference to the same 
!
 matter the rules of equity shall prevail. iwa 
61-3-3. Retised statute* not retroactive. 
fc No part of these revised statutes is retroactive, 
r unless expressly so declared. i9S3 
f C&-3-4. Civil and criminal remedies not merged. 
When the violation of a right admits of both a 
\ '• civil and criminal remedy, the right to prosecute the 
\. one is not merged in the other. itsj 
.; 0 - V 5 . Effect of repealing a statute. 
The repeal of a statute does not revive a statute 
' previously repealed, or affect any right which has 
1 accrued, any duty imposed, any penalty incurred, or 
any action or proceeding commenced under cr by 
virtue of the statute repealed. i«3 
61-34. Identical provisions deemed a continuation, 
not new enact sent . 
The provisions of any statute, so far as they are 
the same as those of any prior statute, shall be 
construed as a continuation of such provisions, and 
, not u a new enactment. itss 
68-3-7. Time, how computed. 
The time in which any act provided by law is to 
be done is computed by excluding the first day and 
including the last, unless the last is a holiday, and 
then it also is excluded. IMJ 
6S-3-I. When a day appointed is a holiday. 
Whenever any act of a secular nature, other than 
a work of necessity or mercy, is appointed by law 
or contract to be performed upon a particular day, 
which day fails upon a holiday, such act may be 
performed upon the next succeeding business day 
with the same effect as if it had been performed 
upon the day appointed. 1953 
tt-3-9. Seal, how affixed. 
When the seal of a court or public officer is 
required by law to be affixed to any paper, the 
word "seal" includes an impression of such seal 
upon the paper alone, as well as upon wax or a 
wafer affixed thereto. In ail other cases the word 
"seal* may include a scroll printed or written. tW3 
69-3-10. Joint authority is authority to majority. 
Words giving a joint authority to three or more 
public officers, or other persons, are 1:0 be 
construed as giving such authority to a majority of 
them, unless it is otherwise expressed in the act 
giving the authority. IMJ 
63-3-11. Rules of construction as to words and 
phrases. 
Words and phrases are to be construed according 
to the context and the approved usage of the 
language; but technical words and phrases, and such 
others as have acquired a peculiar and appropriate 
meaning in law, or are defined by statute, are to be 
construed according to such peculiar and appropri-
ate meaning or definition. 19S3 
68-3-12. Rules of construction as to these statutes. 
In the construction of these statutes the following 
rules shall be observed, unless such construction 
would be inconsistent with the* manifest intent of 
the Legislature or repugnant to the context of the 
statute: 
(!) "Month" means a calendar month, unless 
otherwise expressed, and the word "year," or the 
abbreviation " A D . " is equivalent to the expression 
"year cf our Lord." 
(2) "Oath* includes "affirmation," and the word 
"swear" includes "affirm." Every oral statement 
under oath or affirmation is embraced in the term 
"testify," and every written one, in the term 
"depose." 
(3) "Signature" includes any name, mark, or sign 
written with the intent to authenticate any instrum-
ent or writing. 
(4) "Writing" includes printing, handwriting, and 
typewriting. 
(5) "Person" includes individuals, bodies politic 
and corporate, partnerships, associations, and com-
panies. 
(6) The singular number includes the plural, and 
the plural the singular. 
(7) Words used in one gender comprehend the 
other. 
(8) Words used in the present tense include the 
future. 
(9) "Property" includes both real and personal 
property. 
(10) "Land," "real estate," and "real property" 
include land, tenements, hereditaments, water 
rights, possessory rights, and claims. 
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Paul TANNER, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
Esbern BAADSGAARD, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 16569. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
May 27, 1980. 
TANNER v. HAADS(iAARI) Utah 345 
Cite as.Utnh, 012 P.2d 345 
3. Vendor and Purchaser <*=>315(1), 350 
When parties have entered into formal 
contract, such as for purchase of real prop-
erty, it is to be assumed that they will 
cooperate with each other in good faith for 
its performance, and one refusing to so 
perform, or claiming a forfeiture thereof, 
has burden of showing justification for do-
ing so. 
Assignee of purchasers brought action 
for specific performance of contract for sale 
of one and one-half lots of undeveloped 
property. The Fourth District Court, Utah 
County, J. Robert Bullock, J., entered judg-
ment awarding specific performance, and 
vendor appealed. The Supreme Court, 
Crockett, C. J., held that: (1) evidence war-
ranted a finding that assignee had not 
abandoned contract and supported finding 
that vendor had waived strict compliance 
with the provisions relating to time of pay-
ment, and (2) trial court was justified in 
finding that fact that parties had agreed 
that interest would be paid for the time it 
took to complete the transaction, but had 
not agreed on a definite amount, did not 
result in any such uncertainty as to prevent 
specific performance. 
Affirmed. 
1. Appeal and Error <s=»931(l), 1009(4) 
Though Supreme Court may review the 
evidence in a case in equity, Court will 
indulge considerable deference to trial 
judge's findings, and, where the evidence is 
in dispute, the Supreme Court will assume 
that trial judge believed that which is fa-
vorable to his findings, and the Supreme 
Court will not disturb the findings unless it 
clearly preponderates to the contrary. 
2. Vendor and Purchaser <s=>101 
After waiver of strict compliance with 
dates of payment stated in earnest money 
agreement, vendor must give notice and a 
reasonable time to perform before he may 
insist on holding purchaser strictly to the 
time requirements. 
4. Specific Performance 0^121(11) 
In purchasers' assignee's action for spe-
cific performance of contract for sale of one 
and one-half lots of undeveloped property, 
evidence warranted determination that as-
signee had not abandoned contract and sup-
ported finding that vendor waived strict 
compliance with provisions relating to time 
of payment. 
5. Specific Performance o=»28(l) 
To warrant specific performance, es-
sential terms of the contract must be suffi-
ciently definite to enable parties to under-
stand what their obligations are, but proper 
application of such rule is as a shield to 
protect from injustice, and not as a weapon 
with which to work an injustice. 
6. Specific Performance <&=> 121(8) 
In purchasers' assignee's action for spe-
cific performance of contract for sale of one 
and one-half lots of undeveloped property, 
trial court was justified in finding that fact 
that parties had agreed that interest would 
be paid for the time it took to complete the 
transaction, but had not agreed on a defi-
nite amount, did not result in any such 
uncertainty as to prevent specific perform-
ance. 
Jeril B. Wilson, Provo, for defendant and 
appellant. 
M. Dayle Jeffs, Provo, for plaintiff and 
respondent. 
CROCKETT, Chief Justice: 
Plaintiff Paul Tanner brought this action 
against the defendant Esbern Baadsgaard, 
seeking specific performance of a real es-
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tale contract providing for the sale of one 
and one-half lots of undeveloped property 
in Spanish Fork. From a judgment award-
ing that relief, the defendant appeals. 
[1] As is so often true in such controver-
sies, there is sharp conflict in the evidence 
as to material and controlling facts. Not-
withstanding the correctness of defendant's 
urgence that this Court may review the 
evidence because it is a case in equity,1 it is 
our well-established rule that due to the 
prerogatives and advantaged position of the 
trial judge, we indulge considerable defer-
ence to his findings.2 Where the evidence 
is in dispute, we assume that he believed 
that which is favorable to his findings, and 
we do not disturb them unless it clearly 
preponderates to the contrary.3 
On March 19, 1977, the plaintiff and his 
brother and sister-in-law, Dwight and Vel-
ma Blood, went with the defendant and 
inspected the»propcrty. Later that day, the 
Bloods and the defendant signed an earnest 
money agreement of sale for $40,000, $500 
down, for which Mr. Blood gave a check. 
Further payments were to be: $14,500 upon 
delivery of a deed to half of the whole lot 
on May 1, 1977, $12,500 on April 1, 1978, 
and $12,500 on April 1, 1979, the latter two 
payments to also include 8.5 percent inter-
est from April 1, 1977. 
The $14,500 payment, which was due on 
May 1, 1977, was not made. Mr. Blood 
testified that shortly thereafter, he contact-
ed the defendant and informed him that he 
had not been able to obtain the necessary 
financing to make the payment, but told 
him that he would continue to attempt to 
do so. About two months later, near the 
end of June, 1977, the defendant contacted 
Mr. Blood and told him that he had lost the 
$500 check. Mr. Blood said they agreed 
that he should mail a check for $1,200, both 
1. Timpanogos Highlands, Inc. v. Harper, Utah, 
544 P.2d 481 (1975). 
2. .Id.; Pagano v. Walker, Utah, 539 P.2d 452 
(1975); McBride v. McBride, Utah, 581 P.2d 
997 (1978). 
3. See Kier v. Condrack, 25 Utah 2d 139, 478 
P.2d 327 (1970); McBride v. McBride, supra, 
note 2. 
to replace the lost check and the rest to 
apply on the interest which had accrued to 
the defendant.4 In the letter accompanying 
the check, Mr. Blood stated that he appreci-
ated the defendant's patience and that if 
"circumstances change, necessitating that 
we move more quickly or arrange separate 
financing on the land before we get our 
construction loan, please advise." He re-
ceived no response, nor any complaint about 
delay. 
The plaintiff Tanner testified that he 
spoke with the defendant several times dur-
ing the next six months about the fact that 
Mr. and Mrs. Blood had assigned their in-
terest in the contract to him and he was 
still having difficulty in obtaining financ-
ing. The defendant still made no complaint 
about the delay. But he did tell plaintiff 
Tanner that it would be necessary to charge 
a higher interest rate. In response thereto, 
the parties agreed that interest was to be 
paid "in full for all of the time it took until 
we closed the transaction." 
Just prior to December 25, 1977, the 
plaintiff, who could not then obtain the 
financing, told the defendant that there 
was an individual who was very interested 
in beginning construction on the lots and 
that financing for the project would be 
arranged in January or, at the latest, Feb-
ruary. According to the plaintiff, the de-
fendant again reminded him that "all of the 
interest would be due when the transaction 
was closed." 
On February 21, 1978 the plaintiff con-
tacted the defendant to inform him that 
financing had been obtained and to arrange 
for a time to close the transaction. The 
defendant then told plaintiff Tanner for the 
first time that he had arranged the sale of 
the property to another. Two days later, 
the plaintiff again approached the defend-
4. The defendant testified that, at the time, he 
told Mr. Blood: "I'll sell you the property at the 
same price you bought it for, providing you pay 
me interest by the month until you get your 
financing together." 
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ant, but was told that no money would be 
accepted for the purchase of the property. 
[2] Based on the foregoing, the trial 
court found that, by his conduct, the de-
fendant had waived requirement of strict 
compliance with the dates of payment stat-
ed in the earnest money agreement, which 
waiver had been relied upon by the plain-
tiff. The court applied the rule that after 
such a waiver, the seller must give notice 
and a reasonable time to perform before he 
may insist upon holding the buyer strictly 
to the time requirements.5 The trial court 
concluded that the plaintiff would be enti-
tled to specific performance of the contract 
upon the payment of the stated purchase 
price, plus the interest as agreed upon. 
The defendant contends that the trial 
court erred because the only reasonable 
finding from the evidence should be that 
the plaintiff had abandoned the contract 
before he attempted to complete the trans-
action in February, 1978; and that the 
plaintiff was not entitled to specific per-
formance because he had not met the condi-
tions nor made the payments as required 
under the contract. 
[3,4] As to that contention, these obser-
vations are pertinent: When parties have 
entered into a formal contract, such as for 
the purchase of real property, it is to be 
assumed that they will cooperate with each 
other in good faith for its performance,8 
and one refusing to so perform, or claiming 
a forfeiture thereof, has the burden of 
showing justification for doing so.7 Pro-
ceeding on that premise, it is our opinion 
that there is a reasonable basis in the evi-
dence for the trial court's refusal to believe 
that the plaintiff had abandoned the con-
tract, and for finding that the defendant 
had waived strict compliance wTith the pro-
visions as to time of payment. 
5. 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 506(b). See statements 
in Fuhriman v. Bissegger, 13 Utah 2d 379, 375 
P.2d 27 (1962); Hansen v. Christensen, Utah, 
545 P.2d 1152 (1976); Harrison v. Puga, 4 
Wash.App. 52, 480 P.2d 247 (1971); Angus 
Hunt Ranch, Inc. v. Reb, Inc., Wvo., 577 P.2d 
645 (1978). 
[5, 6] The defendant also contends that 
the terms of the contract had become un-
certain when the parties had agreed on an 
increase of the interest, but had not agreed 
upon a definite amount. We have no doubt 
as to the correctness of defendant's asser-
tion that, in order to warrant specific per-
formance, the essential terms of the con-
tract must be sufficiently definite to enable 
the parties to understand what their obliga-
tions are.8 But the proper application of 
that rule is as a shield to protect from 
injustice, and not as a weapon with which 
to work an injustice.9 In regard to the 
defendant's claim of uncertainty: We think 
the trial court was also justified in finding 
that the agreement that interest would be 
paid for the time it took to complete the 
transaction did not result in any such un-
certainty as to prevent specific perform-
ance. Whatever else may be said about 
uncertainty as to the payment of interest, 
we observe that this claim of error is also 
governed by the rule alluded to above: that 
the parties are duty bound to cooperate in 
good faith to carry out their original intent. 
In the light of what has been said herein, 
we see no reason to disagree with the con-
clusion of the trial court that the plaintiff is 
entitled to specific ^performance of the con-
tract upon payment of the purchase price 
and the accrued interest thereon. 
Affirmed. Costs to plaintiff (respon-
dent). 
MAUGHAN, WILKINS, 
STEWART, JJ., concur. 
HALL and 
8. 
. That the law does not generally favor forfei-
tures, see Fullmer v. Blood, Utah, 546 P.2d 606 
(1976) and cases therein cited. 
81 C.J.S. Specific Performance § 36(b); Pitch-
er v. Lauritzen, 18 Utah 2d 368, 423 P.2d 491 
(1967); Eckard v. Smith, Utah, 527 P.2d 660 
(1974). 
6. Ferris v. Jennings, Utah, 595 P.2d 857 (1979). 
9. Kier v. Condrack, supra, note 3. 
FUIIRIMAN v. BISSEGGER 
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Fcstus M. FUHRIMAN, Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
v. 
Alfred BISSEGGER and LnRene Bissegger 
Carlsen, formerly LaRene Bissegger, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
No. 9590. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Oct. 15, 11MV2. 
Suit by vendor to recover realty sold 
under a real estate contract wherein the 
vendee counterclaimed for specific perform-
ance. The First District Court, Cache 
County, Lewis Jones, J., granted specific 
performance, and the vendor appealed. The 
Supreme Court, Wade, C. J., held that con-
tractual provision giving the vendor the 
option to forfeit rights of vendee if he 
failed to make payments within 30 days 
after they became due was not self-execu-
tory, and it was incumbent upon vendor to 
give sufikicnt notice of election to terminate 
contract and forfeit vendee's rights there-
in. 
Affirmed. 
1. Vendor and Purchaser C=>I0I 
Provision in real estate contract giving 
vendor option to forfeit rights of vendee if 
he failed to make payments within 30 days 
after they became due was not self-execu-
tory, and it was incumbent upon vendor to 
give sufficient notice of election to terminate 
contract and forfeit vendee's rights therein. 
2. Vendor and Purchaser C=>I04 
Evidence sustained finding that vendor 
led vendee to believe that strict perform-
ance with respect to making of payments 
was not required, and that vendor had not 
given vendee, who was of sub-normal in-
telligence, sufficient notice of intent to for-
feit the agreement. 
Daines & Thomas, Logan, for appellant. 
Olson & Caldcrwood, Logan, for respond-
ents. 
WADE, Chief Justice. 
Fcstus M. Fuhriman, appellant herein, 
brought this suit to recover real property 
he was selling under a real estate contract 
entered into in 19-16 between him and Alfred 
Bissegger and his then wife, LaRene Bis-
segger, now LaRene Bissegger Carlsen, re-
spondents herein, on the ground that their 
rights in the contract had been forfeited. 
Respondents counterclaimed for specific 
performance. After trial of the case before 
the court, sitting without a jury, the court 
found the issues in favor of the respondents 
and granted the counterclaim, provided that 
all amounts due under the contract were 
deposited with the court within 60 days. 
[1] The contract provided that if the 
buyers failed to make payments as they 
became due, or within 30 days thereafter, 
the seller at his option could forfeit their 
rights and retake possession. This type of 
forfeiture provision not being self-execu-
tory, it was incumbent upon Fuhriman to 
have exercised his option to forfeit their 
rights by giving Alfred Bissegger, who had 
succeeded to his divorced wife's interest, 
sufficient notice of his election to terminate 
the contract and forfeit his rights therein.1 
[2] From the record it is clear that al-
most from the inception respondents failed 
to make the required payments, and the 
decisive question to be determined is wheth-
er Fuhriman, before the commencement of 
this suit, had given Alfred Bissegger suffi-
cient notice of forfeiture. 
It appears that Alfred Bissegger is of 
sufficiently low intelligence to be classed as 
feeble-minded and has been a recipient of 
welfare since 1955. In 1956, Fuhriman told 
Bissegger that he "figured" the contract 
"wasn't any good anymore" and suggested 
that Bissegger could probably get the Wel-
fare Department to pay rent. Mr. Bisseg-
ger thereupon informed the welfare worker 
in charge of his case that he no longer 
I. Leone v. Zuniga, S4 Utah 417. 34 P.2d 099. 94 A.L.R. 1232, 
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owned the real property in question because 
the owner had "uppcd the price" on him and 
asked that he be allowed $10.00 a month to 
pay rent. This was the exact amount due 
for monthly payments provided in the con-
tract. He was given $10.00 a month to pay 
for rent, but he never paid this to Mr. 
Fuhriman. Mr. Fuhriman, during the next 
four years before the commencement of this 
action, allowed Mr. Bissegger to remain 
on the property, and on occasions when he 
would see him would ask him when he would 
pay something. In the meantime Mr. Fuhri-
man was making some effort to sell the 
property to others. In 1960, he commenced 
this action to evict Mr. Bissegger. When 
Mr. Bissegger received the summons he 
consulted his attorney and immediately 
thereafter a tender was made to Mr. Fuhri-
man of all moneys due under the contract. 
This tender was refused. 
The court found that Fuhriman's con-
versations with Bissegger about the de-
linquent payments and their effect on the 
contract were of an uncertain nature as to 
what he might do in the vague future, and 
were also uncertain as to what he would 
require Bissegger to do to avoid termination 
of the contract; and that this behavior led 
Bissegger to believe that strict performance 
was not required. The court further found 
that Bissegger "is an adult of sub-normal 
intelligence, having the intelligence of 
a child of approximately 7 years old and 
although reasonably capable of caring for 
his physical needs is not of sufficient intelli-
gence to transact business affairs such as 
the agreement with plaintiff without being 
furnished with emphatic, clear, definite and 
detailed instructions." The court then 
found that Fuhriman had, from the begin-
ning, waived strict or substantial compliance 
with the agreement, and that he had failed 
to notify Bissegger that unless payments 
were made within a reasonable time, there 
would be a forfeiture of the agreement. 
We are of the opinion that the evidence 
was sufficient to sustain the court's findings 
that no actual and sufficient notice of intent 
to forfeit the agreement was given Bisseg-
ger before the suit was commenced and 
therefore the court did not err in granting 
specific performance on respondents* coun-
terclaim. 
Affirmed. Costs to respondents. 
HENRIOD, MCDONOUGH, CALLIS-
TER and CROCKETT, JJ., concur. 
O ! M l NUMttR SYSTCM. 
13 Utah 2d 3S2 
Norman W. KETTNER, Administrator of the 
Estate of Elizabeth Herdman, deceased, and 
Howard Herdman, Plaintiffs, 
v. 
Hon. Marcellus K. SNOW, Judge; The Dis-
trict Court Of The Third Judicial District 
In And For Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah; Alvln Keddlngton, Clerk of the Dis-
trict Court of Salt Lake County; Leona 
A. Watklns and John Watklns, Defendants* 
No. 9659. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Oct 5, 1902. 
Original proceeding by defendants to 
prohibit a district court from further pro-
ceeding after it had granted a new trial. 
The Supreme Court, Crockett, J., held that 
a motion for new trial was improperly 
granted where motion therefor was not 
served within 10 days after entry of judg-
ment and there was no showing of diligence 
or likelihood that claimed newly discovered 
evidence would produce a different result. 
Alternative writ made permanent. 
I. Courts C=>l 14 
A court has power to act nunc pro tunc 
in proper circumstances, but such device 
cannot be used to revive time for taking a 
required step in a legal proceeding after 
statutory time for doing it has elapsed. 
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scope is limited to a determination of 
whether or not the action uf the Hoard of 
County Commissioners as a legislative body 
is illegal, arbitrary, discriminatory or ca-
pricious. Xo contention is made that the 
county did not act within its grant of pow-
ers from the legislature in its adoption of 
the original zoning ordinance. The prior 
decisions of this court without exception 
have laid down the rule that the exercise 
of the zoning power is a legislative func-
tion to he exercised by the legislative bod-
ies of the municipalities. The wisdom of 
the zoning plan, its necessity, the nature 
and boundaries of the district to be zoned 
are matters which lie solely within that 
discretion. It is the policy of this court as 
enunciated in its prior decisions11 that it 
will avoid substituting its judgment for 
that of the legislative body of the munici-
pality. We are of the opinion that the 
Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake 
County acted within the scope of its legis-
lative powers, and that the reclassification 
ordinance was adopted pursuant to a plan-
ning scheme developed for that portion of 
the county we are here concerned with. A 
careful review of the evidence leads us to 
the conclusion that the plaintiffs have 
failed to sustain their burden that the ac-
tion of the county was arbitrary, unreason-
able or capricious. 
The decision of the court below is re-
versed and the matter is remanded direct-
ing the court to dismiss the plaintiffs' com-
plaint. Xo costs awarded. 
HENRIOD, C. J., and ELLETT, 
CROCKETT and MAUGHAN, JJ., con-
cur. 
2. Marshall v. Salt Lake City, 105 Utah 111, 
141 P.2d 704; Phi Kappa Iota Fraternity 
v. Salt Lake City, 116 Utah 536, 212 P.2d 
177; Dowse r. Salt Lake City Corp., 123 
Utah 107, 255 P.2d 723; Naylor t\ Salt Lake 
Collln L. HANSEN, the duly appointed, act-
ing and qualified administrator of the Es-
tate of Bernard Hansen, Deceased, Plain-
tiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Delia A. CHRISTENSEN, the duly appoint-
ed and acting and qualified administratrix 
of the Estate of Arnold Chrlstensen, De-
ceased, and Delia A. Chrlstensen, Individ-
ually, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 14112. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Jan. 29, 1976. 
Administrator of estate of purchaser 
brought action against administrator of es-
tate of vendor, in her representative capac-
ity and individually, seeking specific per-
formance of written contract for sale and 
purchase of realty. The First District 
Court, Box Elder County, VeNoy Christof-
fersen, J., entered judgment enforcing con-
veyance, and vendor's administrator ap-
pealed. The Supreme Court, Maughan, J., 
held, inter alia, that purchaser's tender of 
balance due under contract was sufficient. 
Affirmed. 
I. Vendor and Purchaser €=101 
Contract for purchase of realty provid-
ing that after continuance of default for 
90 days vendor had right to accelerate and 
foreclose, or enter, take possession and for-
feit purchaser's interest, or take advantage 
of any other remedy provided by law, re-
quired some affirmative act on part of 
vendor and therefore contractual relations 
between vendor and purchaser were in ex-
City Corp., 17 Utah 2d 300, 410 P.2d 764. 
See also Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 
U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303, 54 
A.L.R. 1016; Wakefield v. Kraft, 202 Md. 
136, 96 A.2d 27. 
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istcnce until such time as vendor chose to 
notify defaulting purchaser of its election 
to proceed under one or all of its options; 
having decided to so proceed, vendor was 
required to give defaulting purchaser rea-
sonable time within which to cure default 
since purchaser could otherwise assume 
that vendor had \vai\cd default, or had 
elected to enforce contract rather than for-
feit it, or that purchaser would be permit-
ted to perform. 
2. Tender C=>\i 
Tender of. balance due under sales 
contract for purchase of certain property 
by defaulting purchaser, who, having re-
ceived no notice that vendor had elected to 
proceed under any of its options under 
sales contract upon such default, had de-
cided to proceed with contract by placing 
on deposit to vendor's order cashier's check 
in total amount due under contract consti-
tuted sufficient tender where vendor had 
refused purchaser's "present physical of-
fer." 
3. Tender OI6(2) 
Where unreasonable conduct of obli-
gee would make actual tender fruitless ges-
ture, offer to comply with terms of con-
tract by obligor is sufficient. 
4. Tender C=>I5(3) 
Where vendor did not object to 
amount of purchaser's tender of balance 
due under sales contract and place of de-
livery at time tender was made, those 
objections were deemed waived. U.C.A. 
1953, 78-27-3. 
Omer J. Call, Brigham City, for defend-
ant-appellant. 
Walter G. Mann, of Mann, Hadfield & 
Thorne, Brigham City, for plaintiff-re-
spondent. 
MAUGHAN, Justice: 
The seller under a written contract for 
the sale 'and purchase of realty appeals 
from a judgment enforcing conveyance. 
345 P.2d—73 
1\2<] 1I.-.2 
Wc affirm the judgment. Parties to bear 
their own costs. 
This is an action for specific perform-
ance, initiated by the administrator of the 
estate of the buyer (hereafter plaintiff or 
buyer) against the administrator of the es-
tate of the seller (hereafter defendant or 
seller) in her representative capacity, and 
individually. The contract was engaged in 
in January of 1958. The contract price 
was $4,000; the buyer paid $1,200 down 
and took possession. Annual installments 
of $900 were to be made January 1st, in 
the years 1959 and I960, with a final in-
stallment of $1,000, to be made January 1, 
1961—all with interest. All taxes and as-
sessments, after January 1, 1958, were to 
be paid by buyer. In July of 1958, de-
fendant's joint seller died. The annual 
payment due January 1, 1958, together 
with $168 interest, was tended to and 
accepted by defendant, Delia Christensen, 
on September 8, 1959. 
In October, 1960, the buyer died, and 
there was no contact or communication be-
tween the parties, until plaintiff went to 
the home of defendant on October 31, 
1962, and offered to make full payment. 
Defendant refused payment, informed 
plaintiff the contract was in default and 
she was repossessing the land. The next 
day plaintiff left a cashier's check, in the 
amount of $2,422.02, with First Security 
Bank, in Brigham City; and defendant re-
ceived notice the money was available to 
her, in exchange for a deed. 
The trial court found the amount of the 
cashier's check represented the balance due 
under the contract, together with taxes and 
interest, up to November 1, 1962; and 
since that time, the money had remained 
available for defendant. The court also 
found plaintiff to have been in possession 
of the realty, since the inception of the 
contract in 1958. Defendants were reim-
bursed in the amount of $115.47, plus $6.70 
interest, for the taxes defendant had paid 
from 1962 to 1974. Pursuant to stipulation 
of counsel, the court was to determine a 
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reasonable attorney's fee if one were to be 
awarded. Plaintiff was awarded an attor-
ney's fee determined by the court. 
Although the contract was not what is 
known in this jurisdiction as a Uniform 
Real Estate Contract, it provided that after 
the continuance of a default for ninety 
days the seller had a right to exercise 
three options. The seller could accelerate 
and foreclose; or enter, take possession, 
and forfeit the buyer's interest; or take 
advantage of any other remedy provided 
by law. All remedies were cumulative. 
[1] It can be seen that the provisions 
of the contract, designed to terminate con-
tractual relations, are not self-executing. 
They require some affirmative act on the 
part of the seller. Therefore, the contrac-
tual relations between seller and buyer are 
in existence until such time as the seller 
chooses to notify the defaulting buyer of 
its election to proceed under one, or all, of 
its options. In so doing, seller must give 
the defaulting buyer a reasonable time 
within which to cure the default. Without 
this notice the defaulting buyer would not 
know what to do. He would not have cer-
tain knowledge his tenancy was at an end. 
He could assume that the seller may have 
waived default, or would elect to enforce 
the contract rather than forfeit i t ; or he 
could assume he would be permitted to 
perform.1 
At trial the matter of Lamont v. Evjen* 
was cited and considerable reliance placed 
on the holding in that matter. However, 
1. Leone et al. v. Zuniga et al, 84 Utah 417, 34 
P.2d G09 (1935). 
2. 29 Utah 2d 266, 508 P.2d 532 (1973). 
that case dealt with a Uniform Real Estate 
Contract, a contract which contains provi-
sions significantly different from those in 
the contract before us. 
[2,3] Here plaintiff made a tender of 
all sums due under the contract, prior to 
the exercise of any option by the seller. I 
Seller challenges this tender on the ground < 
it did not meet the requirements of a j 
"present physical offer." The court found i 
a "present physical offer" to pay was j 
refused by seller, and buyer did the next 
best thing, viz. place on deposit to seller's i 
order a cashier's check, in the total amount 
due under the contract. After defendant's • 
refusal, it would have been fruitless for 
the buyer to have included a cashier's , 
check in the letter sent to the seller in-
forming her the money was available. 
Where the unreasonable conduct of the ob-
ligee would make an actual tender a fruit-
less gesture, an offer to comply with the 
terms of the contract by the obligor is 
sufficient.3 
[4] After trial there were some objec-
tions to the amount of the tender and the 
place of delivery. There is nothing in the 
record to indicate that these objections to 
the tender were made at the time the ten-
der was made. Our law is that the person 
to whom a tender is made must, at the 
time, specify the objections to it, or they 
are waived.4 
HENRIOD, C. J., and ELLETT, 
CROCKETT and TUCKETT, JJ., concur. 
3. Romero r. Schmidt, 15 Utah 2d 300, 392 P. 
2d 37 (in04). 
4. 78-27-5, U.C.A.1953; 74 Am.Jur.2d, Tend-
er, Sec. 10. 
. . . » * • • ; 
• : r < , 
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The foregoing is consistent with cases of 
other jurisdictions which hold that a true 
lease can only l>e negated where there is an 
explicit obligation on the part of the lessee 
to pay an amount substantially equal to the 
purchase price.8 In the instant case, both 
parties had the right to cancel the lease at 
any time after June 30, 1978. The lease 
provided that the lease would run "for a 
minimum period of six months and there-
after until the equipment is returned or 
until lessor terminates the lease." After 
the initial period, the lease therefore be-
came a month-to-month rental. 
[1,2] The trial court interpreted the 
lease provision (quoted supra) as meaning 
that the lessor could terminate the lease 
only "according to the terms and provisions 
hereinafter stated," i. e., for cause. It is 
our considered opinion9 that said phrase 
refers not to the right of termination by the 
lessor but to the agreement itself—to wit, 
"Arnold Machinery . . . hereby leases to 
Utah Excavating . . . the equipment here-
inafter described, according to the terms 
and provisions hereinafter stated . . . " 
Any other interpretation of the disputed 
phrase would render the lease perpetual in 
duration, which was clearly not intended by 
the parties. 
In light of the foregoing, we conclude 
that the lease was not intended as a securi-
ty interest and that plaintiff is entitled to 
recover the unpaid rentals. The lower 
court's judgment is reversed and the case is 
remanded for further proceedings consist-
ent with this opinion. Costs to plaintiff. 
STEWART, HOWE, and CROCKETT/ 
JJ., and MAURICE HARDING, Retired 
District Judge, concur. „
 n 
1. Contracts e=»325 
MAUGHAN, C. J., does not participate Where a contract is entered into and is 
herein; HARDING, District Judge, sat. to be performed in a foreign jurisdiction, 
Melville L. MORRIS, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
Dwane J. SYKES and Patricia Sykes, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
No. 16838. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Jan. 21, 1981. 
Purchaser sued for specific perform-
ance of a contract to purchase undeveloped 
land in Alaska by compelling vendors to 
accept balance thereon or, in alternative, to 
relieve purchaser from unjust and inequita-
ble forfeiture of amount he had paid on 
contract. The Fourth District Court, Utah 
County, J. Robert Bullock, J., found against 
purchaser on issue of requiring defendants 
to convey property, but decreed an equita-
ble reimbursement to purchaser. Vendors 
appealed. The Supreme Court, Crockett, J., 
held that: (1) in view of fact that parties 
were negotiating a reinstatement of con-
tract up to time of unilateral termination 
by vendors, fairness would require definite 
notice to purchaser that he must pay up or 
forfeit payments he had made and his 
rights under contract, and of vendors' in-
tention to sell property to someone else, and 
(2) trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
finding for vendors but decreeing equitable 
reimbursement. 
Affirmed. 
Hall, J., filed concurring statement. 
8. See Bender's Uniform Commercial Code Ser-
vice, Secured Transactions, Volume 1, 
§ 4A.06[9][d], and cases cited therein. 
the trial court. Ephraim Theater Company v. 
Hawk, 7 Utah 2d 163, 321 P.2d 221 (1958). 
9. In reviewing the interpretation of a written 
document, we need not defer to the views of 
* CROCKETT, Justice, concurred in this case be-
fore his retirement. 
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law of such jurisdiction should he applied, 
particularly when contract deals with land 
in such jurisdiction. 
2. Contracts c=*325 
Matters of procedure in a contract ac-
tion arc governed by law of forum. 
3. Vendor and Purchaser e=>2 
Where, in action for specific perform-
ance of contract for sale of realty, there 
was no significant difference between law 
of Alaska, which was situs of property, and 
law of Utah in regard to enforceability of 
contract and forfeiture clause therein, court 
could properly apply Utah law in absence of 
any affirmative showing that law of Alaska 
was different. 
4. Damages c=>81 
Where parties to a land-sale contract 
stipulate to a forfeiture and liquidated 
damages, such stipulation will generally be 
enforceable. 
5. Damages <s=»81 
Where a forfeiture under literal terms 
of a contract results in awarding to a party 
a sum so entirely disproportionate to any 
damages he may have suffered that it 
shocks the conscience of the court, a court 
of equity will neither approve nor enforce 
such a penalty. 
6. Vendor and Purchaser <£=>1G1 
In view of fact that parties to contract 
for sale of realty were negotiating a rein-
statement up to time of unilateral termina-
tion of contract by vendors, fairness would 
require definite notice to purchaser in de-
fault that he must pay up or forfeit pay-
ments he had made and his rights under 
contract, and of vendors' intention to sell 
property to someone else. 
7. Appeal and Error <s=>949 
Specific Performance <s=»l, 8 
Specific performance is a remedy of 
equity which is addressed to sense of justice 
and good conscience of court, and, accord-
ingly, considerable latitude of discretion is 
allowed in court's determination as to 
whether it shall be granted and what judg-
* Justice Crockett wrote this opinion prior to his 
retirement. 
ment should be entered in respect thereto; 
court's ruling thereon should not be upset 
on appeal unless it clearly appears that 
court has abused its discretion. 
8. Specific Performance G=> 127(1) 
In action for specific performance of 
contract for sale of realty, trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in finding against 
purchaser on issue of requiring vendors to 
convey property but as a part of judgment 
decreeing an equitable reimbursement to 
purchaser. 
M. Dayle Jeffs of Jeffs & Jeffs, Provo, 
for defendants and appellants. 
A. H. Boyce, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff 
and respondent. 
CROCKETT, Justice: * 
Plaintiff Morris sued for specific per-
formance of a contract to purchase some 
undeveloped land in Alaska by compelling 
defendants Sykes to accept the balance 
thereon and convey the land to the plain-
tiff, or in the alternative, to relieve the 
plaintiff from an unjust and inequitable 
forfeiture of the $23,216 plaintiff had paid 
on the contract. Upon a trial to the court, 
it found against the plaintiff on the issue of 
requiring defendants to convey the proper-
ty to the plaintiff, but as a part of that 
judgment permitting the defendants to 
keep their property, the court decreed an 
equitable reimbursement of $14,121 to the 
plaintiff. Defendant appeals. 
On October 3, 1974, the plaintiff entered 
into a contract to purchase from the de-
fendant a vacant parcel of land of approxi-
mately 27 acres known as Tract B of the 
Musk Ox Subdivision, located near Fair-
banks, Alaska. The purchase price was 
$40,000, to be paid $2,000 down, with 
monthly payments of $350 beginning De-
cember 1, 1974. The contract further pro-
vided that plaintiff was to pay $1,000 on 
November 1, 1974, $5,000 on February 1, 
1975, $5,000 on August 1, 1975, and $3,000 
on each succeeding February 1 and August 
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1 until November 1, 1979, when the contract 
balance was to IKJ paid in full. The rate of 
interest on the unpaid balance was ten per-
cent. 
The payments were to be made to the 
First National Bank of Fairbanks, Alaska, 
the same bank which held a trust deed on 
the property previously executed by the 
defendant. The bank was instructed by the 
parties that all money received from plain-
tiff on the contract was to be applied on the 
debt. 
Plaintiff made the down payment, but 
the monthly and periodic payments were 
made sporadically, and in amounts different 
than called for by the contract. As a result, 
plaintiff was continually in default under 
the contract. The defendant sent written 
notices to the plaintiff advising him that as 
of January 1, 1976, he would be five months 
delinquent in the sum of $1,750. These 
communications further advised the plain-
tiff that defendant was depending on the 
payments to meet his obligations to the 
First National Bank of Fairbanks on the 
underlying mortgage. 
During December, 1975, defendant of-
fered to sell plaintiff two additional parcels 
in the Musk Ox Subdivision. These negoti-
ations, however, were not fruitful. 
The defendant continued to accept late 
and partial payments on the contract and 
between the date of purchase and by Au-
gust 2, 1976, plaintiff had made payments 
totaling $23,216, $3,507 interest to August 
2, 1976, and $19,709 principal. On Septem-
ber 2,1976, offered to prepay the remaining 
principal if defendant would give him a 
"good discount" for so doing. Defendant 
refused and on November 11, 1976, pursu-
ant to the terms of the contract, defendant 
caused a notice of termination to be issued 
and served upon the plaintiff. Defendant 
then recorded the quitclaim deed from 
plaintiff to defendant and retained all pay-
ments made by the plaintiff. Various of-
fers of reinstatement were made by defend-
ant to plaintiff but these offers were refus-
ed by plaintiff because they were condi-
tioned on plaintiffs purchase of additional 
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property and the payment of a reinstate-
ment fee. 
On February 9, 1977, the bank informed 
the defendant that unless he paid the $3,318 
delinquency on the underlying mortgage 
within 30 days, the entire unpaid balance on 
the mortgage would be declared due. 
Thereafter, on February 15, 1977, the de-
fendant entered into a contract for the sale 
of the property to Johnny M. Iverson, his 
brother-in-law, for $20,663, approximately 
the amount defendant would have received 
had plaintiff performed on the contract. 
Plaintiff was not given any advance notice 
of the defendant's plan to sell the property 
to Iverson. The parties are in agreement 
that at that time it would have been quite 
impractical to sell the property on the mar-
ket because it was under heavy snows and 
therefore inaccessible. 
Upon its analysis of the total situation, it 
was the judgment of the trial court that the 
plaintiff should not be granted specific per-
formance, but nevertheless, that to permit 
the defendant to retain the entire $23,216 
which plaintiff had paid would constitute a 
forfeiture so unconscionable that the court 
could not approve it; and therefore ordered 
the defendant to return $14,121 as a condi-
tion to exonerating himself and his proper-
ty from plaintiffs claim. 
On appeal, the defendant urges enforce-
ment of the forfeiture provision of the con-
tract and seeks reversal of the judgment on 
the grounds that the trial court: 1) misap-
plied the Alaska law on forfeiture and dam-
ages, 2) wrongfully held that there was an 
unconscionable forfeiture which the court 
would not enforce, 3) erroneously ruled that 
the plaintiff should have been given defi-
nite notice, and opportunity to remedy any 
defaults, before the sale to Iverson. 
[1-3] Defendant's argument that the 
trial court misapplied the law of Alaska in 
regard to forfeitures gives us no grave con-
cern here. We have no disagreement with 
the proposition that where a contract is 
entered into and is to be performed in a 
foreign jurisdiction the law of that jurisdic-
k 
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tion should he applied;' and this is particu-
larly so when the contract deals with land 
in that jurisdiction.2 Therefore, it is our 
duty to apply the substantive law of Alaska 
to this controversy.3 However, as correctly 
stated by the trial court, we sec no signifi-
cant difference between the law of Alaska 
and our own in regard to the enforceability 
of such a contract and the forfeiture clause 
therein. Under such circumstances, the 
court may properly apply Utah law in the 
absence of an affirmative showing that the 
law of Alaska is different.4 
[4,5] Defendant's attack upon the re-
quirement that he repay $14,121 of the $23,-
21G which plaintiff had paid him is 
premised upon a forfeiture provision that 
upon the buyer's default the seller may 
retain all amounts paid on the contract and 
terminate plaintiff's interest in the proper-
ty. It is true that where the parties to a 
contract stipulate to a forfeiture and liqui-
dated damages, such stipulation will gener-
ally be enforceable.5 It is, however, well 
established in Utah,6 as well as Alaska,7 
that where a forfeiture under the literal 
terms of a contract results in awarding to a 
party a sum so entirely disproportionate to 
any damages he may have suffered that it 
shocks the conscience of the court, a court 
of equity will neither approve nor enforce 
such a penalty. 
[6] Defendant's final contention is that 
the court erroneously ruled that he should 
have given more definite notice of his in-
tent to forfeit the contract, and of his in-
tended sale to Iverson. The decision of the 
trial court indicates that he was not con-
vinced that the defendant gave plaintiff 
definite notice that he must pay up, or 
1. See, e. g., Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. of 
Hartford, Conn. v. Gentry\ 191 Okl. 659, 132 
P.2d 326 (1942); Catchpole v. Narramore, 102 
Ariz. 248, 428 P.2d 105(1967). 
2. Conant v. Deep Creek & Curlew Valley trr. 
Co., 23 Utah 627, 66 P. 188 (1901). 
3. Matters of procedure in a contract action are, 
of course, governed by the law of the forum. 
See, e. g., Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 239 Or. 1, 395 
P.2d 543 (1964). 
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forfeit the payments he had made and his 
rights under the contra We agree with ( 
the trial judge that fai ess would require 
such a notice, and of thv defendant's inten-
tion to sell the properly to someone else. 
He noted that the parties were negotiating | 
a reinstatement up to the time of the uni- j 
lateral termination of the contract by the i < 
defendant. 
[7,8] Specific performance is a remedy | 
of equity which is addressed to the sense of I 
justice and good conscience of the court, 
and accordingly, considerable latitude of j 
discretion is allowed in his determination as 
to whether it shall be granted and what 
judgment should be entered in respect 
thereto; and his ruling thereon should not 
be upset on appeal unless it clearly appears 
that he has abused his discretion,8 a circum-
stance we have not perceived as being ' 
present here. 
Affirmed. No costs awarded. 
STEWART, J., and HENRIOD, Retired 
Justice, concur. 
MAUGHAN, C. J., does not participate 
herein; HENRIOD, Retired Justice, sat. 
WILKINS, J., heard the arguments but 
resigned before the opinion was filed. 
HALL, Justice (concurring): 
My review of the record does not disclose 
the evidence, if any there was, of actual 
damage which the trial court weighed in 
reaching its determination that enforce-
ment of the liquidated damage provision of 
4. See Booth v. Crompton, Utah. 583 P.2d 82 
(1978), and cases cited therein. 
5. See Perkins v. Spencer, 121 Utah 468, 243 
P.2d 446, 449 (1952), and cases cited therein. 
6. See, e. g., Jacobson v. Swan, 3 Utah 2d 59, 
278 P.2d 294 (1954). 
7. See, e. g., Moran v. Hoi man, Alaska, 501 P.2d 
769(1972). 
8. Ferris v. Jennings, Utah, 595 P.2d 857 (1979), 
and cases cited therein. 
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the contract would l»e unconscionable.1 
Nevertheless, the issue was not raised be-
low, nor on this appeal. Consequently, I 
concur in affirming the judgment. 
( O | K [ Y NUMBER SYSUM 
=> 
Clarice DUPUIS (Heater), Plaintiff and 
Appellant and Cross-Respondent, 
v. 
Edwin Cyrill NIELSON, Defendant and 
Respondent and Cross-Appellant. 
No. 16865. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Jan. 21, 1981. 
Driver of car, upon recovery against 
driver of pickup in personal injury action 
based on automobile accident, filed motion 
for additur or new trial based on inade-
quate damages. The Third District Court, 
Salt Lake County, Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., 
J., denied motion, and driver of car appeal-
ed. Pickup driver cross-appealed claiming 
right of setoff. The Supreme Court, Stew-
art, J., held that: (1) evidence did not com-
pel finding that reasonable persons would 
have reached different measure of damages 
which would have enabled court to grant 
motion for additur, and (2) pickup driver 
was not entitled to reduction of car driver's 
award of general damages to offset no-
fault insurance payment for household ser-
vice benefits. 
Affirmed. 
1. New Trial <s=» 161(1) 
When damages are not so inadequate 
as to indicate disregard of evidence by jury, 
court is not empowered to entertain motion 
for additur. Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 
59. 
2. New Trial c=>161(l) 
Evidence, in |>ersonal injury action aris-
ing from automobile accident, including evi-
dence that injured party was under stress 
for reasons unrelated to accident, did not 
compel finding that reasonable persons 
would have reached different measure of 
damages such as would empower court to 
entertain motion for additur. Rules of Civ-
il Procedure, Rule 59. 
3. Automobiles s=>251.12 
Basic principle of No-Fault Act is to 
prevent double recovery by no-fault in-
sured. U.CA.1953, 31-41-1 et seq. 
4. Automobiles c=>251.17 
Where jury award to car driver in per-
sonal injury action based on automobile ac-
cident did not include award for household 
service benefits, pickup driver involved in 
accident was not entitled to reduction of car 
driver's award of general damages to offset 
no-fault insurance payments made for 
household service benefits. U.C.A.1953, 31-
41-11. 
Samuel King and James E. Hawkes, Salt 
Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant and 
cross-respondent. 
Frank N. Karras, Salt Lake City, for 
defendant and respondent and cross-appel-
lant. 
STEWART, Justice: 
Plaintiff, upon recovering against de-
fendant in a personal injury action, filed a 
motion for an additur or new trial based on 
inadequate damages. It is from the lower 
court's denial of that motion that plaintiff 
herein appeals. 
The accident in which the alleged dam-
ages were sustained occurred when defend-
ant was driving his pick-up truck and 
struck the rear of plaintiff's car which had 
stopped at an intersection for a red light. 
A directed verdict on the issue of liability 
was entered in favor of plaintiff at the 
conclusion of all evidence. 
I. See Perkins v. Spencer, 121 Utah 468, 243 
P.2d 446 (1952). 
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Robert E. CALL, Everett H. Call and 
Ann I). Call, Plaintiffs and 
Respondents, 
v. 
TIMBER LAKES CORPORATION, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 14839. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
July 29, 1977. 
Suit was brought by purchaser for a 
declaratory judgment to determine validity 
of written contract for sale of three moun-
tain lots calling for down payment and 
monthly payments. The Fourth District 
Court, Wasatch County, J. Robert Bullock, 
J., entered decree holding contract to be 
valid and in full force and the vendor ap-
pealed. The Supreme Court, Ellett, C. J., 
held that notwithstanding delinquency in 
payment under contract allowing vendor to 
declare all sums previously paid forfeited, 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
reinstating contract upon purchaser's 
tender of all delinquent payments under 
contract plus accrued interests and costs 
within 15 days. 
Affirmed. 
Vendor and Purchaser <£»185 
Although contract for sale of mountain 
lots stated that time was of the essence and 
that upon any default vendor could at its 
option terminate all rights and retain all 
moneys previously paid, where purchaser 
had made a total payment of $3,181.07 to-
ward the purchase of lots, the ten days 
specified in vendor's letter by which con-
tract was to be brought current was not a 
reasonable time and 22 days was not an 
unreasonable time for purchaser to tender 
performance after notice, and there was no 
abuse of discretion to provide that upon 
purchaser's tender of all delinquent pay-
ments plus accrued interest and costs with-
in 15 days contract would be reinstated. 
John S. Adams of Adams, Kasting & An-
derson, Salt Lake City, for defendant-appel-
lant. 
Russell C. Harris, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiffs-respondents. 
ELLETT, Chief Justice: 
This is a suit for declaratory judgment to 
determine the validity of a written con-
tract, for the sale of real property, dated 
November 6, 1971. The respondents, here-
after referred to as "Calls," were the pur-
chasers and the appellant was the seller. 
The trial court held the contract to be valid 
and in full force and effect. This appeal is 
from that ruling. 
The contract provided for a down pay-
ment of $1,000 and the balance to be paid at 
the rate of $155.89 per month. The Calls 
made numerous late payments and missed 
several but were permitted to make up the 
missed payments. 
On or about December 12, 1974, Timber 
Lakes notified Calls in writing that they were 
in arrears in their payments in the amount 
of $1,558.90 and unless the same was paid 
by December 22, 1974, the contract would 
be terminated. The contract provided as 
follows: 
Time is of the essence of this contract, 
and should the BUYER fail or make de-
fault in any of the payments to be made 
hereunder, or fail to comply with each 
and all of the covenants, conditions and 
restrictions herein described, then, at the 
option of the Seller, the whole sum of the 
purchase price of said lots and all interest 
thereon remaining unpaid shall immedi-
ately become due and payable to the Sell-
er, or the SELLER may, at its option, 
terminate all of the rights and privileges 
of the BUYER hereunder, and all monies 
therefor paid shall be retained by the 
SELLER and no part of such money shall 
be repaid to the BUYER. [Emphasis 
added.] 
The evidence is in dispute regarding the 
efforts made to make the payments as de-
manded; but the court could find from the 
testimony given: (1) that the Calls contact-
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cd Timber Lakes and were informed that 
if they brought the delinquent interest 
up-to-date, amounting to over $000, by Jan-
uary 3, 1975, the contract would not be 
forfeited; (2) Calls took the check made out 
for the delinquent interest to appellant's 
office, but instead of tendering it, they 
offered a check for the entire amount of 
the arrearage demanded in the notice, to 
wit: $1,558.90; (3) that the check was re-
fused and demand made for payment of the 
contract in full in the amount of some 
$7,400 plus $1,800 for a water hookup; (4) 
that there was no agreement to have a 
water hookup included in the contract. 
In its brief, Timber Lakes admits that in 
addition to the down payment, the Calls 
also made monthly payments totaling 
$2,181.07. This makes a total of $3,181.07 
paid towards the purchase of three moun-
tain lots fit only for camping out or for 
building a cabin. There was no income 
from the ownership of the lots. The origi-
nal contract price for the lots was $10,000 
plus a finance charge of $4,095. 
This Court has had occasion to consider 
the question of forfeiture provisions in real 
estate contracts, and as to such provisions 
we held in Jacobson v. Swan : ! 
. The parties have a right to so 
contract and such right should not be 
lightly interfered with. It is only when 
the forfeiture would be so grossly exces-
sive as to be entirely disproportionate to 
any possible loss that might have been 
contemplated, so that to enforce it would 
shock the conscience, that a court of equi-
ty will refuse to enforce the provision. 
When the trial judge has made such de-
termination, we will regard it as prima 
facie correct and will not disturb it unless 
it is plainly erroneous. 
. It is now established in this 
state that where a forfeiture provision 
allows an unconscionable and exorbitant 
benefit to be retained by the seller which 
bears no relationship to the damages 
which have been sustained or reasonably 
could have been contemplated, it provides 
LAKLS CORP. Utah \\[\i) 
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for ;i penalty or punitive damages which 
courts of equity will not enforce. . 
After a full hearing of the matter, the 
trial court found the following: 
On January 3, 1975 plaintiff offered to 
then bring the contract current by paying 
all delinquent payments and accumulated 
interest, and were ready and able to do 
so, but such offer was refused by defend-
ant. 
By accepting different amounts and at 
different times than called for by the 
contract and permitting a delinquency to 
exist for several months, plaintiff waived 
strict performance of the contract. 
Under all of the circumstances, the ten 
days specified in the letter of December 
12, 1974 on which the contract was to be 
brought current was not a reasonable 
time, and twenty-two days was not an 
unreasonable time for defendant to 
tender performance after notice. 
The court ruled that upon tender to the 
appellant of all delinquent payments under 
the contract, plus accrued interest and 
costs, within fifteen days from the date of 
the judgment, "the contract will be and is 
ordered reinstated." 
We see no abuse of discretion or error in 
the ruling made and, therefore, we affirm 
the judgment. Costs are awarded to the 
respondents on this appeal. 
CROCKETT, MAUGHAN, WILKINS 
and HALL, JJ., concur. 
I. 3 Utah 2d 59, 65, 278 P.2d 294 (1954). 
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to the child Lonnic, but at the same time 
she is not able to forecast for me that 
a change in custody would necessarily be 
beneficial to that child. 
1 therefore conclude and hold that the 
best interests of the children require me 
to indulge in the statutory presumption 
that children of young years are best off 
in their mother's care, and the Petition 
to Change Custody is denied. 
Counsel for Mr. S. takes a personal, 
philosophical and asserted moral exception 
to two cases decided by this Court,—both 
by unanimous opinions. These are Stuber 
v. Stuber * and Dcardcn v. Dcardcn,2— 
wherein the authors' bona fides are not at 
all challenged,—but where it is suggested 
that there is such a person as an attentive, 
affectionate, fit and proper mother who 
nonetheless might have done something 
that comes naturally, but perhaps without 
established legal sanction, but possibly born 
of some kind of explainable emotion or in-
fluence or maybe even economics,—or other 
reason about which an irate ex-husband, 
or a child psychologist, or even a priest or 
a lawyer might express some kind of com-
punction. 
We are not unmindful of the apparent 
sincerity of counsel's negative appraisal of 
the Stuber and Dcardcn cases, nor his criti-
cism of about 17 District Judges on the 
Wasatch Front,—comprising four counties 
out of 29, in which such judges serve about 
80 per cent of the people in Utah, when 
he volunteers the following gratuity which 
we consider to be an inaccurate appraisal 
and condemnation of those robed gentle-
men: 
The preoccupation of this trial court, 
and indeed all other trial courts, along 
the Wasatch Front, with the principles 
enunciated in Stuber v. Stubcr, supra, 
and Dcardcn v. Dearden, supra, is ex-
tremely unfortunate,— 
' which commentary now may include the de-
cision here,—with which quotation others, 
I. 121 Utah 632, 244 P.2d 650 (19G2). 
including us, may cxercis a prerogative to 
disagree. 
CALLISTKR, C. J. and KLLFTT, 
CROCKETT, and TUC1 IT, JJ., concur. 
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James H. LAMONT and Lotte Lamont, his 
wife, Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
Ivar Th. EVJEN and Aslaugh S. Evjen, his 
wife, Defendants and Respondents. 
No. 13077. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 5, 1073. 
Action by vendors to foreclose a uni-
form real estate contract. The Third Dis-
trict Court, Salt Lake County, Gordon R. 
Hall, J., entered judgment for purchasers 
and vendors appealed. The Supreme 
Court, Ellett, J., held that where purchas-
ers, who had missed payments on uniform 
real estate contract, were advised by letter 
from vendors on March 6, 1972, that all 
past due payments should be made current 
and on April 3, 1972, purchasers received 
letter stating that vendors were electing to 
treat contract as note and mortgage and 
foreclose the same and on April 3, 1972, 
purchasers tendered all past: due install-
ments to vendors, purchasers were not giv-
en reasonable time in which to make good 
the delinquent installment. 
Affirmed. 
1. Vendor and Purchaser C=>185 
Before seller of land under a uniform 
real estate contract can exercise any of the 
options given him because of failure on 
part of purchaser to pay an installment as 
promised, he must give the purchaser no-
2. 15 Utah 2d 105, 388 P.2d 230 (1004). 
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tice of the default and a reasonable time in 
which to bring the contract current. 
2. Vendor and Purchaser C=>299(2) 
Where purchasers, who had missed 
payments on uniform real estate contract, 
were advised by letter from vendors on 
March 6, 1972, that all past due payments 
should be made current and on April 3, 
1972, purchasers received letter stating that 
vendors were electing to treat contract as 
note and mortgage and foreclose the same 
and on April 3, 1972, purchasers tendered 
all past due installments to vendors, pur-
chasers were not given reasonable time in 
which to make good the delinquent install-
ment. 
Morgan, Scalley, Lunt & Kesler, Grant 
S. Kesler, Robert S. Howell, Salt Lake 
City, for plaintiffs and appellants. 
James A. Mclntyrc, Salt Lake City, for 
defendants and respondents. 
ELLETT, Justice: 
This is an appeal from a judgment ren-
dered in favor of the defendants in an ac-
tion to foreclose a uniform real estate con-
tract by treating it as a mortgage pursuant 
to paragraph 16(c), which reads: 
In the event of a failure to comply 
with the terms hereof by the Buyer, or 
upon failure of the Buyer to make any 
payment or payments when the same 
shall become due, or within thirty days 
thereafter, the Seller, at his option shall 
have the following alternative remedies: 
A. . . . 
B. . . . 
C. The Seller shall have the right, at 
his option, and upon written notice to 
the Buyer, to declare the entire unpaid 
balance hereunder at once due and 
payable, and may elect to treat this 
contract as a note and mortgage, and 
pass title to the Buyer subject thereto, 
and proceed immediately to foreclose 
the same in accordance with the laws 
of the State of Utah, . . . 
'. EVJEN I'tali 5 3 3 
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The contract was signed February 15, 
196(1, and defendants made regular pay-
ments of $110.00 per month to the First 
Federal Savings & Loan Association as 
collecting agent for the plaintiffs, the sell-
ers. The payment for December, 1970, 
was not made until January 4, 1971, and 
thereafter the defendants as buyers made 
regular monthly payments. Xeithcr the 
First F'ederal Savings, the sellers (plain-
tiffs), nor the buyers (defendants) knew a 
payment had been missed for over one 
year. On February 2, 1972, the chief ac-
countant of the collecting agency wrote a 
letter to the defendants stating that the 
payment for December, 1970, had been 
missed and that all payments subsequent 
thereto were made late. The letter re-
quested the defendants "to please see if 
you cannot arrange to bring your contract 
payments up to date." 
Under date of February 29, 1972, the 
lawyer for the plaintiffs wrote a letter 
which was delivered to the defendants 
March 6, 1972. The letter contained the 
following language: 
. [I]t is necessary at this time 
that you bring all past due payments cur-
rent and begin making payments on the 
first of each month when they are due. 
No further periods of delinquincy [sic] 
will be tolerated. 
On March 31, 1972, the plaintiffs mailed 
a certified letter to the defendants stating 
that they were electing to treat the uni-
form real estate contract "as a note and 
mortgage and foreclose upon the same im-
mediately, the entire unpaid balance be-
coming due and payable." In their briefs 
both counsel state that this letter was re-
ceipted for by the defendants April 3, 1972. 
On April 3, 1972, the defendants ten-
dered all past due installments to the plain-
tiffs. The evidence docs not show whether 
the tender was made before or after the 
receipt of the letter by the defendants. 
The trial court found as a fact: 
1. . . . 
2. . . . 
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3. Plaintiffs had never given defend-
ants notice that a payment had been 
missed in December of 11'70. 
And then concluded as a matter of law: 
1. Plaintiffs' failure to notify defend-
ants of their default constitutes a materi-
al omission in the facts necessary to es-
tablish plaintiffs' claims and defendants 
are entitled to an Order of Dismissal. 
In the case of Romero v. Schmidt l the 
question of the effect of a tender upon the 
right of a plaintiff to foreclose pursuant to 
the option in a uniform real estate contract 
was before this court. We there held that 
a valid tender prevented the plaintiff from 
foreclosing on the contract as a note and 
mortgage. See Home Owners' Loan Cor-
poration v. Washington, 108 Utah 469, 161 
P.2d 355 (1945); also see 52 Am.Tur., 
Tender, § 41. 
[1] P>efore a seller of land under a uni-
form real estate contract can exercise any 
of the options given him because of a fail-
ure on the part of the purchaser to pay an 
installment as promised, he must give the 
purchaser notice of the default and a rea-
sonable time in which to bring the contract 
current. The reason for the rule is set 
forth in 52 Am.Jur., Tender, § 41, as fol-
lows : 
. This is so because the debt 
docs not become due on the mere default 
in payment, but by affirmative action by 
which the creditor makes it known to the 
debtor that he intends to declare the 
whole debt due. The creditor is entitled 
to a reasonable time after default in 
which to exercise the option, but the op-
tion itself does not outlive the default. 
Such acceleration stipulations should be 
so construed, if possible and consistent 
with the language employed, as to give 
the protection intended thereby to both 
the debtor and the creditor. . 
The rule is especially applicable in cases 
like the instant one where the default was 
overlooked by all parties for some fifteen 
months. 
[2] It appears that the plaimiffs failed 
to establish that they gave notice to the de-
fendants of their election to treat the con-
tract as a note and mortgage prior to a 
full tender of the amount due. Besides, . 
the defendants were not given a reasonable 
time in which to make good the delinquent 
installment. 
The judgment of the trial court is af-
firmed. Costs are awarded to the respond-
ents. 
CALLfSTER, C. J., and CROCKETT, 
HENRJOD and TUCKETT, JJ., concur. 
29 Utah 2d 269 
The STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
Tino Bill TORRES, Defendant and 
Appellant. 
No. 13036. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
March 28, 1973. 
Defendant was convicted in the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, Joseph 
G. Jeppson, J., of robbery and he appealed. 
The Supreme Court, Crockett, J., held that 
police officer who received radio report 
that young man had robbed service station 
and had run away from service station in 
northwesterly direction acted lawfully in 
stopping car occupied by two young men at 
intersection three blocks northwest of rob-
bery scene about ten minutes after robbery. 
Affirmed. 
Arrest C=>63.» 
Police officer who received radio re-
port that young man had robbed service 
station and had run away from service sta-
I. 15 Utah 2d 300, 392 P.2d 37 (1904). 
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ary. Stanley's present wife, Constance 
Johnson, also occupies a seat on the hoard 
of directors, though she personally does 
not own any shares in the corporation. 
The complaint alleges that she knew of and 
acquiesced in the unauthorized appropria-
tions by Stanley Johnson. As Stanley's 
wife, Constance would stand to benefit by 
any misappropriations by her husband. It 
is doubtful that she would vigorously pur-
sue any action on behalf of the corporation 
to seek reimbursement for the 
unauthorized payments. Finally, Sophie 
Weiner, who owns over 10 percent of the 
corporation, is the remaining director on 
the board. Ms. Weiner, along with Stanley 
Johnson, is an officer of another corpora-
tion which allegedly has been allowed to 
use Steel Inc.'s equipment and property 
without having to pay for that use. It is 
apparent that Ms. Weiner's business rela-
tionships with Mr. Johnson and the compet-
ing corporation would prevent her from 
fairly pursuing an action on behalf of the 
minority shareholders. 
[7] Since a quorum of disinterested di-
rectors or shareholders cannot be assem-
bled to appraise the merits of Joyce John-
son's claims, notice upon the board of di-
rectors would be a futile and ritualistic act. 
The district court's granting of a motion to 
dismiss for failure to make such a demand 
was therefore in error. Accordingly, the 
district court's order is reversed and the 
matter remanded with leave being granted 
to Johnson to amend her complaint if she 
so wishes. 
MANOUKIAN, C.J., SPRINGER and 
GUNDERSON, JJ., and FONDI,3 District 
Judge, concur. 
Nev. (}7_y 
lfl)EV( <), INC, a California corporation; 
John Long; Long Construction Compa-
ny; Dale Roe Development .Corpora-
tion, a Nevada corporation. Appellants 
and Cross-Respondents, 
v. 
Rocky WAGNER, d/b/o Rocky Wagner 
Excavating, Respondent, 
and 
Joe Wosser, d/b/a Wosserlaster 
Enterprises, Respondent and 
Cross-Appellant. 
No. 14195. 
Supreme Court of Nevada. 
March 29, 1984. 
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3. The Governor designated the Honorable Mi-
chael B. Fondi, Judge of the First Judicial Dis-
Subcontractors brought actions on con-
tract and equitable theories against devel-
oper and others to recover on perfected 
liens. The Second Judicial District Court, 
Washoe County, Roy L. Torvinen, J., en-
tered judgments in favor of subcontractors 
but denied one subcontractor's asserted 
right to recover for extracontractual work 
performed, and appeal and cross appeal 
were taken. The Supreme Court held that: 
(1) findings that subcontractor's rough 
grading duties did not include drainage 
swale construction, cost of which developer 
and others sought to offset against amount 
owing subcontractor, and that other sub-
contractor's billings for siding and trim 
work were correct were supported by sub-
stantial evidence; (2) whether developer 
made payments for extra work was not 
controlling of whether it waived contractu-
al written change order requirement; and 
(3) parties mutually intended to waive writ-
ten change order condition. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and 
remanded. 
trict Court, to sit in the place of the Honorable 
John Mowbray. Nev. Const., art. 6 § 4. 
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1. Mechanics' Liens OiSHt) 
In multiparty action to enforce perfect-
ed liens under construction contract, find-
ings that one subcontractor's rough grad-
ing duty did not include drainage swale 
construction, cost of which developer and 
others sought to offset against amount ow-
ing subcontractor, and that second subcon-
tractor's billings for siding and trim work 
were correct were supported by substantial 
evidence. 
2. Contracts c=>316(l) 
Waiver of contractual right can be im-
plied from conduct such as making pay-
ments or accepting performance which 
does not meet contract requirements and 
can also be expressed verbally or in writ-
ing. 
3. Contracts 0316(6) 
Express waiver, when supported by re-
liance thereon, excuses nonperformance of 
waived contractual condition. 
4. Contracts 0=232(4) 
Whether developer made payments for 
extra work was not solely controlling of 
whether it waived contractual requirement 
of written change order for extra work. 
5. Contracts e=>232(4) 
Where developer made express oral 
waiver of contractual written change order 
requirement for extra work and subcon-
tractor performed extra work in reliance 
thereon, parties mutually intended to waive 
written change order condition and subcon-
tractor was entitled to recover for extra 
work performed. 
Hoy & Miller, McDonald & Kafchinski, 
Reno, Stephen L. Rishoff, Wooland Hills, 
Cal., for appellants and cross-respondents. 
Robison, Lyle, Belaustegui & Robb, and 
Bruce T. Beesley, Hale, Lane, Peek, Denni-
son & Howard, and Richard L. Elmore, 
Reno, for respondents and cross-appellant. 
OPINION 
PER CURIAM: 
Two subcontractors, who brought actions 
under contract and equitable theories 
against a developer and others to recover 
on their perfected liens, received favorable 
judgments in district court. The developer 
and the others against whom judgments 
were entered, now appeal. One subcon-
tractor also cross-appeals from the district 
court's denial of his asserted right to recov-
er for extra-contractual work performed. 
For the reasons set forth hereinafter, we 
affirm the judgments in favor of the sub-
contractors and reverse the order denying 
relief to cross-appellant for the perform-
ance of work unspecified in the subcontrac-
tor's contract. 
The facts as they pertain to each subcon-
tractor are as follows: 
Wagner: Rocky Wagner Excavating 
(Wagner) entered into a written agreement 
with Udevco and John Long to perform 
specific rough grading work on the appel-
lants' condominium project. Common area 
grading, drainage swale construction and 
finish grading were not a part of the par-
ties' agreement, according to the contract, 
testimony and the district court's findings 
of fact. The agreement provided that ex-
tra-contractual work would require a writ-
ten change order. While performing his 
contract work, Wagner also performed "ex-
tra work" without obtaining a written 
change order, for which he was paid by 
Udevco. Wagner's last invoice, totalling 
$6,777.33 for contract and "extra work," 
was not paid by Udevco. Wagner recorded 
and perfected a lien. The district court 
found that the parties, by their past prac-
tices, had waived the written change order 
provision and that $6,777.33 was the rea-
sonable value of the work performed. As 
a result, the district court entered judg-
ment for Wagner and awarded him 
$6,777.33 plus interest at 12% from the 
date the invoice was due, costs and attor-
ney's fees, according to NRS 108.237. Ap-
pellants appeal from that judgment. 
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Wosser: Wosser-Laster Knterprises 
(Wosser) entered into a second written 
agreement with Udevco and John Long to 
perform framing work, as well as future 
siding and trim work, if required, on a cost 
basis. The agreement, which settled dif-
ferences relating to a prior contract, pro-
vided that extra-contractual work would re-
quire a written change order. Wosser did 
perform and bill Udevco for siding and trim 
work which was completed after the date 
of the second agreement. After it was 
discovered that Wosser also had billed for 
some siding and trim work completed be-
fore the second contract date, Wosser's 
next invoice contained a credit for the inad-
vertent billing. 
Wosser also performed "extra work" re-
lated to the framing duties. Due to an 
error in the appellants' plans and specifica-
tions, the prefabricated roof trusses did not 
fit. Wosser, as a result, had to cut and 
stack the roofs to complete the framing. 
Wosser additionally was told to perform 
"extra work," such as dropping ceilings to 
meet cabinet tops and "furring down" 
(framing in gaps above) door openings, be-
cause materials received such as cabinets 
and doors did not match the plans and 
specifications. Wosser also altered com-
pleted framing because appellants request-
ed subsequent design changes. Wosser did 
not obtain written change orders for this 
"extra work," although Joe Wosser was 
told by Udevco's superintendent to go 
ahead with the work and was assured he 
would be paid for it. Wosser sent Udevco 
invoices totalling $13,195.00 for "extra 
work" on three occasions. Udevco never 
made any payments for the extra work 
performed by Wosser after the date of the 
second agreement. Udevco also refused to 
pay for certain framing, siding and trim 
work valued at $11,976.75. 
Wosser recorded and perfected a lien and 
brought an action against appellants as an 
intervenor in Wagner's case. The district 
court found that, because Udevco had nev-
er paid Wosser for extra work performed 
without a written change order, appellants 
had not waived that contract requirement. 
As a result, the district court entered judg-
v. W A < ; M : K New fJS 1 
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ment compensating Wosser only for the 
framing, siding and trim work, and award-
ed him $11,970.75 plus interest at 12% from 
the date the invoices were due, costs and 
attorney's fees. Appellants appeal from 
that judgment. Wosser cross-appeals the 
district court's denial of any recovery for 
the extra work performed. 
[1] Appellants contend that the facts do 
not support the trial court's awards in fa-
vor of respondents. As concerning Wag-
ner, appellants primarily contend that in-
dustry standards define rough grading to 
include construction of drainage swales. 
Because Wagner did not perform such con-
struction, appellants argue that they are 
entitled to offset against the award the 
amount spent to have other subcontractors 
do the work. As concerning Wosser, appel-
lants contend that they are entitled to off-
set against the award the amount they 
were over-billed for siding and trim work 
completed before the parties' second agree-
ment was signed. The district court heard 
these s-ime arguments below and made 
findings of fact that: Wagner's duties did 
not include drainage swate' construction; 
and, Wosser's billings for siding and trim 
work were correct. This Court's standard 
for review is set forth in Pace v. Linton, 97 
New 103, 625 P.2d 84 (1981). 
Findings of fact shall not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous, and due re-
gard shall be given to the opportunity of 
the trial court to judge the credibility of 
the witnesses. NRCP 52. Our task 
when reviewing the appropriateness of 
findings and judgments rendered by dis-
trict courts is to " . . . determine whether 
there is substantial evidence in the 
record to support the findings and judg-
ment of the district court." 
Id. at 103-04, 625 P.2d at 85 (emphasis 
added and citations omitted). We conclude 
that the record reflects substantial evi-
dence supporting the district court's find-
ings of fact and judgments. We have con-
sidered appellants' other contentions and 
determined that they are without merit. In 
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this regard we affirm the judgment i of the 
district court. 
As cross-appellant, Wosser's sole conten-
tion is that the district court improperly 
denied any recovery from cross-respon-
dents for extra work performed. It is un-
disputed that Wosser was required to cut 
and stack roofs because the prefabricated 
roof trusses would not fit the framing due 
to incorrect plans and specifications. Our 
review of the record also reveals that after 
framing was completed according to origi-
nal plans and specifications, cross-respon-
dents orally requested that Wosser make 
further alterations to accommodate subse-
quent design changes and incorrectly sized 
cabinets and doors. The extra work was 
necessary, properly performed, and accept-
ed. The district court concluded as a mat-
ter of law that Wosser was not entitled to 
judgment for extra work, reasoning that 
Udevco did not waive its right to require 
written change orders because it did not 
pay for any such extra work after it had 
been performed without written authorisa-
tion. We disagree. 
[2-5] Waiver is usually defined as "the 
voluntary and intentional relinquishment of 
a known right" and may be either express 
or implied. 5 Williston On Contracts 
§ 678 (3d ed. 1961). Waiver can be implied 
from conduct such as making payments for 
or accepting performance which does not 
meet contract requirements; waiver can 
also be expressed verbally or in writing. 
17 Am.Jur.2d Contracts §§ 393, 396 (1964). 
Express waiver, when supported by re-
liance thereon, excuses nonperformance of 
the waived condition. 5 Williston On Con-
tracts § 679 (3d ed. 1961); 17 Am.Jur.2d 
Contracts § 392 (1964); Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts § 84(1) (1981). Whether 
Udevco made payments or not for extra 
work, therefore, is not solely controlling of 
whether it waived the written change order 
requirement. Presenting evidence of such 
payments would have been merely one al-
ternative for proving waiver, had those 
facts occurred. Wosser, instead, chose to 
1. Udevco's superintendent. Dick Clans, testified 
thiil "I don't recall [telling Wosser personnel to 
employ the instant facts to prove that ex-
press waiver and reliance occurred. After 
Udevco's express oral waiver and Wosser's 
reliance thereon, Udevco at that time was 
bound to pay for the extra work, regard-
less of whether it later failed to pay. 
Udevco apparently has not. controverted 
the facts that express oral waiver was pro-
nounced and extra work performed in re-
liance thereon.1 We conclude, under these 
facts, as a matter of law, that the parties 
mutually intended to waive the written 
change order condition. Here, Wosser per-
formed—after completing framing accord-
ing to plans and specifications—extra work 
of such character and magnitude that the 
idea that the parties intended him to do so 
without additional compensation would be 
highly unreasonable. No witnesses testi-
fied for Udevco to controvert Wosser's tes-
timony that $13,195.00 represented the rea-
sonable value of the extra work performed. 
The district court made no finding regard-
ing such value. We therefore remand this 
case for a determination and judgment that 
$13,195.00 represents the reasonable value 
of the extra work performed by Wosser, 
unless the district court finds that the evi-
dence justifies a lower sum. 
The district court judgments awarding 
respondents recovery for contractual work 
is hereby affirmed. The district court's 
judgment denying cross-appellant recovery 
for extra work is hereby reversed. This 
case is remanded for determination of the 
value of extra work performed by Wosser 
and judgment thereon consistent with this 
opinion. 
perform extra work), but that doesn't necessari-
ly mean I didn't say it. 1 mean, I don't recall." 
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Cite as, VVyo., 
ANGUS HUNT RANCH, INC., a Montana 
Corporation, and Charles L. Carlson and 
Jeanne H. Carlson, husband and wife, 
Appellants (Plaintiffs below), 
v. 
REB, INC., a Wyoming Corporation, and 
the First National Bank and Trust Com-
pany of Wyoming, a National Banking 
Association, Appellees (Defendants be-
• low). 
No. 4843. 
Supreme Court of Wyoming. 
April 24, 1978. 
After receiving notice by letter of ven-
dor's election to declare a forfeiture under 
terms of contract for sale of land, purchas-
ers instituted action for declaratory judg-
ment asking court to make certain declara-
tions with respect to contract and for in-
junction against bank as escrow agent. 
Vendor filed counterclaim for a declaration 
of forfeiture. The District Court, Laramie 
County, Vernon G. Bentley, J., granted ven-
dor's motion to dismiss and sustained its 
counterclaim and instructed bank to deliver 
escrow papers to it. Purchasers appealed. 
The Supreme Court, Rose, J., held that: (1) 
presence of right of redemption provision, 
without further evidence of parties' inten-
tion and without any further indications 
arising from contract itself, was not suffi-
cient, as matter of law, to convert install-
ment land contract into equitable mort-
gage, and (2) vendor was entitled to declare 
a forfeiture on basis of breach of material 
condition of contract that purchasers 
agreed to maintain an accredited swine 
herd of not less than 170 sows and a total 
animal population of not less than 750 ani-
mals, inasmuch as there was no evidence 
that vendor had condoned animal reduction 
or had prior knowledge thereof. 
Affirmed. 
1. Trial <s=»384 
Under federal weighing of evidence 
test, trial court in considering defendant's 
II, INC. v. REB, INC. Wyo (J45 
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motion to dismiss need not consider evi-
dence in a light most favorable to plaintiff. 
Rules of Civil Procedure, rules 41(b), 52(a). 
2. Trial c=*384 
If plaintiff has presented a prima facie 
case based on unimpeached evidence, trial 
judge should not grant defendant's motion 
to dismiss, even though he is trier of fact 
and may not himself feel at that point in 
trial that plaintiff has sustained his burden 
of proof; fact that applicable civil proce-
dure rule was amended to follow federal 
rule requiring findings was no reason to 
depart from such prima facie test, since 
such test was more likely to achieve justice 
and reduce number of appeals resulting 
from application of rule. Rules of Civil 
Procedure, rules 41(b), 52(a). 
3. Appeal and Error <s=>1177(8) 
If properly raised, a remand may be 
required because of failure to comply with 
requirement in civil procedure rule govern-
ing motion to dismiss that trial court shall 
make findings if it renders judgment on 
merits against plaintiff. Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, rules 41(b)(1), 52(a). 
4. Appeal and Error <£=>927(3) 
In determining if plaintiff presented a 
prima facie case based on unimpeached evi-
dence which would have result that trial 
court erred in granting defendant's motion 
to dismiss, Supreme Court viewed evidence 
in a light most favorable to plaintiff, just as 
trial court should have done, and presuma-
bly did, in considering defendant's motion. 
Rules of Civil Procedure, rules 41(b), 52(a). 
5. Mortgages e=>27 
In action arising out of vendor's at-
tempted forfeiture and cancellation of a 
contract for sale of land, purchasers, in 
order to establish a prima facie case on 
their equitable mortgage theory, were re-
quired to show that parties intended trans-
action to be a mortgage, rather than an 
installment land contract, as construed 
from their written agreement and sur-
rounding circumstances; there must have 
been an attempt to create a security or, in 
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other words, there must he proof that mak-
er intended property to be held, given or 
transferred as security. 
<>. Mortgages c=>32(l) 
Vendor and Purchaser to95(1) 
While it may be conceded, arguendo, 
that a vendor may waive his right to de-
clare an automatic forfeiture through con-
duct which had been characterized as acqui-
escence, it cannot be said that such acquies-
cence discloses an intention to treat trans-
action as creating a mortgage; primary ef-
fect of such conduct is to preclude vendor 
from exercising its right to forfeiture until 
purchaser is put on notice that future de-
faults will not be countenanced and strict 
compliance will be required. 
7. Mortgages to 33(1), 39 
Presence of right of redemption provi-
sion, without further evidence of parties' 
intention and without any further indica-
tions arising from contract itself, was not 
sufficient, as matter of law, to convert in-
stallment land contract into an equitable 
mortgage, inasmuch as, at most, such provi-
sion was a contingency placed in contract 
for purchasers' benefit, aimed at lessening 
harshness of a forfeiture; to provide for 
such a revivor possibility did not mean that 
purchasers were entitled to same or all the 
protections afforded by a mortgage. 
8. Vendor and Purchaser <3=>104 
In actions arising out of attempted for-
feiture and cancellation of an installment 
land contract by vendor against purchaser, 
fact that purchaser fails to establish a pri-
ma facie case with respect to his equitable 
mortgage theory does not mean that, in 
appropriate cases, purchaser will not be en-
titled to equitable remedies, such as restitu-
tion. 
9. Vendor and Purchaser to95(l) 
In order to establish a prima facie case 
of waiver, purchaser must show that vendor 
has condoned or assented to previous de-
fault and has not given notice of his inten-
tion to insist on strict compliance in future. 
10. Vendor and Purchaw r to9!>(l) 
Effect of vendor's conduct condoning 
or assenting to previous defaults and not 
giving notice of his intention to insist on 
strict compliance in future is not a waiver 
of such vendor's rights to declare a forfei-
ture for future defaults. 
11. Vendor and Purchaser to>101 
Vendor could not legally declare a for-
feiture of installment land contract because 
purchasers had not paid interest, taxes and 
insurance without first giving purchasers 
notice of its intention to insist on strict 
compliance and additionally giving purchas-
ers a reasonable time within which to per-
form or cure continuing defaults. 
12. Vendor and Purchaser <3=>95(1) 
In action arising out of an attempted 
forfeiture and cancellation of installment 
land contracts by vendor against purchas-
ers, vendor was entitled to declare a forfei-
ture on basis of breach of material condi-
tion of such contract that purchasers main-
tain an accredited swine herd of not less 
than 170 sows and a total animal population 
of not less than 750 animals, inasmuch as 
there was no evidence that vendor had au-
thorized or had prior knowledge of drastic 
animal reductions to only 114 animals of 
which only 44 to 50 were sows, even though 
vendor was aware that purchasers had 
changed from farrow-to-finish operation to 
a feeder-pig operation. 
13. Vendor and Purchaser <s=»I04 
In action arising out of an attempted 
forfeiture and cancellation of an install-
ment land contract by vendor against pur-
chasers, it was appropriate to grant a six-
month redemption period to defaulting pur-
chasers since this was an agreed to provi-
sion of contract. 
Bernard Q. Phelan, Cheyenne, for appel-
lants. 
Jerome F. Statkus, of Carmichael & Stat-
kus, Cheyenne, for REB, Inc., appellee. 
James 0. Wilson, of Loomis, Lazear, Wil-
son & Pickett, Cheyenne, for The First Na-
tional Bank and Trust Company of Wyo-
ming, appellee. 
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Before GUTHRIE, C. J., and McCLlN-
TOCK, KAPER, THOMAS and ROSE, JJ. 
ROSE, Justice. 
This appeal arises out of an attempted 
forfeiture and cancellation of a Contract for 
Sale of land by appellee, REB, Inc., the 
seller, against the appellants, Angus Hunt 
Ranch, Inc., and Charles L. Carlson and 
Jeanne H. Carlson, the buyers. After re-
ceiving notice by letter, dated March 3, 
1977, of the seller's election to declare a 
forfeiture under the terms of the contract, 
appellants instituted an action for a declar-
atory judgment, asking the court to make 
certain declarations with respect to the con-
tract, and for an injunction against the 
appellee-bank, as escrow agent. Appellants 
subsequently moved and were allowed to 
amend their complaint, adding a claim for 
restitution in the event seller's counterclaim 
for a declaration of forfeiture was granted. 
A trial on the merits was held on April 4, 
1977, before the district court, sitting with-
out a jury. At the close of buyers'-appel-
lants' evidence, the seller's motion to dis-
miss, for failure of appellants to sustain the 
burden of proof required, was granted; its 
counterclaim was sustained and the bank 
was instructed to deliver the escrow papers 
to the seller. We will affirm this disposi-
tion of the case. 
On June 8, 1973, a Contract of Sale was 
entered into between the seller and the 
buyers. The contract generally provided 
for the sale to the buyers of real property, 
buildings, improvements, equipment and 
animals, comprising the seller's swine oper-
ation, for a total purchase price of $215,-
000.00. Under the relevant contract provi-
sions regarding payment, the buyers were 
to: (1) make a down payment of $20,000.00; 
(2) assume and pay a $95,448.39 note, se-
cured by a mortgage executed by the sell-
ers, to the First National Bank and Trust 
Company of Wyoming; (3) assume and pay 
an $8,837.66 note and mortgage to Capitol 
Savings and Loan Association; (4) make 
annual installment payments on principal 
and interest at seven percent (7%) per an-
num on the unpaid balance of $83,623.75, 
beginning on April 1, 1974, and continuing 
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thereafter on each April 1, until April 1, 
1983, when the entire principal balance, to-
gether with interest, had been paid in full. 
A "time is of the essence" clause was in-
cluded in the contract. In addition, the 
buyers agreed to: provide annual, audited 
financial statements; maintain an accredit-
ed swine herd of not less than 170 sows, and 
a total animal population of not less than 
750 animals; furnish monthly animal inven-
tories; maintain improvements in good or-
der and repair; not further encumber the 
property; pay all taxes and assessments; 
and maintain adequate insurance on the 
assets purchased. 
The contract provides that if relevant 
payments are not timely made, forfeiture 
penalties may be imposed within 60 days of 
due date. If any of the other material 
covenants are not performed, the seller is, 
by the contract, released from all obliga-
tions, whereupon buyers shall forfeit all 
rights to the property, with seller's immedi-
ate right to take possession, and prior pay-
ments are to be retained a3 liquidated dam-
ages. In lieu of the seller's rights described 
above, seller could declare due and payable 
the then unpaid balance. The buyers were 
given a "right of redemption," consisting of 
an obligation to pay all remaining principal 
and interest within six months in the event 
forfeiture had been declared. 
As part of its March 3, 1977, forfeiture 
letter to the buyers, the seller alleged the 
following acts of default: The contract had 
been breached by the buyers in that the 
interest, taxes and insurance had not been 
paid. It was further alleged that financial 
statements and animal inventories had not 
been furnished and that the animal level 
had, without authority, been permitted to 
drop below the agreed-upon levels. Lastly, 
it was further contended that the buyers 
had permitted the property to run down-
all in violation of the contract provisions. 
At trial, the buyers' own evidence dis-
closed that they had not complied with the 
contract in several respects. Nevertheless, 
it was the buyers' position in the trial court, 
and now on appeal, that: 
A i o n 
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1. The Contract of Sale should be con-
strued to be an equitable mortgage, 
and 
2. The seller, by its conduct, has waived 
its right to declare a forfeiture on the 
basis of the alleged acts of default. 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
[1-41 Before we discuss these issues, it 
is necessary to generally consider the pro-
priety of granting a motion to dismiss and 
the standards by which we will review such 
a disposition. It is conceded by the parties 
that the trial court treated the seller's mo-
tion to dismiss as a motion made pursuant 
to Rule 41(b)(1), W.R.C.P.1 Prior to the 
amendment of this rule in 1970—at which 
time the fourth sentence of the relevant 
subsection was added—we considered the 
quantum and quality of the evidence which 
would justify a court's granting such a mo-
tion. In Arbenz v. Bebout, Wyo., 444 P.2d 
317, we embraced the so-called Alaskan rule 
by quoting from Rogge v. Weaver, Alaska, 
368 P.2d 810, 813, as follows: 
44
 'Where plaintiff's proof has failed in 
some aspect the motion should, of course, 
be granted. Where plaintiff's proof is 
overwhelming, application of the rule is 
made easy and the motion should be de-
nied. But where plaintiff has presented 
a prima facie case based on unimpeached 
evidence we are of the opinion that the 
trial judge should not grant the motion 
1. Rule 41(b)(1), W.R.C.P., provides: 
"For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or 
to comply with these rules or any order of 
court, a defendant may move for dismissal of 
an action or of any claim against him. After 
the plaintiff, in an action tried by the court 
without a jury, has completed the presenta-
tion of his evidence, the defendant, without 
waiving his right to offer evidence in the 
event the motion is not granted, may move 
for a dismissal on the ground that upon the 
facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no 
right to relief. The court as trier of the facts 
may then determine them and render judg-
ment against the plaintiff or may decline to 
render any judgment until the close of all the 
evidence. If the court renders judgment on 
the merits against the plaintiff, the court 
shall make findings as provided in Rule 52(a). 
Unless the court in its order for dismissal 
otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this 
subdivision and any dismissal not provided 
even though he is the trier of the facts 
and may not himself feel at that point in 
the trial that the plaintiff has sustained 
his burden of proof. We believe that in 
the latter situation the trial judge should 
follow the alternative offered by the rule 
wherein it is provided that he " * * * 
may decline to render any judgment until 
the close of all the evidence", and deny 
the motion * * V " [Emphasis sup-
plied] 
In doing so, we said: 
44
. . . Such disposition, undoubted-
ly meritorious in jurisdictions such as 
Alaska, which follow exactly the federal 
rule requiring findings, becomes particu-
larly essential in Wyoming where find-
ings are not obligatory.0 444 P.2d at 319. 
We went on to hold that in reviewing the 
grant of such a motion, the entire evidence 
must be viewed most favorably to plaintiff, 
giving him the benefit of all reasonable 
inferences which may be deduced there-
from. Arbenz v. Bebout, supra. Implicit in 
adoption of the Alaskan rule was our recog-
nition of the "prima facie"2 test, as opposed 
to the federal weighing-of-evidence stan-
dard3, which was to be applied by trial 
judges seeking to resolve Rule 41(b) mo-
tions. We find no reason to depart from 
the Rogge prima facie test, merely because 
our rule now follows the federal rule re-
quiring findings, since this test is "more 
for in this rule, other than a dismissal for 
lack of jurisdiction, for improper venue, or 
for failure to join a party under Rule 19, 
operates as an adjudication upon the merits." 
[Emphasis supplied] 
The emphasized portion of the rule was added 
by amendment in 1970. 
2. "Prima facie case" is defined by Black's Law 
Dictionary 4th Ed.Rev. (1968), at 1353, as 
"such as will suffice until contradicted and 
overcome by other evidence (case cited)." 
3. Under the federal test, the trial court need 
not consider the evidence in a light most favor-
able to the plaintiff. Woods v. North American 
Rockwell Corporation, 10 Cir., 480 F.2d 644. 
See, generally, 5 Moore's Federal Practice, 
§ 41.13; 9 Wright and Miller, Federal Practice 
and Procedure: Civil § 2371; and 55 A.L.R.3d 
272. 
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likely to achieve justice and reduce the 
number of appeals resulting from the appli-
cation of Rule 41(b)." Trusty v. Jones, 
Alaska, 369 P.2d 420, 422. Accord, Tillman 
v. Baskin, Fla., 260 So.2d 509; and King v. 
Alaska State Housing Authority, Alaska, 
512 P.2d 887. As a result, if the appellants-
plaintiffs in the instant case "presented a 
prima facie case based on unimpeached evi-
dence," then the trial court erred in dismiss-
ing their action under Rule 41(b).4 In mak-
ing this determination, this court will view 
the evidence in a light most favorable to 
the plaintiffs, just as the trial court should 
have done, and presumably did, in consider-
ing the seller's motion. 
EQUITABLE-MORTGAGE THEORY 
[5] In order to establish a prima facie 
case on their equitable-mortgage theory, 
the buyers were required to show that the 
parties intended the transaction to be a 
mortgage, rather than an installment land 
contract, as construed from their written 
agreement and the surrounding circum-
stances. Baldwin v. McDonald, 24 Wyo. 
108, 156 P. 27; and 59 C.J.S. Mortgages 
§ 10a. There must have been an intent to 
create a security or, in other words, there 
must be proof that the maker intended the 
property to be held, given or transferred as 
security. 1 Jones on Mortgages, § 225, at 
262-263. It has been observed that there is 
little possibility that a court will construe 
an installment land contract as a mortgage, 
assuming that it does not depart too far 
from the usual contract terms and provi-
sions. Rudolph, The Wyoming Law of Real 
Mortgages, at 147. 
[6-8] Appellants contend that they 
made the requisite showing by virtue of the 
contract provisions, which grant them a 
"right of redemption" for a period of six 
months after default, and the seller's con-
4. It is noted that our present Rule 41(b)(1) 
requires that in cases like the present, findings 
shall be made under Rule 52(a), W.R.C.P. Al-
though not properly raised in this case, it is 
apparent that, in appropriate cases, the failure 
to comply with this requirement may require a 
remand. Denofre v. Transportation Ins. Rating 
Bureau, 7 Cir., 532 F.2d 43. 
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duct allegedly waiving its right to forfei-
ture. While it may be conceded, arguendo, 
that a seller may waive his right to declare 
an automatic forfeiture through conduct 
which has been characterized as acquies-
cence, it cannot be said that such acquies-
cence discloses an intention to treat the 
transaction as creating a mortgage. The 
primary effect of such conduct, as pointed 
out by appellants in their waiver argument, 
is to preclude the vendor from exercising its 
right to forfeiture until the vendee is put 
on notice that future defaults will not be 
countenanced and strict compliance will be 
required. Baker v. Jones, 69 Wyo. 314, 240 
P.2d 1165, 1171. Furthermore, we fail to 
see how the language of this contract con-
verts it into an equitable mortgage. See, 
Bishop \\ Beecher, 67 N.M. 339, 355 P.2d 
277. The presence of the right-of-redemp-
tion provision, without further evidence of 
the parties' intention and without any fur-
ther indications arising from the contract 
itself, is not sufficient—as a matter of 
law—to convert this installment land con-
tract into an equitable mortgage. At most, 
this provision was a contingency placed in 
the contract for the buyers' benefit, aimed 
at lessening the harshness of a forfeiture. 
To provide for such a revivor possibility 
does not mean that the buyers are entitled 
to the same or all of the protections afford-
ed by a mortgage. We hold the buyers 
failed to establish a prima facie case with 
respect to their equitable-mortgage theory. 
This does not mean that, in appropriate 
cases, buyers will not be entitled to equita-
ble remedies, such as restitution. Cf., Quin-
lan v. St John, 28 Wyo. 91, 201 P. 149, reh. 
den. 28 Wryo. 91, 203 P. 1088; and Lawrence 
v. Demos, 70 Wyo. 56, 244 P.2d 793.5 
WAIVER THEORY 
[9,10] We must also determine whether 
the appellants established a prima facie 
5. While the buyers amended their complaint to 
seek such equitable relief, the trial court found 
that the seller was entitled to retain all sums 
paid by the buyers since such sums were rea-
sonably related to the seller's actual damages. 
The appellants did not challenge that finding on 
appeal. 
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case in support of their waiver theory. 
Most litigation in this area concerns itself 
with failure to make timely payments un-
der a land contract, but we see no reason 
why the pertinent rules are not equally 
applicable to any failure to strictly comply 
with other material contract provisions. In 
order to establish u prima facie case of 
waiver, the vendee must show that the ven-
dor has condoned or assented to previous 
defaults and has not given notice of his 
intention to insist on strict compliance in 
the future. See, Baker v. Jones, supra; 
and Jones v. Clark, Wyo., 418 P.2d 792, 797. 
See, also, Nclms v. Miliar, 56 N.M. 132, 241 
P.2d 333, 348; 77 Am.Jur.2d, Vendor and 
Purchaser, § 588; and 17A C.J.S. Contracts 
§ 409. The effect of such conduct is not, 
however, a waiver of a vendor's right to 
declare a forfeiture for future defaults. 
Jones v. Clark, supra. 
We said in Baker v. Jones, at 240 P.2d 
1171-1172: 
"It is now well established in law and 
in equity that forfeitures are not favored. 
Before one can declare a forfeiture it 
must appear that he has a clear right and 
then too he himself must be free from 
blame in the premises. Every reasonable 
presumption is against a forfeiture and 
every intendment and presumption is 
against a person seeking to enforce it. 17 
C.J.S. Contracts, § 407 page 896. 'Provi-
sions for forfeiture may be waived and 
the courts are quick to take advantage of 
circumstances indicating such an inten-
tion.' 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 409, page 897. 
And, 4So where the time fixed by the 
contract for performance is permitted to 
pass, both parties concurring, the time of 
performance thereafter becomes indefi-
nite, and one party cannot rescind until 
full notice and a reasonable time for per-
formance is given/ 17 C.J.S. Contracts 
§ 506, page 1081. . . . 
"In line with the holdings of other 
courts, this court has taken the opportu-
nity to say that, 'Forfeitures are not fa-
vored, and it is said that slight evidence 
of the lessor's intention to relinquish his 
right is sufficient to warrant the finding 
of waiver.' 
"Investors Guaranty Corp. v. Thomson, 
31 Wyo. 204-273, 225 P. 590, 592, 32 
A.L.H. 1071; Pacific-Wyoming Oil Co. v. 
Carter Oil Co.t 31 Wyo. 314-329, 226 P. 
193, and in the late case of Larsen Sheep 
Co. v. Sjogren, 67 Wyo. 447-465, 226 P.2d 
177, 178, this court states, 'Forfeiture of 
lease for breach of covenant or condition 
therein may be waived and, forfeiture 
not being favored, slight circumstances 
will at times suffice to constitute a waiv-
er.' " 
[11] Viewing the evidence in a light 
most favorable to the appellants-buyers, it 
is apparent that buyers did establish a pri-
ma facie case of waiver concerning most of 
the alleged acts of default. With respect to 
the buyers' obligation to make interest pay-
ments to the seller, the evidence discloses 
that the buyers made one interest payment, 
of $5,853.66, on April 30, 1974, and, al-
though no interest payments were made in 
1975 or 1976, the seller gave no notices of 
default until the letter of March 3, 1977. 
Even then, the seller did not demand that 
the buyers become current on or within a 
reasonable time after the April, 1977, pay-
ment date. Rather, it demanded that buy-
ers vacate the premises by March 18, 1977, 
or be subject to eviction. Furthermore, the 
evidence discloses that the seller made no 
demands with respect to past due taxes, the 
annual audits, the monthly inventories, or 
the condition of the premises. The seller 
could not legally declare a forfeiture on any 
of these grounds without first giving the 
buyers notice of its intention to insist on 
strict compliance, and additionally giving 
the buyers a reasonable time within which 
to perform or cure continuing defaults. 
[12,13] The matter of the reduction in 
the number of animals is an entirely differ-
ent fact situation. The buyers' evidence 
disclosed that by February, 1977, there were 
only 114 animals on the property, of which 
only 44 to 50 were sows. There is no evi-
dence that the seller had authorized or had 
prior knowledge of these drastic animal re-
ductions, even though seller and the bank 
were aware that the buyers had changed 
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from a farrow-to-finish oj>eration to a feed-
er-pig operation. Plaintiff, Charles L. Carl-
son, acknowledged the imjiortance of main-
taining adequate numbers of animals. 
There being no evidence that the seller had 
condoned the animal reduction, or had prior 
knowledge thereof, the seller was entitled 
to declare a forfeiture on the basis of the 
breach of this material condition of the 
contract. 
We hold, therefore, that the appellants 
failed to establish a prima facie case of 
waiver with respect to all of the alleged 
acts of default, and particularly with re-
spect to the reduction of the animal popula-
tion without seller's knowledge or acquies-
cence. Failing this, the trial court correctly 
found that the seller was entitled to rescind 
the contract and to retake possession under 
its provisions. There was no necessity for 
the seller to put on further evidence in 
order to sustain its counterclaim. Finally, 
it was appropriate to grant a six-month 
redemption period to the appellants since 
this was an agreed-to provision of the con-
tract. 
Affirmed. 
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chief concern of the trial judge was the 
welfare of the minor child, whose custody 
was decided by the court on conflicting ev-
idence. 
[6,7] The court had the hencfit of tes-
timony of psychiatrists, who gave their ex-
pert opinions, based on the appraisals they 
were able to make of the parties, the minor 
child, and the situation in which they were 
involved. Their opinions are worthy of 
careful consideration by the court, but are 
advisory only, and in no sense controlling. 
The parties appeared and testified. The 
court had the opportunity to observe their 
appearance and demeanor and to evaluate to 
a limited degree their personalities, atti-
tudes and emotional stability, and to make 
a judgment in reliance on all the evidence 
produced at the trial as to what appeared 
to be in the best interest of the minor 
child. The ultimate decision was for the 
trial judge, who was in a more favorable 
position than we are to weigh the evidence 
as it came from the mouths of the witness-
es before him, and to make a proper deter-
mination of the issues presented. 
In Johnson z\ Johnson, 7 Utah 2d 263, 
323 P.2d 16, our court said: 
Due to the equitable nature of such 
proceedings, the proper adjudication of 
which is highly dependent upon personal 
equations which the trial court is in an 
advantaged position to appraise, he is al-
lowed considerable latitude of discretion 
and his orders will not be disturbed un-
less it appears that there has been a 
plain abuse thereof. 
We have carefully read the transcript 
and hold that the trial judge's decision was 
fairly sustained by the evidence and that 
there was no abuse of discretion. 
Affirmed. No costs awarded. 
JAMES S. S AWAY A, VcNOY CHRIS-
TOFFERSON, EDWARD SHEYA, Jr. 
and DON V. TIBBS, District Judges, con-
cur. 
544 P.2d—31 
NDS, INC. v. HARPER Utah 4 8 1 
I'.IM 1M j 
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Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Emily D. HARPER and Max D. Harper, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
No. 13936. j 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
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I 
I 
Assignee of contract for sale of real 
estate brought action against vendors for i 
specific performance of contract and ven-
dors counterclaimed, alleging that assignee 1 
had slandered their title by recording aban- \ 
doned contract. The Fourth District 
Court, Provo County, Allen B. Sorensen, -
J., entered judgment in favor of vendors, 
except that it dismissed defendants' coun-
terclaim for slander of title, and parties , 
cross-appealed. The Supreme Court, 
Crockett, J., held that evidence supported 
trial court's conclusion that original con-
tract had been abandoned; that dead man's 
statute did not preclude admission of evi-
dence of statement of original party to 
contract for sale of real estate, now de-
ceased, concerning abandonment of con-
tract; and that assignee's partial tender of 
amount due did not constitute a valid ten-
der. 
Affirmed. 
1. Appeal and Error C=>847(1) 
In action for specific performance in 
equity, appellate court may review law and 
facts. 
2. Appeal tnd Error C=»I009(4) 
In action for specific performance in 
equity appellate court will reverse only if 
persuaded that evidence clearly preponder-
ates against findings. 
3. Contracts €=>256 
Term "abandonment" means intention-
al relinquishment of one's rights in con-
tract; and in order to nullify such rights, 
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there must be a clear and unequivocal 
showing of such abandonment. 
Sec jMiblkfition Words ami Phrases 
for otluT judicial roustructions and 
definitions. 
4. Contracts C=>352(6) 
Dispute as to whether contract has 
been abandoned is usually question of fact 
to be determined from circumstances of 
particular case, which circumstances in-
clude not only nonperformance, but also 
expressions of intent and other actions of 
parties. 
5. Specific Performance 0121(11) 
Evidence, in action for specific per-
formance of contract for sale of real es-
tate, including purchasers' delinquent and 
erratic payments on contract and their fail-
ure to pay taxes or to take possession or in 
any manner to improve or exercise domin-
ion over real estate, supported findings of 
trial court that contract had been aban-
doned. 
6. Witnesses 0=126 
Dead man's statute excluding other-
wise proper evidence should be construed 
and applied strictly according to its terms. 
U.C.A.1953, 78-24-2(3). 
7. Witnesses 0159(8) 
Dead man's statute did not preclude 
admission of vendor's testimony, in action 
for specific performance of contract, con-
cerning fact that original purchaser under 
contract for sale of real estate, now de-
ceased, told him he would have to let prop-
erty go due to financial difficulties. U.C. 
A.1953, 78-24-2(3). 
8. Tender 0=12(2) 
To constitute a valid tender of money 
for purposes of fulfilling obligations due 
under contract, there must be actual and 
bona fide offer to pay whole amount of 
money dut. U.C.A.1953, 70A-2-511. 
9. Vendor and Purchaser C=I70 
Real estate purchaser's tender of 
$3(1,384.25 when amount of payment past 
due under purchase contract, together with 
unpaid taxes and water assessments, to-
taled $36,677.71, did not constitute valid 
tender. U.C.A.1953, 70A-2-511. 
10. Tender C=>I5(I) 
In usual circumstances, one who refus-
es to accept tender should state basis of his 
refusal. U.C.A.1953, 70A-2-5U. 
11. Specific Performance 0=>I2I(I I) 
Assignee in action for specific per-
formance of contract for sale of real es-
tate failed to meet burden of proving it 
had live and viable contract by showing ci-
ther that it had performed its obligations 
or had made valid tender to do so. 
12. Libel and Slander C=>I3I 
In action by assignee for specific per-
formance of land sale contract, in which 
vendors counterclaimed, alleging assignee 
had slandered their title by recording aban-
doned contract, assignee had sufficient ba-
sis for believing it had rights under con-
tract and thus did not willfully and know-
ingly record false or fraudulent instrument 
for purpose of slandering title of those 
ultimately found to be owners. 
Gary A. Sargent, of Backman, Clark & 
Marsh, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and 
appellant. 
Jackson B. Howard, of Howard, Lewis 
& Petersen, Provo, for defendants and re-
spondents. 
CROCKETT, Justice: 
Plaintiff, Timpanogos Highlands, Inc., 
sued defendants, Max D. Harper and Emi-
ly D. Harper (now deceased), for specific 
performance of a contract for the purchase 
of a tract of 71 acres of unimproved prop-
erty cast of Lindon in Utah County. De-
fendants acknowledged execution of the 
contract, but averred that it had been 
abandoned; and also counterclaimed, alleg-
ing plaintiff had slandered their title by re-
cording the abandoned contract. The ac-
tion for specific performance being in eq-
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uity, an advisory jury was used.1 Its find-
ings were in favor of ihe defendants: that 
the contract had been abandoned. The 
trial court made findings accordingly and 
entered judgment against the plaintiff and 
in favor of the defendants, except that it 
dismissed defendants' counterclaim for 
slander of title. Plaintiff appeals. De-
fendant cross-appeals. 
Plaintiff states its contentions: (1) That 
the finding of abandonment ''is against a 
fair preponderance of the evidence"; (2) 
That a tender it made to reinstate the con-
tract should have been accepted; (3) That 
the court erred in admitting evidence of a 
statement of Karl P». Hale, one of plain-
tiff's predecessors, who is now deceased, 
concerning abandonment of the contract. 
The original parties, Perry W. and Emi-
ly D. Harper, as sellers, and Karl H. Hale 
and Roy A. Barrett, buyers (each prede-
cessors to the parties to this action), used 
a uniform real estate contract form. It 
was dated September 18, 1957, and pro-
vided for a total price of $35,000 (about 
$500 per acre) to be paid: $500 for the op-
tion to purchase; $2,500 on the exercise of 
the option; and $3,000 per year, with five 
per cent interest on the deferred balance, 
until the total amount was paid. After the 
initial payments, and the following year, 
1959, the purchasers made sporadic but in-
adequate payments until November, 1968. 
During that time they had paid a total of 
$24,150, of which $14,650 had been applied 
on interest, and $9,500 (thus a little more 
than one-fourth of the total price) on prin-
cipal. 
Other significant facts are: that the 
buyers never entered into the possession of 
the property, or in any way used or exer-
cised dominion over it. Nor did they pay 
the taxes thereon. For several years prior 
to 1968 the buyers had been making two 
payments a year of $500 each. The last 
such payment was made in November, 
I. See Kcslcr t\ Rogers, Utah, 542 P.2d 354 
(1075). 
196K. A few days later, Max Harper 
called Karl H. Hale on the telephone and 
told him that the payment was not enough, 
that it would not even cover the interest 
and taxes. Whereupon Mr. Hale told him 
that due to financial difficulties he could 
not pay for the property and would have to 
let it go. The evidence is further that 
upon a subsequent occasion Mr. Hale made 
a similar statement to Ruby Harper West, 
Max's sister. Shortly after these occur-
rences, the defendants leased the property 
for a term of ten years to a third party. 
Karl P.. Hale died May 24, 1969. There 
is some dispute as to what happened be-
tween that time and April, 1973, when the 
events occurred which precipitated this 
lawsuit. However, there was some contact 
between the parties and conversations 
about paying off the contract; but no 
agreement was arrived at and no payments 
were made. In late April, 1973, plaintiff 
tendered the amount of $30,384.25 to de-
fendants to pay off the contract. The 
amount then owing, together with the sum 
of unpaid taxes and water assessments, to-
talled $36,677,71. When defendants 
refused to accept the tender, this suit for 
specific performance was initiated. 
[1,2] In support of its attack upon the 
findings and judgment, the plaintiff relies 
on certain principles: The first, it correct-
ly states: that this action for specific per-
formance being in equity, this court may 
review the law and the facts.* But its fur-
ther contention: that "the finding of aban-
donment of the contract is against a fair 
preponderance of the evidence," represents 
a misconception of the nature of this re-
view. Even though we may review the 
facts, the well-established and long-fol-
lowed rule is that due to the prerogative of 
the trial court as the initial trier of the 
facts, and his advantaged position to judge 
the credibility of the witnesses and the evi-
dence presented, we indulge the trial court 
2. See Allen v. Allen, 109 Utah 09, !Ck5 P.2d 
872, and see Stanley v. Stanley 97 Utah 520, 
94 P.2d 4G5, particularly concurring opinion 
of Wolfe and authorities therein cited. 
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with considerable latitude in those matters. 
Therefore, we do not review in the manner 
plaintiff surests : to determine whether 
we would agree that "the evidence fairly 
preponderates in favor of the findings." 
But due to the tolerance indulged as just 
stated, we do not reverse unless we are 
persuaded that the evidence clearly prepon-
derates against the findings.3 
[3,4] The term "abandonment" in the 
sense involved here means the intentional 
relinquishment of one's rights in the con-
tract; and in order to nullify such rights, 
there must be a clear and unequivocal 
showing of such abandonment.4 Where 
there is dispute as to whether this has oc-
curred, it is usually a question of fact,5 to 
be determined from the circumstances of 
the particular case, which include not only 
nonperformance, but also expressions of 
intent and other actions of the parties. 
The facts which the plaintiff marshals to 
demonstrate that the contract should be re-
garded as alive and subject to specific per-
formance are: that the defendants did not 
make demands about the inadequate and 
delinquent payments, or the nonpayment of 
taxes; and that they never gave any notice 
of election to forfeit the contract. Fur-
ther, that the defendants (sellers) had en-
tered into a collateral oral agreement by 
which the defendants were allowed to re-
main in possession of the property in con-
sideration for which they would pay the 
taxes; and that during that four and one-
half year period, plaintiff's "predecessor" 
made several contacts with the defendants 
for the purpose of ascertaining the contract 
balance and negotiating a payment sched-
ule, to which the defendants did not give a 
definite response, so that it was the de-
fendants' fault that nothing definite was 
not arrived at about reinstating and paying 
out the contract. 
In opposition to plaintiff's arguments, 
the defendants point to the facts herein-
above recited as justifying the finding of 
abandonment: the always delinquent and 
erratic payments; the failure to pay taxes, 
or to take possession or in any manner im-
prove or exercise dominion over the prop-
erty. They combine this with the fact that 
both by the statements made and the subse-
quent conduct for four and a half years 
indicate an intention to abandon the con-
tract. The defendants' version of what 
happened during that period was that on 
two occasions when the matter was dis-
cussed, plaintiff made proposals to do 
something less than the contract required, 
neither of which they were willing to ac-
cept. 
In addition to the other factors concern-
ing abandonment hereinabove recited, there 
is another one which the jury could well 
regard as having caused a change of mind 
by plaintiff as to abandoning the contract. 
As is not uncommon in these days of infla-
tion and rapidly increasing land values, es-
pecially in some suburban areas, there had 
occurred a dramatic increase in the value 
of the property. While it is not shown 
just what the value was in 1968 when the 
intention to abandon the contract was ex-
pressed, it is shown that by 1973 when this 
plaintiff made the tender and desired to 
reinstate the contract, the land had a value 
of about $5,500 an acre, over ten times its 
value when the original contract was en-
tered into. 
[5] It was the prerogative and the duty 
of the jury and of the trial court to ana-
lyze the foregoing contentions of the par-
ties and to arrive at their conclusions 
3. Ibid. 
4. Grossman r. Liahhcr, Tex.Civ.App., 202 
S.\V.2d 207. 271; Xorlh llenjen Tp. v. 
Thomas S. Lee Enterprise*, Inc., 75 N..T. 
Super. 17. 182 A.2d 137. 130; 1 Am.Jur.2ci 
p. 14: GS A.L.R.2il 581. 
5. Asher v. Hull, 207 Ok!. 478, 250 P.2d 8GG 
(1952) ; Tucker v. Edwarth, 376 P.2d 253. 
This is subject to tbc standard rule that if 
the evidence is such that all reasonable minds 
must necessarily so find one way or the other, 
tbc court should rule as a matter of law. 
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thereon in accordance with their views of 
the evidence. In that regard and in sup-
port of the conclusion they reached, we 
make these further observations: (1) Inas-
much as the plaintiff's obligations were 
clearly set forth in the existing contract, 
which the plaintiff insists was in force and 
effect, all it had to do was to perform that 
contract, and there would seem to have 
been no particular need for negotiating 
new terms. (2) Plaintiff's opposition to 
the finding of abandonment is based upon 
a claimed collateral agreement excusing it 
from performance of the contract. This 
would be in controversion of the expressed 
terms of the written contract, and in order 
to prevail thereon, it could only do so by 
clear and convincing evidence.0 The jury 
and the trial court not having been so con-
vinced, we would not reverse unless the ev-
idence was so clear and persuasive that all 
reasonable minds must necessarily so find,7 
a circumstance which we do not find 
present here. 
[6] Plaintiff's claim of error in admit-
ting evidence of the statement of Karl B. 
Hale about abandonment of the contract is 
based on the ground that it should be 
barred by the so-called dead man's statute.8 
That statute excludes testimony of persons 
who "sue or defend, as . . . executor 
or administrator, heir, legatee or devisee of 
. . . a deceased person" and continues 
the exclusion to a " . . . guardian, as-
signee or grantee . . . of such heir, 
legatee or devisee, . . . " Plaintiff 
concedes that it is not the assignee nor 
any of those three, but is an assignee of 
the deceased person (Karl B. Hale) him-
self and that thus the terms of the statute 
do not literally apply to its relationship to 
Karl B. Hale. But it argues that in logic 
and fairness the statute should be broadly 
6. Sec Vagano v. Walker, 539 P.2d 452, 454 
(Utah, 1975), and Authorities therein cited. 
7. Cf. Statement in Hotcarth r. Ostei'9aard, 30 
Utah 2d 183, 515 P.2d 442. 
8. See. 78-24-2(3), U.C.A.1953. 
9. Maxficld v. Sainabury, 110 Utah 2S0, 172 
P.2cl 122 (1946); Morrison r. Walker Dank 
construed in accordance with its general 
purpose and thus include an assignee of 
the deceased person. Conceding that such 
an argument may have validity in some 
statutory situations, it is not of concern 
here. This is so for the reason that, as 
this court has previously ruled, because this 
statute is one of exclusion of otherwise 
proper evidence, it should be construed and 
applied strictly according to its terms.9 
[7] In so doing the trial court correctly 
ruled that it did not prohibit the testimony 
concerning Mr. Hale's statement. In re-
gard to that statement, it is further perti-
nent to observe that what was done about 
the contract, as recited herein, or, perhaps 
better stated, what was not done about the 
contract, during the next four years, is in 
harmony with the statement and perhaps 
even more cogent indication of the intent 
to abandon it. 
[8-11] Although it is not of controlling 
importance to the decision in this case, it is 
appropriate to make some observations 
about the tender by which plaintiff sought 
to reinstate the contract; and which may 
also have been regarded as tending to jus-
tify the conclusion arrived at by the jury 
and the trial court. To constitute a valid 
tender, there must be an actual and bona 
fide offer to pay the whole amount of 
money due.10 Applying this rule, the plain-
tiffs tender of $30,3&4.25 in April of 1973 
when the amount of payments past due, to-
gether with unpaid taxes and water assess-
ments, total $36,677.71, did not constitute a 
valid tender. It is to be conceded that in 
usual circumstances, one who refuses to ac-
cept a tender should state the basis of his 
refusal. However, also to be considered are 
these propositions: that the plaintiff had 
the burden of proving that it had a live and 
and Trust Co.t 11 Utah 2d 416, 3G0 P.2d 
1015 (1961). 
10. See 74 Am.Jur.2d, p. 545, Zion's Prop-
erties, Inc. v. Holt, 53S I\2d 1319 (Utah, 
1975) ; Sec. 70A-2-5H, U.S.A.1953. 
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viable contract which included either that 
it had performed its obligations, or that it 
had made a valid tender to do so, neither 
of which the plaintiff had done here. 
[121 In defendants' cross-appeal they 
assail the trial court's dismissal of the as-
serted cause of action against the plaintiff 
for slander of title by recording the con-
tract and assignments relating thereto. It 
is our opinion that the trial court was jus-
tified in concluding that plaintiff had suf-
ficient basis for believing that it had rights 
under the contract, that there is no founda-
tion upon which it could be found that it 
wilfully and knowingly recorded a false or 
fraudulent instrument for the purpose of 
slandering the defendants' title.11 The 
cross-appeal is without merit. 
Affirmed. In view of the fact that both 
parties appealed, each should bear his own 
costs. 
HEXRIOD, C. J., and ELLETT, TUCK-
ETT and MAUGHAN, JJ., concur. 
CONSOLIDATED SERVICES, INC., a Utah 
Corporation, et at., Plaintiffs 
and Appellants, 
v. 
FMA LEASING COMPANY, a Utah Corpora-
tion, and Barbara Jensen Interiors, a Utah 
Corporation, Defendants and Respondents. 
No. 14039. 
Supreme Court of Utnh. 
Dec. 19, 1975. 
The Second District Court, Weber 
County, Jay E. Banks, J., dismissed action 
brought by lessees of furniture, seeking to 
recover lease payments to lessor on the 
grounds of unjust enrichment and lack of 
11. Pender v. Douse, 1 Utah 2d 283, 265 P.2<1 
consideration, and the lessees appealed. 
The Supreme Court, Ilenriod, C. J., held 
that evidence was sufficient to -support 
finding that plaintiffs breached the lease 
contract. 
Affirmed. 
Bailment C=>3I(3) 
Evidence was sufficient to support 
finding that lessees of furniture breached 
lease contract. 
George B. 1 Tandy, Ogden, for plaintiffs 
and appellants. 
Robert C. Liljenquist, Picrcey, Bradford 
& Marsden, Salt Lake City, for defendants 
and respondents. 
HENRIOD, Chief Justice: 
Appeal from the dismissal of an action 
brought by Campions, Lessees, involving a 
furniture lease. Affirmed with no costs. 
In October, 1970, Campions purchased 
furniture from Barbara Jensen Interiors, 
half the purchase price of which was being 
financed by defendant Lessor, FMA Leas-
ing. An argument ensued between Cam-
pions and Interiors. The former advised 
FMA not to.make payments to Interiors 
until further notice. Interiors sued Cam-
pions for the price, but the latter, nonethe-
less, paid FMA the commitment fee (the 
first and last installments) anyway, in ac-
cordance with the terms of the lease. 
Thereafter they also paid five more 
monthly payments (totalling $4,156.36) 
while the suit was pending. Interiors ob-
tained a judgment against Campions who, 
about three years later, in December, 1973, 
on the ground of unjust enrichment and 
lack of consideration, sued FMA to re-
cover the payments theretofore made under 
the contract. 
Believable evidence indicated that FMA 
already had paid a lending bank $1,600.00 
interest for the finance money, incurred 
$900.00 accrued handling charges and may 
044; 50 Am.Jur.2tl, Libel and Slander, Sec. 549. 
PITCHER v. LAURITZEN 
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Utah 491 
cfcccl." During the time Nordell had ac-
quired the grazing rights from Jorgensens 
lie paid taxes as stipulated in the deed. 
During the years 1942, 1915, 1944 The Both-
well Corporation, then the owner of the 
mining rights, accepted those payments 
without any questions. Certainly The 
Bothwcll Corporation in accepting these 
taxes was recognizing an interest under 
the "Jorgenscn deed'' which had been trans-
ferred to Nordell. 
For the foregoing reasons we hold that 
there is ample evidence in the record to 
support the findings and judgment of the 
trial court. 
Affirmed. Costs to plaintiff. 
CROCKETT, C. J., IIENRIOD, J., and 
LEONARD ELTON, District Judge, con-
cur. 
TUCKETT, J., being disqualified did not 
participate herein. 
McDONOUGIJ, J., heard the arguments 
but died before the opinion was filed. 
18 Utah 2d 308 
Marcell PITCHER, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
C. W. LAURITZEN, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 10563. 
Supremo Court of Utah. 
Feb. 7, 19C7. 
After earnest money agreement and 
offer to purchase land had been signed and 
purchaser had deposited $100, and before 
full payment was made on contract, pur-
chaser took about $3,500 worth of hay and 
straw from land, and vendor brought ac-
tion for value of crops taken. Purchaser 
counterclairncd for specific performance of 
the contract to purchase. The First District 
Court of Cache County, Lewis Jones, J., 
rendered judgment for vendor, and pur-
chaser appealed. The Supreme Court, 
Ellctt, T., held that competent evidence, 
including fact that nothing was done by 
either party to earnest money agreement 
and offer to purchase agreement prior to 
date when final contract was to be entered 
into and that no final contract was ever 
entered into by the parties, supported finding 
that parties had mutually abandoned their 
contract. 
Affirmed. 
1. Contracts 0313(1) 
"Repudiation" of contract by one party 
is refusal to perform duty or obligation 
owed to other party. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
2. Contracts 0 2 5 6 
"Abandonment'* of contract by one 
party is giving up of right to benefit due 
from another party. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
3. Vendor and Purchaser <£=*86 
Competent evidence, including fact that 
nothing was done by either party to pre-
liminary earnest money agreement and 
offer to purchase agreement prior to date 
when final contract to convey real estate 
was to be entered into, and that no final 
contract was ever entered into by the 
parties, supported finding that parties had 
mutually abandoned their contract. 
4. Appeal and Error <S»I0I0(I) 
Where there is competent evidence to 
support finding of abandonment of con-
tract, Supreme Court cannot substitute its 
judgment for that of lower court even if 
it disagrees with finding of lower court. 
5. Specific Performance 028(1) 
Specific performance cannot be re-
quired unless all terms of agreement arc 
clear, since court cannot compel perform-
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anec of contract which parties did not 
mutually agree upon. 
G. Specific Performance 029(3), 30 
Even if parties had not mutually aban-
doned their contract, specific performance 
could not have been required of vendor of 
realty, where earnest money receipt and 
offer to purchase agreement failed to specify 
which 30 acres of the 189 acres owned 
by purchaser were to be conveyed to vendor 
as part payment, and where contract am-
biguously stated that final balance of 
$25,000 was to be carried by vendor "on 
contract or second mortgage." 
7. Vendor and Purchaser C=>I9I 
Where contract is silent as to when 
possession of land is to be given to pur-
chaser, vendor should have that possession 
as means of compelling performance on 
part of purchaser. 
8. Vendor and Purchaser O I 9 I , 194 
Purchaser of land is not entitled to 
possession of land nor to crops growing 
thereon, especially where purchaser has not 
contributed to cultivation and harvesting 
of such crops, until full payment is made 
to vendor, or if terms are given by contract, 
until compliance therewith is made by pur-
chaser so as to entitle him to possession 
of land. 
9. Vendor and Purchaser O I 9 4 
Party who signed earnest money agree-
ment and offer to purchase agreement and 
deposited $100 on contract to purchase, 
which was later mutually abandoned, was 
liable for $3,500 worth of hay and straw 
which he took from the realty before making 
any further payment and while vendor was 
still entitled to possession. 
E. T. Skeen, Salt Lake City, for appellant. 
Harris & Harris, Logan, for respondent. 
ELLETT, Justice. 
Between April 16 and 20, 1962, the 
plaintiff as seller and the defendant as pur-
chaser signed an earnest money receipt 
and offer to purchase, containing, anion;; 
other things, the following language: 
The total purchase pticc of $100,0n().00 
shall be payable as follows: $100.00 
which represents the aforcdcscribcd de-
posit, receipt of which is hereby acknowl-
edged by you: on delivery of deed or 
final contract of sale which shall be on 
or before May 1, 1962, and bain nee of 
purchase price to be paid as follows: 
30 acres in North Logan as indicated 
by map.valued at $50,000.00, $25,000.00 
cash from loan on seller's farm and 
seller to carry balance on contract or 
second mortgage at 5% interest. * * * 
All other taxes and all assessments, 
mortgages, chattel liens and other liens, 
encumbrances or charges against the 
property of any nature shall be paid by 
the seller except * * * none. (Em-
phasis added.) 
There was no map in existence at the 
time the parties signed the agreement. At 
least it was not shown to the plaintiff if 
any there was. The defendant had given 
to the real estate salesman with whom 
plaintiff had his land listed for sale a 
rough sketch showing where a tract of 
land containing 189 a/cres of land lay out 
of which the 30 acres were to be taken. 
This sketch was not shown to the plaintiff 
either. 
The plaintiff already had a mortgage 
of $23,000.00 on his land, and the title to 
one of the tracts being sold was in escrow 
and would be his when he paid some $6,000.-
00 balance due on it. 
No transfer of possession was ever made 
as to cither tract of land, and the plaintiff 
lost his enthusiasm for the deal when he 
learned that he could not sell the North 
Logan property for anything near $50,000.00 
nor mortgage his own land for more than 
$12,600.00. 
The parties never talked to each other 
about the deal prior to the signing of the 
purported agreement, and it was the real 
estate salesman who secured the signatures 
of each party. It is quite apparent from 
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reading the record that the plaintiff wanted 
and needed money and that defendant 
wanted and needed hay for his dairy opera-
tion. Numerous efforts on the part of the 
real estate salesman to get the parties 
together proved fruitless. 
The real estate salesman was instrumental 
in causing the defendant to go to the 
plaintiff's land and get about $3500.00 
worth of hay and straw during the late sum-
mer and fall of 1962. The plaintiff says 
it was a sale, while the defendant claims 
that he took the hay and straw as a 
matter of right by reason of the earnest 
money agreement which the parties had 
signed. 
No payment was ever made for the hay 
or straw, and in March of 1964 plaintiff 
sued the defendant for the value thereof. 
The defendant apparently thinking his best 
defense was a vigorous offense counter-
claimed for specific performance of the 
signed document entitled "Earnest Money 
Agreement and Offer to Purchase" above 
referred to. 
A trial was had partly to the court and 
partly to a jury. The jury found by a 
special verdict the value of the hay and 
straw, which defendant admits to be sus-
tained by the evidence. The jury also 
found that neither party had repudiated the 
earnest money agreement and offer to 
purchase. The court found the agreement 
to be valid and binding at its inception but 
that it had been abandoned by the parties. 
[1,2] The finding of the court is not in 
conflict with the finding of the jury. 
Repudiation is the refusal to perform a duty 
or obligation owed to the other party, while 
abandonment is the giving up of the right 
to a benefit due from another. 
By his finding of abandonment the court 
disposed of the issues raised by the defend-
ant on his counterclaim for specific per-
formance. 
[3,4] It will be noted that nothing was 
done by cither party prior to May 12, 1962, 
the date when a -final contract was to be 
entered into, and no final contract was ever 
entered into by the parties. The trial court 
found under disputed competent evidence 
that the parties had mutually abandoned the 
contract; and when there is competent 
evidence to support such a finding, we are 
not permitted to substitute our judgment 
for that of the trial court even if we should 
disagree with his finding. 
But even if there had been no finding of 
mutual abandonment, there were ample rea-
sons why specific performance should not 
have been required of the plaintiff. 
[5] Specific performance cannot be 
required unless all terms of the agreement 
are clear. The court cannot compel the 
performance of a contract which the parties 
did not mutually agree upon. Sec Bowman 
v. Rayburn, 115 Colo. 82, 170 P.2d 271. 
In speaking of certain terms required 
for specific performance, the author in 49 
Am.Jur., Specific Performance, Section 22, 
at page 35 uses this language: 
The contract must be free from doubt, 
vagueness, and ambiguity, so as to leave 
nothing to conjecture or to be supplied 
by the court. It must be sufficiently 
certain and definite in its terms to leave 
no reasonable doubt as to what the parties 
intended, and no reasonable doubt of the 
specific thing equity is called upon to 
have performed, and it must be suffi-
ciently certain as to its terms so that the 
court may enforce it as actually made by 
the parties. A greater degree of cer-
tainty is required for specific perform-
ance in equity than is necessary to estab-
lish a contract as the basis of an action 
at law for damages. 
[6] We think the earnest money receipt 
and offer to purchase lacks certainty in 
two respects, either of which would prevent 
the court from granting specific perform-
ance: First, it was not certain which 30 
acres out of the 189 acres owned by the 
defendant were to be conveyed to plaintiff. 
The document says, "as indicated by map," 
but no map was ever shown to the plaintiff. 
Second, the final balance of $25,000.00 was 
to be carried by the seller on contract or 
A-
4 9 1 Utah 423 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
second mortgage. Which would the court 
require? A mortgage was already on the 
plaintiff's land. He was to get another 
loan on the land. Docs that become the sec-
ond mortgage? If second mortgage means 
third mortgage, what arc the terms: 10 
years, 15 years, or 5 years? How are the 
payments to be made: annually, semiannu-
ally, or lump sum at the end of the term? 
How was interest to be paid: annually, 
semiannually, or monthly? Should the 
court require a contract for $25,000.00 
balance instead of the mortgage, and if so, 
would not the same problems arise as to its 
terms as are indicated above for those of 
the mortgage? 
Since plaintiff needed money and believed 
defendant's North Logan land could be sold 
promptly for cash, the court could consider 
the hardship which might ensue in determin-
ing what to do, and it docs not matter that 
the defendant was not the one who made 
plaintiff believe the land would sell for 
$50,000.00. The court could consider the 
fact that only $12,600.00 could be borrowed 
on the plaintiff's land instead of the ex-
pected $25,000.00 in making his ruling 
regarding specific performance. 
But what about the hay and straw? 
The findings of the court do not tell us 
when the parties abandoned the purported 
agreement. If we assume the hay and 
straw were taken before the final abandon-
ment, would the defendant then have to 
pay for it? 
[7,8] Where a contract is silent as to 
when possession of land is to be given to 
a purchaser, the seller should have that 
possession as a means of compelling per-
formance on the part of the purchaser. 
Until payment is made, or if terms are 
given by a contract, until compliance there-
with so as to entitle the purchaser to the 
possession of the land, the purchaser would 
not be entitled to the possession nor to the 
crops growing thereon, and especially is 
this so where he has not contributed to the 
cultivation and harvesting of such crops. 
In the Idaho case of Nuquist v. Bauschcr, 
71 Idaho 89, 227 I\2d 83, it is said at page 
85: 
The general rule is, subject to excep-
tions not herein necessary to discuss, 
that if there is no agreement, expressed 
or implied, in a contract for the sale of 
real estate, the purchaser is not entitled 
to possession until the full payment of the 
purchase price has been made, and if the 
purchaser complies * * * and receives 
the deed to the premises, he is then, 
and not until then, entitled to possession 
of the property sold. 
In 55 Am.Jur., Vendor and Purchaser, 
Section 385, at page 808, the following 
statement is made: 
While the vendee under such a contract 
is considered to be the equitable owner, 
the legal title is in the vendor until the 
contract is performed and a conveyance 
executed, and many cases support the 
general rule that the right to possession 
follows the legal title; that if there is 
no agreement, express or implied, in a 
contract for the sale of real estate, that 
the vendor shall deliver possession of the 
premises before the full payment of the 
purchase price, the purchaser is not en-
titled to the possession; and that a mere 
contract for the sale of real estate which 
provides that if the purchaser complies 
with his part of the contract and pays 
the purchase price as agreed, the vendor 
will then deed the property, raises no 
legal inference that possession of the 
property is to be given before the deed is 
to be executed. 
A specific statement is made relative to 
growing crops in 15 Am.Jur., Crops, Sec-
tion 11, at page 202: 
The general rule that growing crops 
pass with a transfer of the title to the 
land ordinarily applies where the title 
to the land is transferred by virtue of a 
contract of sale. Thus, on the theory that 
equity treats things agreed to be done as 
actually performed, when real estate is 
agreed to be conveyed by a valid contract 
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of sale, without reservation, and the 
vendee has the right to possession, the 
equitable title passes at once to the 
vendee and with it title to all crops 
growing on the land. If, however, the 
purchaser is given no right to the pos-
session until the time for conveyance 
arrives, he acquires no interest in the 
growing crops which mature and are 
harvested before the time for the convey-
ance and his right to possession arrives. 
[9] It would seem that the court was 
amply justified in rendering judgment 
against the defendant for the value of the 
hay and the straw and in refusing to order 
the plaintiff to specifically perform the 
contract. (See Valcarce v. Bitters, 12 Utah 
2d 61, 362 P.2d 427.) 
The judgment is affirmed with costs to 
the plaintiff. 
CROCKETT, C. J., and CALLISTER, 
TUCKETT, and HENRIOD, JJ., concur. 
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did not apply in this case.1 We arc of the 
opinion that the trial court was correct in 
that determination and the judgment of the 
court is affirmed. The plaintiff is entitled 
to costs. 
CROCKETT, C. J., and HENRIOD, 
CALLTSTER and ELLETT, JJ., concur. 
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Garth WHITNEY, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Dave WALKER and Chanae Marie Walker, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
No. 11959. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Jan. 12, 1971. 
Action for personal injuries suffered 
as result of automobile accident. The Dis-
trict Court, Salt Lake County, Marcellus 
K. Snow, J., found adversely to defend-
ants, and defendants appealed. The Su-
preme Court, Tuckett, J., held that pro-
ceeding without appointing guardian ad li-
tem for 15-year-old defendant motorist did 
not entitle defendant to reversal where de-
fendant had not been deprived of any mer-
itorious defense, had not been misled, and 
had not been denied any benefits which she 
might have had through assistance of 
guardian ad litem. The Court further held 
that award of $1,351.40 special damages 
and $37,500 general damages to plaintiff, 
who was 40-year-old real estate salesman, 
who suffered laceration of calf and painful 
injuries to groin area, including six-inch 
tear in scrotum and injury to penis that al-
legedly rendered him permanently partially 
impotent, . who was hospitalized for 16 
days, who was unable to work for six 
I. Thomns v. Brnffef* Heirs. 0 Utnh 2d 
57, 305 r.2il 507; Crump v. Gold Horse 
Restaurants, Inc., (Fin.), 96 So.2d 215, 
. WALKER Utah 4(><J 
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months, and who suffered loss of earnings 
in sum of $7,536.66, was not excessive or 
so disproportionately large as to indicate 
that it had been given under influence of 
passion or prejudice. 
Judgment affirmed. 
Callister, C. J., concurred in result. 
1. Infants 0 7 7 
Defendant and plaintiff have equal re-
sponsibility for having guardian ad litem 
appointed for minor defendant. Rules of 
Civil Procedure, rule 17(b, c). 
2. Infants C=>87 
In action for personal injuries suf-
fered as result of automobile accident, pro-
ceeding without appointing guardian ad li-
tem for 15-year-old defendant motorist did 
not entitle defendant to reversal where de-
fendant had not been deprived of any mer-
itorious defense, had not been misled, and 
had not been denied any benefit that she 
might have had through assistance of 
guardian ad litem. Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, rule 17(b, c ) ; U.CA.1953, 41-2-22. 
3. Infants C=>94 
Plea of infancy is personal privilege 
which can be waived. 
4. Infants €=>M0 
Without showing of fraud, collusion, 
or other substantial error going to merits 
of case, minor defendant is not entitled to 
be relieved of judgment against her on 
plea of infancy. 
5. Appeal and Error €=>I064(I) 
Instruction that life expectancy of 
plaintiff, who was 41 years of age, was 
31.4 years was not prejudicial, though 
plaintiff's injuries, for which recovery was 
sought, were allegedly not shown to have 
effect on plaintiff's future earnings. 
6. Damages C=>I32(I) 
Award of $1,351.40 special damages 
and $37,500 general damages to plaintiff, 
who was 40-year-old real estate salesman, 
05 A.L.U.2d 037 Robertshow-Fulton 
Controls Co. v. Noma Electric Co., 10 
F.R.D. 32. 
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who suffered laceration of calf and painful 
injury to groin area, including six-inch 
tear in scrotum and injury to penis that al-
legedly rendered him permanently partially 
impotent, who was hospitalized for 16 
days, who was unable to work for six 
months, and who suffered loss of earnings 
in sum of $7,536.66, was not excessive or 
so disproportionately large as to indicate 
that it had been given under influence of 
passion or prejudice. 
L. E. Midgley, Salt Lake City, for de-
fendants-appellants. 
Armstrong, Rawlings, West & Schaer-
rer, David E. West and Neil D. Schacrrer, 
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff-respondent. 
TUCKETT, Justice: 
The plaintiff, Garth Whitney, filed his 
action in the court below to recover for 
personal injuries suffered by him as a re-
sult of an automobile accident. On the 
evening of September 19, 1968, the plain-
tiff had parked his automobile in a drive-
way adjacent to a church in Salt Lake 
County. After parking the automobile, the 
plaintiff was in the process of locking it 
when he was struck by a vehicle being op-
erated by Chanae Walker who was accom-
panied by her father, Dave Walker. Chan-
ae was age 15 years and her driving expe-
rience had been very limited. The automo-
bile had only just been purchased by the 
defendant Dave Walker and it was the 
first time that Chanae had operated it. 
The facts would indicate that Chanae was 
unable to control the movement of the car 
or to stop the same prior to its collision 
with the plaintiff. 
The negligence of Chanae was admitted 
and the issue of liability was submitted to 
the jury solely upon the claimed contribu-
tory negligence on the part of the plaintiff. 
The jury returned a verdict adverse to the 
defendants and they have appealed to this 
court. 
As a result of the collision the plaintiff, 
a 40-ycar-old real estate salesman, suffered 
painful injuries to the groin area for 
which he was hospitalized for a period of 
16 days. The plaintiff was also unable to 
work for a period of six months. lie re-
ceived a laceration of the calf of his leg 
and his other injuries were confined to the 
pelvic region. His injuries included a six-
inch tear in the scrotum and an injury to 
the penis which has rendered him partially 
impotent. In the opinion of a medical ex-
pert called by the plaintiff, the injury to 
the penis is permanent and cannot be cor-
rected by surgical or medical treatment. 
The jury awarded the plaintiff special 
damages in the sum of $1,351.40 and gen-
eral damages in the sum of $37,500. The 
evidence shows that the plaintiff suffered 
loss of earnings in the sum of $7,536.66, 
which were included in the award of gen-
eral damages. 
[1-4] The defendants on appeal seek a 
reversal of the verdict and judgment found 
against them in the court below on three 
principal grounds. Firstly, the defendants 
claim that it was error for the court to 
proceed without first having appointed a 
guardian ad litem for the defendant Chan-
ae Walker. The defendants call our atten-
tion to the provisions of Rule 17(b), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides: 
When an infant * * * is a party, 
he must appear either by his general 
guardian, or by a guardian ad litem ap-
pointed in the particular case by the 
court in which the action is pending. 
Our attention is also directed to Rule 
17(c), which provides: 
When a guardian ad litem is appointed 
by a court, he must be appointed as fol-
lows : 
* * * * * * 
(2) When the infant is defendant, 
upon the application of the infant if he 
is of the age of fourteen years and ap-
plies within 20 days after the service of 
the summons, or if under that age or if 
he neglects so to apply, then upon the 
application of a relative or friend of the 
infant, or of any other party to the ac-
tion. 
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It does not appear that the language of the 
rules above quoted has been construed by 
this court. However, similar language 
contained in the rules and statutes of other 
states have been before the appellate courts 
in a number of jurisdictions. 
In the case before us it appears that the 
defendant Chanae Walker appeared and 
filed her answer to the complaint of the 
plaintiff, went to trial, and was defended 
by able and experienced counsel, and it 
would appear that it was only after the 
verdict was returned against her that she 
raised the matter of her minority as a de-
fense. It should be noted that the rule 
above referred to does not place the re-
sponsibility of having a guardian appointed 
upon the plaintiff alone. It would seem 
that the responsibility is equally upon the 
defendant to have a guardian ad litem ap-
pointed at her own instance to render any 
assistance which might be necessary in the 
conduct of her defense. A survey of the 
record fails to disclose that Chanae had 
been deprived of any meritorious defense, 
nor does it disclose that she has been mis-
led or in any way deprived of any benefit 
she might have had through the assistance 
of a guardian ad litem. We are in accord 
with the rule from other jurisdictions that 
the plea of infancy is a personal privilege 
which may be waived and without a show-
ing of fraud, collusion, or other substantial 
error going to the merits of the case the 
minor defendant is not entitled to be re-
lieved of the judgment against her.1 Un-
der the statute the defendant Dave Walker 
was responsible for the negligent operation 
of the automobile.8 
[5] Secondly, the defendants' claim 
that the court's instructing the jury that 
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the life expectancy of one aged 41 years is 
31.4 years was reversible error. The de-
fendants contend that the record in this 
case does not indicate that the plaintiff's 
injuries will in any way affect his future 
earnings. The defendants call our atten-
tion to prior decisions of this court which 
have dealt with the subject, but it should 
be noted in most cases that both mortality 
tables and annuity tables or combinations 
of the two were admitted for the purpose 
of aiding the jury in determining probable 
loss of future earnings. In the instant 
case the court in its instruction only re-
ferred to life expectancy. While the giv-
ing of the instruction would appear to be 
unnecessary, nevertheless, the jury would 
in any event have some knowledge as to 
life expectancy of persons in the age group 
of the plaintiff. Cases from other juris-
dictions follow the rule that life expectan-
cy is pertinent in cases where there are 
permanent injuries.3 We are of the opin-
ion that the giving of the instruction was 
not prejudicial. 
[6] Thirdly, the defendants contend 
that the verdict was excessive and ap-
peared to have been given under the influ-
ence of passion or prejudice. The defend-
ants fail to direct our attention to anything 
in the record except the size of the verdict 
which would indicate passion or prejudice. 
Courts in other jurisdictions have approved 
awards similar to the award in this case.4 
Reasonable minds may differ on the 
amount of compensation adequate to com-
pensate the plaintiff in this case for the in-
juries he has sustained. The amount 
awarded here is not so disportionate as to 
indicate that passion or prejudice influ-
enced the jury's decision.8 
1. King v. Wilson, 110 Cnl.App. 191. 2 
P.2d 833; Carver v. Donin, 139 Cal.App. 
395, 33 P.2d 841; Trolinger v. Cluff, 
56 Idaho 570, 57 P.2d 332.; *3/ 
2. Section 41-2-22, U.C.A.1953. 
3. City of Okmulgee v. Clnrk (Okl.), 425 
P.2d 457; Roberts Const. Co. v. Henrjr, 
2G5 Ala. 008, 93 So.2d 498. 
4. Norton Company v. Hnrrelson, 278 Aln. 
85, 176 So.2d 18; see nlso 12 A.L.R.3d 
657. 
5. Weber Bnsin Water Conservancy Dist. 
v. Skcen, 8 Utnh 2d 79, 328 P.2d 730; 
Schneider v. Suhrmnnn, 8 t'tnh 2d 35, 
327 P.2d 822. 
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The other points on appeal urged by the 
defendants do not appear to justify rever-
sal. The judgment of the court below is 
affirmed. Respondent is entitled to costs. 
HENRIOD, ELLETT, and CROCK-
ETT, JJ., concur. 
CALLISTER, C. J., concurs in result. 
J?\ , 
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Leo W. HOBBS, as Administrator with will 
annexed of the Estate of Joseph Buhler, 
Deceased, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Ethel Jeanne Buhler FENTON and James E. 
Fenton, Defendants and Respondents. 
No. 12105. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Jan. 12, 1971. 
Action by administrator of decedent's 
estate to recover stocks and checking ac-
count from decedent's daughter, who 
claimed such property as surviving joint 
tenant. The Third District Court, Salt 
Lake County, Stewart M. Hanson, J., ren-
dered judgment for defendant, and plain-
tiff appealed. The Supreme Court, Callis-
ter, C. J., held that where father under-
stood that by placing title to his stocks and 
bank account in joint tenancy with his 
daughter, with full rights of survivorship, 
the same would automatically vest full title 
in property in daughter on father's death, 
father was shown to have desired and in-
tended such result, and there was no claim 
or evidence to indicate any fraud, mistake 
or undue influence on part of daughter, 
property passed to daughter on father's 
death.. 
Affirmed. 
Crockett, J., concurred specially and 
filed opinion. 
Joint Tenancy C=>6 
Where father understood that by plac-
ing title to his stocks and bank account in 
joint tenancy with his daughter with full 
rights of survivorship, the same would au-
tomatically vest full title in daughter on 
father's death, father was shown to have 
desired and intended such result, and there 
was no claim or evidence to indicate any 
fraud, mistake or undue influence on part 
of daughter, property passed to daughter 
on father's death. 
Richards & Richards, Edward F. Rich- | 
ards, Gary A. Frank, Salt Lake City, for j 
plaintiff and appellant. \ 
Edward W. Clyde, Salt Lake City, for , 
defendants and respondents. j 
CALLISTER, Chief Justice: { 
Plaintiff, the duly qualified administra- ! 
tor of the estate of Joseph Buhler, who ; 
died testate in March of 1968, initiated this ; 
action to recover certain personal property, 
namely, stocks and a checking account 
from defendant, who claims the property { 
as the surviving joint tenant. Plaintiff al-
leged that the property was held in joint 
tenancy with the decedent's daughter, the 
defendant, for the purpose of convenience. 
Plaintiff demanded that he, as administra-
tor, be adjudged the owner of the personal ' 
property and entitled to the possession 
thereof, that defendant be declared to hold 
the property in trust and be required to 
make an accounting of all the transactions 
which occurred from the time that Joseph 
Buhler placed the first property in joint i 
tenancy, and that defendant be compelled 
to execute such instruments as might be 
necessary to pass legal title to plaintiff. 
By answer, defendant asserted her owner-
ship of the property and denied that plain-
tiff or the heirs of the estate possessed any j , 
rights thereto. 
At the conclusion of a trial upon the ? 
merits, the court granted defendant's mo- j 
tion to dismiss and decreed that the proper- , 
ties which constituted the subject matter of ,* 
the complaint were defendant's sole prop- ^ 
erty and that plaintiff had no right, title, <j 
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TROLINGER v. CLUFR 
No. 6256. 
Supreme Court of Idaho. 
April 21, 1030. 
1. Infants 0 7 8 ( 1 ) 
Statute providing that infant party must 
appear either by general guardian or by 
guardian ad litem Is not applicable unless 
court has acquired jurisdiction of Infant 
(Code 1932, §§ 5 300, 5-307, 5-507). 
2. Infants 0 8 7 
Failure to appoint guardian ad litem for 
infant defendant, while irregular, does not of 
itself defeat jurisdiction of court (Code 1932, 
§§ 5-300, 5-307). 
3. Infants C=>87 
Failure to appoint guardian ad litem for 
infant defendant does not warrant setting 
aside, reversing, or vacating judgment unless 
substantial rights of infant were affected by 
such failure (Code 1932, § 5-30G). 
4. Infants 0 8 8 
Infant aged twenty years and three 
months at time of trial who was duly served 
with process, who appeared In person and 
by counsel and filed answer and other plead-
ings and went to trial without setting up in-
fancy, could not upon reaching his majority 
have judgment vacated for failure to appoint 
guardian ad litem as required by statute, in 
absence of showing of fraud, collusion, or 
duress, or that infant had meritorious de-
fense, or that he was not properly and ably 
represented (Code 1932, §§ 5-306, 5-307, 5-507). 
MORGAN, J., dissenting. 
, » 
Appeal from District Court, Twin Falls 
County, Eleventh District; William A. 
Babcock, Judge. 
Action to vacate judgment by Huston 
Trolinger against Conna Cluff. From a 
judgment for the defendant, the plaintiff 
appeals. 
Affirmed. 
James R. Bothwcll, Harry Povey, and 
Andy Myers, all of Twin Falls, for appel-
lant. 
Chapman & Chapman, of Twin Falls, for 
respondent. 
BUDGE, Justice. 
This action was brought by appellant 
seeking to cancel, annul, and set aside a 
judgment entered against him, the sole rea-
son urged being that when the judgment 
was entered appellant was a minor and did 
not appear by general guardian and no 
guardian ad litem was appointed in the 
action in which the judgment was entered. 
The findings of the court, which arc sus-
tained by the evidence, clearly relate the 
situation: May 9, 1933, respondent herein 
instituted an action against appellant to re-
cover damages. Summons was served upon 
appellant and he then appeared in said ac-
tion by demurrer, amendment to demurrer, 
motion to require plaintiff to separately 
state and number, amendment to motion 
to require plaintiff to separately state and 
number, motion to strike, motion to ekct, 
and demand for bill of particulars. On 
August 2, 1933, appellant filed his answer in 
said action, appearing by three members of 
the bar, being the same attorneys who are 
his counsel in the instant action. The dam-
age action was tried before the court with 
a jury and was concluded on October 11, 
1933, the jury returning a verdict in favor 
of respondent herein. Appellant appeared 
in the damage action in person; his father 
was present at the trial and assisted him in 
the employment of counsel; appellant, his 
father, and numerous other witnesses in 
appellant's behalf were called, sworn, and 
examined; the cause was vigorously con-
tested; instructions were requested by ap-
pellant; the cause argued by appellant's 
counsel; and judgment was duly entered in 
favor of respondent. Thereafter appellant 
filed his motion to retax costs, which said 
motion was denied; the judgment was re-
corded; there was no motion for new trial 
nor to vacate said judgment, and no appeal 
to this court. The judgment has not been 
satisfied, and the same now appears as a 
binding judgment and obligation against ap-
pellant. It was further found by the court 
that in none of the pleadings filed by ap-
pellant in said action was the age of appel-
lant mentioned or alleged, that appellant 
did not in that action at any time make 
application for the appointment of a guard-
ian ad litem. Likewise respondent made no 
application for the appointment of a guard-
ian ad litem and none was appointed in said 
action at any time. The court further 
found that appellant's counsel were and are 
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members of the bar of this court and that more, the court acquires jurisdiction by 
appellant's defense was fully and ably pre-
sented both as to questions of law and fact 
to said court and jury and was fully and 
ably argued by his counsel to said jury and 
that said judgment was and is the result of 
a complete judicial investigation resulting 
from a trial before a court and jury, ex-
tending over a period of six days. The 
court found that during the progress of the 
trial appellant testified he was under the 
age of twenty-one years, and that his 
twenty-first birthday would occur on July 
2S, 1934, and that respondent testified upon 
the trial that appellant had denied his said 
age to her and had stated to her that he 
was older. 
The trial court entered judgment for re-
spondent, upholding the former judgment, 
and this appeal was taken. 
The question presented is: Under the 
foregoing facts, briefly, after a minor of 
the age of more than fourteen years has 
been duly served with process, appears in 
person and by counsel, files an answer and 
other pleadings, goes to trial, is represented 
therein, awaits the return of the verdict and 
judgment without setting up his infancy, 
can he, after judgment against him, upon 
reaching majority interpose his minority as 
a sole ground for setting aside the verdict 
and judgment? 
The statutes indicate a distinction is to 
be drawn between infants under the age 
of fourteen years and those who have 
reached the age of fourteen years or more, 
I.C.A. § 5-307 providing: "When a guard-
ian ad litem is appointed by the court or 
judge he must be appointed as follows: 
* * * When the infant is defendant; 
upon the application of the infant if he be 
of the age of fourteen years and apply with-
in ten days after the service of the sum-
mons; if he be under the age of fourteen, 
or neglect so to apply, then upon the ap-
plication of any other party to the action, 
or of a relative or friend of the infant.'' 
(Italics added.) 
Probably the greatest distinction recog-
nized between infants under and over the 
age of fourteen years is with relation to 
the manner of service of summons in or-
der for the court to acquire jurisdiction, 
I.C.A. § 5-507, providing that in order to 
acquire jurisdiction of an infant under the 
age of fourteen years, service must be had 
on another person as provided in the stat-
ute in addition to the minor, while if the 
personal service on such minor only, the 
statute reciting in part: 
"The summoiis must be served by deliver-
ing a copy thereof as follows: * * * 
"4. If against a minor under the age of 
fourteen years residing within this state, 
to such minor personally and also to his 
father, mother or guardian, or if there be 
none in this state, then to any person having 
the control or care of such minor or with 
whom the minor resides, or in whose serv-
ice he is employed. * * * In all other 
cases to the defendant personally." (Italics 
added.) Brown v. Lawson, 51 Cal. 615; 
Boiling v. Campbell, 36 Okl. 671, 12S P. 
1091; Boiling v. Gibson, 36 Okl. 67S, 123 
P. 1093. 
After jurisdiction has been acquired by 
the court by service upon the minor of the 
age of fourteen years or more, the further 
question presents itself as to the effect of 
the provisions of I.C.A. § 5-306, providing: 
"When an infant is a party, he 
must appear either by his general guardian 
or by a guardian ad litem appointed by the 
court in which the action is pending in each 
case, or by a judge thereof, or a probate 
judge. A guardian ad litem may be ap-
pointed in any case when it is deemed by 
the court in which the action or proceeding 
is prosecuted, or by a judge thereof, ex-
pedient, to represent the infant, * * * 
in the action or proceeding, notwithstand-
ing he may have a general guardian and 
may have appeared by him." 
[1] As will appear from a reading of the 
foregoing section, it presupposes that there 
be an action pending, i. e., the infant must 
have been duly and regularly served with 
process before the appointment of a guard-
ian. The court must have acquired juris-
diction of the infant party before I.C.A. 
§ 5-306 becomes applicable. The situation 
thus presented in the instant action is, 
what is the effect of a judgment rendered in 
an action in which the defendant is a minor 
over the age of fourteen years, has been du-
ly and regularly served with process as pro-
vided by law in a pending action, but who 
does not appear by a guardian or guardian 
ad litem, but in which action the minor did 
appear in his own behalf as heretofore set 
forth? California Code Civ.Proc. § 372, 
provides in the identical terms as the above 
statute (I.C.A. § 5-306) that "When an in-
fant * * * is a party, he must appear 
cither by his general guardian or by a 
minor be of the age of fourteen years or guardian ad litem appointed by the court in 
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which the action is ponding, in cacli case." 
It has been uniformly held by the courts of 
California under the foregoing statute, and 
by the overwhelming weight of authority 
in other jurisdictions, tinder the identical 
or similar provisions, that, notwithstanding 
such provision, where the court has juris-
diction, a judgment or decree rendered 
against an infant, in a case in which no 
guardian was appointed for him and in 
which he did not appear by his general 
guardian or guardian ad litem, is not for 
that reason void, and while it. may be er-
roneous, and subject to be reversed or set 
aside, it is at most only voidable. 
"The weight of authority is to the effect 
that, where the court has otherwise juris-
diction, a . judgment or decree rendered 
against an infant without the appointment 
of a guardian ad litem, while it may be 
erroneous, and subject to be reversed or 
set aside, or to be ground for a new trial, 
at most is only voidable, but not absolutely 
void; and it may not be even necessarily 
erroneous and subject to reversal; the 
error may be amended or cured. It remains 
in full force and effect until it is reversed 
on appeal or error or set aside by direct 
proceedings and is not subject to collateral 
attack; and this rule applies to decrees in 
equity as well as judgments at law. Where 
it clearly appears that a decree is in favor 
of the infant defendant, the failure to ap-
point a guardian ad litem for him is not 
reversible error. Where the court has not 
obtained jurisdiction of the infant by serv-
ice of process and no guardian ad litem 
has been appointed for him then the judg-
ment is void. It is not an absolute pre-
requisite to jurisdiction of an action by 
an infant that he should sue by guardian 
ad litem or next friend, and the suit or 
action is not void on that ground alone; 
it merely affects the regularity of the pro-
ceedings, and the defect is amendable, the 
judgment or decree is not void.''* 31 C.J. 
1121, § 266, citing many cases. 
"The appointment of a guardian ad litem 
for an infant defendant, like the appear-
ance of a next friend for an infant plain-
tiff, is a matter of procedure and not of 
jurisdiction. That either plaintiff or de-
fendant was without such representative 
makes the judgment erroneous, but not 
void." 14 R.C.L. p. 286, § 54. 
[2] Childs v. Lantcrman, 103 Cal. 387, 
37 P. 382, 42 Am.St.Rcp. 121; Emeric v. 
Alvarado, 64 Cal. 529, 2 P . 418; Foley v. 
California Horseshoe Co., 115 Cal. 184, 47 
P. 42, 56 Am.St.Rq>. 87; In re Cahill's Es-
tate, 74 Cal. 52, 15 P. 364; Kemp v. Cook, 
IS Md. 130, 79 Am.Dec. 81 ; Millard v. 
Marmon, 116 111. 649, 7 N.E. 468; Drake 
v. Ilanshaw, 47 Iowa, 291; Myers v. Davis, 
47 Iowa, 325; Hoover v. Kinscy Plow Co., 
55 Iowa, 668, 8 N.W. 658; Rice v. Bolton, 
126 Iowa, 654, 100 N.W. 634, 102 N.W. 509; 
McBridc v. State, 130 Ind. 525, 30 N.E. 699; 
Lcvvstcin v. O'Brien, 106 Ala. 352, 17 So. 
550, 30 L.R.A. 707, 54 Am.St.Rcp. 56; Hol-
lo way v. Mcintosh, 7 Kan.App. 34, 51 P. 
963; Walkenhorst v. Lewis, 24 Kan. 420; 
Baibridge v. Smith, 76 Old. 36, 184 P. 153; 
Slemp v. City of Tulsa, 139 Okl. 76, 281 P. 
280, appeal dismissed and certiorari denied 
281 U.S. 703, 50 S.Ct. 407, 74 L.Ed. 1127; 
First Nat. Bank of Titonka v. Casev, 158 
Iowa, 349, 138 N.W. 897; Rvan v. Fielder, 
99 Ark. 374, 138 S.W. 973; "Kelly v. Kelly 
(Tcx.Civ.App.) 17S S.W. 686; Austin v. 
First State Bank & Trust Co. (Tex.Civ. 
App.) 275 S.W. 156; Reynolds v. Steel, 170 
Ky. 153, 185 S.W. 820; Harrod v. Harrod, 
167 Ky. 30S, 180 S.W. 797; Parker v. Starr, 
21 Neb. 680, 33 N.W. 424; Charley v. Kel-
ley. 120 Mo. 134, 25 S.W. 571; Eubanks v. 
McLeod, 105 Miss. 826, 63 So. 226; Eu-
banks v. McLeod (Miss.) 69 So. 289; Eiscn-
menger v. Murphy, 42 Minn. S4, 43 N.W. 
784, 18 Am.St.Rep. 493; Schimpf v. Roll-
nert, Wayne Circuit Judge, 129 Mich. 103, 
88 N.W. 384; Linn v. Collins, 77 W.Va. 
592, 87 S.E. 934, Ann.Cas.l918C, 86. It 
appears that in this jurisdiction this court 
has recognized the general rule and applied 
it that while the failure to appoint a guard-
ian ad litem is irregular if not erroneous, 
it does not defeat the jurisdiction of the 
court. In Trask v. Boise King Placers Co., 
26 Idaho, 290, 142 P. 1073, 1074, the mother 
of W. E. Trask, a minor, sued upon the 
theory that she was suing for herself and 
the minor, the opinion reciting in part as 
follows: 
"A motion for a new trial was made, and 
on the hearing of this motion, defendants 
raised for the first time the proposition that 
the minor was not bound by the judgment, 
and that the defendants could not be bound. 
At that time W. E. Trask applied to the 
court for the appointment of a guardian ad 
litem by an order nunc pro tunc, as of the 
date of the beginning of the trial. There-
upon the court issued the order authorizing 
the minor to appty for the appointment of 
some suitable person as guardian ad litem, 
which appointment was made. * * * 
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"It must also be conceded that the action 
of the court was irregular, if not errone-
ous, in appointing a guardian after the case 
had been tried. 
"In Ritna v. Rossic Iron Works, 120 N.Y. 
433, 24 N.E. 940, it was held that the omis-
sion to appoint a guardian ad litem of an 
infant plaintiff before the bringing of an 
action is not a jurisdictional defect, but is 
an irregularity merely. To the same effect; 
see Clowcrs v. Wabash, etc., Ry. Co., 21 
Mo.App. 213; Wolford v. Oaklev, 43 How. 
Prac.(N.Y.) US. * * * 
"Both the mother and the minor are 
bound by the judgment as it comes here." 
The recent case of Ilutton v. Davis (Ida-
ho) 53 P.(2d) 345, 346, is not out of harmo-
ny with the foregoing cases. Therein the 
minor was of the age of two years and with 
relation to service of process is governed by 
that part of I.C.A. § 5-507 relating to minors 
under the age of fourteen in which case, 
service must be made upon some one in 
addition to the minor. The case in effect 
recognizes the validity of the judgment se-
cured by the minor, but hold that the appeal 
must be dismissed because of lack of juris-
diction of the appeal, reciting: 
"No effort appears to have been made to 
conform to the statute requiring the infant 
to appear by guardian. The stipulation 
shows the probate court appointed his 
mother guardian for him and that she quali-
fied as such. This appointment was prob-
ably made pursuant to the provisions in 
the award requiring that the money therein 
mentioned be paid to a guardian for the 
minor. It is the duty of the guardian to 
collect and receive that money for -the 
ward. Therefore she is, in her capacity as 
guardian for her son, an indispensible par-
ty to this proceeding and is an adverse 
party within the meaning of I.C.A. § 11-
202, above quoted. The notice of appeal was 
not served on her, nor was it addressed to 
her, nor is she therein named as respond-
ent. * • * 
"The notice of appeal not having been 
served on the guardian for the infant re-
spondent, and he not being represented here 
by any one having authority to represent 
him, we are without jurisdiction of the ap-
peal and it is, therefore, dismissed." 
It will be observed that the appeal was 
dismissed because of a failure to serve the 
guardian or any one haying authority to 
represent the infant. 
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[3] While the judgment rendered in the 
damage action may have been irregular and 
erroneous, the rule supported by the great 
weight of authority is that the failure to 
appoint a guardian ad litem must affect 
the substantial rights of the infant before 
the judgment will be set aside, reversed, or 
vacated. It must be made to appear that 
substantial rights of the infant were af-
fected by the failure to appoint a guardian 
ad litem, such as that the infant had a valid 
defense to the action, fraud, collusion, 
duress, or the same grounds upon which an 
adult might have disputed the judgment. 
In King v. Wilson, 116 Cal.App. 191, 2 P. 
(2d) 833, a judgment was rendered against 
Ralph Wilson for damages and the opinion 
therein recites in par t : 
"The first error assigned by appellant is 
that at the time of the trial he was under 
the age of 21 years and that no guardian ad 
litem was appointed in said action in his 
behalf. The minority of defendant Wilson 
was not brought to the attention of the 
court until the hearing of a motion for new 
trial. The record in this case discloses that 
the defendant was past 20 years of age 
at the time of the trial and had no guardian 
ad litem appointed as provided by the code. 
"The first question which naturally arises 
is : Does such failure to have a guardian ad 
litem appointed go to the jurisdiction of 
the court? * * "* 
"The most that can be said is that the 
failure to appoint a guardian ad litem was 
an irregularity. * • * 
"The courts in many jurisdictions have 
held that the failure to appoint a guardian 
ad litem must affect the substantial rights 
of the infant. Harris v. Bennett, 160 N. 
C. 339, 76 S.E. 217; Grauman, etc., Co. v, 
Krienitz, 142 Wis. 556, 126 N.W. 50; 
Martin v. Gwynn, 90 Ark. 44, 117 S.W. 754. 
What loss of substantial rights did the de-
fendant in this case suffer? He was ably 
represented by counsel in every stage of 
the proceedings. A trial was had by jury, 
before whom he submitted his evidence, and 
his case is ably presented on appeal. 
Wherein are his rights affected and what 
different judgment would have been ren-
dered, had he been represented by a guard-
ian ad litem? None is pointed out. It is 
said in Childs v. Lanterman, 103 Cal. 387, 
390, 37 P. 382, 383, 42 Am.St.Rep. 121: 
'Although it is provided in section 372, 
Code Civ.Proc, that, when an infant is a 
party, he must appear either by his general 
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guardian or by a guardian ad litem appoint-
ed by the court, yet a judgment rendered 
against an infant in which no guardian ad 
litem has been appointed is not for that 
reason void (citing cases); and a judgment 
rendered against him in an action in which 
he has appeared by an attorney will be 
upheld as fully as though he had appeared 
in person (Barber v. Graves, 18 Vt. 290; 
Marshall v. Fisher, 1 Tones (46 N.C.) I l l ; 
Town send v. Cox, 45 Mo. 401)/ 
"The failure to be represented by a guard-
ian was no such error as would warrant 
the court in reversing the trial court on 
this ground." 
In Smith v. Wagner, 137 Cal.App. 556, 
30 P.(2d) 1020, 1021, the same proposi-
tion was again considered, the court say-
ing^ 
"Appellant's first contention is that he 
was a minor at the time the trial of the 
action occurred and that thi. failure of the 
trial court to appoint a guardian at litem 
for him rendered the judgment voidable, 
and that by reason of the failure to ap-
point a guardian appellant was entitled 
to disaffirm the judgment, and that appeal 
from the voidable judgment is a proper 
method of disaffirmance. 
"The record on appeal fails to disclose 
that appellant applied to the trial court 
for the appointment of a guardian ad litem. 
It does disclose that through his counsel 
he filed an answer verified by himself to 
the amended complaint; that on the date 
appointed for the trial of the action he 
appeared in court and through his counsel 
he announced that he was ready for trial; 
that he proceeded to trial; that he tes-
tified as a witness in his own behalf and 
that another witness testified for him; 
that he did not specifically direct the 
court's attention to the fact that he was 
a minor; that the only information re-
specting appellant's age which was con-
veyed to the court during the trial of the 
action was presented by appellant when 
he was called by respondents as a wit-
ness under section 2055 of the Code of 
Civil Procedure and during his cross-ex-
amination by respondents' counsel was 
asked, 'How old are you?' to which he 
replied, 'I am 19 now'; that at no time 
during the proceedings did he make any 
further reference to his minority; that aft-
er judgment was rendered against him 
he then for the first time formally 
advised the court of the fact of his 
minority on his motion for a new trial. 
"The above-narrated facts arc so sim-
ilar to those which appc,,:* in King v. Wil-
son, 116 Cal.App. 191, .1 P.(2d) m, that 
we consider the opinion therein decisive of 
appellant's contention • this regard. / / 
if be conceded that the failure to appoint 
a guardian ad litem uvs an irregularity 
it ivas not, under the circumstances dis~ 
closed by the record, such an irregularity 
as affected the substantial rights of appel-
lant and does not constitute an error of 
such importance that of Itself requires 
a reversal of the judgment." (Italics 
ours.) 
In Carver v. Donin, 139 Cal.App. 395, 
33 P.(2d) 841, the question again arose on 
a motion to vacate a judgment: 
"On January 11, appellant, Cirino, duly 
and regularly filed in said action a docu-
ment entitled disaffirmance of judgment, 
wherein she stated that she thereby dis-
affirmed the judgment 'on the ground 
that at the time of the trial of said ac-
tion said defendant was a minor of the 
age of twenty years, and that said de-
fendant did not become of the age of 
twenty-one years until December 25, 1933, 
and that at the time of the trial of said 
action said minor was not represented by 
any guardian or guardian ad litem.' On 
the same day, January 11, defendant serv-
ed and filed notice of motion to vacate 
the judgment on the same grounds above 
stated. This motion was made upon the 
records and files of the action and the 
affidavit of appellant attached to the notice 
of motion. In the affidavit appellant stated 
that she was born on December 25, 1912; 
that she was not represented at the trial of 
the action by any guardian or guardian 
ad litem; that at the time of the trial, 
and also in a deposition given prior to the 
trial, she testified that she was of the age 
of 20 years; that plaintiff at all times had 
knowledge of said facts through his at-
torney and took no steps to have any 
guardian or guardian ad litem appointed 
for said defendant; that for said reasons 
affiant was desirous of having the judgment 
set aside. 
"The said motion having been * * * 
heard * * * without any counter af-
fidavits on the part of the plaintiff, the 
motion was denied. The present appeal 
is from the order denying said motion. 
* * * The plaintiff now moves that the 
appeal be dismissed, or the order affirmed, 
on the ground that the appeal is without 
merit and that the questions on which 
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the decision of the cause defends are so 
unsubstantial that they need no further 
argument. [Italics added.] 
"From the hill of exceptions it fur-
ther appears that the action was brought 
to trial on December 21, 1933, and was 
submitted for decision on December 22, 
and so remained until findings of fact 
and conclusions of law were filed on Jan-
uary 5, 1934, followed by entry of judg-
ment on January S; that the appellant was 
not represented by any guardian or guard-
ian ad litem; that after December 25, 
1933, and before the decision of the court 
or entry of judgment the attorneys of 
record for appellant communicated ad-
ditional points and authorities on behalf of 
appellant to the court, and to counsel for 
plaintiff, and at such time duly represented 
the appellant as her attorneys in said ac-
tion; that at all times up to and including 
January 8, 1934, appellant did not raise 
any question as to her minority; that the 
only reference thereto was the state-
ment of her age in response to a ques-
tion propounded therefor; that she at-
tended throughout the trial of said action, 
and aided and assisted her said counsel, 
both as a witness and in marshalirg other 
witnesses. 
"It is provided by section 372 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure that, when an 
infant is a party, he must appear either 
by his general guardian or by a guardian 
ad litem appointed by the court in which 
the action is pending. Appellant relies 
upon various decisions which establish 
the rule that a judgment against an in-
fant in an action in which no guardian 
or guardian ad litem had ever been ap-
pointed may be disaffirmed by the infant 
after reaching majority provided he acts 
promptly and without laches, but that the 
judgment is not void. * * * The sub-
ject is reviewed at some length in King 
v. Wilson, 116 Cal.App. 192, 2 P. (2d) 
833. * * * The court held that un-
der the circumstances shown by the rec-
ord appellant suffered no loss of sub-
stantial rights, and the judgment was 
affirmed. The facts in that case were 
very similar to those presented in the 
case at bar, although we have here the 
additional facts that the decision was not 
filed and the judgment was not entered un-
til after appellant attained her majority, 
and that, after appellant became of age 
and prior to the decision of the cause, at-
torneys properly representing her acted 
in her behalf by presenting to the court 
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additional points and authorities upon the 
matters submitted, which matters did not 
include any item relating to the minority 
of appellant. 
"From the foregoing it plainly appears 
that the ground of appeal relied upon by 
appellant is without merit, and that the 
question presented required no further 
argument. 
"The order is affirmed." 
In Sams v. Covington Buggy |Co., 10 Ga. 
App. 191, 73 S.E. 18, 19, the court says 
that the court very properly refused to 
set aside such a judgment: "The minor 
having brought or filed the suit by his 
counter-affidavit and made the issue 
*. * * should have been represented 
therein by his statutory guardian or guard-
ian ad litem; and if the matter had been 
called to the court's attention, or to the at-
tention of the other party, this formal re-
quirement of the statute would doubtless 
have been complied with by proper amend-
ment. But the minor, in his defense to the 
suit originally, did not disclose his minor-
ity. He silently permitted a judgment to 
be entered against him without disclosing 
the fact, and therefore the irregularity was 
cured by the verdict. For this reason we 
think the court very properly refused to 
set aside the judgment.1' (Our italics.) 
"It is the generally accepted doctrine 
that an infant cannot avoid a judgment 
or decree against him merely on the 
ground of infancy, and that he cannot im-
peach such a judgment or decree by an 
original bill except upon grounds that 
would be available to an adult, such as 
fraud." Robison v. Floesch Const. Co., 
291 Mo. 34, 236 S.W. 332, 336, 20 A.L.R. 
1239. 
In Watson v. Wrightsman, 26 Ind.App. 
437, 59 N.E. 1064, 1065, the appellate court 
of Indiana considered a situation almost 
identical with that herein and a portion 
of the court's opinion appears to be par-
ticularly appropriate: 
' T h e question thus presented is simply 
this: After a minor has been duly served 
with process, appears in person and by 
counsel, files an answer, goes to trial, and 
awaits the return of a verdict, without 
setting up his infancy as a defense, can 
he then interpose his minority as a ground 
for setting aside the verdict? It is a fa-
miliar rule of law that the plea of infancy 
is a personal privilege, and must be pleaded 
by the defendant in case the record does 
not disclose his infancy. Blake v. Doug-
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lass, 27 Ind. 416; Cohec v. Itai-r, 134 
Ind. 375, 32 N.E. 920 [39 Am.St.Rcp. 270]; 
1 Black Tiul-m. § 196; Winer v. Mast, 
146 Ind. \77f 45 N.E. 66; Frcem.Jmlgrn. 
(3d.Ed.) §§ 151, 513. * * * In Winer 
v. Mast, supra, it is said: 'It is true that 
infancy may he pleaded either in abate-
ment or in bar, depending on the facts 
shown. In case the facts pleaded show, 
or do not deny, a good cause of action, 
but merely disclose that the party is a 
minor, and therefore cannot maintain or 
defend the action, then the plea, if made, 
would be in abatement. Doubtless, how-
ever, the court, in such case, would ap-
point a guardian ad litem for a minor de-
fendant, and the trial would proceed, and 
even if judgment should be entered without 
such appointment, if not attacked on its 
merits, would stand.' In the same case 
it was held that a meritorious defense 
must be shczi'n by the party who seeks 
relief, and that the defense must be one 
of substantial nature, affecting the merits 
of the case, 
"In the case we are considering, the ap-
pellant has not made any showing that he 
had any meritorious defense to the ac-
tion. He has not shown a substantial fact 
affecting the merits of the case. He has 
not shown fraud, collusion, or error, as 
suggested by Freeman, supra. 1 Black, 
Judgm. § 196, says: 'The general disposi-
tion of the authorities is to regard the plea 
of infancy as a personal privilege, that may 
be waived, and, if it is not pleaded,, a 
judgment against the infant is binding up-
on him/ * * * 
"In this case, appellee founded her cause 
of action upon the fact of an assault upon 
her by appellant, in which he was charged 
with intending to carnally know her. This 
was a wrongful act, and for injuries re-
sulting therefrom he was liable to respond 
in damages, as declared by the authorities. 
The record does not disclose any fact that 
even tends to excuse him for the act, and, 
as we have seen, no defense whatever is 
shown. Upon service of process, he came 
into court with counsel and his legal guard-
ian, filed an answer in denial, went to trial, 
and not until after a verdict was re-
turned against him did he attempt to shield 
himself behind his infancy. As the de-
fense of infancy is a personal privilege 
it seems to us that appellant waived that 
privilege by going to trial without plead-
ing it. But what would it have availed 
him, in the first instance, if he had applied 
for the appointment of a guardian ad 
litem? The guardian could have done no 
more than to have filed an answer and con-
ducted the defense. This, in fact, was 
done by able counsel. After verdict, what 
could such guardian have done other than 
what was in fact done? Nothing; for a mo-
tion for a new trial and in arrest of judg-
ment were duly made, and the appeal to this 
court was properly prosecuted, and the ques-
tions raised fully and ably discussed. Wrc arc 
unable to sec how appellant was injured. 
In the case of Evans v. State, 58 Ind. 587, 
it was held that the failure to appoint a 
guardian ad litem for an infant defend-
ant in a bastard suit, where such appoint-
ment had not been requested before the 
trial of the cause, was not a cause for a 
new trial. Sec, also, Rawlcs v. State, 
:6 Ind. 433, and De Priest v. State, 68 
Ind. 569. Judgment affirmed." 
"While the evidence shows that appel-
lant knew appellee was a minor, and it is 
not shown that a guardian ad litem was 
appointed for him, the record shows that 
he appeared by attorney, filed a general 
denial to each paragraph of the complaint, 
and participated in the trial up to the 
close of appellant's testimony when he 
moved for and obtained a peremptory in-
struction in his favor. * * * Winer v. 
Mast, 146 Ind. 177, on page 183, 45 N.E. 
66. * * * 
"We do not think the suggestion in the 
motion of the minority of the defendant 
and the failure to appoint a guardian ad 
litem for him authorized the court to di-
rect a verdict in his favor." (Daugherty 
v. Reveal, 54 Ind.App. 71, 102 N.E. 381, 
384.) 
In Curtis v. Curtis, 250 Mich. 105, 229 
N.W. 622, the Supreme Court of Michigan 
announces the rule that when a decree is 
voidable for error in procedure, it is a 
matter of judicial discretion whether it 
shall be vacated or not when questioned in 
a direct proceeding: "The statute * * * 
provides that, after service of process up-
on an infant defendant the suit shall not 
be further prosecuted until a guardian ad 
litem is appointed. The court had juris-
diction of the subject-matter and of the 
parties. Defendant, though an infant, was 
before the court by summons, duly served 
upon her. * * * Failure to do so [ap-
point a guardian], however, did not oust 
the court of jurisdiction, for the statute 
mentioned is procedural only, bat did ren-
der the decree voidable if questioned in a 
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direct proceeding such as this. When a dc- that the question of the minority of the 
crcc is voidable for error in procedure, 
it is a matter of judicial discretion wheth-
er it shall be vacated. • * * That the 
failure to appoint a guardian ad litem docs 
not render the decree void is well settled. 
* * * Wc find no abuse of discretion 
in refusing to vacate the decree for want 
of appointment of a guardian ad litem." 
In 'Fiask v. Boise King Placers Co., su-
pra, this court said: 
"Section 4231, Rcv.Codcs [I.C.A. § 5-
907] provides that: 'The court must, in 
every stage of an action, disregard any 
error or defect in the pleadings or pro-
ceedings which does not affect the sub-
stantial rights of the parties and no judg-
ment shall be reversed or affected by rea-
son of such error or defect.' 
"It does not appear that any substantial 
rights of the appellants have been material-
ly affected by any error or defect that 
occurred in the proceedings cr trial of 
this case. [Citing cases.]" 
[4] It appears that at the time of the 
trial of the damage action appellant was of 
the age of approximately twenty years and 
three months, and was before the .court 
by summons duly served upon him. The 
court had jurisdiction of the parties and of 
the subject-matter. Appellant has made no 
attempt to show, nor has he suggested, 
that he had any meritorious defense, and 
no fact is presented tending to show fraud, 
collusion, duress, or that appellant was not 
properly and ably represented, or any 
single instance wherein his rights were 
substantially affected by reason of the 
procedural fact that no guardian ad litem 
was appointed for him, in fact, the record 
negatives any such suggestion. 
It will be remembered that appellant's 
father, his natural guardian (I.C.A. § 15-
1805) was in constant attendance with ap-
pellant during the trial, participated there-
in, testified as a witness and assisted in 
the employment of counsel. It has been 
held that the appearance in, and defense 
of, a suit by the natural guardian need'not 
be a matter of record and may be shown 
by parol. In Fuller v. Smith, 49 Vt. 253, 
it is said: 
complainant was not raised before the 
justice at all during the trial. It further 
appeared * • * Willard Fuller, the 
father of the complainant * * * was 
present at the trial, and testified as a wit-
ness upon material points in the case, and 
that he attended as such witness at the 
suggestion of the counsel, for the com-
plainant ; that he assisted his son and his 
counsel in the impanneling of the jury, and 
was present during the entire trial, and 
'interested himself in the case to its close. 
* * * 
"The question presented is, whether, up-
on the above facts, the judgment sought 
to be vacated is a valid, binding judg-
ment, or whether it is voidable by the 
complainant. * * * But where the 
party who is legally competent to appear 
in behalf of the infant has notice of the 
pendency of the suit, and opportunity to 
appear and defend the same, and actually 
docs appear and participate in the de-
fence, the infant has his day in court:, 
and has opportunity to make defence by 
one having legal capacity to make it. 
Where a guardian ad litem is appointed 
for an infant, the appointment should ap-
pear of record. But the appearance in, 
and defence of, the suit by the natural 
guardian, need not be made a matter of 
record, and may be shown by parol. The 
cases of Priest v. Hamilton, 2 Tyler, 44, 
and Wrisley & Wrisley v. Kenyon, 28 Vt. 
5, are full authorities in support of both 
of these propositions. See also 1 Am. 
Lead.Cas. 2§5, marginal paging, and cases 
there cited. Judgment affirmed." 
It seems to us that in a case such as the 
one at bar, unless the minor, who has 
reached his majority, makes some showing, 
to the effect that he has a meritorious de-
fense or that he has been misled, deceived, 
or in some way deprived of some benefit 
of an independent and* unhampered de-
fense, he should not be allowed to disaf-
firm a judgment obtained in the manner 
this judgment was obtained, or have the 
same vacated. After a most diligent in-
vestigation of the authorities and a care-
ful consideration of the record in this case, 
"The case shows that at the time the * taking into consideration all of the facts 
writ was served upon the complainant, and and circumstances, we have concluded that 
the trial had which resulted in the judg-
ment sought to be vacated, he was a minor; 
that no guardian ad litem was 
appointed by the justice on said trial; and were denied him. 
sufficient grounds were neither alleged nor 
established to warrant vacating the judg-
ment. No substantial rights of appellant 
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Judgment affirmed. Costs awarded to 
respondent. 
GIVENS, C J., and IIOLDEN and 
AILSIIIE, JJ., coitcur. 
MORGAN, J., dissents. 
(p wK £T, **- '*ai a &YSTt *\ 
JENSEN v. WOOTERS. 
No. 6266. 
Supreme Court of Idaho. 
April 23, 1936. 
1. Sales C=*4I7 
Evidence held to sustain verdict for buyer 
suing seller for breach of contract for sale of 
restaurant in withdrawing service deposit 
with utility companies contrary to agreement. 
2. Trial C=>252 (20) 
In buyer's action for seller's breach of 
contract, refusal to instruct that buyer's fail-
ure to establish amount of damages in dollars 
and cents limited recovery to nominal damag-
es held proper, where there was evidence from 
which actual damages could be computed. 
3. Sales <£=>42l 
In buyer's action for seller's breach of 
contract, refusal to instruct that buyer could 
recover only nominal damages' held proper, 
where buyer established actual damages 
which were natural and proximate conse-
quences of breach of contract. 
4. Damages €=>II7 
In action for breach of contract, only such 
damages will be allowed as fairly compensate 
injured party for his loss. 
Appeal from District Court,' Bannock 
County, Fifth District; L. E. Glennon, Act-
ing Judge. 
Action by Marie Jensen against Otis 
Wooters for damages for breach of oral 
agreement. From a judgment for plaintiff, 
defendant appeals. 
Affirmed. 
C. M. Jeffcry, of Pocatello, for appellant. 
* • I I . I • ! I • 
$=»For othtr casei Nt umt topic aud KEY N 
F. E. Tydcman and B. W. Davis, both of 
Pocatello, for respondent. 
BUDGE, Justice. 
This is an action brought by respondent 
against appellant for damages upon an al-
leged breach of an oral agreement growing 
out of the purchase of a certain restaurant 
known as the Circle Shop owned by or held 
in the name of Ora Ball, an employee of ap-
pellant. 
From the facts it appears that appellant 
offered to sell the restaurant to respond- I 
cnt. Respondent was not financially able ! 
to place with the Idaho Power Company and j 
the Public Utilities Consolidated Corpora- '< 
tion, referred to in the proceedings as the i 
gas company, the necessary and required | 
deposits to secure the services rendered by ! 
said companies and which were necessary in 
carrying on the restaurant business. The | 
accounts of the Circle Shop with the gas 
company and the Idaho Power Company ! 
were at the time carried in the name of ap- ! 
pcllant, and appellant had on deposit with 
the Idaho Power Company, as required by 
its rules and regulations, $100, and also had 
a credit with the gas company to insure pay-
ment for service rendered to said restau-
rant. For the purpose of promoting and 
inducing respondent to enter into an agree-
ment of purchase of the furniture, fixtures, 
and equipment of the Circle Shop, appel-' 
lant agreed with respondent that he would i 
permit the accounts to remain in his name, 
permit the deposit to remain in the hands of 
the Idaho Power Company, and permit the 
credit to remain with the gas company, and 
would also leave in the cash register $20 in 
change, thereby making it possible for re-
spondent to carry on the business. In pur-
suance to the agreement entered into be-
tween respondent and appellant and an 
agreement of purchase thereafter entered 
into between respondent and Ora Ball, ap-
pearing as the record owner of the restau-
rant, respondent delivered on the purchase; 
price of the fixtures and equipment a notei 
signed by one H. C. Nelson, which she then: 
owned, and further agreed to pay the sum 
of $S a day, $2 thereof to be applied on the, 
purchase price and $6 a day to pay genera! 
expenses such as gas, electricity, rent, etc.; 
the aforementioned amounts to be paid each 
day to Ora Ball-and by her distributed. Re-
spondent went into possession of the restau-, 
rant July 9, 1932, and continued in pos-
session until November 3, 1932, during 
which time she made the payments stipulat-j 
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LAKE CITY, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Tony R. BARRUTIA et al., Defendants 
and Appellants. 
No. I33G0. 
Supreme Court of I'tali. 
AUK. LM>, 1!>74. 
City Redevelopment Agency com-
menced condemnation suit to take defend-
ants' land which was improved with a 
three-story building. The Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, Joseph G. Jepp-
son, J., entered judgment on jury verdict 
for defendants in the amount of $93,000, 
and defendants appealed contending that 
court committed prejudicial error in its 
rulings on admissibility of certain evidence 
and in giving certain jury instructions. 
The Supreme Court, Callister, C. J., held 
that trial court properly excluded offered 
testimony as to the value in use of proper-
ty following testimony by same witness as 
to fair market value of the property; that 
trial court properly admitted into evidence 
testimony by deposition of witness with 
heart condition relating to comparable sale; 
that defendants' objection to testimony on 
comparable sale based on fact that sale had 
been made under advice of property man-
ager to sell so as to avoid costs of con-
demnation lega t ion went to weight of the 
evidence rather than competency; and that 
instruction to jury not to consider interest, 
attorney's fees or costs of proceedings in 
assessing value of subject property was 
properly given so as to direct attention of 
jury to sole issue they were to decide. 
Affirmed. 
I. Eminent Domain €=>202(l) 
Trial court properly excluded offered 
testimony of appraisal witness in condem-
nation action as to the use value of subject 
property to new owner following testimony 
of same witness that present structure on 
parcel had reached end of its economic life 
LAKE CITY v. BARRUTIA V h 4 7 
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and that highest and best use of the prop-
erty would be to tear down the old building 
and construct a new development. U.C. 
A. 1953, 11-10-23.9. 
2. Depositions 0107(10) / 
Where trial court in eminent domain 
proceedings ordered taking of testimony of 
witness with heart condition by deposition 
and defendants objected to admission of 
such deposition on grounds that they were 
materially hampered in making objections 
to testimony by sensitive health of witness, 
defendants' asserted objections that testi-
mony was highly prejudicial, based on 
hearsay, and fraught with conclusions 
without adequate foundation could have 
been made at trial and were not waived by 
failure to make them during course of dep-
osition. Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 
32(a)(3)(C), (b), (d)(3)A). 
3. Trial C=>83(l) 
Defendants' asserted objections that 
testimony was highly prejudicial, based on 
hearsay, and fraught with conclusions 
without adequate foundation failed to state 
clearly specific ground of objection as re-
quired by rules of evidence. Rules of Evi-
dence, rule 4(a). 
4. Evidence 0=142(1) 
In condemnation proceedings, land-
owners' objection to admission into evi-
dence of testimony concerning alleged com-
parable sale based on fact that sellers were 
nonresidents and had been advised to make 
sale prior to condemnation to avoid costs 
of litigation affected weight rather than 
competency of evidence. 
5. Eminent Domain €=3262(5) 
Trial court's instruction to jury in em-
inent domain proceedings that jury was not 
to consider interest, attorney's fees, or 
costs of the proceedings in assessing value 
of subject property was not prejudicial er-
ror since such instruction did not affect 
substantial rights of parties and was wisely 
given in case wherein landowners had em-
phasized costs of litigation involved in con-
demnation action in their objections to ad-
mission of comparable sale testimony. 
Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 61. 
A 
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scrimp that the trial court committed prej- j 
udicial error in regard to its rulings on the 
admissibility of certain evidence and cer- i 
tain jury instructions. 
The date of the taking of the subject 
property was February 2, 1972. One of 
the landowners testified that the fair mar-
ket value on the date of the taking was 
$165,On(.) to $170,000. Defendants' three j 
expert witnesses testified as to the follow- I 
ing as the fair market value: Memory H. 
Cain, $165,000; Ray Williams, $149,000; j 
and Edward P. Westra, $87,140. Plain- j 
tiff's expert witness was of the opinion j 
that the value of the property was $72,765. j 
The experts were of the opinion that the ! 
building situated on the premises was obso-
lete and at the end of its economic life. 
The two upper stories of the building had I 
been utilized as a hotel but it had been va- ; 
cant since January 1971, and would require j 
remodeling to conform with fire regula-«, j 
tions. The basement area had been last i 
rented in 1966. The main floor was divid- ! 
ed into two areas. The southern portion 
had been rented for $125 per month as a 
secondhand furniture store; it had been 
vacant since June, 1968. The northern por-
tion had been extensively renovated in i 
1967 and had been operated by the land- j 
owners as a tavern called the "Downtowner I 
Lounge"; it had a rental value of approxi-
mately $300 per month. j 
The highest and best use of the property • 
was commercial and it was so zoned. The 
neighborhood had undergone a dramatic j 
revitalization by the construction of the j 
Salt Palace Complex, which increased both 
pedestrian and vehicular traffic. Several 
new motels were being constructed in the 
area, and a shopping mall called "Arrow j 
Press Square" was being completed. ! 
These new commercial enterprises stimu-
lated an increment in the property values 
of the area. 
6. Eminent Domain C=>255 
Landowners' objection to jury instruc-
tion in condemnation action on grounds 
that it was confusing, misleading, and did 
not comport with evidence was not consid-
ered on appeal since it failed to point out 
with a requisite degree of particularity 
wherein the instruction was not supported 
by the law. Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 
61. 
7. Appeal and Error C=»I032(I) 
Upon appeal, appellant had burden of 
showing that there was substantial and 
prejudicial error which deprived him of 
opportunity for full and fair presentation 
and consideration of disputed issues since 
there is a presumption in favor of the veri-
ty of the verdict and judgment, including 
all aspects of the conduct of the proceed-
ings and rulings of the trial court. 
Brant H. Wall, Salt Lake City, for de-
fendants and appellants. 
B. Lloyd Poelman and II. Reese Hansen, 
of Strong, Poelman & Fox, Salt Lake City, 
for plaintiff and respondent. 
CALLISTER, Chief Justice: 
Plaintiff, pursuant to the power of emi-
nent domain conferred by Sec. 11-19-23.9, 
UX.A.1953, as amended 1971, initiated this 
action of condemnation to take defendants' 
property. Defendants' property was a par-
cel of land measuring 49 by 156 feet, situ-
ated on the east side of West Temple 
Street between Second and Third South in 
Salt Lake City. Located upon the property 
was a three story building with an im-
proved basement for storage facilities. 
The sole factual issue in dispute was the 
amount that would constitute just compen-
sation. Upon trial, the matter was submit-
ted to a jury, which rendered a verdict 
finding that the fair market value for land 
and improvements was $93,000. The trial 
court rendered judgment in accordance 
with the verdict and denied defendants' 
motion for a new trial or a judgment not-
withstanding the verdict in the form of an 
additur. Defendants appeal therefrom as-
[1] On appeal, defendants contend that 
the trial court erred in striking the testi-
mony of witness Cain concerning the inter-
im value of the building on the land. The 
witness testified that the structure had 
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reached the end ot its < . conomie life and 
the highest and best use of the property 
would be to tear down the old building and 
construct a new type of development, such 
as, an office building or retail stores. The 
witness testified that in appraising the sub-
ject property, he had rejected the cost and 
income approaches and utilized the market 
approach which involves locating compara-
ble sales of similar property in the area. 
He testified that the fair market value of 
the land was $153,615; this opinion was 
based on the sales of four parcels that he 
considered comparable. All of these four 
other properties had old buildings situated 
thereon, but the witness ascribed no value 
to the improvements; although the vendees 
were presently utilizing the buildings— 
some after extensive renovation. Witness 
Cain further testified that in addition to 
the value of the land, the willing buyer 
would pay a nominal value for the build-
ing. He explained that even though the 
building had reached the end of its eco-
nomic life and was not producing suffi-
cient income to pay the interest on the 
land, a buyer would pay a nominal sum 
since the building was producing some in-
come to the owner, which could be collect-
ed while the plans and financing for a new 
structure were being completed. To deter-
mine this interim use value, Mr. Cain uti-
lized a formula he characterized as a mod-
ified income approach. 
Mr. Cain testified that the property 
could generate $685 per month rent, i. e., 
$300 for the tavern, $100 for the basement, 
$160 for the hotel, and $125 for the store. 
The ,sole expenses he deducted were for 
taxes and insurance. He did not deduct 
for management, vacancy and credit loss, 
repairs and replacement and other standard 
expenses. He determined a net income of 
$6,275 for each of the two years interim 
use of the building. He used the Inwood 
Tables to find the present use of future in-
come. He testified that the building had a 
nominal value of $11;200 interim use. He 
explained that he could not use the stand-
1. Metropolitan Water District of Southern 
California v. Adams, 110 P/Jil 7, ](M7 (Oal. 
W-H) ; 4 Xiehols on Kmincnt Domain CM 
526 P.2d—4 
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aid income approach, i. e., capitalized net 
income to determine the fair market value 
because the property was not being pv.t to 
its highest and best use. 
While the jury was not present in the 
courtroom, plaintiff made a motion that 
the testimony of witness Cain concerning 
the $11,200 interim use of the building be 
stricken. The court granted the motion 
and ruled that the jury would be limited to 
a maximum finding of value of $153,615, 
the amount to which witness Cain testified 
as to the fair market value of the property. 
Subsequently, the jury was never so in-
formed or so instructed by the court. 
However, defendants claim the ruling of 
the court precluded counsel from arguing 
this point to the jury or from presenting 
further testimony concerning the value of 
this interim use. 
The trial court did not err in its ruling. 
Market value is not a multiple, for the val-
ue in use of property for a particular pur-
pose is not market value but merely a fac-
tor in determining such value. It is gener-
ally improper to express an opinion of val-
ue in use in terms of so much money. 
There is a clear distinction between value 
in use and market value; a given piece of 
land has only one market value and not a 
certain market value for one purpose and a 
different market value for another pur-
pose. The market value of land is deter-
mined by considering the highest possible 
use to which the land is or reasonably may 
be adapted and the price which the willing 
purchaser would be willing to offer in 
view of such highest possible use. While 
there is a clear distinction between evi-
dence of the value in use of land in terms 
of money for a particular purpose and 
opinions of market value in terms of mon-
ey, based upon a consideration of the high-
est available use of the land of which the 
witness has knowledge, the evidence must 
be scrutinized to determine whether the 
testimony falls within the first or inadmis-
sible category or the second or admissible 
category.1 The testimony of witness Cain 
Ed.), See. 12.2(2), pp. 12-80, and See. 12.312, 
pp. 12-140 to 12-110. 
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was inadmissible since he stated the mone-
tary value of the land for a particular pur-
pose; the effect thereof was not to aid in 
determining the market value of the prop-
erty, but to add a separate item of dam-
age.2 
[2,3] Defendants contend that the trial 
court erred in admitting the testimony by 
means of a deposition of witness Kdwin 
Whitney. During the course of the trial 
defendants' expert witness, Cain, was in-
terrogated about the sale of a parcel of 
land identified as the "Weir Sale." Mr. 
Cain testified that he had conferred with 
Edwin Whitney, the manager of the prop-
erty, who had advised him that the owners 
of the property were uninformed as to its 
value and didn't receive market value. Mr. 
Cain concluded that the Weir sale was not 
comparable. The Weir transaction was a 
key sale in plaintiff's case to establish fair 
market value. Mr. Whitney had suffered 
a serious heart attack and had been recent-
ly released from the hospital. Plaintiff 
moved for an order permitting the deposi-
tion of Mr. Whitney for use at trial to im-
peach the testimony of Mr. Cain. Mr. 
Whitney was advised by his doctor that he 
could be interviewed in the office but 
could not make a court appearance. De-
fendants objected to the deposition being 
taken on the ground that the Weir sale 
was not comparable to the subject proper-
ty. 
Thereafter the deposition of witness 
Whitney was taken and recorded simulta-
neously by the court reporter and a cas-
sette recorder. Defendants had ample op-
portunity to conduct cross-examination. 
The deposition of Mr. Whitney was admit-
ted at the trial under Rule 32(a)(3)(C), 
U.R.CP., as amended 1972. The tape 
recording was played to the jury. The 
record indicates that prior to playing the 
cassette, counsel argued their objections to 
the content of the recording, that the court 
ruled thereon, and that it was agreed be-
tween counsel that exceptions could be dic-
tated to the reporter while the jury was 
2. State v. Noble, 6 Utah 
deliberating. Thereafter, defendants ex-
cepted to the ruling of the court on the 
ground that the admission of the testimony 
was highly prejudicial, was largely based 
on hearsay, was fraught with conclusions 
without adequate foundation. Defendants 
further claimed that the testimony as elicit-
ed did not afford or give to the landown-
ers the opportunity to interpose appropri-
ately the objections that would have been 
so interposed but for the fact that the wit-
ness was in delicate health and that their 
cross-examination and objections were sub-
stantially and materially hampered by the 
sensitive health of the witness. 
There is nothing in the record to indicate 
that defendants were inhibited in their 
cross-examination of Mr. Whitney. Under 
Rule 32(b) and (d)(3)(A), U.R.C.P., as 
nmcndcd 1972, defendants asserted objec-
tions could have been made at the trial and 
they were not waived by failure to make 
them during the course of the deposition. 
The record docs not indicate that defend-
ants objected to the use of the cassette rec-
ord, which would undoubtedly interfere 
with the assertion of an objection. Defend-
ants' generalized objections directed to the 
entire deposition do not comport with the 
requirements of Rule 4(a), U.R.E., that 
there appear of record an objection to the 
evidence timely interposed and so stated as 
to make clear the specific ground of objec- j 
tion. : 
[4] Defendants further contend that 
the trial court erred in admitting evidence 
of the "Weir Sale" on the ground that it 
was not a comparable sale. Defendants 
urge that the Weirs were acting under du-
ress, in that they were nonresidents and 
had been advised by their property manag-
er to make the sale prior to condemnation 
to avoid costs of litigation. Under such 
circumstances, defendants claim that the 
trial court abused its discretion in admit-j 
ting such highly prejudicial evidence. j 
A review of the instant record indicates' 
that there was a substantial basis in the! 
evidence for the trial court to rule that the; 
2d 40, 305 P.2d 495 (1057). 
! 
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test of "reasonable comparability" had been 
met, and the evidence was properly admit-
ted. The differences urged and empha-
sized by defendants affected the weight of 
the evidence more than its competency and 
were properly submitted to the jury.3 
[5] Defendants contend that the trial 
court erred in giving Instruction No. 8, 
wherein the jury was instructed that they 
were not to consider interest, attorney's 
fees, or costs of the proceedings in assess-
ing the value of the subject property; that 
these items would be dealt with by the 
court in accordance with the law. Defend-
ants claim that the instruction went beyond 
the scope of the issues presented in the 
trial and constituted prejudicial error. 
This instruction properly directed the at-
tention of the jury to the sole issue they 
were to decide and that they were not at 
liberty to enhance the award by calculating 
any other costs. Within the context of the 
record of this case, this admonition to the 
jury was wise since defendants had empha-
sized the "Weir Sale" was not comparable 
but under duress to avoid the costs of liti-
gation involved in a condemnation action. 
Furthermore, the instruction could not be 
considered a defect which affected the sub-
stantial rights of the parties and must 
therefore be considered harmless error un-
der Rule 61, U.R.C.P. 
[6] Finally, defendants contend that 
the trial court erred by its Instruction No. 
22. The record indicates that defendants 
excepted thereto as being contrary to the 
law and on the grounds that it is confus-
ing, misleading, and does not comport with 
the evidence and testimony in the trial. 
3. State Road Commission v. Wood, 22 Utah 
2d 317, 452 P.2d 872 (1909). 
4. Employers Mutual Liability Insur. Co. of 
Wis. v. Allen Oil Company, 123 Utah 253, 
203. 258 i\2d 445 (1953). 
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Rule 51, l'.R.C.r., provides that in ob-
jecting to the giving of an instruction, a 
party must state distinctly the matter to 
which he objects and the grounds of his 
objection. The purpose of this rule is to 
direct the attention of the court to the 
claimed errors in the instruction so that he 
might have an opportunity to correct them 
if he deems it proper. The objection must 
be sufficiently specific to give the trial 
court notice of the claimed error in the in-
struction. An objection that an instruction 
is not supported by, and is contrary to the 
law lacks that degree of specificity so as to 
direct the court's attention to a particular 
matter. Since defendants failed to point 
out with the requisite degree of particulari-
ty wherein the instruction was not support-
ed by the law, this court will not consider 
the instruction on its merits.4 
[7] A survey of the entire record 
clearly reveals that the parties had a fair 
opportunity to present their respective 
claims to the court and jury for determina-
tion. Thereafter, there is a presumption in 
favor of the verity of the verdict and 
judgment, including all aspects of the con-
duct of the proceedings and rulings of the 
court. Upon appeal, appellant has the bur-
den of showing that there was substantial 
and prejudicial error which had the effect 
of depriving him of the opportunity of a 
full and fair presentation and consideration 
of the disputed issues.5 No such error 
emerges in the instant record. 
The judgment of the trial court is af-
firmed. Costs are awarded to plaintiff. 
HENRIOD, ELLETT, CROCKETT 
and TUCKETT, JJ., concur. 
5. Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City 
v. Mitsui Investment, Iu<\ (Utah), 522 P.2d 
1370, 1374 (1974). 
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In addition to the foregoing, and even 
more important, is the fact that I cannot 
sec any basis whatsoever in the evidence to 
justify submitting the question of plain-
tiff's negligence to the jury. It is my 
opinion that in observing his older brother, 
who preceded him under the wire, and in 
making inquiry before he attempted to 
pass, he exercised at least the degree of 
care which a boy ten years of age should 
be expected to observe. (The main opin-
ion makes no suggestion to the contrary). 
It was therefore error for the defendant to 
request, and for the trial court to submit, 
the issue of the plaintiff's contributory 
negligence to the jury. 
In fairness to the decision of this court, 
I must concede that the main opinion is 
correct as to these aspects of procedure: 
(1) that plaintiff's requested instruction 
No. 12 did deal with the duty of care im-
posed upon a child, which would seem to 
indicate an assumption on the part of 
plaintiff's counsel that the issue of plain-
tiff's contributory negligence would be sub-
mitted; (2) that he did not make a motion 
for a directed verdict on that issue; (3) 
nor did he ask for a new trial. Neverthe-
less, under the particular circumstances of 
this case, I do not think that the trial court 
and this court should consider themselves 
powerless to rectify an injustice. 
My conclusion is consistent with the 
spirit and purpose of our rules of proce-
dure. 
Rule 1(a), U.R.C.P., provides in part 
that: 
* * * they shall be liberally construed 
to secure the just, speedy, and inexpen-
sive determination of every action; 
I. See 4 C.J.S. Appeal and Error $ 332, p. 
1077, noting exception to the peneral rule, 
stating that, "notwithstanding the ab-
sence of exceptions in the trial court, al-
leged errors in submitting issues to a 
jury may be considered on appeal when 
required in the interest of justice." Cit-
ing, X. Y. Con. U. It. Co. v. Mass. 
bonding A Ins. Co., 1*4 N.Y.S. 243, 103 
App.Div. 438. affirmed 135 N.E. 012, 
233 N.Y. 547, wherein the court states 
that "if it was error to submit to a 
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and Rule 51 states that: 
* * * Notwithstanding the forego-
ing requirement, [stating objections and 
the grounds therefor] the appellate court, 
in its discretion and in the interests of 
justice, may review the giving or fail-
ure to give an instructon. 
There is both text and case law supporting 
this practical view of doing justice.1 
For the reasons discussed above: (1) 
there was an obvious impropriety in giving 
the instruction and in submitting the ques-
tion of the plaintiff's contributory negli-
gence where there was no evidence to jus-
tify doing so; (2) the special verdicts ar-
rived at were themselves inconsistent; 
which (3) seem to indicate that the jury 
was confused by the verdicts, it is my 
opinion that the interests of justice would 
best be served by remanding this case for a 
retrial upon all issues. 
y i \
 w 
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24 Utah 2d 301 
Stephen SIMPSON, Plainti f f and Appellant, 
v. 
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
No. 11630. 
Supremo Court of Utah. 
Juno 5, 1970. 
Action by automobile body painter 
against automobile mantifacturer for inju-
ries received while painter was struck in 
forehead by torque tension rod which re-
jury a question of the defendant insurer's 
liability * • • the appellate court 
way reverse under it* plenary potcer, al-
though no exception vrn% taken below, 
* * • because a fair trial was not 
had." And of. Sutton v. Otis Elevator 
Co., as Utah M, 249 F. 437, where the 
court held that in special circumstances 
in the interest of justice failure to give 
proper instructions was reviewable nn np-
I>ealf though no such instructions were 
requested. 
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leased while lie was conditioning tail gate 
assembly on station wagon for painting. 
The Third District Court, Salt Lake Coun-
ty, D. Frank Wilkins, J., entered judgment 
on verdict of no cause of action in favor 
of manufacturer, and painter appealed. 
The Supreme Court, Crockett, C. J., held 
that testimony that job in question did not 
ordinarily involve disassembly of tail gate, 
together with fact that reasonable minds 
may well have believed that one who relies 
on his own judgment to deviate from ordi-
nary and usual procedure should take into 
consideration possibility of any increased 
risk in doing so, justified submission to jury 
of question as to whether painter was con-
tributorily negligent in disassembling tail 
gate, thereby allowing torque tension rod 
to release and strike him in forehead. 
Affirmed. 
t. Appeal and Error C=»I72(I) 
Plaintiff's contention relating to strict 
liability would not be considered by Su-
preme Court where it was raised for first 
time on appeal. 
2. Negligence C^136(9) 
Issue of contributory negligence may 
be submitted to jury if there is basis in ev-
idence upon which reasonable minds could 
conclude that plaintiff was negligent in 
that he failed to exercise that degree of 
care which an ordinary, reasonable and 
prudent person would have observed under 
the circumstances. 
3. Automobile* C=>I6 
Testimony that station wagon paint 
job did not ordinarily involve disassembly 
of tail gate, together with fact that reason-
able minds may well have believed that one 
who relies on his own judgment to deviate 
from the ordinary and usual procedure 
should take into consideration possibility of 
any increased risk in doing so, justified 
submission to jury of question as to wheth-
er painter was contributorily negligent in 
disassembling tail gate for purposes of 
painting it, thereby allowing torque tension 
rod of tail gate to release and strike him in 
forehead. 
4. Automobiles C=>I6 
Admission in cvk nee of service man-
ual showing proccdm involved in remov-
ing tail gate was r.ot error, in action 
against automobile manufacturer by auto-
mobile body painter for injury sustained i 
when torque tension rod released and 
struck painter in forehead while he was 
disassembling station wagon tail gate for 
painting, where facts of existence of serv- ; 
ice manual, its availability to painter if he | 
had asked for it, and its contents, could be ! 
considered as having some bearing both 
upon issue whether manufacturer had tak- ; 
en reasonable precautions for safety of ! 
those who would be concerned with that 
assembly and whether painter observed j 
reasonable care for his own safety in ! 
connection with its removal. j 
5. Trial C=>295(l) 
Specific jury instruction should be 
considered in its entirety along with all 
other instructions. 
6. Trial <3=>296(4) 
Phrase "against misuse by careless 
persons" in instruction of defendant manu- i 
facturer's standard of care was not an im- \ 
putation of carelessness to plaintiff where j 
jury was properly instructed that they \ 
should consider all instructions together, | 
and another instruction adequately safe- ! 
guarded plaintiff's interests as to standard 
of care imposed upon him. 
7. Appeal and Error C=>930(l), 1032(1) 
All presumptions favor validity of ver- i 
diet and judgment and they will not be I 
overturned unless attacker shows that j 
there is error which is substantial and 
prejudicial in sense that there is reasonable 
likelihood that in its absence, result would 
have been different. i 
i 
Woodrow D. White, Salt Lake City, for j 
plaintiff and appellant. | 
Harold G. Christensen, Salt Lake City, j 
for defendant and respondent. j 
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CKOCKKTT, Chief Justice. 
The plaintiff Stephen Simpson, an auto 
body painter for Capital Chevrolet Compa-
ny in Salt Lake City, sues for injuries he 
received on being struck in the forehead by 
a torque tension rod which released while 
he was conditioning the tail gate assembly 
on a Chevrolet station wagon for painting. 
Mis complaint charged negligence against 
defendant General Motors in the design of 
the tail gate assembly, particularly that as 
it was lowered an apparently harmless ten-
sion rod slipped out of its holder and 
struck him; and that the construction con-
stituted a hidden danger which the defend-
ant should have foreseen and guarded 
against, and/or given warning about. The 
case was submitted to a jury upon the is-
sues of defendant's negligence and the 
plaintiff's contributory negligence. They 
returned a verdict of no cause of action in 
favor of the defendant. 
On appeal plaintiff contends that the is-
sue of contributory negligence should not 
have been submitted (a) because of the 
doctrine of strict liability where an inher-
ently dangerous instrumentality is involved, 
and (b) that the evidence would not justify 
a finding of contributory negligence. He 
also assigns error in rulings on evidence 
and the giving of instructions. 
[1] The contention relating to strict 
liability is an attempt to inject that doc-
trine into this case for the first time on 
appeal. It was dealt with neither in the 
plaintiff's complaint, nor in the pretrial 
conference, nor at the trial. It is therefore 
not appropriate to address such a conten-
tion to this court. Orderly procedure, 
whose proper purpose is the final settle-
ment of controversies, requires that a party 
must present his entire case and his theory 
or theories of recovery to the trial court; 
and having done so, he cannot thereafter 
change to some different theory and thus 
1. That mutter* r.iised for the first time on 
nppc:tl will not foe considered sec Hamilton, 
ct nl. v. Suit Lake County Sewernjrc Imp. 
!>«**., et nl.. 15 Ttnli 2d 210, 302 I\2d 
235, and eases therein cited. 
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attempt to keep in motion a merry-go-
round of litigation.1 
[2] 
Contributory Ncyliycncc 
Consideration of the justification 
for submitting the issue of contributory 
negligence is analogous to making the 
same determination as to primary negli-
gence: whether there is a basis in the evi-
dence upon which reasonable minds could 
conclude that the plaintiff was negligent \\\ 
that he failed to exercise that degree of 
care which an ordinary, reasonable and 
prudent person would have observed under 
the circumstances.2 
[3] The evidence is to the effect that 
the usual procedure in doing the job as-
signed plaintiff did not involve any taking 
apart of the tail gate, but that he elected to 
do so upon his own initiative, believing it 
would be easier to do a more thorough and 
better job. That doing the paint job in 
question did not ordinarily involve undoing 
the tail gate assembly was supported by the 
testimony of three other auto body paint-
ers. This testimony, together with the fact 
that reasonable minds may well believe 
that one who relies on his own judgment 
to deviate from the ordinary and usual 
procedure should take into consideration 
the possibility of any increased risk in 
doing so, justified the trial court in sub-
mitting to the jury the question as to 
whether the plaintiff was contributorily 
negligent under the standard above set 
forth.3 
Rutiny on Evidence 
[4] Defendant assigns as error the ad-
mission in evidence of a service manual of 
the defendant which showed the procedure 
involved in removing the tail gate when 
necessary. An essential part of the plain-
tiff's case was his contention that he had 
no knowledge and no warning of danger 
2. See Stickle v. t'nion Viwtf'u- U. Co., 122 
Ctnli 477. 251 l\2d 8u7. 
3. Ibid. 
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hidden in the tail gate assembly. The 
facts of the existence of the service man-
ual, its availability to the plaintiff if he 
asked for it, and its contents, could well be 
considered as having some bearing both 
upon the issue whether the defendant had 
taken reasonable precautions for the safety 
of those who would be concerned with that 
assembly, and whether the plaintiff ob-
served reasonable care for his own safety 
in connection with its removal. Inasmuch 
as the service manual had some logical rel-
evancy as proof on an essential issue, we 
do not see any impropriety in admitting it 
in evidence.4 
Instructions 
[5,6] Plaintiff's complaint about in-
structions to the jury includes one about a 
portion of Instruction No. 16: 
* * * A manufacturer is not re-
quired to foresee all possible ways in 
which a person may injure himself nor 
to protect against all such possibilities or 
against misuse by careless persons. 
[Emphasis added.] 
It is urged that the emphasized phrase is 
an imputation of carelessness to the plain-
tiff. It is neither fair nor realistic to ex-
cerpt a single phrase from an instruction, 
nor one instruction from the rest, and as-
sume that the jury regarded it in isolation. 
They were properly instructed that they 
should not do so, but that they should con-
sider all of the instructions together.5 In 
addition, Instruction No. 19 adequately 
safeguarded the plaintiff's interests as to 
the standard of care imposed upon him: 
* * * A person is not required to 
guard against danger in places where it 
is not expected to be, and if you shall 
find that the plaintiff exercised ordinary 
care in the performance of such work, 
and in the exercise of such ordinary care 
was unaware of the function of the 
torque rod assembly and any danger in-
herent therein, then the plaintiff could 
not be charged with contributory negli-
gence. 
[7] The parties have had a full and 
fair opportunity to present their evidence 
and arguments upon the issues to the court 
and the jury, who after due consideration 
and deliberation have made their determi-
nations thereon. This is the objective of a 
trial. When it has been accomplished the 
administering of evenhanded justice to 
both sides demands that there should be 
some solidarity in the result so that it can 
be relied upon. Accordingly, the estab-
lished rule is that all presumptions favor 
the validity of the verdict and judgment; 
and they will not be overturned unless the 
attacker shows that there is error which is 
substantial and prejudicial in the sense that 
there is a reasonable likelihood that in its 
absence the result would have been differ-
ent. We have found no such error here. 
Affirmed. Costs to defendant (respon-
dent). 
CALLISTER, TUCKETT, HENRIOD 
and ELLETT, JJ., concur. 
4. As to the admissibility of evidence de-
pending on logical relevancy to prove an 
issue, see 31A C.J.S. Evidence 426 et 
seq.; see Foster v. Keating, 120 Cal. 
App.2d 435, 261 P.2d 529 (1953) ; and 
Sumrall v. Butler, 102 Cal.App.2d 515, 
227 P.2d 881 (1951). 
5. That an instruction should be considered 
in its entirety, and along with all of the 
other instructions, sec Badger v. Clayson, 
18 Utah 2d 329, 422 P.2d 065; and see 
Walkenhorst v. Kesler, 92 Utah 312, 67 
T.2d 654. 
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Personal representative of grantor's 
estate brought action to cancel warranty 
deed and to quiet title to property describ-
ed in deed. The Third District Court, Salt 
Lake County, Dean E. Conder, J., entered 
judgment for grantees, and personal repre-
sentative appealed. The Supreme Court, 
Howe, J., held that: (1) actions based on 
lack of consideration and undue influence 
are equitable actions governed by four-year 
statute of limitations; (2) date of delivery 
of date set period of limitations in motion 
and those actions were therefore barred 
years before grantor's death; (3) considera-
tion paid by grantees in 1964 was adequate 
and fully performed; (4) no confidential 
relationship existed between grantees and 
grantor so burden remained upon personal 
representative to prove by clear and con-
vincing evidence that conveyance should be 
set aside; and (5) no resulting trust was 
shown where personal representative did 
not prove that grantor intended anything 
but unconditional conveyance of her prop-
erty. 
Affirmed. 
1. Deeds <s==>211 
Party attacking validity of written in-
strument such as a deed must do so by 
clear and convincing evidence. 
2. Appeal and Error e»1009(4) 
Supreme Court will disturb findings of 
fact in equity cases only where evidence 
clearly preponderates against them. 
3. Appeal and Error 01009(1) 
Supreme Court is not bound to substi-
tute its judgment for that of a trial court in 
equity cases and because of trial court's 
advantaged position, Supreme Court gives 
considerable deference to its findings and 
judgment. 
4. Deeds <3=>68(1) 
Where deed is executed with no intent 
to transfer present interest, it will be inval-
idated by court in equity. 
5. Deeds ®=>194(5) 
Presumption of valid delivery arises 
where deed has been executed and record-
ed but this presumption may be overcome 
by clear and convincing evidence to the 
contrary. 
6. Trusts 0 6 2 
Essential element of resulting trust is 
intent of creator that res be held in trust. 
7. Limitation of Actions e^ GOtS) 
Where there was testimony that grant-
or knew that she had conveyed her proper-
ty to grantees with full understanding that 
she had no further claim to it, where liens 
she executed encumbering the property 
were discharged by her repayment of all 
sums received through welfare assistance, 
and where in 14 years that she lived after 
conveying property she never once at-
tempted to obtain property's return nor 
told anyone that she still owned property, 
requisite statute of limitations began to 
run no later than date deed was delivered 
and thus grantor's personal representa-
tive's claim of a trust was barred. U.C.A. 
1953, 78-12-25(2). 
8. Deeds e=>17(4) 
Grantees, who paid property taxes and 
assessments over period of 14 years, pro-
vided grantor a home for the remainder of 
her life and fully performed terms of their 
agreement with grantor, gave adequate 
and substantial consideration for property. 
9. Cancellation of Instruments &*32, 
34(4) 
An action demanding cancellation of 
deed for failure of consideration is an equi-
HAKKll v 
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table action and governed by four-year 
statute of limitations for actions for relief 
not otherwise provided by law. U.C.A. 
1953, 78-12-25(2). 
10. Limitation of Actions c=>60(5) 
Regardless of whether deed was deliv-
ered when executed in 1964 or when it was 
recorded in 1965, the four-year statute of 
limitations for actions for relief not other-
wise provided by law had expired before 
action demanding cancellation of deed for 
failure of consideration was brought by 
grantor's estate following her death in 
1978. U.C.A. 1953, 78-12-25(2). 
11. Limitation of Actions <2>97 
In cases of undue influence and du-
ress, limitation period begins with termina-
tion of influence. ' 
12. Fraud <e=>50 
Confidential relationship is presumed 
between parent and child, attorney and 
client and trustee and cestui que trust; 
same holds true between spiritual advisor 
and a dying man. 
13. Fraud <s=>50 
Where confidential relationship exists, 
presumption of unfairness arises which 
must be overcome by countervailing evi-
dence, and burden shifts to defendant to 
prove absence of unfairness by preponder-
ance of the evidence; in all other relation-
ships, existence of confidential relationship 
becomes question of fact. 
14. Trusts <B=>110 
Where trial court found that no confi-
dential relationship existed between grant-
or and one grantee and that grantee, a real 
estate agent, was not serving as her agent 
at time of conveyance, burden was on 
grantor's personal representative to estab-
lish by clear and convincing evidence that 
grantor conveyed her property as result of 
grantee's undue influence and that influ-
ence continued until time of grantor's 
death. 
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15. Deeds e=>211(4) 
Trusts C=*110 
Where grantees recorded deed in 1964 
and grantor took no action against them in 
14 years she lived thereafter, and where 
grantor validated and acknowledged origi-
nal transaction through subsequent inac-
tion for well over a decade after initiating 
conveyance, no undue influence was proven 
in execution of deed, and thus no construc-
tive trust could be impressed upon proper-
ty. 
Robert M. Anderson, Danny C. Kelly, 
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant. 
Richard A. Rappaport, Salt Lake City, 
for defendants and respondents. 
HOWE, Justice: 
Plaintiff, personal representative of the 
estate of Leda K. Wickel Little, deceased, 
brought this action against defendants to 
cancel a warranty deed executed by the 
deceased in 1964 and to quiet title to the 
real property described in the deed. She 
alleged lack of intent to deliver the deed, 
conveyance in trust, undue influence by 
one in a confidential relationship and fail-
ure of consideration or grossly inadequate, 
unconscionable and unfair consideration. 
Defendants counterclaimed, seeking to qui-
et title in themselves, generally denying 
the allegations of the complaint and fur-
ther defending on the grounds that the 
action was barred by applicable statutes of 
limitation. The trial court entered judg-
ment for the defendants and plaintiff ap-
peals. 
Leda Little and her first husband were 
the owners of three homes, No. 1909, No. 
1911 and No. 1915 East 4500 South in Salt 
Lake County, Utah, on property roughly 
IV2 acres in size. They moved into No. 
1909 in 1940 and built No. 1915 in 1957, but 
he died before she moved into it in 1958. 
No. 1911 was a modular home moved onto 
the property in 1950. 
Little had met Clyde Bradshaw, a real-
tor, through her first husband. Both she 
and Bradshaw were from Minersville, 
A-
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Utah, and became good friends. Three 
years after her husband died, Little asked 
Bradshaw to sell the property, as there 
were delinquent property taxes owing and 
she was having difficulty maintaining it. 
When Bradshaw was unable to sell it for 
cash as she requested, she offered to con-
vey the property to him in return for his 
paying the taxes and providing her a place 
to live for the rest of her life. Bradshaw 
did not want to shoulder that responsibility 
but put her in touch with his daughter and 
her husband, Dwight and Vella Pattee, the 
defendants herein. Mr. Pattee, also a real-
tor, attempted to sell Nos. 1909 and 1911 
over a period of six months, but was unable 
to find purchasers for cash. The listing 
agreement expired in January of 1964. At 
about that time, Little extended the same 
proposal to Pattee that she had earlier 
made to Bradshaw. Pattee was reluctant 
at first, thinking that it was too much 
responsibility for him and his wife. Little 
was 59 years old and wanted defendants' 
assurance that she would always have a 
place to live in comfort in return for deed-
ing the property to them. Both parties 
consulted a lawyer for advice, but did not 
transact any business through him. In-
stead, Pattee prepared a warranty deed 
and on September 30, 1964, went to Little's 
home with his brother-in-law, a notary pub-
lic, where Little executed the deed convey-
ing the three homes to defendants. Pattee 
took the deed with him and thenceforth 
assumed and paid the taxes on the proper-
ty. Little continued to live in No. 1915 and 
to receive $50 a month rent from one of the 
other houses until her death in 1978. 
On February 17 and April 21, 1965, Little 
executed two separate public welfare lien 
agreements with the Salt Lake County 
Public Welfare Department, pledging the 
property as collateral. Defendants had no 
knowledge of that transaction. They re-
corded their deed on March 22, 1965. Some 
time later, Little remarried and continued 
to live in the home at No. 1915 with her 
second husband. :Both of them repaid the 
amounts received from the Department of 
Public Welfare and the lien on the property 
was fully discharged in December of 1971. 
In early October 1978, Little and her hus-
band were admitted to a nursing home, 
where she died later that month, never 
having by word or action attempted to re-
pudiate the conveyance. She had no chil-
dren and both her parents and siblings had 
predeceased her. Plaintiff is Little's niece 
and her closest surviving relative. 
[1-3] Plaintiff urges us to conduct a 
new and independent review of both ques-
tions of law and questions of fact. A party 
attacking the validity of a written instru-
ment must do so by clear and convincing 
evidence. Pagano v. Walker, Utah, 539 
P.2d 452 (1975) (joint bank account); First 
Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Hall, 29 
Utah 2d 24, 504 P.2d 995 (1972) (stock 
certificates); Controlled Receivables, Inc. 
v. Harman, 17 Utah 2d 420, 413 P.2d 807 
(1966) (deed); Haywood v. Gill, 16 Utah 2d 
299, 400 P.2d 16 (1965) (joint bank account); 
Northcrest, Inc. v. Walker Bank & Trust 
Co., 122 Utah 268, 248 P.2d 692 (1952) 
(deed). This Court will disturb the findings 
1
 of fact in equity cases only where the evi-
dence clearly preponderates against them. 
Sown v. Loveland, Utah, 678 P.2d 292 
(1984); Del Porto v. Nicolo, 27 Utah 2d 
286, 495 P.2d 811 (1972); First Security 
Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Hall, supra. We 
are not bound to substitute our judgment 
for that of the trial court, and because of 
its advantaged position, we give considera-
ble deference to its findings and judgment. 
Gillmor v. Gillmor, Utah, 657 P.2d 736 
(1982); Jensen v. Brown, Utah, 639 P.2d 
150 (1981); Pagano v. Walker, supra. The 
trial court, after addressing the substan-
tive issues, found all of plaintiffs claims to 
be barred by U.C.A., 1953, §§ 78-12-25, 
78-12-26, 78-12-5 and/or -6. We shall 
address the pertinent statutes of limitation 
in conjunction with the respective claims on 
appeal before us. 
I. 
[4,5] Plaintiff contends that the deed 
was not delivered and accepted with the 
requisite legal intent and that at best it 
must be viewed to be a conveyance in trust. 
HAKKU v. PATTHK 
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Where a deed is executed with no intent to 
transfer a present interest, it will be invali-
dated by a court in equity. Curtiss v. 
Ferris, 168 Colo. 480, 452 I\2d 38 (1%9). 
This Court has held that a conveyance is 
valid only upon delivery of a deed with 
present intent to transfer, Givan v. Lam-
beth, 10 Utah 2d 287, 351 P.2d 959 (1960). 
A presumption of valid delivery arises 
where the deed has been executed and re-
corded, Kresser v. Peterson, Utah, 675 
P.2d 1193 (1984); Controlled Receivables, 
Inc. i\ Harman, supra, but such a pre-
sumption may be overcome by clear and 
convincing evidence to the contrary. Gold 
Oil Land Development Corp. v. Davis, 
Utah, 611 P.2d 711 (1980). 
The recording of a deed and placing the 
names of others on the property is some-
what in the nature of a public declaration 
that [the grantor] intended the instru-
ment to become effective immediately. 
People as a rule do not deliberately put a 
flaw in the title to their property, there-
by handicapping its later disposal, unless 
they really intend to transfer some inter-
est to the person whose name is thus 
placed in the record. 
Allen v. Allen, 115 Utah 303, 204 P.2d 458 
(1949). 
[6,71 Plaintiff contends that Little did 
not deliver the deed with the requisite in-
tent to divest herself of all right, title and 
interest in the property, and that her estate 
should therefore be permitted to enforce a 
resulting trust. An essential element of a 
resulting trust is the intent of the creator 
that the res be held in trust. Parks v. 
Zions First National Bank, Utah, 673 
P.2d 590 (1983); Jones v. Jones, Okla., 459 
P.2d 603 (1969). Had that been the finding 
in the instant case, the statute of limita-
tions would not begin to run until the trus-
tees affirmatively repudiated the trust. 
Therefore, this action would not be barred. 
Parks, supra. Plaintiff attempted to show 
that about the time Little conveyed the 
property to Pattee she was the defendant 
in a suit for alienation of affections and 
that she wanted to remove her assets from 
the reach of a potential judgment creditor. 
However, the trial court found the convey-
ance to have been absolute and uncondi-
tional and not in trust. That finding was 
supported by testimony that Little knew 
that she had conveyed her property to de-
fendants with the full understanding that 
she had no further claim to it. There was 
evidence that she may not have understood 
the nature of the lien agreements she exe-
cuted encumbering the property. Docu-
ments proved that she repaid all sums re-
ceived through welfare assistance and that 
the liens were subsequently discharged. 
In the 14 years Little lived after conveying 
her property, she never once attempted to 
obtain its return or told anyone that she 
still owned what she had conveyed away. 
Under those circumstances, we are disin-
clined to upset the trial court's finding in 
the absence of any clear weight of evidence 
to the contrary. Plaintiffs claim of a trust 
was thus barred as the requisite statute of 
limitations, U.C.A., 1953, § 78-12-25(2) (ac-
tions for relief not otherwise provided for 
by law), began to run no later than the date 
the deed was delivered. 
II. 
[8] Plaintiff also claims that there was 
failure of consideration for the deed, or to 
the extent consideration was given, the 
same was grossly unfair and inadequate. 
Specifically, plaintiff relies upon a letter 
written by Pattee to Little two years after 
the conveyance. The letter confirmed that 
an agreement had been reached at the time 
of the conveyance and then continued: 
I will permit you to live at 1915 East 
4500 South for as long as the property is 
in my possession. I will try to sell [the 
other homes on the property], but you 
may stay in your present home as long 
as you wish, provided only that you pay 
the expenses thereto, i.e., all utilities, 
water, gas, electricity, taxes, etc. as may 
become due thereon. 
Pattee testified that he wrote that letter 
at Little's request at a time when he was 
piloting planes to Southeast Asia and all 
over the world. Little was concerned lest 
his family should fail to follow through on 
A 
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the agreement if something happened to 
him. He stated that he wrote the proviso 
on expenses because he was afraid that in 
the event of his death, his wife would not 
have the income to pay them. Nonethe-
less, the evidence is undisputed that he 
continued to pay taxes on the property 
throughout Little's remaining years. At 
the time of her death he had paid a total of 
$12,581.33. In addition, Little received a 
monthly income of $50 from one of the 
other homes through the period at issue 
here, approximately 15 years. Further-
more, she lived rent-free in her home until 
a month before she died. 
Plaintiff claims that the value of the 
property was stated to be $35,000 in 1957 
in the probate proceedings of the estate of 
Little's first husband. The record is totally 
barren of any support for that assertion. 
The present value of the property is 
claimed to be far in excess of that amount. 
We are here concerned, of course, only 
with what the value of the property was in 
1964 at the time of conveyance. The trial 
court found that defendants gave adequate 
and substantial consideration for the sub-
ject property. They paid property taxes 
and assessments over a period of 14 years, 
provided Little a home for the remainder of 
her life, and fully performed the terms of 
their agreement with her. The weight of 
the evidence does not clearly preponderate 
against that finding, and we will not dis-
turb it. 
[9,10] An action demanding cancella-
tion of a deed for failure of consideration is 
an equitable action and governed by § 78-
12-25(2). Without deciding here whether 
the deed was delivered when signed by 
Little or when recorded by Pattee, an issue 
not before us, we hold that the period of 
limitations had run long before this action 
was instituted. 
III. 
[11] Plaintiff's position with respect to 
the issue of undufe influence is essentially 
two-fold: (1) a confidential relationship ex-
isted between Pattee and Little, and the 
burden shifted to him to prove that he did 
not procure the deed by undue influence; 
and (2) even in the absence of a confidential 
relationship, the evidence clearly prepon-
derated against the trial court's finding 
that the conveyance was not procured by 
undue influence. In cases of undue influ-
ence and duress the limitation period be-
gins with the termination of the influence. 
Developments in the law—Statute of Limi-
tations (1950) 63 Harv.L.Rev. 1177. See 
also Baker v. Masscy, Okla., 569 P.2d 987 
(1977) for a discussion of the applicable 
statute of limitations for equitable actions 
based on undue influence. 
[12,13] A confidential relationship is 
presumed between parent and child, attor-
ney and client, and trustee and cestui que 
trust. Blodgctt v. Martsch, Utah, 590 P.2d 
298 (1978). The same holds true between a 
spiritual advisor and a dying man. Corpo-
ration of the Members of the Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Wat-
son, 25 Utah 45, 69 P. 531 (1902). Where a 
confidential relationship exists, a presump-
tion of unfairness arises which must be 
overcome by countervailing evidence, and 
the burden shifts to the defendant to prove 
absence of unfairness by a preponderance 
of the evidence. Robertson v. Campbell, 
Utah, 674 P.2d 1226 (1983) (finding of un-
due influence in execution of trust shifted 
burden to defendant to prove absence of 
undue influence in a subsequent alleged 
ratification of the trust); Johnson v. John-
son, 9 Utah 2d 40, 337 P.2d 420 (1959); In 
re Swan's Estate, 4 Utah 2d 277, 293 P.2d 
682 (1956). In all other relationships the 
existence of a confidential relationship be-
comes a question of fact. Blodgett v. 
Martsch, supra. 
[14] The plaintiff contends that Pattee 
received the deed as Little's real estate 
agent while in a confidential relationship 
with her. In support, plaintiff cites cases 
showing a breach of fiduciary duty where 
real estate agents failed to disclose to their 
principals that they had ownership inter-
ests as buyers. M.S.R., Inc. v. Lish, 34 
Colo.App. 320, 527 P.2d 912 (1974). See 
also Ornamental and Structural Steel, 
HAKKIt v 
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Inc. v. BBG, Inc., 20 Ariz.App. 1(5, 50!) P.2d 
1053 (1973); Batson v. Strchlow, 68 Cal.2d 
662, 68 Cal.Rptr. 589, 441 P.2d 101 (19G8). 
Under those circumstances a court will not 
uphold a transaction between a principal 
and his agent. No such failure to disclose 
has been claimed here. "The doctrine of 
confidential relationship rests upon the 
principle of inequality between the parties, 
and implies a position of superiority occu-
pied by one of the parties over the other. 
Mere confidence in one person by another 
is not sufficient alone to constitute such a 
relationship." Bradbury v. Rasmussen, 
16 Utah 2d 378, 401 P.2d 710 (1965). The 
trial court found that no confidential rela-
tionship existed between Little and Pattee 
and that Pattee was not serving as her 
agent at the time of the conveyance. The 
burden thus was plaintiffs to establish by 
clear and convincing evidence that Little 
conveyed her property as a result of Pat-
tee's undue influence and that that influ-
ence continued until the time of her death. 
To buttress her claim that Little acted 
under the undue influence of Pattee, plain-
tiff points to Little's commitment to a men-
tal hospital and attendant emotional disor-
ders some ten years before she executed 
the deed. She emphasizes that Little never 
went to school until she was 16 years of 
age. Countervailing evidence was sub-
mitted at trial that Little remarried subse-
quent to the execution of the deed, contin-
ued occupying her home, managed her own 
financial affairs and never concealed the 
fact that she had deeded away her proper-
ty. Though she had bouts with physical 
illness, no evidence was adduced that Pat-
tee at any time overpowered her volition to 
the extent that she was impelled to do—or 
refrain from undoing—that which she 
would not have done had she been free 
from such controlling influence so that the 
conveyance represented the desire of Pat-
tee rather than that of Little. See undue 
influence defined in In re LaVelle's Estate, 
122 Utah 253, 248 P.2d 372 (1952). There 
was no such dominance shown in any of the 
evidence before the trial court, and particu-
larly no evidence that in the execution of 
the deed, Little acted under the undue in-
PATTKK Utah 637 
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fluence of Pattee. In In re Woodward, 
Okla., 519 P.2d 1207 (1976), the nieces of a 
decedent attempted to set aside a joint ten-
ancy deed in favor of their brothers on 
grounds of fraud, undue influence and lack 
of mental capacity. In holding that the 
statute of limitations had expired on the 
claims of fraud and undue influence, the 
court stated that the means of discovering 
fraud and undue influence came into the 
hands of the plaintiffs when the deed was 
filed of record and that they failed to exer-
cise ordinary diligence in discovering it. 
See also Mollendorf v. Derry, 95 Idaho 1, 
501 P.2d 199 (1972) (upholding transfer of 
property made by a man of little education 
to his niece, an experienced businesswom-
an); Haywood v. Gill, 16 Utah 2d 299, 400 
P.2d 16 (1965) (upholding a joint bank ac-
count created by decedent five years before 
his death in favor of his daughter). 
[15] Pattee recorded the deed on March 
22, 1965. Little took no action against him 
in the 14 years she lived thereafter. This 
case is distinguishable from Robertson v. 
Campbell, supra. There the father con-
veyed property into a trust that the court 
found had been earlier created by him un-
der the undue influence of his daughter, 
who was the principal beneficiary. As a 
result, any ratification of the trust by the 
subsequent conveyance of property into the 
trust was held to be presumptively tainted. 
Here, by contrast, no further transaction 
took place, and Little validated and ac-
knowledged the original transaction 
through subsequent inaction for well over 
a decade. The trial court found that Little 
initiated the conveyance and that the evi-
dence was insufficient to show any undue 
influence on the part of Pattee in the exe-
cution of the deed, let alone subsequent to 
the transaction. The weight of the evi-
dence does not clearly preponderate 
against that finding, and we will not dis-
turb it. 
In conclusion, we summarize our hold-
ings on the various issues before us. No 
confidential relationship existed between 
Pattee and Little, so the burden remained 
upon the plaintiff to prove by clear and 
A 
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convincing evidence that the conveyance 
should be set aside. That burden was not 
met. No resulting trust could come into 
being, as the plaintiff did not prove that 
Little intended anything but an uncondi-
tional conveyance of her property. No con-
structive trust could be impressed upon the 
property by the Court, as no lack of consid-
eration or undue influence was proven in 
the execution of the deed. The considera-
tion paid by plaintiffs in 1964 was adequate 
and fully performed. Actions based on 
lack of consideration and undue influence 
are equitable actions governed by the four-
year statute of limitations. The date of 
delivery of the deed set the period of limita-
tions in motion and those actions were 
barred years before Little's death. 
The judgment of the trial court is af-
firmed with costs to defendants. 
HALL, C.J., and STEWART and DUR-
HAM, JJ., concur. 
OAKS, J., having resigned, does not par-
ticipate herein. 
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UPLAND INDUSTRIES CORPORA-
TION, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
PACIFIC GAMBLE ROBINSON COM-
PANY, a corporation, Defendant 
and Respondent. 
No. 18850. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
June 20, 1984. 
Lessor brought action requesting adju-
dication of respective rights and duties of 
parties under lease, and lessee counter-
claimed for specific performance of option 
to purchase. The Third District Court, Salt 
Lake County, David B. Dee, J., found les-
sor in breach of agreement and ordered it 
to convey property to lessee, and lessor 
appealed. The Supreme Court, Hall, C.J., 
held that: (1) lessee's notice letter consti-
tuted effective and timely exercise of op-
tion to extend lease, and (2) lessor's asser-
tion in 1970, as well as that in 1971 with 
respect to expiration of purchase option, 
was at most anticipatory breach or repudia-
tion of lease agreement, and lessee there-
fore had right to elect either to treat repu-
diation as effective and bring suit at once 
or continue to treat repudiation as ineffec-
tive and bring suit if and when actual 
breach occurred. 
Affirmed. 
1. Landlord and Tenant «>86(2) 
Where lessee's intention to exercise op-
tion to extend lease without any reserva-
tion or condition was evident in language 
used in notice letter, where lessor's corre- j 
spondence demonstrated that it understood 
cancellation proposal to be nothing more 
than request and recognized notice letter to 
be effective exercise of option, and where j 
both parties continued to perform under 
terms of lease for nearly two and one-half j 
years, lessee's notice letter constituted ef- j 
fective and timely exercise of option to I 
extend lease. | 
2. Limitation of Actions <*=>46(6) 
Cause of action on contract accrues, j 
thus causing statute of limitations to com- j 
mence, only upon breach of contract 
i 
3. Limitation of Actions e=>46(6) 
Lessor's mere assertion in 1970 and 
1971 with respect to status of lessee's ten-
ancy did not constitute actual breach of 
lease agreement but, rather, breach did not 
occur until 1978 when lessor actually refus- | 
ed to convey property to lessee as required 
under purchase option provision of lease. I 
4. Limitation of Actions ®=»46(6) 
Lessor did not commit actual or j 
present breach by merely asserting invalid- I 
ity of lease, especially considering its con-
tinuing performance under lease terms, ! 
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CALLISTKK, C. J., and CROCKKTT, 
) . , concur. 
IIKNRIOD, J., docs not participate 
herein. 
TUCKETT, Justice (concurring and dis-
senting) : 
I concur in the decision of the majority 
insofar as it affirms the judgment of the 
lower court on the question of damages 
sustained by the plaintiff on his claim for 
the loss of certain sheep. I respectfully 
dissent to that portion of the majority de-
cision which reverses the lower court on 
its determination that the Grass Creek 
road was not a public way. I particularly 
object to that portion of the decision which 
states that: 
Due to a landslide in the early 1950's 
and the failure of the county to keep the 
road in repair, the public departed from 
the road in places and traveled along an 
old abandoned railroad right of way. 
There was no objection by the railroad 
company to the use being made, and 
since this deviation continued for more 
than ten years, that part of the railroad 
right of way which was used by the pub-
lic became the Grass Creek road. 
The record shows and the court found that 
for approximately 40 years the defendants 
and their predecessors in interest had 
leased the right of way from the railroad 
company, and it thus appears that the rail-
road had no right to object nor to concur 
in the use of the right of way by members 
of the public. The record further shows 
that segments of the railroad right of way 
had been improved by defendants and their 
predecessors to enable them to use it as a 
private way. Defendants had the right to 
exclude the public from those segments of 
the right of way. Even though the de-
fendant Ralph Judd and his father before 
him permitted others owning property in 
the area to use that portion of the right of 
way this does not support the majority's 
determination that the entire way was pub-
lic. It should be noted that the majority 
opinion deals with rights of the railway 
company even though it was not made a 
party. 
James W. SEEQUIST and Joan W. Sec-
qulst, his wife, Plaintiffs and 
Appellants, I 
v. 
Gladys R. SEEQUIST et al., Defendants 
and Respondents. 
No. 13569. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
July 11, 1074. 
Appeal to review a judgment of the | 
Second District Court, Davis County, John 
I\ Wahlquist, J., dismissing plaintiffs' 
complaint and defendants' counterclaim 
and quieting title to the properties involved • 
in defendant mother. The Supreme Court, i 
Ilcnriod, J., held that the finding that \ 
mother, who first executed a warranty j 
deed on property to her son and daughter- j 
in-law and then, a few days later, executed 
a warranty deed on the same property to | 
her daughter by a second marriage, did not 
have the mental capacity to comprehend I 
the effect of the transactions was support- ' 
ed by the evidence; furthermore, the 
Court correctly found that the son, as a fi-
duciary and a person having a confidential ; 
relationship with his mother, had a duty to ] 
act fairly, disclose material information, j 
and take no unfair advantage of his supe- J 
rior position, but that he breached such 
duty in view of, inter alia, the extreme dis-
parity between the market value of the | 
property and the amount he paid his moth- : 
er for it. ! 
Affirmed. j 
Deeds e»68(M/2), 72(7) ! 
Finding that mother, who first execut- ! 
cd a warranty deed on property to her son ; 
and daughter-in-law and then, a few days j 
later, executed a warranty deed on the 
same property to her daughter by a second 
marriage, did not have the mental capacity i 
to comprehend the effect of the transac-
tions was supported by the evidence; fur-
thermorc, the court correctly found that 
the son, as a fiduciary and a person having ^ 
a confidential relationship with his mother, j 
A-326 
had a duty to act fairly, disclose material 
information, and take no unfair advantage 
of his superior position, hut that he 
breached such duty in view of, inter alia, 
the extreme disparity between the market 
value of the property and the amount he 
paid his mother for it. 
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ny which was relied upon by the trial court 
clearly reflects such confidence. 
The court found that, as fiduciary and a 
person having confidential relationship 
with Gladys, James had a duty to act fair-
ly, make a disclosure of material informa-
tion, and to take no unfair advantage of 
his superior position. We think it was 
correct in finding that James breached his 
duty and also in its reliance upon both the 
extreme disparity between the market val-
ue of the property, somewhere between 
$62,500 and $91,250, and the amount paid 
by the plaintiff, $28,000, and the fact that 
plaintiff made no attempt to secure for de-
fendant Gladys any independent advice or 
representation even though he was aware 
that she had no independent knowledge of 
the value of the property involved. 
CALLISTER, C. J., and ELLETT, 
CROCKETT and TUCKETT, JJ., concur. 
P. Keith Nelson, of Brandt, Miller, Nel-
son & Christophcrson, Salt Lake City, for 
appellants. 
George K. Fadel, Bountiful, for respond-
ents. 
I1ENRIOD, Justice: 
Appeal to review the dismissal of plain-
tiffs' complaint and defendants' counter-
claim and quieting title to the properties 
involved in defendant Gladys R. Secquist. 
Affirmed. No costs awarded. 
Plaintiffs James W. and Joan \V. Sec-
quist are husband and wife. James is the 
son of defendants A. W. Seequist and 
Gladys R. Seequist and the half-brother of 
Jean M. King. On March 27, 1973, Gladys 
executed a warranty deed on property to 
James and Joan Seequist. The deed was 
properly recorded April 6, 1973. On April 
2, 1973, Gladys executed a warranty deed 
on the same property to Jean M. King, 
which deed was properly recorded the 
same day. 
The trial court found that Gladys did 
not have the mental capacity to compre-
hend the effect of the transactions. We 
think appellants have failed to show an 
abuse of discretion of the court absent a 
clear showing of such an abuse. 
Based on Gladys* testimony, the trial 
court found that the requirements neces-
sary to show the existence of a confiden-
tial relationship between James and Gladys 
R. Seequist * were present when the trans-
actions took place. Counsel for appellants 
argue that no evidence was presented which 
would show a -.reposal of confidence by 
Gladys in James, but we think her testimo-
Grace BERGERA, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
IDEAL NATIONAL L IFE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, Defendant and Respondent. 
No. 13525. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
July 10, 1974. 
Suit by beneficiary of life policy, con-
taining a double indemnity provision in 
case of accidental death of insured and 
containing an exclusionary clause if death 
resulted directly or indirectly from war, to 
recover on the policy for death of insured 
soldier who was fatally injured when he 
accidentally detonated a mechanical am-
bush device while returning to a night de-
fensive position in Vietnam. The Seventh 
District Court, Carbon County, Edward 
I. See Bradbury v. Rasmussen, 10 Utah 2d 378. 401 P.2d 710 (1905). 
PACK v. HULL DEVELOPMENT CO., INC. Utah 39 
Cite as 667 P.2d 39 (Utah 1083) 
forfeiture for late payment and that the 
Devar C. PACK and Carolyn Pack, notice of forfeiture was ineffective to trig-
Plaintiffs and Respondents, ger vendor's right to foreclose all of the 
v purchasers' rights under the agreement. 
HULL DEVELOPMENT CO., INC., a 
Utah corporation, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 18136. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
June 30, 1983. . 
Purchasers brought action against ven-
dor seeking specific performance of real 
estate contracts. The Fourth District 
Court, Utah County, George E. Ballif, J., 
entered judgment for purchasers and ven-
dor appealed. The Supreme Court held 
that: (1) evidence of the receipt and reten-
tion of purchasers' late payments by vendor 
sustained finding that vendor had effective-
ly waived the right of forfeiture for late 
payment and that the notice of forfeiture 
was ineffective to trigger vendor's right to 
foreclose all of the purchasers' rights under 
the agreement, and (2) where purchasers 
took possession of property in July 1977 and 
real estate contract provided that purchas-
ers were liable to pay interest at the rate of 
9% per annum after that date, and parties 
stipulated that as of July 12, 1979, the total 
sum owed by the purchasers under the 
agreement, including interest, was $11,-
892.93, and in July 1981, trial court ordered 
purchasers to pay vendor that amount, pur-
chasers were liable to vendor for interest on 
that amount for the additional two years, 
and vendor's refusal to accept the tender of 
two checks at about the time of vendor's 
attempted rescission did not preclude its 
recovery of interest. 
Affirmed in part and remanded. 
1. Specific Performance <&=> 121(11) 
In purchasers' suit for specific perform-
ance of real estate contract, evidence of the 
receipt and retention of purchasers' late 
payments by vendor sustained finding that 
vendor had effectively waived the right of 
2. Interest <a=>39(l), 50 
Vendor and Purchaser <s=>172 
Where purchasers took possession of 
property in July 1977 and real estate con-
tract provided that purchasers were liable 
to pay interest at the rate of 9% per annum 
after that date, and parties stipulated that 
as of July 12, 1979, the total sum owed by 
purchasers under the agreement, includ-
ing interest, was $11,392.93, and in July 
1981, trial court ordered purchasers to pay 
vendor that amount, purchasers were liable 
to vendor for interest on that amount for 
the additional two years, and vendor's re-
fusal to accept the tender of two checks at 
about the time of vendor's attempted rescis-
sion did not preclude its recovery of inter-
est. 
Robert D. Lamoreaux, Payson, for de-
fendant and appellant. 
John G. Mulliner, El Ray F. Baird, Provo, 
for plaintiffs and respondents. 
PER CURIAM: 
On July 25, 1977, an Earnest Money Re-
ceipt and Offer to Purchase a lot was exe-
cuted between the parties, which included a 
provision that if the purchasers, Packs, did 
not make payments or complete the pur-
chase as required, the defendant, Hull, at 
its option could retain payments theretofore 
made as "liquidated and agreed" damages. 
The Earnest Money agreement called for 
a purchase price of $17,500 at 9%, with 
$2,000 down and $250 per month. The final 
contract to incorporate the terms of the 
Earnest Money agreement was prepared by 
Hull, the seller, and presented to the Packs 
for execution. They refused to sign it since 
the Earnest Money agreement provided 
that Hull would install the sewer, while the 
proposed final contract required the Packs 
to assume the obligation for the installation 
of the sewer. No further offer to finalize 
A 
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has been made. Irrespective of this at-
tempted switch of obligation, the Packs, 
nonetheless, made numerous payments, but 
at times were delinquent according to the 
terms of the agreement. 
Hull warned the Packs of the delinquen-
cies, and threatened action to assert its 
rights under the contract. By letter dated 
February 28, 1979, Hull gave the Packs 
until March 25, 1979, to bring the payments 
current. Payments were made in response 
thereto apparently to Hull's satisfaction. 
On October 23, 1979, Hull again wrote the 
Packs, enclosing a check for $5,666.42 
"which represents all the money which you 
paid toward the purchase [less interest]." 
The letter continued by saying that Hull 
"hereby exercises the right it has under the 
terms of its agreement to cancel the trans-
action for your failure to carry out its 
terms." The agreement had no term for 
"cancellation" or any other right to rescind, 
but only a right to retain payments already 
made if the buyers did not complete the 
payments and purchase of the lot. 
Packs brought this suit for specific per-
formance. Hull bases its defense on the 
October 23, 1979, letter hereinabove men-
tioned. At that time it appeared that there 
were two payments delinquent. Hull con-
tends that the court's findings as to waiver 
and notice were in error. 
[1] The receipt and retention of late 
payments by Hull on a number of occasions 
are clearly reflected in the record, and the 
form of the notice of "cancellation" fully 
justifies affirmance of the trial court's find-
ings. The court specifically found that 
there had been an effective waiver of the 
right of forfeiture for late payment, and 
that the notice of forfeiture was ineffective 
to trigger Hull's right to foreclose all of 
Packs' rights under the agreement. 
Hull urges that the court should have set 
aside the judgment and granted a new trial 
1. Blomquist v. Bingham, Utah, 652 P.2d 900 
(1982); Atnoss v. Bennion, 23 Utah 2d 40, 456 
P.2d 172 (1969). 
2. Farnworth v. Jensen, 117 Utah 494, 217 P.2d 
571 (1950). 
under Rule 00(b)(7), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, IKCAUSC "many errors of law and 
fact were made by lx>th the court and the 
attorneys." Assuming without deciding 
that Rule 60(b)(7) can be invoked in such 
instance, on the facts presented, we are not 
convinced that the trial court abused its 
discretion. 
[2] Hull also contends that it should be 
awarded interest on all sums remaining un-
paid on the Earnest Money agreement. 
The award of interest in a case such as this 
depends on who has possession of the prop-
erty. If the seller has in some way prohib-
ited the buyer from taking possession, no 
interest is allowed on the unpaid balance.1 
If, however, the buyer has possession, inter-
est will generally be awarded.2 In the in-
stant case, by the terms of the parties' 
agreement as interpreted by the court, the 
Packs took possession of the property in 
July, 1977. They were therefore liable to 
pay interest at the rate of 9% per annum 
after that date, as specified in the agree-
ment. The parties stipulated at trial that 
as of July 12, 1979, the total sum owed 
under the agreement (including interest) 
was $11,392.93. This was the amount the 
trial court ordered the Packs to pay when 
judgment was rendered in July, 1981. The 
court therefore erred in failing to award 
interest for those additional two years. 
The Packs seem to rely on the fact that 
Hull refused to accept the tender of two 
checks at about the time of the attempted 
rescission. Where the buyer has possession 
of the property, such tender is insufficient 
to avoid payment of interest. In such a 
case, the only legitimate way of avoiding 
interest would be for the buyer to tender 
into court or otherwise set aside the full 
amount due under the contract so that the 
buyer is excluded from all benefits and use 
of the funds.3 
3. Le Vine v. Whitehouse, 37 Utah 260, 109 P. 2 
(1910). See also Justice Wolfe's concurring 
opinion in Farnworth v. Jensen, supra. 
BAUM v. 
Cite «s <W7 P.2d 
Affirmed except as to the interest issue. 
For the limited purpose of awarding inter-
est as explained in this opinion, the case is 
remanded. No costs awarded. 
O fe KEYNUUBEK SYSTEM 
Gam L BAUM, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Harley GILLMAN, Defendant 
and Respondent. 
No. 17755.-
Supreme Court of Utah. 
June 30, 1983. 
Causes of action for slander were dis-
missed by the Fourth District Court, Utah 
County, J. Robert Bullock, J., and plaintiff 
appealed. The Supreme Court, Hall, C.J., 
held that slander complaint did not allege 
defamation per se, where none of the alle-
gations contained therein were such that 
the court could legally presume that plain-
tiff had been damaged; the allegations 
clearly did not impute criminal conduct, 
loathsome disease, conduct incompatible 
with the exercise of a lawful business, or 
unchastity; while the statements imputed 
poor business practices in the past, such had 
to be viewed and considered in light of the 
fact that plaintiff had been out of the sub-
ject business since 1974 and the allegedly 
defamatory incident did not appear until 
1979, five years later; furthermore, the 
complaint contained no allegation that de-
fendant's statements damaged plaintiff in 
any current business endeavor or pursuit. 
Judgment affirmed. 
Stewart, J., filed a dissenting opinion. 
1. Libel and Slander <*=»89(1) 
Inasmuch as complaint for slander con-
tained no allegation of special damages, in 
31LLMAN Utah 41 
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order to state a claim upon which relief 
could be granted the statements attributed 
to defendant had to constitute defamation 
per se. 
2. Libel and Slander c=>33 
In order to constitute defamation per 
se, the defamatory words must charge crim-
inal conduct, loathsome disease, conduct 
that is incompatible with the exercise of a 
lawful business, trade, profession, or office, 
or the unchastity of a woman. 
3. Libel and Slander o=>33 
Whether defamatory words are action-
able per se is to be determined from their 
injurious character; the words must be of 
such common notoriety that damage can be 
presumed from the words alone. 
4. Libel and Slander <e=»80 
Slander complaint did not allege defa-
mation per se, where none of the allega-
tions contained therein were such that the 
court could legally presume that plaintiff 
had been damaged; the allegations clearly 
did not impute criminal conduct, loathsome 
disease, conduct incompatible with the exer-
cise of a lawful business, or unchastity; 
while the statements imputed poor business 
practices in the past, such had to be viewed 
and considered in light of the fact that 
plaintiff had been out of the subject busi-
ness since 1974 and the allegedly defamato-
ry incident did not appear until 1979, five 
years later; furthermore, the complaint 
contained no allegation that defendant's 
statements damaged plaintiff in any cur-
rent business endeavor or pursuit. 
5. Libel and Slander <&=>33 
Statements which may be injurious 
only to some future happening do not give 
rise to a cause of action for either per se or 
per quod defamation. 
Robert Macri, Salt Lake City, for plain-
tiff and appellant. 
Jerry L. Reynolds, Dallas H. Young, Jr., 
Provo, for defendant and respondent. 
A-330 
254 Idaho 635 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
102 Idaho 588 
J. Sandy SINGLETON and Cay Singlc-
ton, Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
v. 
Mary PICHON, Defendant-Appellant, 
and 
Anita Foster, individually and heir or devi-
see of the Ned Foster Estate; and the 
Ned Foster Estate, Defendants-Respon-
dents. 
No. 13270. 
Supreme Court of Idaho. 
Oct. 5, 1981. 
Vendees brought specific performance 
action on title retaining land sale contract. 
Upon remand, 98 Idaho 149, 559 P.2d 765, 
the District Court, Fifth Judicial District, 
Blaine County, James M. Cunningham, J., 
entered judgment in favor of vendees, and 
vendors' successor in interest appealed. 
The Supreme Court, Shepard, J., held that: 
(1) trial court's refusal to relieve counsel of 
stipulation agreeing to submit matter to 
court without trial and upon then existing 
record was within exercise of his discretion; 
(2) trial court did not err in vacating pre-
trial order, execution of which served no 
purpose whatsoever; (3) findings, conclu-
sions and decision of trial court were sup-
ported by evidence; (4) cause of action did 
not accrue in vendees until tender of per-
formance and successor's refusal of such 
tender; and (5) there was no evidence upon 
which trial court could have found vendees 
guilty of laches. 
Affirmed. 
Bakes, C. J., concurred in result. 
1. Stipulations $=>13 
Where stipulation agreeing to submit 
matter to court for its decision without trial 
and upon then existing record was clear and 
without equivocation, trial court's refusal to 
relieve counsel of such stipulation was with-
in exercise of his discretion. 
2. Pretrial Procedure c=»l 
Where, pursuant to stipulation, matter 
had l>een submitted to and decided by trial 
court, trial court did not err in vacating 
pretrial order, execution of which at such 
point in proceeding served no purpse what-
soever. 
3. Specific Performance c=> 121(11) 
Findings, conclusions and decision of 
trial court in favor of vendees in action for 
specific performance brought by them on 
title retaining land sale contract were sup-
ported by evidence that neither vendors nor 
vendors' successor in interest ever prepared 
written notice of default and intention to 
terminate contract or mailed any such no-
tices to vendees pursuant to terms of con-
tract. 
4. Limitation of Actions c=>43 
Statute of limitations only begins to 
run following accrual of cause of action and 
statute of limitations may only be asserted 
as bar after expiration of statutory period 
following accrual of cause of action. 
5. Specific Performance o=> 105(1) 
Cause of action did not accrue in 
vendees who brought action for specific 
performance on title retaining land sale 
contract until their tender of performance 
and refusal of such tender by vendors' suc-
cessor in interest. 
6. Specific Performance c=>l21(ll) 
There was no evidence in record of 
specific performance action brought by 
vendees on title retaining land sale contract 
upon which trial court could have found 
vendees guilty of laches. 
Stanley Crow, Boise, for defendant-appel-
lant. 
E. Lee Schlender, Ketchum, for plain-
tiffs-respondents. 
David B. Lincoln, Boise, for defendants-
respondents. 
SHEPARD, Justice. 
This is an appeal from a judgment in 
favor of plaintiffs-respondents in an action 
SINGLETON 
Cite as, Idaho, 
for specific performance brought by them 
as vendees in a title retaining land sale 
contract. We affirm. 
The salient facts of the case are recited in 
the previous opinion of this Court in an 
earlier appeal, Singleton v. Foster, 98 Idaho 
149, 559 P.2d 765 (1977). There the Court 
reversed the trial court which had, on the 
basis of the statute of limitations, dismissed 
the action. 
Upon remand depositions of the various 
parties were taken and, following a pre-tri-
al conference at which various exhibits 
were admitted, the matter was submitted 
for the decision of the court on the basis of 
the then existing record. The trial court 
made its findings of fact, conclusions of law 
and decision in favor of plaintiffs ordering 
and decreeing specific performance of the 
contract. Thereafter counsel for appellant 
Pichon submitted a form of pre-trial order 
to the court which was evidently inadvert-
ently signed by the trial judge. Singleton 
moved to vacate the "pre-trial** order. Ap-
pellant Pichon moved to set aside the find-
ings, conclusions and judgment and to be 
relieved from her stipulation which sub-
mitted the matter for the decision of the 
court without trial and further moved that 
the cause be set for trial upon its merits. 
The court granted respondent Singleton's 
motion to vacate the pre-trial order and 
denied all motions of appellant Pichon. 
[1] Appellant Pichon asserts that the 
court erred in failing and refusing to grant 
Pichon's request for a trial of the cause. 
We find such assertion to be totally without 
merit. The stipulation agreeing to submit 
the matter to the court for its decision 
without trial and upon the then existing 
record is clear and without equivocation. 
The trial court's refusal to relieve counsel 
of that stipulation was within the exercise 
of his discretion and we find no abuse of 
that discretion. Thompson v. Turner, 98 
Idaho 110, 558 P.2d 1071 (1977); Loughrcy 
v. Weitzel, 94 Idaho 833, 498 P.2d 1306 
(1972). 
[2] Similarly, we find no merit to Pi-
chon's assertion that the trial court erred in 
v. PICHON Idaho 255 
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vacating the pre-trial order. At that point 
in the proceeding the execution of such a 
pretrial order served no purpose whatsoev-
er. Pursuant to stipulation the matter had 
been submitted to and decided by the trial 
court. 
[3] Appellant Pichon next contends that 
the findings, conclusions and the decision of 
the trial court are not supported by the 
evidence. We disagree. The contract in-
strument between the Singletons and the 
Fosters provided that: 
"Before purchaser's interest may be ter-
minated or cancelled, vendor shall give 
purchaser written notice specifying the 
particulars in which purchaser is in de-
fault * * * if purchaser fails to comply 
with the then due terms of this contract 
as required by said notice within such 
thirty day period, then this contract will 
be subject to final and complete termina-
tion and cancellation by vendor. * * * 
Advice of cancellation may be given in 
the same manner as written notices.*' 
At the heart of the findings of the trial 
court are those which found that neither 
the Fosters nor Pichon ever prepared a 
written notice of default and intention to 
terminate the contract, much less mailed 
any such notices to the Singletons. 
The Singletons at all times lived in Ha-
waii and during the eleven years in ques-
tion maintained various residences and/or 
business addresses at from three to six loca-
tions. It appears to be the principal conten-
tion of Pichon that the Singletons were 
somehow obligated to furnish their then 
current addresses to the Fosters and/or Pi-
chon. It is sufficient to note that no such 
obligation is contained in the contract. 
Rather, if the Fosters or their assignee de-
sired to exercise the default provisions of 
the contract, they needed only to mail such 
notices by certified mail to that address of 
the Singletons as stated in the contract. 
This the trial court found they did not do 
and that finding is clearly sustained by the 
evidence. Hence, we hold that since the 
Fosters and Pichon failed to comply or even 
attempt to comply with the express provi-
sions of the contract, their contentions re-
A 
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garding post office regulations, changes of 
the Singletons' address and the Singletons' 
failure to give the vendors notice of the 
change of address are all irrelevant. 
[4,5] Although the issue before this 
Court in Singleton v. Foster, supra, in-
volved the statute of limitations, such was 
not ruled upon by the court below and that 
issue is raised only peripherally on this ap-
peal. A statute of limitations only begins 
to run following the accrual of a cause of 
action and a statute of limitations may only 
be asserted as a bar after the expiration of 
the statutory period following the accrual 
of the cause of action. City of St. Anthony 
v. Mason, 49 Idaho 717, 291 P. 1067 (1930); 
Little v. Emmett Irr. DisL, 45 Idaho 485, 
263 P. 40 (1928). See 54 C.J.S. Limitations 
of Action § 108 (1948). Here there is no 
indication that the cause of action accrued 
in the Singletons until their tender of per-
formance and Pichon's refusal of such 
tender. See Stockmen's Supply Co. v. Jen-
ne, 72 Idaho 57, 237 P.2d 613 (1951). 
[6] Likewise, Pichon only asserts periph-
erally that the trial court failed to give 
consideration to the doctrine of laches. The 
trial court made no finding regarding lach-
es and we find no indication in the record of 
a request, motion or demami by Pichon that 
the trial court consider and rule ujK>n lach-
es. Nevertheless, on the basis of the record 
before the trial court and here, we find no 
evidence upon which the trial court could 
have found the Singletons guilty of laches 
in the instant circumstances. Pichon was 
aware of the contract interest of the Single-
tons in and to the proj>erty since the quit-
claim deed issued to Pichon was made spe-
cifically subject to the interest of the Sin-
gletons in the property. 
We have considered appellant's remaining 
assignments of error and find them to be 
without merit. The judgment of the trial 
court is affirmed. Costs to respondents. 
McFADDEN, BISTL1NE and DONALD-
SON, J J., concur. 
BAKES, C. J., concurs in the result. 
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10 Utah 2d 378 
R. Gcoroe BRADBURY, Administrator of the 
Estate of George R. Bradbury, deceased, 
and Althea Bradbury, Plaintiffs and Re-
spondents, 
v. 
Gordon L. RASMUSSEN and Yora Gene Ras-
mussen, tils wife, Defendants 
and Appellants. 
No. 10055. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
May 7, 1905. 
Action by husband and wife to have 
declared null and void a warranty deed, a 
lease agreement, and a transfer of water 
stock certificates to a niece and her hus-
band. The husband died during the course 
of the litigation and his administrator was 
substituted as a party plaintiff. The Sixth 
District Court, Sevier County, Ferdinand 
Erickson, J., entered a judgment in favor 
of the plaintiffs and the defendants appeal-
ed. The Supreme Court, Callister, J., held 
that the evidence failed to establish undue 
influence on the part of niece and her hus-
band and that the plaintiffs failed to sustain 
their burden of proving that they thought 
that the documents they had signed were for 
a contract of sale rather than a deed reserv-
ing life estate. 
Reversed. 
1. Jury 3=^28(5) 
Defendants in action to declare null 
and void a warranty deed, lease agreement 
and a transfer of water stock certificates 
were not entitled to a jury trial where jury-
trial which was originally demanded by 
plaintiffs was waived by them at pretrial. 
2. Deeds C=>I96(3) 
Landlord and Tenant C=>22(4) 
Waters and Water Courses C=>234 
Undisputed evidence that there existed 
among the parties sincere affection, trust 
and confidence was not legally sufficient to 
constitute a confidential relationship giving 
rise to presumption of unfairness of trans-
action involving a warranty deed, a lease 
agreement and a transfer of water stock 
certificates from a husband and wife to a 
niece, whom they had reared as their own 
daughter, and her husband. 
3. Deeds C=>I96(3) 
Gifts C=>47(3) 
If a confidential relationship is shown 
to exist and a gift or conveyance is made 
to a party in a superior position, a presump-
tion arises that the transaction was unfair; , 
this presumption has the force of evidence ' 
and will itself support a finding, if not over- | 
come by countervailing evidence. j 
4. Deeds 0=196(3) j 
Where a confidential relationship is • 
shown to exist, burden is upon superior j 
party to convince court by preponderance 
of evidence that transaction was fair. 
5. Deeds 0196(2, 3) 
Mere relationship of a parent and child 
does not constitute evidence of such confi-
dential relationship as to create a presump-
tion of fraud or undue influence. 
6. Deeds C=211(4) 
While kinship may be a factor in deter-
mining existence of a legally significant 
confidential relationship, there must be a 
showing, in addition to kinship, of a reposal 
of confidence by one party and resulting 
superiority and influence on other party. 
7. Deeds <§=>72(3) 
A relationship to constitute a confiden- i 
tial relationship must be such as would lead 
an ordinarily prudent person in manage-
ment of his business affairs to repose that 
degree of confidence in other party which 
largely results in substitution of the will of j 
latter for that of former in material matters 
involved in transaction. 
8. Deeds C=>72(3) 
Doctrine of confidential relationship 
rests upon principle of inequality between j 
the parties and implies a position of supe* j 
riority occupied by one of parties over th* 
other. 
9. Deeds 072(3) 
Mere confidence in one person by **• 
other is not sufficient alone to constitute* 
V] 
,,l 
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confidential relationship; the confidence 
must be reposed by one under such circum-
stances as to create a corresponding duty, 
either legal or moral, upon part of other to 
observe confidence and it must result in a 
situation where as a matter of fact there is 
superior influence on one side and depend-
ence on the other. 
10. Deeds C=>211(4) 
Landlord and Tenant 022(4) 
Waters and Water Courses 0=234 
Evidence in proceedings to set aside a 
warranty deed, a lease agreement, and a 
transfer of water stock certificates by a 
husband and wife failed to establish undue 
influence on part of a niece, whom husband 
and wife had reared as their own daughter, 
and her husband. 
11. Deeds 0211(4) 
Undue influence must be established 
by clear and convincing evidence. 
12. Deeds @=>2II(2) 
Landlord and Tenant €=322(4) 
Waters and Water Courses C=>234 
Evidence in action by husband and wife 
to have declared null and void a warranty 
deed, a lease agreement and a transfer of 
water stock certificates to a niece and her 
husband failed to establish that transfer of 
property was made subject to a mistake of 
fact on part of husband and wife who claim-
ed that they thought the documents they 
had signed were for a contract of sale rath-
er than a deed reserving a life estate. 
13. Deeds C=>l06(t«/2) 
Landlord and Tenant <§»22(4) 
Waters and Water Courses C=>234 
Husband and wife who brought an ac-
tion to have declared null and void a war-
ranty deed, a lease agreement and a trans-
fer of water stock certificates to a niece and 
Her husband had burden of proving that 
transfer of property wras made subject to 
mistake of fact on part of husband and wife 
*ho claimed that they thought the docu-
ments they had signed were for a contract 
'• Goorge It. Brndbury was originally a 
Party plaintiff along with his wife, Althca, 
but died daring the course of the litiga-
of sale rather than a deed reserving a life 
estate. 
Nielsen, Conder & Hansen, Salt Lake 
City, for appellants. 
Dan S. Bushnell, Little America, Wyo., 
for respondents. 
CALLISTER, Justice: 
Defendants appeal from a judgment in 
favor of plaintiffs wherein the lower court 
declared null and void a warranty deed, a 
lease agreement, and a transfer of water 
stock certificates. 
PlaintiiTs, George R.1 and his wife, Al-
thea Bradbury, were the owners of farm 
land and appurtenant water rights in Sevier 
County, Utah. They had only one child, 
R. George Bradbury. However, they had 
reared as their daughter, defendant Yora 
Rasmussen, who was the natural child of a 
niece, whom they had also reared. After 
Yora's marriage to defendant Gordon Ras-
mussen, she moved away, but the close 
familial relationship continued. 
For several years prior to 1960, the farm 
had been leased to other individuals. The 
son, R. George, at one time operated the 
farm but left to seek employment elsewhere. 
From 1957 through 1959, M. D. Foreman, 
a brother of Mrs. Bradbury, operated the 
farm. He advised the Bradburys that he 
could not continue and advised them to sell 
their holdings. They declined this sugges-
tion. 
In October of 1959, the Rasmussens visit-
ed the Bradburys at the farm, and there was 
a discussion about a possible sale of the 
farm to the Rasmussens for $300 per acre. 
Mr. Rasmussen stated that he would have 
to think the matter over. From here on the 
testimony of the parties as to what tran-
spired differs substantially. 
However, in the early part of 1960, the 
parties consulted Mr. Tex R. Olsen, an at-
tion, nnd his son, R. Georgo Bradbury, 
as administrator of his father's estate, 
was substituted as a party plaintiff. 
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torney, at his office in Rich field, Utah. 
What took place at this consultation is in 
dispute as between the parties. After meet-
ing with the attorney, the Rasmussens re-
turned to their home in Orem, Utah and the 
Bradburys to their farm. On a subsequent 
date, Mrs. Bradbury delivered to the at-
torney some tax notices which contained a 
description of the property. She had a dis-
cussion at this time with Mr. Olscn. On 
February 18, 1960, the Bradburys went to 
the office of Mr. Olsen and executed the 
papers which he had prepared. The Brad-
burys testified that the attorney merely read 
the papers to them and they signed the same 
without realizing their significance. 
The papers executed by the Bradburys 
consisted of a warranty deed conveying 
their real property to the Rasmussens, but 
reserving a life estate to them, and a farm 
lease agreement wherein the Bradburys 
leased the property to the Rasmussens for 
the term of the life of the survivor of the 
lessors unless sooner terminated by mutual 
agreement. 
The following day the deed and lease, to-
gether with copies thereof, were mailed to 
the Rasmussens. They signed the original 
lease and mailed it back to the attorney. 
About two weeks later, the Rasmussens gave 
the Bradburys a check for the one dollar 
consideration which was recited in the deed. 
Shortly thereafter, Mr. Rasmussen moved 
to the farm and undertook its operation. 
His wife and family joined him at the close 
of the school term, and the family moved 
into one of the homes on the farm. The 
Rasmussens terminated their employment 
and disposed of their home in Orem. 
Later, the Bradburys gave the Rasmus-
sens three water stock certificates, together 
with assignments thereto which were taken 
by Gordon Rasmussen to the secretary of 
the water company who issued new certifi-
cates in the name of the Rasmussens. 
2. A jury trial was originally demanded by 
tlio Bradburys but waived by tbem at pre-
trial.* However, defendants refused to 
agree and insisted upon the case being 
tried to a jury. Defendants cite this as 
These certificates wc« turned over to the 
Bradburys and held 1 them. 
The trial court mad- findings of fact sub-
stantially in accord w h the facts outlined 
up to this point. It :adc additional find-
ings which will be discussed subsequently. 
The parties evidently lived side by side 
in harmony during I960, cooperating with 
and assisting one another. The Bradburys 
financed the purchase of some cattle by the 
Rasmussens. 
Sometime in 1961 a conflict arose between 
the parties. According to the Rasmussens 
it was in the spring that the son, R. George, 
learned of the transaction and shortly there-
after his parents informed the Rasmussens 
that there would have to be some changes 
made. According to the Bradburys, the dis-
pute arose in August when a man from the 
bank came to check the property and they 
became aware of the import of the papers 
which they had signed. However, M. D. 
Foreman testified that ih July he had driven 
the Bradburys to St. George, Utah to visit 
their son, and that he had heard the son tell 
his parents that they should "fight it all the 
way" to get the property back. 
[1] It was the contention of the Brad-
burys that they thought the documents they 
had signed were for a contract of sale rath-
er than a deed reserving a life estate. The 
case was tried before the lower court with-
out a jury.2 It made, among others, a find-
ing of fact that the deed, lease and transfer 
of water stock were null and void for the 
following reasons: 
(a) A confidential relationship existed 
between the parties thereto. 
(b) The plaintiff, Althea Bradbury, and 
her husband, George R. Bradbury, deceased, 
were elderly people, with infirmities inci-
dent to age.3 
(c) The defendants represented the 
transaction as being one for the sale of the 
error. Ilowever, sec Johnson v. Johnson, 
9 Utah 2d 40, 337 P.2d 420 (1959). 
3. George It. was 83 years of age, with fail-
ing eyesight, and Althea was 73 at the 
time the documents were executed. 
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farm and water stock, when, in fact, the 
documents purported to make a gift of such 
property. 
(d) The transferors at no time intended 
to make a gift of said property. 
(c) The alleged transfer of the above 
mentioned property was made subject to a 
mistake of fact on the part of the plaintiffs 
as to the nature of the transaction and the 
transfers involved. 
(f) The plaintiffs were of the opinion 
and understanding that said transactions 
were for the purpose of consummating the 
negotiations for the sale of the property. 
(g) That the transferors did not have 
the benefit of independent advice in con-
nection with said transaction. 
(h) By virtue of the alleged transfers 
of the property mentioned above, the trans-
ferors has substantially disinherited their 
natural born heir, being their only son, R. 
George Bradbury. 
(i) The defendants failed to prove by 
clear and convincing evidence that the al-
leged gifts were fair, equitable, valid and 
free from any fraud or undue influence 
arising from the faith and trust reposed in 
them because of the confidential relation-
ship. 
Based upon the foregoing findings, the 
court concluded as a matter of law that the 
defendants in their confidential relationship, 
exerted undue influence upon the Bradburys 
and eutered judgment accordingly. 
[2-4] The first question to be resolved 
is whether the lower court erred in its de-
termination that a confidential relationship 
existed between the parties, as that term 
4. If a confidential relationship is shown to 
exist, and a gift or conveyance is made 
to a party in a superior position, n pre-
sumption arises that the transaction was 
unfair; this presumption has the force of 
evidence and will itself support a finding 
if not overcome by countervailing evi-
dence. The burden is.upon the superior 
party to convince the court by n pre-
ponderance (not clear and convincing) of 
the evidence that the transaction was 
fair. Johnson v. Johnson, 9 Utah 2d 
401 P.2d—45Va 
i is considered in its legal significance. The 
 evidence is undisputed that there existed 
among the parties sincere affection, trust 
j and confidence, but is this legally sufficient 
to constitute a confidential relationship 
6*vnl£ r» se to a presumption that the trans-
action was unfair?4 We think not. 
a 
fs 
[5-9] The mere relationship of parent 
l e
 and child does not constitute evidence of 
such confidential relationship as to create a 
)n
 presumption of fraud or undue influence.5 
l s
 While kinship may be a factor in deter-
i e
 mining the existence of a legally significant 
>'• confidential relationship, there must be a 
re showing, in addition to the kinship, a reposal 
a- of confidence by one party and the resulting 
superiority and influence on the other 
rs party.0 The relationship must be such as 
s . would lead an ordinarily prudent person in 
,jr the management of his business affairs to 
R repose that degree of confidence in the other 
party which largely results in the substitu-
. tion of the will of the latter for that of the 
l_ former in the material matters involved in 
J the transaction. The doctrine of confiden-
tial relationship rests upon the principle of 
• inequality between the parties, and implies 
a position of superiority occupied by one of 
the parties over the other. Mere confidence 
in one person by another is not sufficient 
n e
 alone to constitute such a relationship. The 
h<» 
"
e
 confidence must be reposed by one under 
!P» such circumstances as to create a corre-
} s sponding duty, either legal or moral, upon 
the part of the other to observe the confi-
e(l dence, and it must result in a situation |e_ where as a matter of fact there is superior 
lip influence on one side and dependence on the 
r  other.7 
40, 337 P.2d 420 (1959) ; In re Swan's 
Estate, 4 Utah 2d 277, 293 P.2d G82 
(1950). 
5. Froyd v. Barnhurst, S3 Utah 271, 2S P. 
2d 135 (1934). 
6. Newell v. Holloran, 08 Utah 407, 250 P. 
9SC (192G). 
7. Itenshaw v. Tracy Loan & Tr. Co., 87 
Utah 304, 49 P.2d 403, 100 A.L.R. 872 
(1934). See also Bogert, Trusts and 
Trustees, 2d Ed., 5 482, pp. 135-139. 
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The extensive testimony of the attorney, 
Tex R. Olsen, contributes significantly to 
the determinative question as to whether 
there was a superior influence exerted by 
the Rasmusscnf and a corresponding de-
pendence by the Bradburys. 
The first consultation with Mr. Olscn 
was arranged by Gordon Rasmusscn and 
held in Olscn's office on a Sunday after-
noon. It lasted one and a half to two hours 
and both parties were present. According 
to Olscn, the following transpired: 
Gordon Rasmussen told him that he and 
his family were going to move down to the 
farm to operate it, and that they wanted an 
arrangement whereby they would be assured 
that the farm would not go to anyone else 
upon the death of the Bradburys. The Ras-
mussens both emphasized their desire for 
security if they made the move and under-
took to operate the farm. The Bradburys 
stated that they had a general plan in mind, 
but nothing specific. The attorney suggest-
ed several alternatives to accomplish the 
desired result; one of which was a testa-
mentary disposition, which was rejected by 
the parties because of its ambulatory nature. 
Mrs. Bradbury stated that she wanted to 
give "these kids" some security if they made 
the move. Mr. Olsen suggested the giving 
of a deed, reserving a life estate to the 
Bradburys so that the latter would be en-
titled to the use and income from the prop-
erty so long as they lived. The attorney 
explained to the parties the meaning and 
effect of such a transaction. The "Brad-
burys thought this would be agreeable with 
them because they wanted the property to 
go to the Rasmussens and they wanted some 
assurance that they would get something 
out of it during their lifetime." The con-
sultation concluded with Mr. Olsen agreeing 
to prepare the papers and mail them to the 
Rasmussens after they were signed by the 
Bradburys. 
About two days later Mrs. Bradbury came 
to Mr. Olscn's office and delivered to him 
some tax notices which contained the legal 
descriptions of the farm property. At that 
time she asked the attorney if Yora were an 
heir, to which he replied in the negative. 
She then remarked that the other property 
which they might have in their names would 
go to their son. Mr. Olscn told Mrs. Brad-
bury that he would call her when the papers 
were ready. 
At a later date, the attorney notified the 
Bradburys that the papers were ready to 
be signed. They came to his office and 
went over the documents with him. After 
telling him what they had in mind, they 
signed the deed and lease agreement and 
received copies. On this occasion, accord-
ing to Mr. Olsen, the papers were discussed 
in detail prior to the signing with particular 
emphasis on the provisions concerning the 
life estate which the Bradburys again re-
quested an explanation of its meaning. 
Mr. Olsen also testified as to the general 
health and alertness of the Bradburys. He 
stated that Mrs. Bradbury was very alert, 
but that Mr. Bradbury was advanced in 
years and limited in his ability to move 
about. Both of them participated in the 
discussions and advised Mr. Olsen what 
they desired to accomplish. Mr. Bradbury 
responded readily with information when 
so requested and helped make the decision 
on the instruments to be prepared. 
Mr. Olsen testified that at no time during 
his discussion with the parties was mention 
made of a sale of the property for $300 per 
acre. 
In the instant case there is no fact or cir-
cumstance to indicate a situation of trust 
or confidence wherein one of the parties had 
a commanding influence over the other; 
nothing indicating dominance, either per-
sonal, social, or moral. On the contrary, 
the evidence indicates that there was no in-
equality of influence in the circumstances of 
the transaction. Each party was free to act, 
and did act, upon his independent volition 
and will. The terms of the deed and lease 
appear to have been fixed and agreed upon 
by the Bradburys upon their independent 
judgment after complete apprizal by Mr. 
Olsen of their legal significance and the coil-
sequences thereof. The insistence by tfe* 
Rasmussens that they be protected is W*^ 
BRADBURY v. KASMUSSEN Utah 715 
CUe na 401 1\1U 710 
indicative of any weakness or dependence 
on the part of the Bradburys. 
The fact that both parties testified that 
the Bradburys had confidence and trust in 
the Rasmussens is not sufficient to establish 
such a confidential relationship as to raise 
a presumption of unfairness in the trans-
action. The parties lived in distant towns 
and visited only occasionally. There is no 
evidence that the Rasmussens ever partici-
pated in the conduct of the Bradburys* busi-
ness affairs prior to the transaction here in 
question, or in any way exerted a dominant 
influence in their lives. 
[10,11] From the facts heretofore out-
lined it is evident that a finding of undue 
influence cannot be sustained. Undue in-
fluence must be established by clear and 
convincing evidence.* On the contrary, 
such a finding is against the clear weight of 
the evidence. 
[12,13] It also follows from the evi-
dence that the finding that the transfer of 
the property was made subject to a mistake 
of fact on the part of the Bradburys as to 
the nature of the transaction cannot be sus-
tained. The burden of proving such a mis-
take was upon the Bradburys. The testi-
mony of Mr. Olsen and the conduct of the 
Bradburys completely negative the possibil-
ity of a mistake. 
Reversed. Costs to defendants. 
HENRIOD, C. J., and McDONOUGH, 
CROCKETT and WADE, JJ., concur. 
8. Richmond v. Ballard, 7 Utah 2d 341, 325 P.2d 839 (195S). 
CUNNINGHAM v. CUNNINGHAM 
Cite a* f>W l\2<1 549 (I (ah I9H4) 
HOWK, .Justice (concurring): 
1 concur except that in Part IV of the 
opinion of the Court, I cannot subscribe to 
the conclusion that Provo's objection to In-
struction No. 23 failed to meet the require-
ments of Rule 51, Utah R.Civ.P. In my 
opinion, the objection adequately alerted 
the trial court to Provo's claim that In-
struction No. 23 did not follow U.C.A., 
1953, § 58A-3-20(2) which adopts by refer-
ence the provisions of the National Electric 
Safety Code. 
Hah 1!) 
Kvona Ilanna CUNNINGHAM, Plaintiff. 
Respondent and Cross-Appellant, 
v. 
Franklin E. CUNNINGHAM and Lola 
M. Cunningham, Defendants, 
Appellants and Cross-Respondents. 
No. 19212. 
In the pre-trial order prepared by plain-
tiff's counsel, one of plaintiff's contentions 
was that provisions of the NESC and 
§ 58A-3-20 had been violated rendering 
Provo negligent. One of Provo's defenses 
enumerated in that pre-trial order was that 
it had complied with all applicable stan-
dards of the NESC and with the provisions 
of § 58A-3-20. Compliance and noncom-
pliance with NESC were again the subjects 
of requested jury instructions submitted by 
both plaintiff and Provo. Consequently, it 
appears to me that the trial court was 
readily aware of what Provo was referring 
to in its objection to Instruction No. 23. 
Provo made its objection during the stress 
and pressure of the trial and should not be 
held to the standard of a textbook model. 
The objection went to the whole of the 
instruction and not just to the third para-
graph. 
However, I do not believe that it was 
prejudicial error to fail to instruct the jury 
that compliance with the NESC was prima 
facie evidence that an installation was rea-
sonably safe. Since compliance does not 
create a substantive presumption, as the 
majority opinion correctly points out, the 
failure of the instruction to mention "prima 
facie" was harmless. The instruction in-
formed the jury that compliance was "evi-
dence which would support a finding" that 
the installations were reasonably safe. It 
would have added nothing to have instruct-
ed the jury that compliance was "prima 
facie evidence." Either way, the plaintiff 
was entitled to present evidence of noncom-
pliance to be weighed by the jury. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Sept. 19, 1984. 
Sister-in-law brought action against 
brother-in-law to void two deeds to proper-
ty given to brother-in-law. The Second Dis-
trict Court, Weber County, Calvin Gould, 
J., entered judgment that found that broth-
er-in-law was in confidential relationship 
with sister-in-law and had overreached, and 
voided deed to one property, but allowed 
brother-in-law to keep property in which he 
lived and awarded money judgment to sis-
ter-in-law. Brother-in-law appealed, and 
sister-in-law cross-appealed award of mon-
ey judgment instead of voiding the transac-
tion. The Supreme Court, Zimmerman, J., 
held that: (1) evidence supported finding 
one deed was void for nondelivery; (2) evi-
dence was sufficient to support findings 
that brother-in-law was in confidential rela-
tionship and was guilty of abuse of that 
relationship in other transaction; (3) void-
ing deed as to latter property was the 
correct remedy; and (4) trial court abused 
its discretion in fashioning an equitable 
remedy of money judgment rather than 
voiding of the second deed given its finding 
that brother-in-law had overreached. 
Affirmed in part, and reversed and re-
manded in part. 
1. Appeal and Error C=>179(1) 
Supreme Court could not reach issue 
as to whether property transaction violated 
statute of frauds where issue was first 
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raised bolow in posttrial memorandum and 
there was no indication that trii»l court 
reached or ruled on issue. 11.C. A. 11153, 25-
5-1 et seq. 
2. Deeds 0208(1) 
In action brought by sister-in-law 
against brother-in-law seeking to void a 
deed transferring property to brother-in-
law, evidence was sufficient to support 
finding that deed was void due to nondeliv-
ery. 
3. Reformation of Instruments c=>4 
Court does not have carte blanche to 
reform any transaction to include terms 
that it believes are fair; its discretion is 
narrowly bounded. 
4. Reformation of Instruments <*>16 
Reformation may be appropriate if 
both parties were mistaken as to a term of 
contract, or if one party is mistaken and 
other party is guilty of inequitable conduct, 
but it is not available to rewrite contract to 
include terms never contemplated by par-
ties. 
5. Deeds ®=>211(4) 
Voiding of deed to real property was 
required, rather than reformation of con-
tract for transaction, due to overreaching 
and a violation of trust and confidence re-
posed in grantee of deed by grantor, where 
there was no evidence that parties had 
agreed to sale for fair market value at time 
of transaction and evidence did not show 
mistake about any term of the sale. 
6. Deeds e=>196(3) 
When confidential relationship exists 
between the parties, and the transaction 
occurred that benefits one in whom confi-
dence is placed, presumption arises that 
transaction is unfair and shifts burden to 
benefiting party to persuade court that 
there was no fraud or undue influence ex-
ercised toward the other. 
7. Deeds c=>72(3) 
Transaction in which brother-in-law of 
grantor received deed to property for less 
than fair market value was a result of 
overreaching and violation of trust and con-
fidence reposed in brother-in-law by sister-
in-law and was properly remedied by void-
ing the deed, even though transaction was 
carried out in "somewhat good faith." 
8. Deeds G=»72<3) 
Mere fact that two individuals were 
brother-in-law and sister-in-law was not 
enough to prove that confidential relation-
ship existed between them. 
9. Deeds e=>72<3) 
Confidential relationship existed be-
tween brother-in-law and sister-in-law, thus 
warranting voiding of deed from sister-in-
law to brother-in-law for less than fair mar-
ket value, where sister-in-law actually re-
posed a great trust and confidence in broth-
er-in-law, was an alcoholic, and 64 years 
old. 
10. Cancellation of Instruments ©»57 
In action seeking to void deed on 
grounds of confidential relationships and 
exercise of undue influence by purchaser, 
trial court was not empowered to affirm 
sale of residence on modified terms, rather 
than voiding deed or enforcing original con-
tract, because laches was almost, but not 
quite, proven by purchaser, where vendor 
was otherwise entitled to have the transac-
tion voided. 
Pete N. Vlahos, Ogden, for defendants, 
appellants and cross-respondents. 
C. DeMont Judd, Jr., Ogden, for plaintiff, 
respondent and cross-appellant. 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: 
Defendants appeal from an order of the 
district court adjudicating interests of the 
parties in several parcels of real property 
located in Ogden, Utah. We affirm in part 
and reverse and remand in part. 
In 1975, the plaintiff, who was then 64 
years old, owned a savings account and two 
pieces of real property in Ogden—a home 
on 34th Street and a home on Polk Avenue. 
Although she was married, her husband 
was in very poor health and in a rest home. 
(He died in October of 1975.) Sometime 
prior to the fall of 1975, defendant Franklin 
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Cunningham, plaintiffs brother-in-law, and 
his wife, Lola Cunningham, expressed a 
desire to help the plaintiff with her affairs. 
They induced her to place her savings ac-
count in joint tenancy with Franklin. 
Franklin then withdrew $13,000 and placed 
it in his own account.1 Thereafter, defend-
ants caused the plaintiff to be hospitalized 
for chronic alcoholism. 
On September 9, 1075, immediately after 
plaintiff was released from the hospital, 
Franklin took plaintiff to a friend who was 
a realtor to effect a "sale" of the Polk 
Avenue property. The realtor prepared a 
warranty deed that purported to convey 
the property to defendants. The deed did 
not describe any terms of the "sale." And 
other than the deed, no writing was prepar-
ed to reflect the terms of the transaction. 
At the time plaintiff signed the deed, 
Franklin Cunningham orally informed her 
that he would pay her $1,000 immediately 
and $100 per month until her death. This 
is the only evidence that related to the 
terms of the transaction. 
A little over a year later, on November 
17, 1976, Franklin once again took plaintiff 
to the same realtor's office where she 
signed a deed conveying the 34th Street 
house to defendants. Plaintiff testified 
that she kept this deed in a drawer in her 
home and that she intended the title to vest 
in defendants at the time of her death. 
Defendant Franklin conceded that this was 
the understanding, but admitted that he 
took the deed and recorded it approximate-
ly three years later because he was con-
cerned that she might deed the property to 
someone else. 
Defendants have paid plaintiff $100 per 
month on the Polk Avenue property since 
1975 and, in addition, have expended some 
time and effort fixing up the property. 
Defendants have been living in the Polk 
Avenue dwelling. 
In 1982, plaintiff sued defendants claim-
ing no delivery on the 34th Street deed and 
undue influence .on the Polk Avenue deed 
('1!NMN<;IIAM Utah 531 
19 (Itah 1984) 
and seeking reconveyance of both proper-
ties to plaintiff or invalidation of both 
deeds. After a bench trial, the court is-
sued its memorandum decision. It found 
that the deed for the 31th Street property 
was void for nondelivery and ordered it 
vacated. With respect to the Polk Avenue 
property, the court found that plaintiff re-
posed great trust and confidence in Frank-
lin and a confidential relationship existed 
between plaintiff and defendant Franklin, 
that for this reason she did not question 
the transaction or seek independent advice, 
that there were no negotiations regarding 
purchase price or terms, only Franklin's 
statement of what he would pay plaintiff, 
and that he substituted his will for hers in 
the transaction. The court noted the gen-
eral rule that under such circumstances a 
presumption of undue influence arises and 
found it not to be rebutted; therefore, 
"this transaction must . . . fail." However, 
it also found that Franklin did not "fully 
appreciate that his actions were wrongful 
. . . and has made some improvements to 
the Polk property." The court stated that 
it was "unclear as to its authority" with 
respect to the proper remedy and asked for 
further briefs by the parties. 
After further briefing, the court filed a 
supplemental memorandum decision. The 
findings reflected in the earlier memoran-
dum wrere not disturbed. The court found 
that in 1975, the Polk Avenue property was 
worth approximately $42,000 and had a fair 
rental value of $300 per month. It also 
found that since 1975 defendants had paid 
plaintiff approximately $10,000 in the form 
of a down payment and monthly payments 
and that plaintiff had "sat on her rights for 
a period of time and accepted payments 
from defendants." The court stated that 
while plaintiff was not guilty of laches, 
these circumstances could be taken into 
account in fashioning a remedy. It con-
cluded that: 
the equitable resolution of this case 
would be to leave defendants in posses-
1. In 1982, after this suit was filed, the $13,000 not at issue in this appeal, 
was returned to plaintiff. This transaction is 
552 Utah cm PACIFIC m:p<)KTi:u. 2<i SKKIKS 
sion and award plaintiff a money judg-
ment for the approximate actual value 
[of the property] at the time of the deed 
and not credit payments made [by de-
fendants] because [the] payments did not 
exceed reasonable rental value. 
It summarized by stating the defendants 
were left in possession for three reasons: 
(i) plaintiff's delay in asserting her rights; 
(ii) defendants' having put much time and 
effort into improvement and upkeep of the 
property, "which cannot reasonably be ac-
counted for;" and (iii) defendants' "some-
what good faith" belief in the validity of 
the transaction. Judgment was entered 
vesting title in defendants and granting 
plaintiff a judgment in the amount of $42,-
000. 
[1] Both parties appealed, plaintiff 
seeking to void the Polk Avenue deed and 
defendants seeking to confirm the 34th 
Street deed and overturn the $42,000 judg-
ment. Plaintiff asserts that since the trial 
court found her not barred by laches, it 
should not have considered the post-trans-
action delay in fashioning a remedy and 
should have voided the Polk Avenue deed 
both as violative of the statute of frauds 
and because of defendants' undue influ-
ence. Defendants contend that the statute 
of frauds is avoided by part performance;2 
that the trial court's finding of undue influ-
ence is based on the finding of a confiden-
tial relationship which, in turn, is founded 
largely on the brother/sister-in-law rela-
tionship between Franklin and plaintiff, 
and that this is not sufficient to support 
the finding of a confidential relationship; 
and, finally, that the court's equity powers 
do not permit it to fashion a remedy with-
out reference to the terms of the underly-
ing transaction. 
[2] As to the 34th Street property, we 
reject defendants' contentions and find that 
the conclusion of the trial court that the 
deed is invalid for nondelivery is amply 
2. In their arguments to this Court, both par-
ties focus principally on whether our Statute 
of Frauds, U.C.A., 1953, § 25-5-1, ct seg., invali-
dates the sale of the Polk Avenue property. We 
do not reach the issue because the record indi-
supported by the record evidence. We 
therefore affirm the judgment voiding the 
84th Street deed. 
As for the Polk Avenue property, the 
judgment must be reversed. Rather than 
void the deed based on the finding of a 
confidential relationship and an unrebutted 
presumption of undue influence, as well as 
actual evidence of overreaching, the trial 
court appears to have attempted to use its 
equitable powers to recast the "sale" in 
terms that it thought would reflect an 
arm's-length transaction. Although we 
sympathize with the trial judge's effort to 
do equity, that effort must fail for several 
reasons. 
First, the final judgment of the court 
conflicts with its findings. In its initial 
memorandum decision, the court specifical-
ly found that the "sale" of the Polk Avenue 
property was the result of undue influence 
by defendants, and therefore, it must fail. 
These findings were not disturbed by the 
supplemental memorandum. Yet in the fi-
nal judgment, the sale was affirmed. 
[3-5] Second, we are aware of no au-
thority that can support the trial court's 
attempted exercise of its equitable powers 
under the circumstances of this case. A 
court does not have carte blanche to reform 
any transaction to include terms that it 
believes are fair. Its discretion is narrowly 
bounded. Reformation may be appropriate 
where both parties were mistaken as to a 
term of the contract, or where one party is 
mistaken and the other party is guilty of 
inequitable conduct, see Bourn v. Loveland, 
678 P.2d 292 (Utah 1984), but it is not 
available to rewrite a contract to Include 
terms never contemplated by the parties. 
Isaak v. Massachusetts Indemnity Life In-
surance Co., 127 Ariz. 581, 584, 623 P.2d 
11, 14 (1981). Here the record does not 
reflect that the parties agreed to a sale for 
fair market value at the time of the trans-
action, nor does it show that plaintiff was 
catcs plaintiff first raised this issue below in a 
post-trial memorandum. There is no indication 
that the trial court reached or ruled on the 
issue. Cf. In re Estate of FMer, 19 Utah 2d 414, 
432 P.2d 45(1967). 
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mistaken about any term of the sale; rath- the substantial 
or, it supports the trial court's initial find-
ing that defendant Franklin overreached 
and violated the trust and confidence re-
posed in him by plaintiff. Under Utah law, 
this required a voiding of the deed. 
[6,7] When a confidential relationship 
exists between parties, and a transaction 
occurs that benefits the one in whom confi-
dence is placed, a presumption arises that 
the transaction is unfair. E.g., Bradbury 
v. Rasmusscn, 16 Utah 2d 378, 383, 401 
P.2d 710, 713 (1965). This shifts to the 
benefiting party the burden to persuade 
the court that there was no fraud or undue 
influence exercised toward the other. In 
re Swan's Estate, 4 Utah 2d 277, 293, 293 
P.2d 682, 693 (1956). From the findings of 
the trial court, which are amply supported 
by the evidence, the burden was properly 
shifted to defendants, and they wholly 
failed to carry it. The fact that they were 
in "somewhat good faith" is not enough to 
free them from the consequences of their 
actions. The deed should have been void-
ed. Seequist v. Secquist, 524 P.2d 598 
(Utah 1974); Albright v. Medoff, 54 Or. 
App. 143, 634 P.2d 479 (1981). 
[8,9] Defendants are correct in arguing 
that the mere fact that plaintiff and de-
fendant Franklin were brother and sister-
in-law is not enough to prove that a confi-
dential relationship existed. See Nelson v. 
Nelson, 30 Utah 2d 80, 83, 513 P.2d 1011, 
1013 (1973); Bradbury v. Rasmussen, 16 
Utah 2d at 383, 401 P.2d at 713. However, 
the trial court did not rely on that fact 
alone; rather, it specifically found that 
plaintiff actually reposed great trust and 
confidence in Franklin, that because of this 
she did not question the terms of the trans-
action or seek outside advice, that there 
were no negotiations over the terms of the 
transaction, and that Franklin substituted 
his will for that of the alcoholic plaintiff. 
Plaintiff, then 64 years old, conveyed away 
a $42,000 piece of property with a rental 
value of $300 per month for $1,000 plus an 
expectation of $100 per month for the re-
mainder of her life. To realize the 1975 
fair market value of her property, plaintiff 
would have had to live an additional 34 
years, and this does not take into account 
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ulditional amount in inter-
est that would have been due had plain-
tiff's financing of defendants' "purchase" 
been at fair market interest rates. 
[10] A final problem with the trial 
court's ruling is that it specifically found 
that plaintiff's conduct did not amount to 
laches, but it refused to void the deed be-
cause the plaintiff "sat on her rights for a 
period of time and accepted payments from 
defendants." If the plaintiff was not 
guilty of laches, then that defense failed, 
and the trial court should not have af-
firmed the sale. If plaintiff was guilty of 
laches, or was estopped from denying the 
transaction, or if she somehow ratified the 
sale on defendants' original terms, the 
court should have enforced the original 
contract as dictated by Franklin. It was 
not free to affirm the sale on modified 
terms because laches was almost, but not 
quite, proven. 
In sum, on the record and findings we 
have before us, the judgment of the trial 
court as to the Polk Avenue property can-
not stand. We therefore reverse that por-
tion of the judgment and remand for entry 
of a judgment voiding the Polk Avenue 
deed. 
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, HOWE and 
DURHAM, JJ., concur. 
Wilbur H. BERRETT and Doris H. Ber-
rctt, husband and wife, Plaintiffs 
and Respondents, 
v. 
R. Michael STEVENS, Robert W. Den-
ning, and Jerrold S. Jensen, Trustee, 
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